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Bringing economic inequality into coupled economic-environmental models 
Coupled economic-environmental models are cross-disciplinary tools that explore how economic 
activity interacts with the environment and vice versa. This thesis focuses on models that estimate 
the economic consequences of climate change, different greenhouse gas emissions pathways, and 
mitigation efforts. Such models typically examine interactions with gross domestic product (GDP). 
Within-country inequality rarely features, despite evidence from other disciplines suggesting that 
climate change may cause significant distributional effects within countries.  
The thesis uses input-output analysis (IOA) to explore how climate change may affect within-country 
income inequality via two case studies. The first uses a prominent integrated assessment model 
(IAM), the Climate Framework for Uncertainty, Negotiation and Distribution (FUND), to estimate 
impacts for seven countries, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, the United States, Vietnam and Zambia, 
while the second uses a collection of impact studies for Alaska. Long-term predictions are not 
feasible for complex, nonlinear systems, so scenario analysis is instead used to explore which 
sectors, if any, may produce sizeable inequality effects, if results are consistent across countries, if 
any household groups appear particularly vulnerable, if inequality effects could negate the benefits 
of average income growth for certain households, and if there is evidence to suggest that poorer or 
more unequal countries may be more vulnerable to climate change inequality effects. A broad range 
of types and degrees of climate change costs and benefits are considered. The thesis also reflects on 
whether income inequality effects are likely to be of sufficient magnitude to merit the increased 
model complexity or future research focus. 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
This chapter provides a general background to the topic of the thesis, states the thesis’ goals, 
outlines its contributions, and explains how these fit together to deliver the stated objectives. 
Section 1.1 details the motivations underlying the thesis. Section 1.2 then introduces the subset of 
coupled economic-environmental models that are used for the case studies in this thesis, that is, 
those used to explore the economic consequences of climate change. The section then summarises 
the history of exploring the economic consequences of climate change, and highlights the within-
country income inequality research gap. Section 1.3 outlines the thesis’ contributions, including the 
six research questions that are the main focus of this work. Finally, Section 1.4 describes the 
individual contributions of the eight subsequent chapters, and explains how the different 
components of the thesis fit together to deliver the outlined contributions and objectives. 
1.1 Motivation 
People are dependent on their environment for food, water, leisure, shelter and production. Yet 
social and natural systems are often studied independently. One family of models, however, which 
this thesis calls ‘coupled economic-environmental models’, instead explore how economic activity 
interacts with the environment and vice versa. While such models can address a wide range of 
questions, this thesis uses those that estimate the economic consequences of climate change, as 
climate change is arguably the biggest challenge of our generation. The methodology developed, 
however, could be applied to models that focus elsewhere. 
Coupled economic-environmental models typically estimate impacts on gross domestic product 
(GDP)1 or production of a specific commodity, and can be global or focused on a specific region(s). 
Within a region, how effects fall on households existing at different times is also a frequent area of 
study. There is, however, very limited consideration of how different households in a country at a 
given point in time could be differently affected, which this thesis calls ‘within-country inequality’. 
Valuable insight may be lost by this approach. For example, if a household in a country enjoys 
increased income and another household in that country loses the same amount, most coupled 
economic-environmental models would net these together to conclude there is zero effect, which is 
obviously an incomplete picture. Similarly, as those on lower incomes generally own a small 
percentage of a country’s wealth, large percentage damages incurred by these households may 
 
1 Gross domestic product (GDP) is a measure of production defined to be the total value of all the goods and 




amount to only a small percentage impact on the nation’s wealth. The current, modest estimates2 of 
the impact of climate change on average incomes could thus be masking severe hardships incurred 
by some. 
Why does inequality matter3? Firstly, while the relationship between inequality and growth is 
currently unclear, they could plausibly interact. Beyond purely economic dynamics, inequality could 
also cause political instability, regulatory capture, increased crime and moral concerns. Behavioural 
studies moreover indicate that relative income is a key factor in wellbeing. Finally, the few studies 
that have explored how climate change may impact on economic inequality have suggested that 
climate change could cause the poor’s incomes to fall while average incomes still rise, so potentially 
severing the link between GDP growth and poverty reduction4. So perhaps ending poverty, reducing 
inequality, and taking action against climate change, three of the United Nation’s Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs)5, may be interlinked tasks. 
One can study inequality without being tied to a ‘theory of justice’. This thesis is not focused on the 
latter, but rather is interested in exploring how climate change damages might be distributed across 
different income groups, the mechanisms driving such effects, sources of vulnerability, and the 
consequent trade-offs that climate change and development could entail. 
1.2 Background 
1.2.1 Introduction to coupled economic-environmental models 
Coupled economic-environmental models are cross-disciplinary tools that are typically built to 
estimate how environmental change may affect the economy, for example, by exploring global 
warming or natural resource depletion. Simplifications and trade-offs are unavoidable when 
combining models of diverse and complex systems. The environmental and economic components 
of these models, thus, do not reflect the most up-to-date, detailed understanding of their respective 
subjects. They instead focus on exploring interactions between core processes, which leaves them 
 
2 Kompas et al. (2018), for example, estimates that a 3oC increase in global mean surface temperature (GMST) 
from pre-industrial times will result in a 3% fall in global GDP in 2100. 
3 The following motivations are explored in depth in Chapter 2. 
4 A person is said to be ‘poor’ if they are living in poverty, i.e.  if their family’s access to resources is below a 
given threshold. ‘Absolute poverty’ is a global metric that indicates an inability to meet basic needs, and is 
currently generally taken to mean a family income of less than USD 1.90 per day. ‘Relative poverty’ indicates 
an inability to meet the living conditions enjoyed by many people in one’s country, and the metric can be 
defined differently in different countries. In the United Kingdom, for example, the threshold is taken to be 
earning less than 60 percent of the median family income. 
5 In 2015, the United Nations General Assembly set 17 global development goals, called the Sustainable 




open to criticism from specialists in both fields who have concerns about the simplification (Rotmans 
and Van Asselt, 1996). 
This thesis focuses on models that explore the economic consequences of climate change, different 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions pathways, and mitigation efforts. These economic-environmental 
models can broadly be split into two groups. The first contains single-issue studies that are generally 
microeconomic, where the analysis focuses on one sector of the economy, such as agriculture. For 
brevity, such research will be called ‘impact studies’ in this thesis. 
The second group draws upon many impact studies to ask broader macroeconomic questions, such 
as ‘how might unabated climate change impact on future GDP’? A prominent subset of models 
within this group, called Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) generate plausible and consistent 
scenarios of future population, economic growth and emissions, with some then using cost-benefit 
analysis (CBA) to, for example, compare different GHG abatement strategies, or to determine the 
optimal strategy. Well known IAMs include the Dynamic Integrated Climate-Economy model (DICE) 
(Nordhaus, 2017) and the Integrated Model to Assess the Global Environment (IMAGE) (van Vuuren 
et al., 2011). 
1.2.2 History of exploring the economic consequences of climate change  
Scientists started exploring the impact of GHGs on the Earth’s climate in the latter half of the 19th 
century; for example, see Tyndall (1865) and Arrhenius and Holden (1897). It wasn’t until the 1960s, 
however, that the field gained widespread attention with the publication of Pales and Keeling (1965) 
and Brown and Keeling (1965). These papers introduced the Keeling Curve, which showed that 
atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2) concentration had increased since 1957, and so raised the spectre 
of anthropogenic global warming. It took more time, however, before economists began modelling 
the economic consequences of climate change, with the topic not being meaningfully explored until 
the 1970s; for example, see Nordhaus (1977). 
In the early days, impact studies were only available for agriculture, energy consumption and sea-
level rise (SLR) in the United States (US). There were no studies focused on other regions, so 
researchers extrapolated from American impact assessments to get estimates for other countries. 
Early mitigation cost analysis similarly focused on the US; for example, Manne et al. (1990) and 
Jorgenson (1991). 
This American focus can partly be attributed to the US Congress’ 1986 decision to ask the US 
Environmental Protection Agency for a report investigating ‘The Potential Effects of Global Climate 
Change on the United States’ (Smith and Turpak, 1988). It was the first national legislature to take 
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this step, and it produced over fifty academic papers. Data from the resulting study was widely used 
by subsequent researchers; for example, Nordhaus (1991), Cline (1993) and Fankhauser (1995).  
Impact studies for other countries emerged relatively quickly for agriculture and SLR; for example 
Tobey et al. (1992) and Rijsberman (1991) respectively. Sectors such as forestry, energy, water and 
health, however, were overlooked for longer. Even in 2000, William Nordhaus, the creator of DICE, 
reflected that “only agriculture and sea-level change have made significant progress in estimating 
climate change impacts on a detailed regional level” (Nordhaus and Boyer, 2000). Nearly all studies, 
moreover, focused on wealthy or very populous countries, such as Canada or China. There was next 
to no consideration of smaller or lower-income countries (Nordhaus and Boyer, 2000). 
Nowadays, global coverage is still sporadic and skewed towards wealthier countries, although some 
studies for lower-income countries do exist, such as Arndt et al. (2011), Arndt et al. (2012) and 
Chinowsky et al. (2015) for Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia respectively. 
Similarly, while damages to agriculture and SLR have received more attention than other sectors, 
studies on forestry, fisheries, energy and infrastructure are now more commonplace; for example, 
Boccanfuso et al. (2018), Seung and Ianelli (2016), Huang and Gurney (2016) and Melvin et al. (2017) 
respectively. 
Most impact studies and IAMs estimate the interaction between climate, abatement and mitigation 
efforts, and GDP. Where impacts on different household groups are considered, the focus is typically 
on the impact of climate change, abatement or mitigation on inter-generational inequality6 or inter-
regional inequality7. Intra-regional, particularly within-country inequality rarely features, despite 
evidence from other disciplines suggesting that climate change may cause significant distributional 
effects within countries.  
1.3 Research contributions 
A methodology is put forward that extends coupled economic-environmental models so that, in 
addition to estimating impacts on GDP or production, they can also estimate impacts on within-
country income inequality8. While this thesis pilots the methodology with models exploring the 
economic effects of climate change; it could be applied to models exploring other issues.  
 
6 ‘Inter-generational inequality’ refers to how households existing at different points in time could be 
differently affected. 
7 ‘Inter-regional inequality’ refers to how households in different regions at a given point in time could be 
differently affected. 
8 As detailed in Chapter 5, inequality ratios, such as Q5/Q1, where Q1 and Q5 are the incomes of the poorest 
and wealthiest income quintiles respectively, are the chosen measures of income inequality. 
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Two case studies are then implemented, one for each of the two identified types of coupled 
economic-environmental models: impact studies and IAMs. The impact studies case study is for 
Alaska, and is the first multi-sector study of the economic impact of climate change on an Arctic 
region. The IAM case study uses the prominent IAM the Climate Framework for Uncertainty, 
Negotiation and Distribution (FUND) (Anthoff and Tol, 2014). These two case studies demonstrate 
how the proposed methodology is applied, and are also used to address six research questions: 
1. Climate change induced changes to which sectors seem likely to have the greatest effect on 
within-country income inequality?  
2. Do impacts to certain sectors consistently increase within-country income inequality across 
different economies? Or do impacts in some countries reduce inequality and in other 
countries increase inequality? 
3. Do certain household groups seem particularly vulnerable across economies?  
4. Is there evidence to support the conclusion in Rozenberg and Hallegatte (2015) that starting 
levels of average income and within-country income inequality may affect the extent that 
climate change impacts on inequality? 
5. Are within-country income inequality effects relatively small in many or all scenarios 
compared to projected growth in average incomes? Alternatively, is it possible, as suggested 
by Dennig et al. (2015) and Rozenberg and Hallegatte (2015), that increased inequality from 
climate change might cancel out improvements in overall standards of living from GDP 
growth for low-income households? 
6. Is it only in the most extreme climate damage scenarios and time frames that relatively 
sizable within-country income inequality effects emerge? Or are they plausible in shorter-
term, moderate scenarios? 
The conclusions drawn from these research questions, along with an analysis of the limitations of 
the methodology, are then used to consider if the impact of climate change on within-country 
income inequality is a fruitful area for further research, including whether income inequality effects 
are too small to merit the trade-off of increased model complexity. 
This thesis does not provide definitive answers to the six aforementioned research questions – an 
implausible goal given the long time-horizon and complex nonlinear nature of climate and economic 
systems. The aim was instead to start exploring the impact of climate change on within-country 
income inequality, an area that had hitherto generally been neglected, put forward a methodology 
to facilitate study, better understand why this question is typically overlooked, and suggest whether 
the topic should be studied in greater depth, or if instead researchers’ time would be better spent 
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elsewhere. The thesis does not, however, investigate how abatement or mitigation may affect 
income inequality, as many economists already explore the latter9. 
Useful by-products also emerged from this thesis.  Firstly, an existing map, called a Social Accounting 
Matrix (SAM)10, of monetary flows between different sectors11 and institutions12 in an economy, in 
this case Alaska, had to be adapted so that income inequality effects could be modelled. Other 
researchers could use this bespoke SAM to explore a wide-range of questions around income 
inequality in Alaska, such as what types of government investment may most efficiently reduce 
inequality or benefit the poor. 
Similarly, so that a high income country could feature as one of the countries in the IAM case 
study13, a SAM specifically set-up to model income inequality effects was constructed from scratch 
for the US, and will be made available for other researchers to use. Furthermore, a US SAM time-
series was generated to empirically test the assumptions underpinning input-output analysis (IOA), 
the methodology chosen to estimate income inequality effects, and so explore the extent that useful 
lessons for the future can be drawn from IOA of recent SAMs. This is also a methodological 
contribution to IOA, as previous work in this area looked only at input-output tables (IOTs)14, which 
map a much smaller subset of the network structure of an economy.  
Finally, as the US SAMs were constructed from scratch and precise data sources and uses were 
known, an alternatively disaggregated SAM for 2016 was also produced and used to test the 
conjecture in Pieters (2010) that disaggregated industry-by-industry labour accounts15, not just 
labour accounts disaggregated by, say, educational level, are required to observe differing inequality 
effects from growth in different sectors. This thesis was, thus, able to make a further methodological 
contribution to IOA, in terms of the information and model set-up required to enable effective 
exploration of inequality questions. 
 
9 As detailed in Chapter 2. 
10 Social accounting matrices (SAMs) are explained in depth in Chapter 4. 
11 ‘Sectors’ refers to commodities, such as food, wood products and banking services, and economic activities, 
for example, manufacturing and retail trade. 
12 ‘Institutions’ means households, enterprises, government and the rest of the world (ROW). 
13 As seen in Chapter 2, existing studies suggest that initial inequality and average income may affect how 
vulnerable a country is to climate change induced income inequality. It was thus important that the IAM case 
study used a sample of economies with a wide range of starting inequalities and overall levels of development. 
14 Very few SAM time series currently exist, as compiling SAMs is highly time and data-intensive, whereas IOT 
time-series are common.  
15 ‘Labour’ is a ‘factor of production’, i.e. an input required to produce goods and services that is not itself 
significantly used-up in production. 
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1.4 Thesis structure 
The thesis has nine chapters, including this introductory chapter.  
Chapter 2 surveys the existing literature exploring the economic consequences of climate change, 
and identifies and illustrates the within-country income inequality research gap. A history of 
economists’ evolving attitudes towards income inequality as an economic question is also compiled 
to help understand why this research area has hitherto often been neglected. This is then 
considered to establish motivations for filling the research gap. Finally, the preceding analysis is used 
to develop the six research questions. 
Chapter 3 explains the main methodological and subject choices made in this thesis. It starts by 
introducing coupled economic-environmental models in greater detail and outlines their 
shortcomings. A discussion of complex systems and decision making under uncertainty forms part of 
this analysis. In light of this, scenario analysis is then chosen to explore uncertainty, and the 
scenarios developed for the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which are used in 
this thesis, are detailed. Alternative modelling procedures for extending coupled economic-
environmental models so that they can estimate impacts on within-country income inequality are 
subsequently presented and contrasted, with the pros and cons of each approach stated and 
explained. Reflecting on this, the shortcomings of coupled economic-environmental models, and the 
research questions established in Chapter 2, IOA is identified as the most appropriate modelling 
approach. In addition, different common ways of measuring inequality are presented, and it is 
argued that inequality ratios are the most appropriate measure for this thesis. The research 
questions from Chapter 2 are then used to choose the IAM that will feature in the IAM case study, 
the seven countries16 to be explored within this case study, and the region, Alaska, that forms the 
focus of the impact studies case study. Finally, SAMs for these countries and regions are located. 
Suitable SAMs could not be found for Alaska or the United States, so an existing SAM was adapted 
for the former, while a SAM time-series was constructed from scratch for the latter. Chapter 4 
documents these processes. 
Chapter 5 introduces IOA, the different forms it takes, and the assumptions it is built upon. The 
coupling methodology used to incorporate IOA and SAMs into coupled economic-environmental 
models is then outlined, including the choice of inequality measure. This methodology enables the 
impact of climate change on within-country income inequality to be explored. Finally, using the 
time-series of US SAMs constructed in Chapter 4, along with two existing SAM time series, IOA’s 
 
16 The seven countries are Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, the United States, Vietnam and Zambia. 
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underlying assumptions are empirically tested, with a reflection on this analysis used to consider the 
extent that useful lessons for the future can be drawn from an IOA of recent SAMs.  
Chapter 6 presents the IAM case study. The model and scenarios are described, as is how regional 
results were disaggregated to enable sector-level impact estimates for the seven countries featuring 
in the case study. Using the coupling methodology derived in Chapter 5, within-country income 
inequality impact estimates for each country are generated across a range of scenarios. 
Chapter 7 presents the impact studies case study. The underlying impact studies and scenarios are 
outlined, and then used with Chapter 5’s coupling methodology to estimate within-country income 
inequality impacts. 
Chapter 8 uses the results from the two case studies to address the research questions outlined in 
Chapter 2. In addition, the sensitivity of results to uncertainty around future economic structure is 
explored by comparing results generated using different SAMs from the US SAM time-series. Finally, 
the chapter compares results from the alternatively disaggregated 2016 US SAMs to see if they 
support the conclusion in Pieters (2010) that disaggregated industry-by-industry labour accounts are 
required to study differing inequality effects from growth in different sectors. 
Chapter 9 summarises this thesis’ findings, suggests policy implications, outlines the limitations of 
the methodology, and draws upon the analysis in Chapter 8 to consider if the impact of climate 
change on within-country income inequality is a fruitful area for further research, including whether 
income inequality effects are too small to merit the trade-off of increased model complexity. Finally, 
areas for future study are suggested. 
Figure 1.1 illustrates how the different components of the thesis fit together to deliver the 
objectives and research contributions outlined in this chapter. 
1.5 Summary 
Coupled economic-environmental models typically estimate impacts on gross domestic product 
(GDP)17 or production of a specific commodity, and can be global or focused on a specific region(s). 
Within a region, how effects fall on households existing at different times is also a frequent area of 
study. There is, however, very limited consideration of how different households in a country at a 
given point in time could be differently affected, which this thesis calls ‘within-country inequality’. 
 
17 Gross domestic product (GDP) is a measure of production defined to be the total value of all the goods and 




This is despite evidence from other disciplines suggesting that climate change may cause significant 
distributional effects within countries. 
Figure 1.1 – Process flow chart 
 
Notes: Diagram illustrates how the different components of the thesis fit together to deliver the objectives and research contributions 
outlined in Chapter 1. Ovals are start and end points. Rectangles are steps in the process. Red represents a literature review or analysis of 
a literature review. Yellow represents a methodological choice. Grey represents a useful by-product. Green represents a methodological 
contribution. Purple represents data generation and analysis. Blue represents a contribution to knowledge. 
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The thesis explores how climate change damages might be distributed across different income 
groups, the mechanisms driving such effects, sources of vulnerability, and the consequent trade-offs 
that climate change and development could entail. It does not aim to definitively answer all 
questions surrounding climate change and inequality, or even the research questions that formed 
the focus of this thesis, but it will begin exploration into this complex subject. 
Specifically, it puts forward and pilots a methodology that extends coupled economic-environmental 
models so that, in addition to estimating impacts on GDP or production, they can also estimate 
impacts on within-country income inequality. The results from two case studies are then used to 
address six research questions, and to consider if the impact of climate change on within-country 
income inequality is a fruitful area for further research. Useful by-products were also produced, 
including a SAM time-series for the US, and a SAM for Alaska that was adapted to enable exploration 
of inequality questions. 
In addition to introducing the thesis’ goals and contributions, this chapter also provided background 
for the thesis. For example, by explaining the two main types of coupled economic-environmental 
models used in this thesis, impacts studies and IAMs, and briefly summarising the history of 
exploring the economic consequences of climate change. 
Finally, this chapter explained each subsequent chapter’s contributions, and how these all fit 














Chapter 2 – Research gap 
This chapter outlines the research gap addressed in this thesis, why it is important that it is filled, 
and the specific contribution this thesis makes. Section 2.1 of this chapter surveys the existing 
literature exploring climate change and economic inequality, and notes the lack of research 
exploring the impact of climate change on within-country income inequality, despite evidence from 
other disciplines suggesting that different income groups may be differently affected. To help 
understand why this area has hitherto been generally neglected, a history of economists’ evolving 
attitudes towards inequality as an economic question is then presented in Section 2.2. The preceding 
analysis is then used in Section 2.3 to establish motivations for filling the research gap, and in 
Section 2.4 to select the research questions explored in this thesis. 
2.1 Climate change and inequality 
People can be unequal in many different ways. There can be inequality in skills, income, wealth, 
opportunities, health, and access to rights, education, and healthcare, to name just a few variables. 
This thesis is focused on income inequality, specifically distribution across households, not how 
national income is split between land, labour and capital. 
Inequalities between different groupings of households have been considered to varying degrees 
within the literature exploring the economic consequences of climate change, mitigation and 
emissions abatement. Let us briefly survey the existing work. 
2.1.1 Existing studies 
2.1.1.1 Inter-generational inequality 
Inter-generational inequality has received the most attention, primarily due to it being a key feature 
of cost-benefit analysis (CBA). CBA involves estimating all future costs and benefits, and netting 
them off against each other to determine total costs or benefits. If the total gains from a project are 
estimated to exceed the total costs, then the project is deemed an improvement on the status quo. 
CBA thus requires comparing cash flows that occur at different period of time. This is no easy task, 
due to the time value of money and human bias to value the present more than the future. 
A technique called ‘discounting’ has been developed, so that all cash flows can be valued as it they 
occur today. The present value of a future cash flow is defined to be the future value of that cash 
flow multiplied by a discount factor, 𝐹, where 𝐹 = (1 + 𝑅) , and 𝑡 and 𝑅 are the years from 
present day and the annual discount rate respectively. The higher the discount rate, the less weight 
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is placed on future events. 
In the integrated assessment literature, the discount factor is typically determined by the Ramsey 
model (Ramsey, 1928), where 𝑅 = 𝜌 + η𝑔. 𝜌 is the pure time preference, i.e. the extent that people 
care less about the future, η is the consumption elasticity18 of marginal utility of consumption, i.e. 
the sensitivity of well-being received from an additional unit of consumption to changes in the 
current level of consumption, and 𝑔 is the per capita consumption growth rate. The second 
component of the discount factor, η𝑔, accounts for future generations being wealthier than the 
current one, and so being better placed to absorb damages. This means that future impacts count 
for less when calculating net present values. 
A literature review covering research on discounting and intergenerational inequality is presented in 
Chapter 3, as that chapter also explores the thorny debate surrounding the ‘correct’ discount rate 
and the extent that the choice of discount rate affects modelling results. At this point, let’s simply 
note that this is one of the most controversial and unresolved areas of integrated assessment, and a 
large literature exploring different weightings of the various generations exists, for example Gollier 
(2013) and Nordhaus (2017). The degree that future generations may be impacted compared to 
their present counterparts has thus received extensive attention. As part of this, there has also been 
extensive philosophical debate around the justice of the generations who did not cause global 
warming being the ones to suffer the impacts; for example, see White (2017).  
2.1.1.2 Inter-regional inequality 
Even the very early economics of climate change literature recognised that lower-income countries 
could be more at risk from climate change due to their reliance on agriculture (Fankhauser, 1995). 
Thus, while the initial models estimating the economic consequence of climate change were global, 
for example Nordhaus (1991), researchers soon recognised the need to explore the regional, 
distribution of climate change impacts. These regional estimates corroborated the hypothesis that 
climate change damages may not be equally distributed across the world. Table 2.1, for example, 
shows regional damage estimates made using the Regional Integrated model of Climate and the 
Economy (RICE) (Nordhaus and Boyer, 2000). As a further example, Mendelsohn et al. (2006) 
explored climate change damages between countries using six scenarios, and finds that the global 
poor are likely to shoulder “the bulk” of climate change damages, as they live in countries that are 
already very warm, have large agricultural sectors, and may struggle to adapt. 
 
18 Elasticity is a measure of sensitivity, specifically the ratio of percentage changes. 
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Table 2.1 - Regional damage estimates generated by RICE 
Country or region Damages from 2.5 degrees warming (% of GDP) 
India 4.93 
Africa 3.91 
OECD Europe 2.83 
Low income countries 2.64 
Middle income countries 2.44 
High income OPEC countries 1.95 
Global (population weighted) 1.88 
Lower middle income countries 1.81 
Global output weighted 1.5 




Other high income countries -0.39 
Russia -0.65 
 
Notes: Table shows regional damage estimates, as percentages of gross domestic product (GDP), from a 2.5 degrees warming since 
preindustrial times for different countries and groups of countries. Note than negative damages are benefits. For example, Russia enjoys 
benefits from warming because its current climate is cooler than the estimated optimal temperature in the region for agriculture and 
many other affected market sectors, such as forestry, water systems and construction. Russian outdoor leisure time is also expected to 
increase in a warmer climate, and the monetary value of these nonmarket activities is estimated and counted as additional GDP. All these 
benefits collectively outweigh expected climate change damages in Russia from, for example, sea-level rise.  Damages estimates were 
generated using RICE, a different IAM to that used for the case study in Chapter 6, and were taken from Nordhaus and Boyer (2000). 
As will be described in Chapter 3, Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) rely on willingness to pay 
(WTP) and willingness to accept compensation (WTA) methods to value climate change impacts. 
These valuation procedures, however, will generate different answers depending on the levels of 
income in the given area. For example, survey participants from richer countries will place a higher 
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monetary value on their environment than their counterparts in lower-income countries 
(Fankhauser et al., 1997). Market-based valuation methods will also produce higher values for 
wealthier countries. This all leads to impacts on wealthier countries counting for more than impacts 
on poorer countries. Some early studies, for example, valued deaths in high-income countries 11.5 
times higher than deaths in low-income countries (Risbey et al., 1996). 
In the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC)19 early reports, no adjustment was made 
to address these valuation problems (Fankhauser et al., 1997). Later studies viewed this as unjust, 
and introduced ‘equity weights’ that gave greater emphasis to losses or gains incurred by poorer 
regions, partly to compensate for these valuation inequalities, and partly for broader ethical reasons, 
such as people in lower-income countries being less able to absorb climate change damages than 
their wealthier counterparts. 
CBA economists have been debating the need for equity weights for decades; for example, see Little 
and Mirrlees (1968). In particular, equity weights introduce an explicitly normative element to the 
economic analysis, which many economists reject, as they view value-laden analysis as lying outside 
the economic discipline. Some researchers also argue that climate change and inequality are 
separate problems, and should be analysed and solved as such (Fankhauser et al., 1997).  
To calculate costs and benefits, the concepts ‘utility’ and ‘social welfare function’ (SWF) are often 
introduced, where utility is a measure of the overall wellbeing of an individual, and a SWF is an 
aggregation of individual utilities into a social utility that can be used to compare the desirability of 
different policy options. In the multi-regional RICE, for example, there is a single representative 
household for each region, so each region has its own utility function and its own SWF, which is the 
discounted sum of its utility over time. 
Utility is difficult to precisely define, let alone measure, so economists frequently take money to be 
the measuring rod. In IAMs, utility typically depends on consumption, 𝑐, and it is assumed that utility 
increases with additional units, but with diminishing marginal utility. In other words, each additional 
unit of 𝑐 provides less utility, 𝑈(𝑐), than the previous unit, but the utility gained is always positive. 
Mathematically, ( ) > 0 and ( ) < 0.This is equivalent to a concave utility curve, i.e. individuals 
would prefer to be guaranteed a smaller quantity of utility, than to take a gamble and possibly gain 
more utility but risk having none. The more one values increases in consumption at lower 
 
19 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was established by the United Nations in 1988 to 
compile literature reviews, called ‘Assessment Reports’, for governments, policy makers and United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). These reports summarise scientific, technical and 
socioeconomic expertise around anthropogenic climate change and its potential impacts on people, social 
systems and the natural world. 
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consumptions levels in comparison to increases in consumption at higher consumptions levels, the 
more concerned one is about not being at the bottom of the consumption distribution. The 
concavity of a utility function is thus taken to be an aversion to inequality or a measure of risk 
aversion, and the more concave a utility function, the greater the risk or inequality aversion. To get a 
dimensionless measure, one can look at the negative consumption elasticity of marginal utility of 
consumption, η = −𝑐 ( ) ( ). η is a positive constant typically called the coefficient of 
inequality aversion or relative risk aversion, and estimates of it vary widely from less than 1 to over 
10 (Kaplow, 2005), which illustrates how difficult it is to confidently quantify and measure an 
aversion.  
Economists thus don’t agree on how households approach risk (Thomas, 2016). A utility function 
with constant relative risk aversion (CRRA), however, has many useful modelling properties, 
including that consumption will grow at a constant rate in long-run equilibrium. An isoelastic20 utility 
curve is required for CRRA, i.e. for households to invest the same proportion of their wealth in risky 
assets regardless of their current level of wealth. Only power series utility functions are isoelastic; 




                                                                            (2.1) 
where η is constant. Shifting utility by a constant preserves the utility ordering. As IAMs generally 
assume η → 1, this means that 𝑈(𝑐) = ln (𝑐), because 
 lim
→
 𝑈(𝑐, η) − = lim
→
 (𝑒( ) ( ) − 1) (1 − η) = ln (𝑐). 
RICE, for example, assumes η → 1 and so uses the logarithm of consumption for all regions’ utility 
functions (Nordhaus and Boyer, 2000). This means that consumption damages hitting poorer regions 
will count for more than the same consumption damages hitting wealthier regions. Policy Analysis of 
the Greenhouse Effect (PAGE) (Hope and Newbery, 2006) and the Climate Framework for 
Uncertainty, Negotiation and Distribution (FUND) (Anthoff and Tol, 2014a) do not explicitly invoke 
utility and instead measure impacts directly in terms of changes to gross domestic product (GDP), 
but implicitly this fulfils the role of a SWF, as the analysis assesses the relative desirability of policies. 
Furthermore, PAGE equity-weights damages by the factor ,
,
, where 𝐺𝐷𝑃 ,  is the initial GDP 
per capita in a chosen focus region, 𝑓, and 𝐺𝐷𝑃 ,  is the GDP per capita in region 𝑟 at time 𝑡. This 
 




normalised weighting factor is derived21 from (2.1). FUND similarly weights each regional ‘social cost 
of carbon’22 (SCC) by ,
,
, when calculating the global SCC. 
As will be shown in Chapter 3, the choice of equity weights can have a large impact on results. 
Moreover, as the coefficient of relative risk aversion features in both the utility function and the 
discount rate via 𝑅 = 𝜌 + η𝑔, it can increase or decrease SCC estimates depending on whether the 
discounting effect or equity-weighted utility effect dominates23. Chapter 3 explores how this can 
differ as η varies. 
The effects of climate change on inter-regional inequality are thus regularly explored using multi-
regional Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs), and the impact of introducing equity weights into 
utility functions has also received significant attention. 
In addition, the considerable literature on inter-regional damage inequality has fed into a related 
debate surrounding inequality of blame and injury between different countries. Wealthier countries 
are responsible for the vast majority of greenhouse gas emissions. Roberts (2001), for example, 
observes that “Twenty percent of the world’s population is responsible for 63% of the emissions, 
while the bottom 20 % of the world’s people are only releasing 3%”. The regions that have 
contributed least towards global warming, however, may suffer the greatest damages; for example, 
see Sinivasan (2010). Such countries may also be poorly equipped to absorb damages (IPCC, 2007). 
This has sparked discussion around how carbon emission rights should be distributed across 
countries, for example, Alcaraz et al., (2018), and whether wealthier countries should pay 
compensation to lower-income countries, for example, Tol and Verheyen (2004). 
Thus, via exploring equity weighting, how damages may fall differently on different regions, and 
theories of justice surrounding the latter, the academic community has put considerable effort into 
exploring interactions between global warming and inter-regional inequality; although some of 
these problems, such as what are the ‘correct’ equity weights, are highly contentious. Note that the 
aforementioned coefficient of inequality aversion is only used when aggregating different utilities, 
for example, in CBA. As explained in Chapter 3, this project does not use CBA, and so inequality 
aversion does not feature in this thesis. In addition, as explored in the preceding paragraphs and in 
Chapter 3, the effect of different equity weighting, including different values of η, has already been 
 
21 See Anthoff et al., (2009) for the derivation. 
22 The social cost of carbon (SCC) is the discounted economic impact of emitting an additional tonne of carbon 
today.  
23 Although one could argue that aversion to inter-regional inequality and aversion to inter-generational 
inequality are not necessarily equivalent. 
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extensively explored in the literature. 
2.1.1.3 Intra-regional inequality 
While inter-generational and inter-regional inequalities have both received much attention, intra-
regional inequality, particularly within-country inequality, has been relatively neglected, with multi-
regional IAMs, for example, using a representative household for each region. 
There are a few, relatively recent exceptions. Anthoff et al. (2009), for example, takes the 
distribution of average consumption between nations within each region into account in the FUND 
welfare function. The paper assumes that climate damages fall equally on all individuals, and 
considers three scenarios for how the consumption distribution may change over time. The first 
assumes that inequality remains constant, the second that inequality decreases linearly until 2300, 
when all incomes are equal, and the third that inequality increases at a linear rate until all regions at 
2300 are as unequal as the most unequal region in 2000. In the constant inequality scenario, 
introducing intraregional equity weights into the welfare function is found to increase marginal 
damages in the IPCC’s SRES A1B scenario by 27 – 33%, depending on the pure time preference used. 
With a 1% pure rate of time preference, the increasing inequality scenario is found to increase 
marginal damages by a further 55%. The decreasing inequality scenario, in contrast, is found to 
decrease marginal damages by 19%. 
Dennig et al. (2015), meanwhile, considers the income distribution within each region in RICE, and 
experiments with varying the degree of damages hitting the different income groups. If damages are 
skewed towards the poor, consumption for those on lower incomes is found to possibly fall as time 
goes on. It is a widespread conclusion in development policy papers that GDP growth is a key tool to 
lift people out of poverty, for example Dollar et al. (2016). Dennig et al. (2015) thus raises the 
possibility that climate change could break this relationship. Dennig et al., (2015) find that the poor’s 
consumption growth in Africa, China and Europe are particularly vulnerable. 
Dennig et al. (2015) also observes that if damages are sufficiently skewed towards the poor, then 
optimal mitigation strategies will change, requiring greater mitigation. Using Nordhaus’ usual 
discount rate, unequal damages could even produce a SCC similar to that found by the Stern 
Review24. As discussed in Chapter 3, the results generated by Nordhaus and Stern greatly differ due 
to opposing views on discounting. This leads Dennig et al. (2015) to conclude that “properly 
accounting for the distribution of consumption and damage within regions may be as important for 
 
24 The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change (Stern, 2007) was a report prepared for the United 
Kingdom (UK) government by economist Nicholas Stern.  
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climate policy as the debate over discounting.” When damages are proportional to income, 
however, Dennig et al. (2015) finds that introducing inequality does not change the optimal strategy.  
Finally, Dennig et al. (2015) explores what level of flat tax followed by intra-regional transfers on 
post-damages incomes would reverse the aforementioned change in optimal strategy. Assuming 
that taxation does not impact on GDP, a 65% consumption tax would be required. 
Anthoff and Emmerling (2016) model inequality between nations within RICE-2010 and FUND 3.9 
regions by assuming that within-region consumption is log-normally distributed across countries in 
that region. If climate change damages are skewed towards higher incomes, incorporating inter-
regional inequality increases the SCC by 167% and 156% in FUND and RICE respectively. Then 
incorporating intra-regional inequality between nations is actually found to reduce the SCC by 12.5% 
and 3.7% respectively. This is because the welfare functions with equity weights place greater 
emphasis on those with lower incomes. If damages were skewed towards those on lower incomes, 
the SCCs would rise. Anthoff and Emmerling (2016) concludes that intra-regional inequality is a 
‘second-order effect’, with inter-regional inequality having a much larger impact on the SCC. 
Some non-IAM impact studies have also explored the relationship between climate change and 
intra-regional economic inequality. Jacoby et al. (2015), for example, uses a general equilibrium 
model and finds that the effects of a climate-induced food price shock in India would not affect the 
income distribution if rural wages are adjusted upwards accordingly. Without rural wage changes, 
however, a food price increase is regressive. Hertel et al. (2010) similarly uses a general equilibrium 
global trade model to explore climate-induced agricultural productivity shocks in 15 countries in 
Africa, Asia and Latin America. The study estimates that poverty amongst non-agricultural workers 
could increase by 50% by 2030 in areas of Africa and Asia. Conversely, poverty rates could fall by 
50% amongst agricultural workers in Asia and Latin America. The paper concludes that changes in 
climate could have “large distributional effects”, and so warns against solely relying on aggregate 
damage estimates. Meanwhile, Havlík et al. (2015) uses a partial equilibrium model, and estimates 
that by 2030 the effect of global warming on food consumption in a highly unequal world could be 
double that in a relatively equal one. 
Finally, Rozenberg and Hallegatte (2015) uses sector-level damage studies for agriculture, health and 
natural disasters, and a scenario analysis approach, to explore the possible impact of climate change 
on poverty in 92 lower-income countries by 2030. Effects are found even in this short time-frame, 
with the degree of damage varying according to starting levels of average income, inequality, and 
green policies. As many as 100 million people could be pushed into poverty, and incomes of the 
bottom 40% could fall by more than 4% in most countries. The bottom 40% in some countries could 
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have their incomes fall by more than 8%. These results are particularly worrying given that the study 
only considers up to 2030. There is thus a danger that large inequality effects could emerge on even 
a relatively small time-scale.  
In addition, Rozenberg and Hallegatte (2015) finds that with higher starting average incomes and low 
inequality in lower-income countries, nearly all impacts of climate change on poverty can be 
eliminated. Impacts on poverty could be 8-12 times higher with lower starting levels of GDP and high 
inequality. Agriculture and health are the sectors that appear most likely to translate climate 
damages into poverty. 
The few papers exploring the effects of climate change on intra-regional inequality, thus, suggest 
that these effects could significantly impact on damage estimates, the SCC, and mitigation strategies. 
Most of the IAM studies, however, explore hypothetical income distributions and damage incidences 
across income groups, and the non-IAM studies typically focus on agriculture. Rozenberg and 
Hallegatte (2015) was the first multi-sector study to estimate, rather than assume, inequality effects. 
However, only three sectors, agriculture, health and natural disasters, were considered in this paper, 
and no higher-income countries feature. 
2.1.2 Possible links between climate change and intra-regional inequality 
While studies exploring the economic consequences of climate change generally do not consider 
intra-regional economic inequality, particularly within-country inequality, there is ample evidence to 
suggest that climate change may affect different people within a region differently. Such studies 
generally address two themes: ‘exposure’, the extent that people are likely to be impacted by 
climate change, or ‘resilience’, how easily people can recover when affected. On both metrics, 
research suggests that poorer people are likely to suffer more from climate change, at least in 
relative terms. 
Firstly, citizens working in agriculture, forestry and fisheries are likely to be more exposed to climate 
change than people in other professions. Poorer people can be highly dependent on their local 
ecosystem, including for subsistence farming (Hallegatte et al., 2015). Using data from 24 countries, 
Noack et al. (2015) found that, on average, 27% of the poor’s income stems from the environment, 
with the poorest households being most dependent. The study estimates that, in the absence of 
environmental income, the poverty rate in Sub-Saharan Africa could be nearly 60%. 
In a study of 92 countries, Hallegatte et al. (2015) found that the poor are more exposed to climate 
change induced agricultural shocks. Velazco and Ballester (2016) similarly finds that poor, rural 
households in developing countries are more exposed to agricultural shocks than their wealthier 
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counterparts. Alem and Soderbom (2010) found the same result for urban households in Ethiopia. In 
a study of 52 countries, Winsemius et al. (2015) found that poorer people are generally more likely 
to experience both droughts and extreme temperatures, and Reardon and Taylor (1996) similarly 
conclude that poorer farmers’ crops in Burkina Faso are more affected by drought than their 
wealthier counterparts, perhaps due to lower quality land and lack of capital. 
Food price increases could benefit some of the rural poor, depending on whether they own farms 
that benefit, or if price rises are passed on to wages. The urban poor, however, do not benefit from 
high food prices. For example, in a study of the 2010 food price spike, where Thai rice, wheat, sugar, 
maize, and soybean and palm oil prices rose by 17%, 100%, 64%, 76% and 64% respectively, Ivanic et 
al. (2012) found that an additional 44 million people in 28 countries fell into poverty. 
Inequality effects from climate-induced agricultural damages could emerge even in higher income 
countries. In the United States (US), for example, households in 2017 earning less than USD 15,000 
spent 16% of their total annual expenditure on food, whereas households earning more than USD 
150,000 spent only 10% (BLS, 2018a). Similarly, in the United Kingdom (UK), households in 2014 in 
the lowest income decile spent 16% of their total expenditure on food, while households in the 
wealthiest decile spent only 8% (ONS, 2015). Household food insecurity is already a serious concern 
for many low-income groups in high income countries (Loopstra, 2018). 
Poor people also often live in areas that are vulnerable to natural disasters, as such locations are 
typically affordable, and are close to sources of work and income (Hallegatte, 2013; Peacock et al., 
2014). In a study of Bangladesh, for example, poorer families were found to be more vulnerable to 
flooding (Brouwer et al., 2007). In a study of 52 countries, Winsemius et al. (2018) similarly found 
that those on lower incomes are typically more exposed to droughts and urban floods. Examining 24 
countries, Angelsen and Dokken (2018) found that that the poor have greater exposure to weather 
shocks. Most of the people killed by the 2005 cyclone in Mumbai, for example, lived in the city’s 
slums (De Sherbinin et al., 2007). Even in high-income countries, low-income housing is often poorly 
made and in more vulnerable locations, thus leaving the properties more exposed to natural 
disasters (Peacock et al., 2014). When choosing where to live, poorer families do not prioritise 
avoiding natural disasters (Hallegatte, 2013; Patankar, 2015). While wealthier people also want to 
locate close to economic opportunities, they can afford to buy property in lower-risk areas.  
While the rich may lose more in absolute terms from natural disasters, as they own a large 
percentage of a country’s assets, the poor usually lose a greater percentage of their wealth 
(Hallegatte et al., 2015; Winsemius et al., 2018). Reardon and Taylor (1996), for example, found that 
poorer farmers had to sell a greater percentage of their livestock for income in the aftermath of a 
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drought than wealthier farmers, even though the latter sold more in absolute terms. 
Negative educational and health impacts from natural disasters are also more likely to affect the 
poor (Baez et al., 2010), and such effects can be long-lasting (Dercon and Porter, 2014). In an 
analysis of 92 countries, Hallegatte et al. (2015) found that the poor are more likely to suffer health 
problems from climate change. In a study of 52 countries, Park et al. (2018) similarly found that the 
poor tend to be more exposed to heat stress, due to their locations and occupations. 
Resilience to climate change damages often depends on existing capital (Huynh and Stringer, 2018). 
Wealthier farmers may have more capital and technology to enable them to adjust to a changing 
climate (Jacoby et al., 2015). The poor may also be cut off from financial tools, such as loans and 
insurance, that can help people adapt to climate change or repair damages (Hallegatte et al., 2015). 
Reardon and Taylor (1996), for example, found that poorer Burkina Faso farmers had to sell livestock 
to get income in desperate times. Similarly, 54% of people affected by Huricane Katrina in the United 
States had no insurance (Ramin and Svoboda, 2009). 
Having a diversified income is another crucial component of resilience (Huynh and Stringer, 2018). In 
a study of before and after a drought in Burkina Faso, the disaster was found to decrease inequality 
in one region, as farmers had multiple source of incomes and adapted by selling livestock or by 
migrating and sending back remittances (Reardon and Taylor, 1996). In a different area, however, 
inequality was found to increase, as the poor were hugely reliant on crop incomes, and struggled to 
find alternatives. The agricultural industry had also distributed incomes more progressively than 
other sectors. In general, the poor frequently do not have diversified incomes. In a study of farmers 
in North-West Selangor, Malaysia, for example, Alam et al. (2017) found that only 20% of farming 
households contained someone working in a non-agricultural profession, and that only 14% of 
agricultural household income came from non-agricultural sources. 80% of farmers said that they 
needed government transfers to successfully adapt to climate change. 
Government support for low-income people in the aftermath of natural disasters can also be 
inadequate (Del Ninno et al., 2003). In Mumbai, for example, government flood assistance payments 
in response to the extreme floods of 2005 only covered 10-15% of poor families’ lost assets 
(Patankar, 2015). US government assistance in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina was also criticised 
for being slow, and poorly designed and implemented (Kamel, 2012). 
It can thus take many years for the poor to rebuild lost assets (Dercon, 2004). In the aftermath of 
hurricanes Andrew and Galveston in the United States, for example, higher-income areas rebuilt 
faster than lower-incomes areas (Peacock et al., 2014). Similarly, lower-income Hurricane Katrina 
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victims were more likely to suffer long-term financial difficulties than their wealthier counterparts 
(Toldson et al., 2011). 
Migration is further tool for responding to the income effects of climate change (Reardon and 
Taylor, 1996). Droughts and tsunamis have caused mass displacement in the past (Marchiori and 
Schumacher, 2011), although the majority of migrants eventually return to their home. The very 
poor, however, may struggle to migrate away from affected areas for even a short while (Hallegatte 
et al., 2015). So this is another aspect of resilience that is frequently beyond their means. 
Thus, while studies exploring the economic consequences of climate change generally do not 
consider intra-regional economic inequality, there is ample evidence from other studies to suggest 
that climate change may cause significant distributional effects. So why has intra-regional economic 
inequality been hitherto mostly ignored? 
2.2 Economists on economic inequality 
Economists, from their beginnings to the present day, have been interested in how a society 
increases the total resources at its disposal, i.e. economic growth (Niehans, 1990). The distribution 
of these resources, however, has received varying degrees of attention over the years. In addition, 
certain aspects of distribution, for example, international trade and avoiding monopolies, have 
consistently held an important place in mainstream economic thought, while other aspects of 
distribution, particularly the functional and personal income distributions, have moved in and out of 
focus.  
To explore the reasons behind this, let us review how and why economists’ attitudes towards 
studying the personal and functional income distributions have evolved over time. Here the personal 
income distribution is taken to be the distribution of national income between households, while the 
functional income distribution is how national income is divided between the different factors of 
production, i.e. land, labour and capital. 
2.2.1 Data availability 
The data necessary for studying distribution and economic inequality is a relatively new 
phenomenon. The early economists had very little data at their disposal (Piketty and Goldhammer, 
2014). Ricardo and Marx’s influential distributional analyses, for example, were not empirical 
grounded. 
The first social accounts were constructed in the late seventeenth century by William Petty (Petty, 
1664) and Gregory King (King, 1936). These efforts focused on the UK, although estimates for France 
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were also produced in the late seventeenth century (Le Pesant de Boisguilbert, 1843) and for Russia 
in the early eighteenth century (Studenski, 1958). This early work generally focused on estimating 
national income and expenditure, and the breakdown between key constituent parts, such as land-
rents and wages. King, in addition, estimated incomes accruing to different social groups, such as 
lords, knights, merchants, farmers and freeholders, and made international comparisons. By the end 
of the 19th century, rough social accounts were available for twenty countries thanks to Mulhall 
(1886). Such early national income estimates were, however, essentially guesswork (Berdell, 2009), 
and are considered to be highly inaccurate (Piketty and Goldhammer, 2014). 
The introduction of the census in 1801 was a key source of more robust national data (Allen, 2018). 
Similarly, the launch of the modern income tax and accompanying tax returns provided invaluable 
information (Piketty and Goldhammer, 2014). A new wave of social accounting then took off in the 
early to mid-twentieth century with Arthur Lyon Bowley in the UK (Bowley, 1937), Simon Kuznets in 
the US (Kuznets et al., 1941), and Colin Clark (Clark, 1937), who produced data for the UK and 
Australia, and also introduced the concept of gross national product (GNP)25.  
Although the Gini coefficient, a commonly used measure of inequality, was developed in 1912 by 
Corrado Gini, reliable estimates of personal inequality were not produced until 1953, when Kuznets 
developed the first modern estimates of income inequality in an analysis of the US (Piketty and 
Goldhammer, 2014). It would be decades before such data could be found for a wide variety of 
countries. The World Bank, for example, only provides Gini coefficient estimates from 1979 
onwards, and, for many countries, the data-series begins many years later (World Bank, 2016a). 
More recently, Thomas Piketty and colleagues compiled wealth and income inequality data-series 
for many countries using income and inheritance tax returns; for example, see Atkinson and Piketty 
(2014). Data on the wealth distribution is, however, still scant, even for many high income countries 
(Piketty and Goldhammer, 2014). 
In this light, it is not surprising that many of the modelling frameworks that arose in economics are 
highly aggregated (Pasinetti, 2000). Beyond an inheritance of perspectives and methods, however, it 
does not explain why many contemporary economists are still relatively disinterested in income 
inequality. For this we must look to other factors. 
2.2.2 The functional income distribution 
Throughout the history of economic thought, when economists refer to ‘distribution’ or ‘distribution 
 
25 Gross national product (GNP) is the value of all goods and services produced by residents of a country in a 
year, including the value of goods and services produced by residents abroad, minus the value of goods and 
services produced in the country by non-residents. 
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theory’ they are almost always referring to the functional income distribution. The early economists 
who developed this framework viewed land, labour and capital as representing the three main social 
classes26 (Aspromourgos, 1996; Kaldor, 1955; Niehans, 1990; Park, 1998).  
William Petty is credited with introducing the concept of an economic surplus (Aspromourgos, 
1996), equivalent to the output produced that exceeds that required to meet the basic needs of the 
population. While Petty understood that how this surplus is used will impact on future production, 
he did not significantly explore this idea (Aspromourgos, 2005). Classical economists, however, 
became deeply interested in this question (Cohen and Harcourt, 2003; Goodacre, 2014). 
A wage–fund doctrine was proposed, where a fixed amount of money from capital was believed to 
be available for wages, and so, in an analysis that feels Malthusian to a modern reader, salaries 
became a function of population (Mandler, 2001). If there were too many people, for example, 
wages would be pushed down below that required for survival, causing the population to fall and 
wages subsequently to rise.  
While Adam Smith developed such a theory of wages, he did not construct a theory of distribution 
(Sandmo, 2015). He believed that distribution was determined by social institutions and was 
independent of economic growth (Persky, 1992). David Ricardo, in contrast, believed that 
distribution between the classes determined all other economic dynamics, including growth and 
technological progress (Kaldor, 1955). He was concerned, for example, that the corn laws that 
benefited the British landed gentry would decrease profits and so diminish investment, capital 
accumulation, and consequently growth (Deane, 1978). It is because of this proposed relationship 
between distribution and growth, rather than moral reasoning27, that Ricardo famously declared 
distribution to be “the principal problem in Political Economy” (Ricardo, 1817). 
While Ricardo was interested in distribution as a driver of growth, economist Robert Torrens, along 
with socialist writers, such as Thomas Hodgskin, and cooperative philosophers, like Pierre-Joseph 
Proudhon, all pushed for a focus on distribution with the explicit aim of improving conditions for the 
majority (Deane, 1978; Dobb, 1973). The Industrial Revolution, where returns to capital steadily 
increased but wages stagnated at a very low level, played a key role in the emergence of this self-
conscious socialism (Piketty and Goldhammer, 2014). 
 
26 Although it had taken a while for the concept of capital to be developed and profits to be fully distinguished 
from wages, as capitalism was still in its infancy (Aspromourgos, 1989). 
27 Although one should also note that Ricardo was writing in the decades following the French Revolution, 




Karl Marx, for example, had only a minor interest in growth. He developed theories of unstable 
growth cycles, where capital-driven growth would lead to crises, followed by more growth, and so 
on, but he did not work on growth-theory per se. He exhibited no interested in maximising growth, 
and does not explain what will drive growth in a post-capitalistic society; he merely claims it will be 
less prone to crisis. 
The Classical economists did not, however, emphasise ownership, and, thus, did not develop 
theories of the personal income distribution (Sandmo, 2015). Questions of ownership were viewed 
as historical legacies that lay outside of the scope of political economy, as economics was known at 
the time (Sandmo, 2015)28. Thus, while differential rent was considered by Petty and Ricardo, and 
Smith and Mill explored drivers of wage differences, without a proper consideration of ownership, 
Classical work could not extend beyond the functional income distribution (Sandmo, 2015). 
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, people could approximately be split into 
landowners, wage-earners and capitalists, and so these bins could be useful representative agents29. 
People nowadays, however, often have more diversified incomes, with workers, for example, also 
investing via pension funds and sometimes owning buy-to-let properties or enjoying large capital 
gains from increases in house prices. In such a world, it is harder to draw a parallel between the 
functional and personal income distributions. The term ‘distribution theory’, nevertheless, still 
typically refers to the functional income distribution. 
A greater interest in the functional versus the personal income distribution has remained a theme 
long after the demise of Classical economics, with Jevons, Walker, Cairnes, Marshall, Hicks, 
Robertson, Debreu, and Arrow, to name just a few, all weighing in on the drivers of the functional 
income distribution30. As Neoclassical economics evolved, however, an interest in even the 
functional income distribution began to dim. 
2.2.3 The representative household 
A certain degree of aggregation is, of course, necessary in macroeconomic analysis. One does not 
have the information required to model every consumer and firm in an economy individually, and, 
even if one did, running such a model would be beyond current computing power. But what degree 
of aggregation is appropriate? 
 
28 Although John Stuart Mill believed that the effect of the personal distribution on the economy was relevant 
to political economy. 
29 People, of course, did not fit perfectly into these categories. There were also, for example, paupers, owner-
farmers and a lower middle-class, which included the likes of shopkeepers, tailors and teachers (Allen, 2018). 




Representative agents were formally introduced by Alfred Marshall in the form of a representative 
firm (Hartley, 1996). Marshall uses it as an abstract concept to justify an industry having a single 
supply curve, despite firms within a sector being heterogeneous, even if only in size, and so having 
different marginal costs. The device quickly came under criticism. Piero Sraffa, for example, argued 
that there is no reason for an industry to have a collective supply curve or for a given price to meet 
equilibrium conditions for all firms in that industry (Hartley, 1996). Such critiques led to the concept 
being abandoned in the first half of the twentieth century (Schohl, 1998). 
In the 1970s, however, the idea re-emerged in the form of a representative household (Schohl, 
1998). A key driver behind this was the newfound desire for macroeconomic models to have 
microfoundations31, i.e. for economy-wide phenomenon to be derived from behavioural equations 
for optimising individuals and firms (Schohl, 1998). If all households in an economy are identical, 
then the representative household is any household in that economy. Alternatively, if households 
are not identical, it is equivalent to a pseudo-household whose behaviour matches that of the 
collective behaviour of all households. 
Having a single representative household greatly simplifies the mathematics of solving for general 
equilibrium (Jarrow and Larsson, 2018). It also circumvents the mathematical issues that could lead 
to multiple and unstable equilibria (Kirman, 1992). If multiple equilibria could occur, how does one 
predict which will? The price theory is thus incomplete. Multiple equilibria are also disliked because 
they make it difficult to definitively rank different policies (Kirman, 1992), an issue that is further 
discussed later in this chapter. Meanwhile, if equilibria are not stable, this greatly reduces the 
relevance of general equilibrium theory (Kirman, 1992). Why should one study equilibrium if they 
are only fleeting, transient states? The representative agent has thus become widespread in 
Neoclassical models; although most studies that use a representative agent do not justify this choice 
(Hands, 2017). 
There are, however, many questions that cannot be addressed using this framework. 
Unemployment, for example, cannot be studied under this assumption. Meanwhile, as the 
representative household both owns and consumes all production, the distribution of income, even 
the functional distribution of income, becomes unimportant, as all factor income accrues to the 
same household. Thus, most modern macroeconomic models are not able to explore issues 
surrounding inequality; although, as will be discussed in Chapter 3, multi-agent macroeconomic 
 
31 There were concerns that empirical macro-level analyses may produce results that are only valid at a given 
time and situation, as they may not fully capture causal relationships (Lucas, 1976). In contrast, if one had a 
model of behaviour at the individual level, this should be able to withstand regime changes. 
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models have recently become more common. 
2.2.4 Marginal productivity theory of distribution 
The representative agent is not the only reason modern Neoclassical theory has relatively little 
interest in even the functional income distribution. In the Neoclassical growth model, pioneered by 
J. B. Clark, and developed by Marshall, Jevons and Walras, marginal productivity determines factor 
prices and thus the share of income between factors, regardless of how capital, labour and land are 
initially distributed (Cohen and Harcourt, 2003). Any effects of wages on productivity are 
overlooked, as is joint-demand for factors. As institutions and other social phenomenon have no 
impact in this theory, this suggests that the distribution that emerges through market forces is free 
from political values (Felipe and Fisher, 2003). Many thus see productivity-driven distribution as 
being ‘fair’.  
Assuming perfect competition, the model also predicts that there will be no spare capacity in the 
economy. All factors, including labour, will be fully utilised, which means there will be no involuntary 
unemployment (Pasinetti, 2000). If the latter occurs, it is thus the result of interference in the 
market. Trade union action or introducing a minimum wage, for example, will produce 
unemployment. 
There are many criticisms of the marginal productivity theory of distribution. For example, the 
theory is built upon the existence of an aggregate production function, which states a recipe for 
transforming labour and capital into output. While labour and land have units that do not depend on 
prices, for example, man-hours and acres, measuring aggregate capital and output is more 
challenging. How can one, for example, add together financial capital and machine capital? The only 
way to aggregate them is to aggregate their monetary values. Similarly output in the service sector is 
often not physical, so to aggregate, say, auditing services with asset management services, one must 
add the financial values of the services provided. Even manufacturing output, which is physical, is 
heterogeneous and so not easily summed. How does one aggregate the amount of cars and 
televisions produced, except by financial value? If the price of capital, however, is used to determine 
the quantity of capital, and this, in turn, is used to estimate the marginal productivity of capital, and 
thus the price of capital, then one has circular logic. In other words, aggregate output and aggregate 
capital cannot be defined independently of prices, so these variables shouldn’t be taken to be 
exogenous in a theory of prices. 
Other problems have also been raised, including a non-monotonic relationship between capital 
intensity and profitability, a phenomenon known as ‘reswitching’ (Moseley, 2015; Osborne and 
Davidson, 2016), and the ability to empirically test aggregate production functions and marginal 
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productivity theory without instead accidentally testing an accounting identity that will, by 
definition, always hold (Felipe and McCombie, 2015).  
These collective issues, called the ‘Cambridge capital controversies’, were extensively debated in the 
1960s and 70s without resolution, perhaps because an aggregate production function is used to 
derive many key results in neoclassical economics (Felipe and Fisher, 2003). The marginal 
productivity theory of distribution is still widely accepted as true32 and, as a result, alternative 
theories of the functional income distribution are rarely explored (Felipe and McCombie, 2015). In 
addition, as the distribution that emerges through market forces is free from political values in this 
theory, many perceive it as being ‘fair’, which further impedes interest in inequality. 
2.2.5 Separation of efficiency and equity 
The mathematician Bernoulli introduced the concept of utility, a measure of satisfaction, and first 
postulated that the benefits gained from additional income decrease as one’s starting level of 
income increases (Bernoulli, 1738). The Marginalist economists later formalised this concept as 
‘diminishing marginal utility’. It could explain observed phenomena, such as why people consume a 
greater variety of goods as they get wealthier, and also had modelling appeal as, in the presence of 
budget constraints, it means that consumption functions have a unique maximum. It could also be 
used to justify progressive taxation. 
With the Marginalist Revolution bringing a newfound attention to the notion of utility, a new branch 
of economics arose, called ‘welfare economics’, which aimed to estimate the social well-being 
stemming from various economic allocation options and so enable different policies to be compared 
and ranked. 
Diminishing marginal utility is a ‘cardinal’ concept, as it is dependent on a measure of utility where a 
positive linear transformation would preserve the ordering and the relative spacing between 
options. Such a measure relies on the existence of a unit of utility, called the ‘util’. Unsurprisingly, 
there are extensive debates between philosophers and economists around how to define ‘well-
being’ (Cartwright and Montuschi, 2014). Similarly, how, practically, can utility be measured? And 
how could one validly compare the utility experienced by one person with the utility experienced by 
another? 
Many economists started to criticise the use of cardinal utility as an economic tool. Interpersonal 
utility comparisons, in particular, were deemed too subjective for scientific enquiry. Carl Menger 
 




encouraged moving away from attempts to measure utility and instead focused on merely ranking 
the utilities of different options for an individual. This became known as ‘ordinal utility’, and 
diminishing marginal utility is not valid in such a world. Paul Samuelson later proposed that ordinal 
utility functions could be inferred by observing people’s behaviour (Moscati, 2013). This is called 
‘revealed preference theory’. If people always choose one option over another, for example, than 
the utility function selected must show a greater level of utility for the preferred option. 
Utility here is not interpreted as wellbeing; it is simply a tool that helps explain how people make 
decisions. Ordinalists, thus, do not explain why people make decisions; they model how people make 
decisions. They can still define utility functions for individuals33; they just view the numeric 
difference between utility values at different points on the function as having no meaning. All that 
matters is that the utility function displays a higher value for more preferred choices. Utility 
maximisation is, thus, still a valid concept. However, individuals are not necessarily maximising their 
welfare; they’re simply displaying behaviour that is consistent with the chosen function. The 
analytical emphasis is no longer on well-being but rather on ‘preference satisfaction’. 
It was found that ordinal utility was sufficient to derive key Neoclassical economic concepts, such as 
the downward sloping demand curve (Hicks and Allen, 1934a, 1934b). Once it was known that such 
results could be derived from the extremely weak axiom of ordinal preferences, without reference 
to cardinal utility, the latter, with its problematic subjectivity, was swiftly dropped from mainstream 
economics (Kincaid and Ross, 2009). This was the ‘Ordinal Revolution’. Most economists were never 
again to hold cardinality and interpersonal comparisons in high esteem, and without interpersonal 
comparisons one cannot talk about inequality. 
If interpersonal utility comparisons cannot be made, however, how can ‘good’ policy decisions be 
determined? Vilfredo Pareto developed a framework, called ‘Pareto efficiency’ or ‘Pareto 
optimality’, which is an allocation of resources such that no one can be made better off without 
making someone else worse off. It enables the ranking of some economic allocation possibilities 
above others, without making interpersonal comparisons. Pareto also showed that, if certain 
conditions are fulfilled, such as perfect competition, all goods are privately owned, and there are no 
externalities, then general equilibrium points will be Pareto optimal outcomes (Blaug, 2007). This is 
known as the ‘first fundamental theorem of welfare economics’.  
While Pareto optimality bypasses interpersonal comparisons, it is difficult to think of changes that do 
not disadvantage at least one person, unless an economy has spare capacity. Pareto optimality is 
 
33 Although they often prefer to use indifference curves. 
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thus of limited practical use. In addition, the situation where one person owns every good and the 
rest of the population owns none is a Pareto efficient distribution. This surely cannot be considered 
desirable under any welfare definition, yet Pareto optimality offers no way to determine the 
relatively desirability of the different possible ‘optimal’ allocations, as they are ‘Pareto non-
comparable’. Despite this, welfare economics became centred on this framework. When economists 
talk about ‘efficiency’, for example, they are generally referring to Pareto efficiency.  
Nicholas Kaldor was troubled by how infrequently Pareto improvements can be found in real life, but 
suggested that if those who gain from a change could theoretically compensate those who have lost 
out, then the change should be viewed as increasing economic welfare, as it is a potential Pareto 
improvement. He believed that economists could safely make such recommendations, and claimed 
that “the scientific status of [such] prescriptions is unquestionable, provided that the basic postulate 
of economics, that each individual prefers more to less… is granted” (Kaldor, 1939). Whether or not 
compensation actually occurs, Kaldor argued, is not an economic question; it is a political issue 
(Kaldor, 1939). The implication here is that optimising output and questions of distribution are 
perpendicular issues that can be separated. It’s up to the economist to advise how to maximise 
national income; how this pie is divided is a political decision.  
This amendment to Pareto’s framework, which became known as ‘Kaldor-Hicks efficiency’ or the 
‘hypothetical compensation test’, could be applied extensively to real-life problems, and also meant 
that economists could establish the relatively desirability of many, but not all, Pareto non-
comparable policies. The popular policy analysis tool, CBA, for example, ranks policies based on 
Kaldor-Hicks compensation tests. The latter is a Utilitarian approach, but one that economists claim 
allows the separation of equity and efficiency as problems (Boadway and Bruce, 1984).  
Compensation is, of course, unlikely to occur in reality. How in practice, moreover, could such 
Kaldor-Hicks improvements be ascertained? Who estimates how much people have gained or lost, 
and how do they do this? This judgement would fall to economists or central planners, which is very 
different to the ethos embodied in the fundamental theorems of welfare economics, that individuals 
acting for themselves in the free market bring about optimal allocations. In addition, the separation 
of efficiency from equity hinges on distribution having no impact on future growth. 
A theory called the ‘second fundamental theorem of welfare economics’ was developed that 
suggested exactly this. It was shown that, if certain conditions are fulfilled, any Pareto optimal 
outcome can be achieved by making appropriate lump-sum transfers and then allowing the free 
market to steer the economy to general equilibrium. Lump-sum taxes are neutral, i.e. all people are 
taxed the same amount so, in theory, incentives are not affected. Progressive taxation, thus, is not 
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necessary to move to a different Pareto optimum. Many economists, however, argue that the 
conditions required for the fundamental theorems of welfare economics to hold are unrealistic 
(Blaug, 2007). These conditions include perfect competition and no externalities, i.e. all costs are 
incorporated into the market price. In addition, many query the idea that lump-sum transfers can be 
practically implemented or that they do not affect incentives (Blaug, 2007). 
The belief that efficiency and equity could be dealt with separately was reiterated in another 
theorem, the Coase Theorem. This states that if property rights can be assigned to correct an 
externality, for example, by assigning emissions quotas so the market can internalise the cost of 
pollution, then regardless of how those property rights are initially distributed, a Pareto optimum 
will be achieved provided transaction costs are zero and there is perfect information.  
Coase wrote the paper to illustrate that governments should prioritise minimising transaction costs 
and defining property rights. He later expressed concern with the frequent interpretation that his 
paper advocated minimising government intervention when correcting market failures (Hahnel and 
Sheeran, 2009). Many other economists also criticised the theorem. Paul Samuelson, for example, 
notes that transaction costs are never zero and, from a game theory approach, there is no guarantee 
that a Pareto optima will emerge (Samuelson, 1995). He also doubted that the required perfect 
competition would occur in reality. Nevertheless, the Coase Theorem remains popular and 
misinterpreted (Hahnel and Sheeran, 2009). 
The economic consensus thus became that distribution and efficiency had successfully been 
separated, with the former falling into the subjective discipline of politics, and the latter being part 
of objective economics, which had the rigor and prescriptive certainty of the natural sciences. 
Interpersonal comparisons of utility were deemed obsolete, and key results from economic theory 
could be derived from ordinal preferences. This school of value-free welfare economics became 
known as New Welfare Economics. 
It emerged as part of a broader debate around what economics was for, where it was postulated 
that there were two branches of economics, ‘positive’ and ‘normative economics’34. Definitions of 
these words vary, but a common distinction is that positive economics uses the scientific method to 
determine facts, while normative economics involves both facts and value judgements. This is often 
 
34 The origins of the positive-normative dichotomy can be traced to David Hume’s ‘is-ought problem’, which 
notes that it is impossible to logically move from descriptions about the world to statements about how things 
should be (Reiss, 2017). Hume also asserted that knowledge only consists of facts or logical statements; 




expressed as positive economics is the study of ‘what there is’, whereas normative economics asks 
‘what ought to be’. By extension, positive economists see economics as the study of economic 
behaviour, while normative economists think economists should advise on how scare resources are 
distributed. In his influential essay ‘The Methodology of Positive Economics’, Milton Friedman, for 
example, argued “Positive economics… is, or can be, an ‘objective’ science, in precisely the same 
sense as any of the physical sciences” (Friedman, 1953). According to Friedman, positive economics 
can determine “correct” economic policy, and that disagreements about policy arise from a failure 
to properly separate positive, scientific analysis from normative judgements. Positive economics 
builds consensus; whereas, with normative economic questions, “men can ultimately only fight” 
(Friedman, 1953). 
New Welfare Economics suggested that a positive economic approach that uses only the scientific 
method could rank different policies, usually the domain of normative economics, without making 
subjective ‘what ought to be’ leaps of logic. This proposition held enormous appeal, and so 
normative analysis became far less common (Ventura et al., 2016). Economists’ rankings of different 
possible allocations were taken to be ‘value-free’ and ‘scientific’, and distribution and well-being 
were no longer deemed acceptable subjects of economic enquiry, as they could not be addressed 
scientifically (Deane, 1978). 
Not all economists, however, rejected questions of distribution and interpersonal comparison. 
Abram Bergson, for example, introduced the concept of a social welfare function (SWF), which 
postulates how individual utilities could be combined to form an aggregate utility function. Such a 
function requires cardinality. Individuals can also be given different weights in the function. Bergson 
thus unashamedly proclaimed that welfare economics was normative, and argued that a SWF would 
“state in precise form the value judgments required for the derivation of the conditions of maximum 
economic welfare” (Bergson, 1938). Some economists now regularly use SWFs. For example, as 
discussed earlier, SWFs have been incorporated into CBA. 
In addition, some economists became interested in exploring the impact of current distribution on 
future growth and the impact of current growth on future distribution. After all, economies are 
dynamic, not static. 
2.2.6 Interactions between growth and the personal income distribution 
Beyond formulating the Pareto efficient framework, at the end of the nineteenth century Pareto also 
performed one of the first empirical analyses of the personal income distribution. By studying 
England, Italy, France, Germany and Peru, he found that the distribution of income in these different 
economies could all reasonably be fit to a specific curve. As these countries had quite different 
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economic systems, Pareto suggested that societies naturally had this pattern of income distribution. 
This became known as ‘Pareto’s law’. Many people subsequently argued that, if this law is true, 
redistribution is of limited use, as one cannot significantly alter the income distribution. Progressive 
taxation could thus reduce national income without reducing inequality, so the only way to increase 
the poor’s income is for the economy to grow overall. Many economists, however, challenged the 
empirical basis for this law (Persky, 1992), and nowadays, it is generally agreed that Pareto’s law well 
describes only the wealthiest tail end of income distributions (Aydiner et al., 2018). 
Fifty years later, Simon Kuznets, who had done extensive work compiling national income data, 
began, like Ricardo, to believe that there was a relationship between growth and distribution, which 
set him apart from most of his contemporaries35 (Foster, 2015). Kuznets was particularly interested 
in the personal income distribution, which had become more accessible thanks to recent advances in 
national accounting, including Kuznets’ own work. In the 1950s, he proposed that income inequality 
would increase as a country first develops as, when industrialisation takes place, capital is initially 
able to exploit the workers who migrate to cities. He then argued that inequality would decrease 
when development reaches a high enough level to support a welfare state and investment in human 
capital, such as good state education. If this pattern, called the ‘Kuznets curve’ is true, then growth 
can be expected to benefit everyone once a country has reached a sufficiently high level of 
development. 
Kuznets, however, derived his theory by looking across countries with different levels of 
development, instead of following the development of given countries over time. More recent panel 
data studies typically find no evidence for the Kuznets curve, for example, see (Fields, 2002). In 
addition, despite many advances in national accounting, Kuznets observed that, with regards to the 
income distribution, there was still an “unusual scarcity of data” (Kuznets, 1955). He acknowledged 
that his hypothesis was thus “perhaps 5 per cent empirical information and 95 per cent speculation”. 
He justifies “building an elaborate structure on such a shaky foundation”, by claiming that 
“[distribution] is central to much of economic analysis and thinking; that our knowledge of it is 
inadequate… and that so long as [the proposed relationship] is recognized as a collection of hunches 
calling for further investigation rather than a set of fully tested conclusions, little harm and much 
good may result… Effective work in this field necessarily calls for a shift from market economics to 
 
35 In addition, while Kuznets formalised the modern definition of GDP, he disagreed with the predominant role 
it then assumed in economics (Kapuria-Foreman and Perlman, 1995), as he didn’t believe it to be a good 
measure of welfare (EC, 2007). 
54 
 
political and social economy”36 (Kuznets, 1955). 
While distribution continued to take a back seat in economics, more economists were starting to 
think about it. Most arguments suggested, like Pareto and Kuznets, that growth would benefit all 
income groups. Theories of balanced growth in the long-term, such as those proposed by Robert 
Solow, for example, suggested that all factors would equally benefit from growth (Piketty and 
Goldhammer, 2014). Some earlier economists had also made this claim. Léon Walras, say, noted that 
technological innovation had saved mankind from a Malthusian crisis, and so argued that economic 
growth had improved conditions for all classes (Sandmo, 2015). 
Economists also became interested in heterogeneous individuals. Theories of investment in human 
capital, for example, emerged to explain productivity differences amongst workers, which were seen 
to be a key determinant of economic growth (Sandmo, 2015). Milton Friedman, meanwhile, 
explained the income distribution in terms of differing attitudes towards risk (Sandmo, 2015). In his 
model, aggregate risk aversion pushes society to implement redistributive insurance policies, 
whereas societies with a higher collective tolerance for risk will be more unequal. 
More recent studies focusing on inequality and growth typically use theoretical axiomatic modelling 
or empirical regression analysis. Alesina and Rodrik (1994), for example, built a political-economy 
model that suggests that inequality is bad for future growth, as it prompts greater demand for 
redistribution, which dampens growth. 
When measures of inequality are regressed on growth, a negative correlation between the two is 
often found (Perotti, 1996). Alesina and Rodrik (1994), for example, found that both inequality of 
land ownership and income inequality are negatively correlated with growth. Persson and Tabellini 
(1994) also observed a negative relationship between inequality and subsequent growth. Perotti 
(1996), meanwhile, in a regression analysis of 67 countries, did not find support for the theory that 
inequality causes greater demand for redistribution, which retards growth. The study does, 
however, find that more equal societies have higher levels of education, and thus invest more in 
human capital, which boosts growth. It also concludes that unequal societies are more politically 
unstable, which inhibits growth. Forbes (2000), however, suggests that the relationship between 
 
36 Beyond an interest in the relationship between inequality and growth, Kuznets also had political motivations 
behind his paper. In the conference during the Cold War where he introduced the curve, he expressed hope 
that his observations would encourage lower-income countries to stick with capitalism rather than move 
towards communism (Piketty and Goldhammer, 2014). He was particularly concerned that they would be 
vulnerable to communist reasoning during the initial increase in inequality that he hypothesised came with 




inequality and economic growth becomes insignificant when country-fixed effects are included in 
the regression. 
An influential development study of 137 high and low income countries over 40 years, Dollar and 
Kraay (2002) explored growth in average income for the poorest quintile compared to growth in 
national income. These incomes were found, on average, to rise together. This led the authors to 
conclude that, in both rich and poor countries, those on the lowest incomes seem to benefit from 
growth as much as the average person. Hence the conclusion, “growth is good for the poor”37.  
Dollar et al. (2016) notes that while an econometric study may find no average relationship between 
inequality and growth, in some countries there could be a strong positive relationship between 
inequality and growth, while in others there could be a strong negative relationship. Ravallion (2005) 
similarly argued that the relationship between growth and an increase in the lowest incomes may 
differ depending on which economic sectors drive growth. In a study of Burkina Faso, for example, 
Reardon and Taylor (1996) observed that the agricultural industry distributed income more 
progressively than other sectors. Similarly, input-output models38, which are always disaggregated 
into many sectors, and often disaggregated into different factors or income groups, have provided 
another avenue for exploring how growth in different sectors differently affect distribution; for 
example, Miyazawa (1976) and Pyatt (2001). This sector-by-sector focus, rather than an analysis of 
aggregates, parallels Kuznets’ approach to studying growth. He understood that certain industries 
may display higher growth rates than others, and his theories of aggregate growth were thus 
centred around the different growth rates in different sectors (Syrquin, 2016). 
Other studies also indicate that there may not be a fixed law between economic inequality and 
growth for all countries. Rozenberg and Hallegatte (2015), for example, found that different poverty 
eradication strategies are needed in different countries, with education and demographic changes 
being most important in some countries, formal employment in others, and redistribution in yet 
others. In addition, Gobbin and Rayp (2008) analysed Belgium, the US and Finland and found that a 
different model for the relationship between economic growth and income inequality emerged for 
each country. The study concluded that “A country-specific estimation approach is needed since 
‘one-size-fits-all’ does not apply in the field of growth empirics”. 
This could potentially tie into the ‘varieties of capitalism’ narrative, where whether a country has a 
liberal market economy or a coordinated market economy affects relationships between a company 
 
37 Although they acknowledge that this does not necessarily imply that boosting growth is the best or only way 
to improve conditions for the poor. 
38 Input-output models are described in depth in Chapter 5. 
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and its employees, labour protection, education and skills acquired on-the-job, a country’s 
comparative advantages, corporate governance, and within-industry collaboration (Hall and Soskice, 
2001). Coordinated market economies, for example, tend to have less inequality (Hall and Soskice, 
2001). 
There are, however, limitations on studies exploring inequality and growth. Firstly, both axiomatic 
and empirical studies frequently comment on inadequate data. As discussed earlier in this section, 
wealth data is particularly sparse. There are also concerns about large errors in income distribution 
estimates. Data from household surveys, for example, are imperfect, particularly with regards to 
coverage of the very rich (Ravallion, 2001), and even the picture drawn from tax data may be 
incomplete, due to tax evasion. 
Econometrically testing the relationship between inequality and growth is also difficult due to 
omitted variable bias (Forbes, 2000; Gobbin and Rayp, 2008). A very large number of variables could 
affect growth, and one has limited degrees of freedom due to the quantity of data points available. 
Introducing dummy variables for time-fixed and country-fixed effects can reduce this problem. 
Lagged regressors, however, are often believed to be needed, which can compromise the 
consistency of time-fixed estimators. Panel data dynamic models, such as Generalised Method of 
Moments (GMM), have also been tried; however, problems can still persist depending on the extent 
of autoregression (Gobbin and Rayp, 2008). Simultaneous causality is also an issue, and it is difficult 
to identify adequate instrumental variables. 
In short, those studies that have explored the relationship between growth and the personal income 
distribution have found mixed results, with some finding positive or negative relationships, and 
others finding no relationship at all. Some even suggest that there is no fixed ‘law’ between 
inequality and growth across countries, and that different countries exhibit different relationships. 
Which sectors drive growth may be a key factor behind the latter. Neves et al. (2016) provides of 
summary of the widely different estimates of the relationship between inequality and growth that 
can be found in the literature. All these studies are, however, inhibited by lingering problems with 
data availability, along with possible omitted variable bias and simultaneous causality. 
2.2.7 Summary 
Distribution theory is typically focused on the functional income distribution, despite people no 
longer being easily split between the traditional classes, land-owners, capitalists and workers. 
Despite a lack of data, the Classical economists, particularly Ricardo, were highly interested in how 
distribution affects growth. In the Neoclassical model, however, the impact of distribution on future 
growth and the impact of initial endowments are not considered, beyond asserting that interfering 
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with market processes will cause unemployment and impede growth. As the distribution that 
emerges through market forces is determined by the marginal productivity of factors, it is thus often 
viewed as being value-free or even ‘fair’. With the commonly used representative household, 
moreover, distribution became truly unimportant as, under this assumption, all national income 
accrues to one individual. One cannot study inequality using such a framework. 
Following the Ordinal Revolution, it has become unpopular to make interpersonal comparisons or to 
explicitly bring value-judgements into economic analysis. Kaldor-Hicks compensation tests and the 
fundamental theorems of welfare economics were believed to have shown that questions of 
efficiency and distribution could be separated, with the former studied scientifically by economists 
and the latter appraised using political values. This implied that a positive economic approach could 
be used to rank policies, and also explains why economists have remained interested in inter-
country inequality, as politicians can address domestic inequality via fiscal policy, whereas large 
fiscal flows across countries do not occur. The assumptions underpinning such proofs, however, are 
unrealistic and reflect prioritising an ability to solve for a single general equilibrium solution, i.e. 
mathematic elegance, above realism. Without these assumptions, Neoclassical theories of 
distribution, including marginal productivity theory, do not hold.  
Not all economists, however, rejected questions of distribution. SWFs, for example, began to be 
incorporated into models, including CBA. Additionally, some economists began, like Ricardo, to 
believe that there was a relationship between the income distribution and growth. Early empirical 
analysis by Pareto and Kuznets, for example, along with axiomatic balanced growth models, 
suggested that “a high tide lifts all boats”.  
Data availability has, historically, severely limited studies of distribution, and there are unfortunately 
still problems with a lack of data, particularly with regards to the wealth distribution. In addition, 
empirical analyses of the relationship between growth and the personal income distribution likely 
suffer from omitted variable bias and simultaneous causality. 
Recent empirical studies, nevertheless, have been attempted, and have found mixed results, with 
some suggesting positive or negative relationships between growth and the personal income 
distribution, while others find no relationship at all. These varying conclusions are perhaps indicative 
of the aforementioned statistical issues. There may also not be a fixed ‘law’ between inequality and 
growth, with the relationship differing across countries depending, say, on institutional factors and 
which sectors drive growth. 
While the relationship between inequality and growth is currently unclear, there are many plausible 
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potential causes of such interactions. Firstly, the demand for redistribution may affect incentives and 
reduce growth. There are also administrative costs associated with redistribution. High levels of 
inequality can additionally encourage debt-fuelled consumption by households in a bid to “keep up 
with the Joneses”, and so lead to financial instability (Cardaci, 2018). While increased inequality may 
facilitate saving and investment, if these savings are invested in the international capital markets, as 
the wealthier members of society often do when they save, this may not improve a country’s long-
term growth prospects. In contrast, additional money received by those on lower incomes, who save 
less, could have greater domestic multiplier effects to boost aggregate demand.  
Beyond purely economic dynamics, inequality could also cause political instability, which is bad for 
investment and growth (Perotti, 1994). Similarly it could lead to regulatory capture, resources 
wasted on lobbying, and ‘rent-seeking’39, as the wealthy may exert disproportionate influence over 
the political process (Stiglitz, 2013). Such behaviour can severely impair economic efficiency. Low tax 
rates also necessitate lower public spending on, say, public health and education, which are key to 
developing human capital, a driver of growth. Economic mobility could also be affected. Low public 
spending, for example, can produce poverty traps that last for generations (Perotti, 1996). In 
addition, there could be underinvestment in research, infrastructure and tackling crime, making it 
more difficult to do business. 
Finally, the value of money itself, and thus prices, will be affected by distribution. In an economy 
where one person has all the income, for example, the concept of money itself would likely break 
down. So not only is growth potentially affected by inequality, the measuring rod itself is. 
In countries where there is a relationship between inequality and growth, the idea that these two 
issues can be treated separately falls apart. Thus, as our understanding of the dynamics between 
growth and inequality improves, economists may have to address efficiency and distribution 
together, and explore the possibility that there may not be an objective, value-free way to rank 
policies. 
2.3 Motivation for thesis 
As this chapter has shown, economists estimating the economic consequences of climate change 
have extensively considered problems of inter-generational and inter-regional economic inequality, 
yet intra-regional economic inequality, particularly within-country inequality, is rarely considered, 
despite ample evidence from other studies to suggest that climate change may cause significant 
 
39 Rent-seeking is any activity that increases one’s share of national income without increasing national 
income, i.e. wealth transfers without wealth creation. 
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distributional effects. This is likely partially due to the deep uncertainties surrounding estimates of 
the economic damages from climate change, which will be explored in Chapter 3. When modelling 
processes are already so uncertain, to introduce further uncertainties one should be confident that 
additional complexity is adding value. The absence of thought on within-country inequality, 
however, is also consistent with the trend in economics over the past seventy years to believe that 
national distribution is a political question that lies outside the scope of economics. 
This thesis will focus on within-country income inequality. As has been explored, while the 
relationship between inequality and growth in a country is currently uncertain, there are many 
plausible causal links to suggest that inequality may impact on growth, and vice versa. If these links 
prove true, then growth and inequality may need to be addressed simultaneously rather than via 
separate sets of policies. In addition, Dennig et al. (2015) suggests that large tax increases could be 
required to reverse climate change inequality effects. This could be difficult politically, so, even if 
inequality has no impact on growth, this weakens the idea that climate change and inequality are 
separate problems that can be solved in isolation from one another, and that fiscal policy could 
easily be used to correct any distributional impacts from climate change. 
Beyond economic concerns, how climate change may impact on economic inequality is also of 
interest from social and political perspectives. Behavioural studies, for example, indicate that 
relative income is a key factor in wellbeing (Stiglitz, 2013). Income inequality is also correlated with 
crime (Metz and Burdina, 2018) and conflict (Bartusevičius, 2014). 
Amartya Sen argues that all political, ethical and economic ideologies are interested in equality, but 
disagree on “equality of what?” (Sen, 2010). For example, communists value equal wealth, whereas 
classical Utilitarians value all individuals being given equal weight in any social calculus. Similarly, 
Libertarians believe that all people should have complete autonomy and freedom. Thus distributive 
justice seems to feature in some form in all major theories of social organisation. ‘Fairness’ appears 
to be a core human value; we just don’t all agree on what it means. 
As has been shown, in recent decades, there has been a belief in economics that growth in average 
income benefits those on the lowest incomes. This is consistent with John Rawls’ philosophy that 
inequalities are permissible if they benefit the least endowed (Rawls, 1971). Dennig et al. (2015) and 
Rozenberg and Hallegatte (2015), however, suggest that climate change could cause the poor’s 
incomes to fall while average incomes rise, so potentially severing the link between GDP growth and 
poverty reduction. The results in Rozenberg and Hallegatte (2015) suggest that this could occur as 
early as 2030. So perhaps a rising tide may no longer lift all boats, and poverty reduction and tackling 
climate change may be interlinked tasks. As the poor own a small percentage of a country’s wealth, 
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large percentage damages incurred by those on lower incomes may amount to only a small 
percentage impact on the nation’s wealth. The current, modest estimates of the impact of climate 
change on average incomes could thus be masking the severe hardships incurred by some. So even if 
inequality does not affect growth, economists may be forced to operate in a world of trade-offs, 
where ‘optimal’ policies cannot be declared without making explicit value-judgements. 
For IAMs with equity weights, if climate change damages are skewed across the income distribution 
then the SCC could be quite different to current estimates, which could also impact on 
recommended mitigation strategies. Dennig et al. (2015) even suggests that the magnitude of such 
effects could be comparable to the issues surrounding discounting; although Anthoff and Emmerling 
(2016) concludes that intra-regional inequality effects are smaller than inter-regional inequality 
effects. For reasons explored in Chapter 3, this thesis is not concerned with how estimates of the 
SCC are impacted. This, however, could be of interest to other researchers, and the results of this 
study could be used to improve current approaches, which, as we have seen, typically rely on 
speculative skews of damages across income groups, instead of formal modelling of how damages 
might be distributed. 
 
2.4 Research questions 
There are two main components of economic inequality, income and wealth40, which can 
compensate for each other. Wealth, in the form of housing or other financial assets, could be sold, 
for example, if the owner suffers a loss of regular income. In addition, holding wealth in the form of, 
say, shares and bonds, generates an income stream without needing to sell. There is ample 
evidence, as documented in Section 2.1.2, that climate change could have a large impact on stocks 
of wealth which could, in turn, could produce distributional effects. Unfortunately, as noted in 
Section 2.2.1, data on the distribution of wealth is currently sparse, even for many high income 
countries. It thus was not feasible to include wealth in this study, so this thesis focuses only on 
within-country income inequality. One should remember, however, that only one facet of economic 
inequality is being explored. 
Firstly, to incorporate the hypothesis outlined in Section 2.2.6 that inequality effects from changes 
to growth may vary depending on which sector is driving these changes, this thesis will explore 
whether climate change impacts to different economic sectors have different effects on inequality. 
 
40 Wealth is the stock of total assets held at a given point in time, whereas income is money received over a 
given period of time, usually a year. 
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Specifically, the first research question addressed in this thesis is  
1. Climate change induced changes to which sectors seem likely to have the greatest effect on 
within-country income inequality?  
To probe another conjecture from Section 2.2.6, that the relationship between growth in a sector 
and inequality may vary across countries, the thesis’ second research question will be 
2. Do impacts to certain sectors consistently increase within-country income inequality across 
different economies? Or do impacts in some countries reduce inequality and in other 
countries increase inequality? 
The literature review in Section 2.1.2 suggests that climate change may affect different people 
within a country differently, but whether it is the poorer or wealthier members of society that are 
most affected may vary from country to country depending on, for example, the poor’s dependence 
on ecosystems, if food price rises are passed on to agricultural wages, government insurance 
schemes, state healthcare, which sectors are most impacted by climate change, if climate change 
affects the financial system, etc. The third question asked in this thesis is thus 
3. Do certain household groups seem particularly vulnerable across economies? 
As outlined in Section 2.1.1.3, Rozenberg and Hallegatte (2015) found that with higher initial starting 
incomes and low-inequality in lower-income countries, nearly all of climate change’s impacts on 
poverty may be eliminated. This thesis thus asks 
4. Is there evidence to support the conclusion in Rozenberg and Hallegatte (2015) that starting 
levels of average income and within-country income inequality may affect the extent that 
climate change impacts on inequality? 
Similarly, as Dennig et al. (2015) and Rozenberg and Hallegatte (2015) raise the possibility that 
climate change could sever the relationship between rising average incomes and increased incomes 
for the poor, this thesis asks 
5. Are within-country income inequality effects relatively small in many or all scenarios 
compared to projected growth in average incomes? Alternatively, is it possible, as suggested 
by Dennig et al. (2015) and Rozenberg and Hallegatte (2015), that increased inequality from 
climate change might cancel out improvements in overall standards of living from GDP 
growth for low-income households? 
Finally, Rozenberg and Hallegatte (2015) found that notable inequality effects emerged on a 
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relatively short time-scale – by 2030, so the final question explored in this thesis is 
6. Is it only in the most extreme climate damage scenarios and time frames that relatively 
sizable within-country income inequality effects emerge? Or are they plausible in shorter-
term, moderate scenarios? 
 
2.5 Summary 
This chapter explored the existing literature on climate change and inequality, and observed that 
such studies typically feature inter-generational inequality and inter-regional inequality. Intra-
regional inequality, particularly within-country inequality, typically is not present, and, where it is, 
hypothetical income and impacts distributions are generally used. For example, only one study could 
be found that estimated, rather than assumed, the distribution of effects, and this paper only 
considered three economic sectors and did not feature higher-income countries. Many studies from 
other disciplines, however, suggest that climate change is unlikely to equally impact different 
income groups. 
To help understand why within-country inequality is so often overlooked in the coupled economic-
environmental models that explore the economic consequences of climate change, a history of 
economists evolving attitudes towards inequality as an economic question was then compiled. This 
found that distribution theory is often solely focused on the functional income distribution, despite 
people no longer fitting easily into labour, capitalist and landowner classes thanks to the rise of 
extremely high wages for some, and many people both working and owning, say, shares and buy-to-
let properties. The dominance of Neoclassical economic theory was found to be another key factor, 
as this approach advocates the marginal productivity theory of distribution, so distribution may be 
viewed as being ‘fair’, and frequently uses a single representative household, which means that 
inequality cannot be modelled. Furthermore, the ordinal revolution, along with the second 
fundamental theory of welfare economics and Coase’s theorem, gave the impression that questions 
of economic growth and distribution could be separated, which suggested that economics could be a 
‘positive’, value-free discipline like the natural sciences. Nevertheless, some economists, such as 
those doing CBA using SWFs, and input-output analysis with disaggregated household models, 
continued to take an interest in distribution. As data availability improved, empirical analysis of 
growth and distribution also emerged. While early work by Pareto and Kuznets suggested that “a 
high tide lifts all boats”, later work paints a less clear picture, with some studies finding a positive 
relationship between growth and inequality, some a negative relationship, and others no 
relationship at all. This has led some to conclude that the relationship might differ from country to 
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country depending on, for example, institutional factors and which sector is driving growth. Work in 
this contentious area continues, and still suffers from data limitations along with statistical 
challenges, such as simultaneous causality. 
While the relationship between inequality and growth is currently unclear, there are many plausible 
interactions. Beyond economic considerations, inequality could also cause political instability, 
regulatory capture, resources wasted on lobbying, reduced well-being, increased crime and poorer 
health outcomes. Distributive justice also seems to feature in some form in all major theories of 
social organisation, and so ‘fairness’ appears to be a core human value. 
Having established the research gap, explored why it has arisen, and outlined motivations for filling 
it, this chapter then set out the six research questions that are explored in this thesis, and described 
how they arose out of the proceeding analysis. Finally, this chapter highlighted that this thesis only 
explores one facet of within-country inequality, income inequality, as wealth inequality could not be 
included due to data limitations. 

















Chapter 3 – Choice of methodology and case 
studies 
This chapter explains the main methodological and subject choices made in this thesis. Section 3.1 of 
this chapter introduces integrated assessment models (IAMs) in greater depth, including the 
different types of IAMs and common criticisms of this family of models. This includes discussions 
about the impossibility of testing counterfactuals, difficulties in modelling and predicting complex 
nonlinear systems, and if and how imperfect models can still be useful. Section 3.2 outlines 
alternative frameworks to cost-benefit analysis (CBA) that are specifically developed for dealing with 
high levels of uncertainty. One of these approaches, scenario analysis, is then selected for exploring 
uncertainty in this thesis, and the scenarios developed for the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC), which are used in the case studies in this thesis, are then detailed. Section 3.3 
reviews the main tools currently used for macroeconomic modelling, their varying strengths and 
weaknesses, and then uses these, along with a consideration of the research questions outlined in 
Chapter 2, to argue that input-output analysis is the most appropriate tool for bringing economic 
inequality into coupled economic-environmental models. Section 3.4 discusses the common ways 
inequality is measured, and explains which measures will be used in this thesis. The choice of IAM 
for the case study in Chapter 6, along with the seven countries that are studied in the case study, is 
then justified in Section 3.5. Finally, the choice of region for the impact studies case study in Chapter 
7 is detailed in Section 3.6. 
3.1 Introduction to IAMs 
3.1.1 Different types of IAMs 
As described in Chapter 1, IAMs are cross-disciplinary tools that explore how economic activity 
interacts with the environment and vice versa. IAMs can have different goals. One set of IAMs, for 
example, derives scenarios for different demographic, economic and technological futures and 
associated greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions trajectories, and explores impacts on climate variables 
and the biosphere. Prominent IAMs in this group include the Asia-Pacific Integrated Model (AIM) 
(Masui et al., 2011), the Integrated Model to Assess the Global Environment (IMAGE) (van Vuuren et 
al., 2011b) and the Model for Energy Supply Strategy Alternatives and their General Environmental 
Impact (MESSAGE) (Riahi et al., 2011). These IAMs tend to be large, complex and computationally 
intensive. As a result, they are typically deterministic, as these models involve thousands of 
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parameters that often have unknown probability density functions (PDFs)41. In addition, even if the 
PDFs were known, computational power is often not sufficient to run large numbers of simulations 
with varying parameters. 
A separate set of IAMs aims to estimate the economic consequences of different GHG emissions 
trajectories and adaptation strategies. These IAMs tend to be much smaller and simpler, which 
means that uncertainties can be explored using Monte Carlo analysis42; although some IAMs in this 
category are deterministic. These models either generate plausible and consistent scenarios of 
future population, economic growth and emissions themselves, or use the scenarios produced by 
the previous set of IAMs as exogenous inputs, and then generate their own estimates of subsequent 
changes in global mean surface temperature (GMST) and sea-level rise (SLR), along with associated 
economic costs and benefits. They typically use CBA to compare different GHG abatement 
strategies, or to determine the cost-optimal strategy. Well known IAMs in this category include the 
Dynamic Integrated Climate-Economy model (DICE) (Nordhaus, 2017), the Climate Framework for 
Uncertainty, Negotiation and Distribution (FUND) (Anthoff and Tol, 2014a) and Policy Analysis of the 
Greenhouse Effect (PAGE) (Hope, 2013). These models can be global or multi-region. DICE, for 
example, is a global model, whereas FUND and PAGE estimate regional damages, with 16 and 8 
regions respectively. 
This second group of IAMs will often focus on estimating the ‘social cost of carbon’ (SCC), which is 
the discounted43 costs net benefits of emitting an additional tonne of carbon today. William 
Nordhaus, the creator of DICE, for example, called the SCC “The most important single economic 
concept in the economics of climate change” (Nordhaus, 2017). The SCC is calculated by running the 
same climate and socioeconomic scenario twice, typically a ‘business as usual’ scenario; only, in one 
case, assuming additional carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions in the starting period. The SCC will, thus, 
be different for different scenarios; although the variation is often limited (Hope and Newbery, 
2006). With recognition of its limitations, the SCC is sometimes cautiously put forward as the 
possible tax that should be applied on carbon emissions to correct for associated climate change 
‘externalities’, i.e. costs from carbon emissions not being included in the prices of goods and services 
produced by carbon-emitting industries. For example, see Anthoff and Tol (2013) and Hope and 
 
41 Probability density functions (PDFs) capture the relative likelihoods of the different values that a given 
parameter might take. 
42 In Monte Carlo analysis, one estimates or assumes the range of plausible forms or values that, respectively, 
equations and parameters may take, and also the associated PDFs, which capture the relative likelihood of the 
different options. Many simulations are then run where the model is varied in accordance with the PDFs, so 
that one can explore how model outcomes are affected by model uncertainties. 




This thesis is interested in how climate change may impact on economic inequality, and so focuses 
on IAMs in the second category. As discussed, these models specialise in estimating the economic 
impacts of changes in climate variables, whereas IAMs in the first category focus on how different 
demographic and socioeconomic futures change GHG concentrations trajectories, and then how the 
latter impact on climate variables and the biosphere. They are, thus, less appropriate for addressing 
the research questions outlined in Chapter 2. 
3.1.2 Criticisms of IAMs 
Much of the criticism of the second category of IAMs revolves around their use of CBA; although 
their damage functions, treatment of uncertainties, and levels of transparency are also frequently 
challenged. Let us briefly examine these common critiques in turn. 
3.1.2.1 Discounting 
As described in Chapter 2, CBA involves aggregating the costs and benefits of a project over time 
into a net present value. This requires comparing cash flows that occur at different periods in time 
using a process called ‘discounting’. 
Table 3.1 – Estimated 2020 SCCs (in USD per tonne of carbon) using different IAMs and discount 
rates 
 
Annual discount rate 
5% 3% 2.5% 
DICE 12 40 59 
PAGE 23 74 105 
FUND 3 22 37 
 
Notes: Table shows how the social cost of carbon (SCC) varies when using three different annual discount rates and three different 
integrated assessment models (IAMs), specifically, Dynamic Integrated Climate-Economy model (DICE), Policy Analysis of the Greenhouse 
Effect (PAGE), and Climate Framework for Uncertainty, Negotiation and Distribution (FUND). Data was taken from Nordhaus (2017). One 
can see that widely different estimates are made depending on the model and discount rate chosen. 
What is the ‘correct’ discount rate? This difficult question is not unique to environmental economics; 
it is pervasive throughout government decision-making. The choice of discount rate, for example, 
can change public health strategies; for example, see Schad and John (2012). The very long term 
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nature of climate change, however, amplifies the sensitivity of results to discounting. The widely 
different estimates of the SCC provided by, say, DICE (Nordhaus, 2011) and the Stern Review (Stern, 
2007), fundamentally come down to using different discount rates (Hope and Newbery, 2006; 
Pindyck, 2017). Table 3.1 shows how the 2020 SCC varies across three different models according to 
the chosen discount rate. 
The pure time preference, 𝜌, introduced in Chapter 2, is the most controversial component of the 
commonly used Ramsey discount rate44, as it invokes ethical questions about how different 
generations should or do value one another. Nordhaus (2007), for example, argues that this can be 
empirically observed. The time preferences indicated by observational studies, however, can vary 
from 0% to 96000% (Frederick et al., 2002). It is also difficult to unpick exactly what is being 
measured. Does an observed discount rate reflect solely the pure time preference, or also 
uncertainty, or forecasts of subsequent income (Frederick, 1999)? 
Stern (2007) takes a different approach, and argues from an ethical standpoint that 𝜌 should be 
minimal, but not zero, so that different generations are given very nearly equal weight. The nonzero 
𝜌 acknowledges the infinitesimal risk that future generations may not exist, and so should not be 
given precisely the same weight as people alive today. 
If discounting at Nordhaus’ rate, future economic costs would have to be extremely high for it to 
make economic sense for the current generation to take strong action against climate change. Very 
low discount rates, however, mean that people alive today would be expected to give their 
preferences almost the same weight as every other possible future generations’. 
We are faced with the dilemma met in Chapter 2: should discounting be positive, i.e. describe how 
things are, and, if so, can discounting be positive? Alternatively, should models used to inform 
government policy instead reflect how things should be? And, if so, what are the appropriate values? 
Should today’s generation shoulder the full costs of preventing climate change? Is discounting a 
concept that is even valid across generations? Or is it only applicable to a certain individual, group or 
project as they move through their lifetime? Are different generations incommensurable? Is it 
appropriate to use the same tools to value one’s own future consumption as to value future people’s 
consumption? Surely for many people, these two concepts are very different. And how do we know 
what future generations’ preferences will be? 
In short, there is no consensus amongst economists on the discount rate, or indeed on whether 
discounting is an appropriate framework for intergenerational decision-making, and no resolution is 
 
44 See Chapter 2 for an explanation of the Ramsey discounting model. 
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in sight (Gollier, 2013). 
3.1.2.2 Equity weights 
As described in the previous chapter, many IAMs have introduced equity weighting into their social 
welfare functions (SWFs). While they are controversial, as many economists are uncomfortable with 
introducing normative elements into economic analysis, all of the prominent IAMs that focus on 
estimating the economic consequences of emissions and adaptation policies feature equity weights. 
Equity weighting can have a large impact on results. Using a 3% discount rate, Hope (2008) finds that 
introducing equity weights into PAGE2002 increases the SCC from $58 to $78 per tonne. Hope 
(2008) puts this relatively small impact down to the emissions scenario explored, in which 
interregional inequality falls as time goes on, so larger damages fall when income inequality is less 
severe. Hope (2008) then notes that the inequality aversion coefficient45, η, also appears in the 
discount rate, so it is inconsistent to change equity weights in the welfare function whilst holding the 
discount rate constant46. When adjusting the discount rate accordingly, introducing equity weights is 
then found to reduce the SCC, as the higher discount rate outweighs the increased damages from 
equity weighting.  
Tol (2002) finds the same result using FUND, unless regions ‘cooperate’, i.e. unless the sum of all the 
regions’ welfare functions is optimised, instead of each region individually optimising their own 
welfare function. With cooperation, Tol (2002) finds that the dominating effect depends on the 
chosen value of η.  
Anthoff and Emmerling (2016) uses RICE-2010, and discovers that for lower values of risk aversion 
the discounting effect dominates. For an inequality aversion coefficient above approximately 0.6, 
however, equity weighting dominates and the SCC increases. When using FUND 3.9, Anthoff and 
Emmerling (2016) observes that equity weights always dominate discounting effects, so increased 
inequality aversion increases the SCC. 
Much like the debate around discounting, many economists are concerned that IAM SCC estimates 
vary to such a degree as a result of weights that cannot be objectively determined. This explicit 
influence of values on results does not sit comfortably with positive economists. 
 
 
45 As described in Chapter 2, this is the negative consumption elasticity of marginal utility of consumption. 
46 Although one could argue that aversion to inter-regional inequality and aversion to inter-generational 




CBA requires addition, and so can only be performed if all costs and benefits have the same units. 
This is problematic as, while climate change may cause economic damage, it may also impact on 
health, ecosystems and aesthetics, none of which are easily expressed in the same units. 
CBA economists have, nevertheless, developed various methods to estimate the monetary worth of 
nature and other market intangibles. These tools include ‘hedonic pricing’ and ‘contingent 
valuation’. Hedonic pricing ascribes value by, for example, statistically comparing the prices of 
houses next to a park with the prices of similar houses not near a park, and interpreting the 
difference to be the value of parkland. Contingent valuation directly asks people how much they 
would pay to get access to, say, a forest (‘willingness to pay’ or WTP), or how much compensation 
they would be prepared to accept for having a forest taken away from them (‘willingness to accept 
compensation’ or WTA). 
These techniques are frequently criticised. Shortcomings to contingent valuation include:  
 The price that people are willing to pay for, say, nature, is unlikely to be independent of 
what other people are prepared to pay (Sen, 2000). Contingent valuation does not account 
for this. 
 People’s real life choices often don’t mirror their answers to hypothetical questions (Haab et 
al., 2013).  
 Stated preferences can change depending on how the question is framed (McFadden and 
Train, 2017). 
Similarly, problems with hedonic pricing include: 
 Markets are not perfectly efficient; they often misprice goods, as demonstrated by asset 
bubbles. 
 Behavioural economics indicates that people often do not behave like ‘rational decision 
makers’ (Gradinaru, 2014). Consumer behaviour, therefore, does not necessarily reveal 
‘rational’ preferences. 
 Market prices aggregate desires on a ‘one dollar, one vote’ basis, i.e. the rich’s preferences 
count for more than the poor’s. 
 Market prices only reflect the current generation’s preferences. 
A particular area of contention is the ‘value of statistical life’ (VSL) (Ackerman, 2008). This estimates 
how much people are willing to pay to avoid fatality risks, and is used to include changes to mortality 
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rates in CBA. It is determined by statistically assessing wage differences between safe and dangerous 
jobs. Different studies, however, have produced very different results; for example, Hultkrantz and 
Svensson (2012). 
Hedonic pricing and contingent valuation will also vary depending on the wealth of the people or 
market being surveyed (Viscusi and Masterman, 2017). To account for this, when comparing 
individuals or regions with different incomes, should one, as was explored in Chapter 2, introduce 
equity weights, and, if so, which equity weights are appropriate? 
Many economists, moreover, argue that there is an intellectual flaw with trying to put monetary 
values on non-market goods and services, as this approach hinges on such goods being equivalent to 
a given amount of money; for example, Aldred (2002). They claim that no amount of extra 
consumption could sufficiently compensate humanity for, say, the loss of a unique eco-system or 
species. So does it make sense to try to value such things in monetary terms? Similarly, can the value 
of human life really be captured in dollars and cents and, if not, does it make sense to try to force it 
into a CBA framework? Money is a medium of exchange; goods and services only have monetary 
values because they can be traded. Without exchange, money has no use or meaning. 
As was seen in Chapter 2, New Welfare Economics claims an ability to rank different policy options 
‘scientifically’, i.e. without making value judgements. Even ignoring the criticisms levied towards this 
in the previous chapter, this objective ranking is only possible if one has a single criterion, such as 
economic growth. If additional criteria are introduced, then one must weight them to rank policies. 
This weighting process is clearly value-laden, and so problematic for many economists. Attempting 
to convert impacts on health, ecosystems and aesthetics into monetary units is an attempt to 
collapse a multi-dimensional problem onto one dimension, without explicitly acknowledging the 
values underpinning the conversion process. Its proponents, nevertheless, argue that CBA makes 
exploring the merits of different policy decisions objective (Ackerman, 2008). 
One-dimensional CBA is one of many possible ways to frame a problem, with an alternative being 
cost-effectiveness analysis. The latter takes a policy goal set outside of CBA, and then uses CBA to 
find the most cost-effective way to achieve that objective. A further possibility is multi-criteria 
analysis, which does not try to force all units onto the same metric. Factors are instead evaluated in 
their natural units, and policies are assessed against many different metrics. 
If one weights the different criterion in a multi-criteria analysis, it is still possible to determine an 
‘optimal’ policy. Weighting different criteria, however, makes value judgements explicit, and one can 
explore how the ranking of different possible states depends on the weighting of the different 
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criteria. If the weights are highly uncertain, then the concept of an optimal policy becomes dubious. 
The emphasis instead often shifts towards exploring trade-offs, as goals may conflict with one 
another. The term ‘sustainable development’, for example, indicates the balancing of two, 
sometimes contradictory, objectives. 
3.1.2.4 Uncertainty 
One faces risk when all possible outcomes and their probabilities are known. An example is rolling a 
dice. Uncertainty, on the other hand, occurs when one’s knowledge of either the outcomes or their 
probabilities is limited. ‘Quantifying uncertainty’ means estimating how model outcomes may be 
affected by uncertainties surrounding parameters, structure, observational errors and numerical 
approximations of solutions. Where observational outcome data is available, regression, Bayesian, 
Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) and Generalised likelihood uncertainty estimation (GLUE) 
methods are often deployed. This is known as inverse uncertainty quantification, as the model and 
associated uncertainties are inferred from the data. Where data is sparse or unavailable, one instead 
typically uses sensitivity analysis or forward uncertainty propagation, for example, Monte Carlo 
simulations, to explore uncertainty in model output variables given a specified scenario, i.e. set of 
values for model input variables. A good overview of inverse and forward uncertainty quantification 
methods can be found in (Beven, 2009).  
‘Deep uncertainty’, sometimes called ‘Knightian uncertainty’, occurs when quantifiable information 
is so sparse that the PDF associated with an uncertainty cannot be ascertained. An example is the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC’s) Representative Concentration Pathways47 
(RCPs) (IPCC, 2014). These GHG atmospheric concentration scenarios do not have associated 
probabilities, as there is insufficient information to estimate the relative likelihood of the 
socioeconomic assumptions underpinning these scenarios. Deep uncertainty is a problem for 
methods such as CBA that rely on calculating expected values, and so require PDFs or exact 
knowledge. 
Our understanding of climate change is highly uncertain, both from an environmental and economic 
perspective, and much effort has been made to quantify uncertainty. Sources of environmental 
uncertainty include the response of GMST to changes in atmospheric CO2 concentration. This 
‘climate sensitivity’ involves complex feedback loops that scientists struggle to predict (Bony et al., 
2006). Attempts to estimate this sensitivity have used a variety of tools, including model simulations, 
instrumental records of GHG atmospheric concentrations and temperature, and paleo records. 
 
47 See Section 3.2.3 for a description of the Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs). 
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Another source of climate-related uncertainty is the ocean circulation response (Barnes and Screen, 
2015); but many other examples exist. 
On the socioeconomic side of IAMs, economic and demographic projections are uncertain, 
particularly given the time-scale over which climate change damages are likely to occur. IAM 
‘damage functions’, which estimate the annual cost or benefit to an economy or sectors within it 
arising from changes in annual mean temperatures, are highly speculative. While they theoretically 
draw upon a range of external impact studies, the latter are often exploratory rather than confident 
estimates. Moreover, there are very few impact studies that estimate the economic consequences 
of a GMST increase greater than 3°C. In the studies surveyed in the IPCC’s fifth assessment report 
(IPCC, 2014), for example, 19 studies explore damages for a 1oC to 3.5oC change in GMST, while only 
one study explores a higher temperature change48 (Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2015). 
Nordhaus and Sztorc (2013) similarly observe that “estimates of damage functions are virtually non-
existent for temperature increases above 3°C”. IAMs, however, often look at scenarios where GMST 
increases by as much as 6°C. So how do IAMs estimate damages at such levels? 
Approaches include performing regression analysis over the range in which damage estimates are 
available and then extrapolating the established relationship to higher temperatures, or using expert 
guesses of functional forms that can then be calibrated based on one or two damage estimates from 
lower temperature changes. Expert guesses are also sometimes used for lower temperature 
changes, where impact estimates are not available, or where it’s believed existing impact estimates 
need to be adjusted to reflect omitted factors. Prieg and Yumashev (forthcoming) provides a 
summary and critique of the traditional methods deployed. 
A recent wave of impact studies has used econometrics to estimate the relationship between 
temperature and total economic growth across a large number of countries. Burke et al. (2015), for 
example, uses regression analysis on data from 166 countries between 1960 and 2010 to estimate 
the effect of temperature on growth in real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, specifically 
whether deviations from growth trends appear to be driven by deviations from temperature trends. 
Individual response functions are generated for the different countries and then combined to form a 
global response function. Taking only the first or the last 20 years of the time period generates 
essentially the same results, which suggests that technological advancements and increased wealth 
have not altered the relationship. While year-on-year fluctuations in temperature in any given 
country cover only moderate increases in temperature, the wide range of countries studied have 
very different average temperatures, so, by placing all the countries on the same curve, the effects 
 
48 This study explores a 5.5oC increase in GMST. 
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of a wide range of temperature increases are estimated. 
Such studies provide a more compelling calibration approach then the methods usually deployed. To 
date, however, PAGE-ICE (Yumashev et al., 2019) is the only IAM to have based its damage function 
on such results; but other IAMs are likely to eventually follow suit. Econometric analysis, however, 
will not resolve all IAM uncertainties. The Burke et al. (2015) approach, for example, assumes that all 
countries can be placed on the same curve. In reality, economies and the environment may struggle 
to adapt to large increases in average temperature levels that occur over a relatively short time-scale 
or high volatility. The Burke et al. (2015) analysis also tells us nothing about what will happen if 
countries at the top end of the average temperature spectrum experience a large increase in 
temperature, and unfortunately these countries tend to be among the poorest. IAMs additionally 
typically assume that all damages are repaired by the next time-step, which may be overly 
optimistic, particularly as resources will need to be diverted from other activities towards repairing 
climate damages. In other words, there may be growth rate, rather than, or in addition to, level 
effects. Moreover, while econometrics may work for a total economic damage function, there may 
be insufficient sector-level data for a wide variety of countries to establish sector-level damage 
functions in this manner49. Depending on the research question being addressed, a sector-level 
approach may be required; for example, if one hopes to estimate the extent that different sectors 
are vulnerable to climate change. Finally, econometric analysis cannot resolve climate response 
uncertainties. Nevertheless, such studies provide a way forward for IAMs to improve upon some of 
the current problems with damage functions. 
As discussed, IAMs in the first category are large and complex, which means they are typically 
deterministic. To explore uncertainty, different models produced by different modelling teams are 
often used to generate climate and biophysical results for the same scenario. Probabilities are not 
assigned to the results for different scenarios; the latter are merely used to get an idea of the range 
of outcomes that may occur. For example, this is the approach taken by the IPCC in its Assessment 
Reports. IAMs in the second category, meanwhile, are smaller and simpler, and so the effect of 
uncertainty on a model’s output can be explored. While they typically use the non-probabilistic GHG 
and socioeconomic scenarios generated by IAMs in the first category as exogenous inputs, for each 
of these scenarios they attempt to quantify the uncertainty around their output variable, which is 
usually the SCC. FUND and PAGE, for example, use expert guesses or the range of estimates provided 
by external studies to suggest PDFs for over 100 uncertain variables, be they a scaling factor for the 
 
49 Although there are many existing econometric studies exploring the relationship between temperature and 
labour productivity or agricultural output. 
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climate impact at a calibration temperature or polynomial degree which determines the convexity of 
the damage function. Monte Carlo simulations50 are then performed to estimate a PDF for the SCC. 
However, not all IAMs in this category are highly stochastic. Some, such as DICE, are deterministic or 
present only a very simple sensitivity analysis. To explore structural uncertainty, for example, 
Nordhaus (2017) varies three variables in DICE 2016R: the damage parameter, productivity growth 
and equilibrium temperature sensitivity. As with IAMs in the first category, research using IAMs in 
the second category also frequently compares results generated by the different models.  
As explored in Prieg and Yumashev (forthcoming), the choice of methods used to derive economic 
damage functions and their associated PDFs is often not explained in the model technical 
documentation and is sometimes puzzling. Moreover, the studies providing the data used for 
calibration are often very out-of-date; for example, they are frequently from the 1990s. This reduces 
the data points available for calibration and so also limits the calibration methods that can be 
applied. In addition, scientific progress has been made over the past twenty years that will not be 
incorporated. Many IAM PDFs are based on guesswork, not modelling or observation. In FUND 3.9 
(Anthoff and Tol, 2014a), for example, agricultural damages due to the rate of change of 
temperature are assumed to be proportional to rate of change in GMST raised to a power. The PDF 
of this uncertain power is transparently stated to be an expert guess that is not derived from any 
damage studies. Similarly, the PDFs in PAGE are simply assumed to be triangular. PDFs underlying 
catastrophic climate events and their impacts are particularly spurious. The likely consequent 
damages are essentially unknown, and the tails of these distributions might be fatter, which could 
have a large impact on the resulting CBA (Weitzman, 2014, 2009). In short, the uncertainty 
surrounding the economic consequences of climate change is, at least currently, deep. 
With the exception of catastrophic climate events, the PDFs underpinning climate uncertainties are 
better understood than their economic counterparts. As described in Chapter 1, research into the 
environmental side of climate change naturally began before economists started thinking about the 
subsequent economic consequences. It is, thus, not surprising that our understanding of climate 
uncertainties is more developed. Yet there is nevertheless much work to be done to confidently 
understand even key climate uncertainties, such as the climate sensitivity (Freeman et al., 2015). As 
discussed, there is also currently a lack of input data to define many of the thousands of parameters 
that form large climate models. 
 
50 Monte Carlo simulations run a model thousands of times using random sampling of any uncertain variables 
from a specified PDF. Through thousands of simulations, one can thus build up a probability distribution for 
the model’s outcome value. Monte Carlo analysis also allows one to see which uncertain variables have the 
largest impact on results (sensitivity analysis). 
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3.1.2.5 Summary of key criticisms 
This chapter does not aim to provide a comprehensive list of critiques of IAMs, but rather to give a 
flavour for key areas of concern – discounting, equity weighting, commensurability and uncertainty. 
All these shortcomings have left IAMs open to extensive criticism. Pindyck (2013), for example, 
writes 
“These models have crucial flaws that make them close to useless as tools for policy analysis: certain 
inputs (e.g., the discount rate) are arbitrary, but have huge effects on the SCC estimates the models 
produce; the models' descriptions of the impact of climate change are completely ad hoc, with no 
theoretical or empirical foundation; and the models can tell us nothing about the most important 
driver of the SCC, the possibility of a catastrophic climate outcome. IAM-based analyses of climate 
policy create a perception of knowledge and precision, but that perception is illusory and 
misleading.” 
Risbey et al. (1996) similarly argued that it is difficult even to use IAMs heuristically to make, say, 
order of magnitude estimates or to explore temporal sequencing, as even qualitative conclusions 
will be heavily influenced by the flawed assumptions underpinning the models. 
If this analysis is correct, then there is serious cause for concern, as IAM results are frequently 
referenced by the IPCC and government environment departments, and appear to have influenced 
public policy (Schwanitz, 2013). 
3.1.2.6 Can IAMs be tested? 
In an ideal world, one would divide a data set in two, and use half of the data to calibrate an IAM, 
and half to verify it. Could IAM predictions from twenty years ago, for example, be tested against 
climate change damages suffered over the past, say, ten years? How would one identify and 
measure what the losses from climate change have been? This would require knowing how sectors 
and economies would have performed in the absence of climate change, with everything else 
staying the same. One cannot observe such macroeconomic counterfactuals. Damages from climate 
change in the recent past and near future are also likely to be small (Nordhaus, 2007), and so even 
more difficult to distinguish from other factors affecting economic performance. 
The inability to test macroeconomic counterfactuals is a problem for validating many types of 
models, not just IAMs. Many disciplinary macroeconomic models, for example, similarly cannot 
really be tested predictively. This includes axiomatic computable general equilibrium (CGE) models, 
which are generally not used for forecasting, but instead for estimating what the impact of an 
isolated policy would be, assuming no other developments in the economy. As with IAMs, one 
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cannot test the accuracy of such ceteris paribus estimates, as this would require knowledge of a 
counterfactual world for which one has no observational evidence. While statistical techniques 
attempt to unpick causal effects, as will be shown in the subsequent section of this chapter, there 
are many challenges associated with statistically testing complex nonlinear systems. 
Given the lack of counterfactual data, there is no consensus on how to evaluate IAMs (Schwanitz, 
2013). Some emphasise transparency, particularly with regards to assumptions, so that individual 
components of the models can be evaluated, even if predictions from the entire system cannot 
(Rotmans and Van Asselt, 1996; Schwanitz, 2013). Even if this approach is taken, however, one must 
remember that economies and the climate are complex, dynamic non-linear systems, so one must 
approach IAM estimates with caution, particularly when they are generated for long time frames. 
3.1.3 Modelling complex nonlinear systems 
If 𝐴 + 𝐵 is fed into a linear system, the output generated is the same as if 𝐴 and 𝐵 had been fed into 
the system individually, with their outputs then summed. In nonlinear systems, this principle is 
broken. Meanwhile, a dynamical system is one containing variables that are time dependent. 
Most nonlinear differential equations are not integrable. Such systems do not have closed-form 
solutions, and one must instead use numerical methods to see how they evolve. Nonlinear systems 
can have predictable steady states or periodic behaviour, but they can also exhibit quasi-periodicity 
or complex behaviours that are extremely difficult to predict. In addition, small inputs can translate 
into large outputs. This can result in small measurement errors for initial conditions translating into 
large differences in long-term prediction trajectories. Small uncertainties can thus be amplified over 
time, so rendering predictions useless (Kleeman, 2011). Such systems may also have multiple 
equilibria or ‘attractors’, where the latter is an area of the map of possible outcomes towards which 
a nonlinear dynamic system eventually evolves and orbits, periodically or otherwise. This means that 
a small deviation has the potential to suddenly shift the system into a new regime (Lorenz, 1963). 
Complex systems, such as the atmosphere or an economy, have many different parts that interact. 
While the isolated individual components of such systems may be predictable, interactions and 
feedback effects can make the system unpredictable. An example of this is the double pendulum, a 
non-integrable system. While the dynamics of each individual pendulum, in isolation, are easy to 
predict, when the pendulums are connected the behaviour becomes chaotic (Shinbrot et al., 1992). 
To precisely predict such systems, one would need to have perfect knowledge of all the forces acting 
on every component, along with perfect measurement of starting conditions for each component, 
and extensive computing power. Without these capabilities, the system may exhibit behaviour that 
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cannot be predicted from studies of isolated components – a phenomenon called ‘emergence’. The 
double pendulum has only two components, and already exhibits complexity. The atmosphere or an 
economy contains countless parts, so the level of knowledge, measurement and computer power 
required to precisely predict such systems is high indeed. Furthermore, while the forces and 
dynamics around single pendulums are well known, with naturally occurring complex systems it can 
be difficult to isolate components and determine the equations governing them. Trying to infer such 
information from emergent behaviour is extremely difficult (Wang et al., 2011). 
The study of nonlinear dynamics is in its infancy, with mathematical tools still being developed (De 
Gooijer and Hyndman, 2006; Vlad et al., 2010). This is reflected in the performance of such models 
versus linear ones; namely, nonlinear models often don’t produce better forecasts (Clements et al., 
2004; De Gooijer and Hyndman, 2006). Understanding the behaviour of complex systems is 
considered to be one of the key challenges in modern science (Cheng et al., 2015). 
While statistics can often be useful for exploring microdynamics, time-series analysis, for example, 
struggles to deal with interacting processes and non-stationary behaviour, where means and 
variances evolve with time (Cheng et al., 2015). Such behaviour is common in complex, dynamic 
non-linear systems (Cheng et al., 2015). While techniques that can deal with non-stationary 
processes, such as multi-layer perceptron (MLP) and generalised autoregressive conditional 
heteroscedasticity (GARCH), have been developed (Golestani and Gras, 2014), such methods 
typically can only cope with certain types of non-stationary behaviour (Cheng et al., 2015). Non-
stationary time series analysis thus still poses great challenges. Furthermore, the data demands 
required to overcome such difficulties are high, as models of complex systems commonly have many 
variables relative to data points, which reduces statistical power. 
The problems of non-stationarity have been known for many years. Robert Solow, for example, 
argued that it is “straining credulity” to believe that economic processes are stationary: 
“As soon as time-series get long enough to offer hope of discriminating among complex hypotheses, 
the likelihood that they remain stationary dwindles away, and the noise level gets correspondingly 
high. Under these circumstances, a little cleverness and persistence can get you almost any result you 
want. I think that is why so few econometricians have ever been forced by the facts to abandon a 
firmly held belief.” (Solow, 1985). 
Macroeconomic models’ current forecasting abilities, even for the near-future, reflect these 
challenges. Researchers at the Federal Reserve, for example, examined US GDP growth and inflation 
forecasts for between 1992 and 2004 and found that dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) 
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models appear to forecast “very poorly”, although outperform econometric models and expert 
guesses (Edge and Gurkaynak, 2011). DSGE predictions of inflation for even one quarter ahead had 
an R2 of only51 0.13. For quarters further out, the R2 fell to nearly zero. Fildes and Stekler (2002) 
surveyed the literature evaluating UK and US real GDP and inflation forecasts, and found that 
forecasts outperformed those generated by naïve random walk models, but not significantly so. 
Fildes and Stekler (2002) also found only mixed evidence for macroeconomic forecasts improving 
over the latter decades of the twentieth century as econometric techniques improved. Meanwhile, 
in May 2007 and 2008, in the midst of the financial crisis, the OECD predicted GDP growth for the 
following year in 40 different countries. These estimates were ultimately wrong by an average of 2.6 
percentage points – a very large error for GDP growth (Richardson et al., 2014). 
To add value, researchers must therefore remember that IAMs deal with nonlinear systems and 
imperfect models, knowledge, and measurements, so, given the tools currently available, one 
cannot make precise predictions, even for the next decade, let alone over the climate change 
timescale. This is a big conceptual leap for the economics profession which, since Milton Friedman’s 
influential essay (Friedman, 1953), has generally focused on predictive power when evaluating 
models. Friedman argued that  
“Truly important and significant hypotheses will be found to have “assumptions” that are wildly 
inaccurate descriptive representations of reality, and, in general, the more significant the theory, the 
more unrealistic the assumptions” (Friedman, 1953) 
He goes on to claim that the appropriateness of assumptions is determined not by how realistic they 
are, but by how well the model, as a whole, makes predictions. As models cannot include everything, 
they are inherently unrealistic. In fact, successful models will be the most unrealistic, he asserts, as 
they should have distilled a phenomenon down to its core drivers and eliminated more minor 
interactions. Friedman’s arguments have had an enormous influence on the economics profession 
and its interpretation of the scientific method (Mäki, 2009). 
Moving away from this makes it more difficult to assess a model. Can an imperfect model still have 
academic value? And, if so, how can we tell which models are helpful, and which are useless or even 
misleading? To approach this, let us consider what models are for. 
 
 
51 R2 is a proportional measure of the extent that realised data can be explained by the model. It varies from 0 
to 1, where the former indicates that none of the data can be explained by the model and the latter means 
that the model can explain all the data. 
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3.1.4 Why do we build models? 
Models do not perfectly reflect reality. The latter is too complex for mankind to encapsulate in a 
series of rules. Even if such a model could, in theory, be created, there is insufficient computing 
power to run it. So models are instead simplified abstractions of reality that help us explore 
questions and discover new ones; they are tools to help us learn. While Friedman argued that the 
purpose of an economic model is to make predictions, many natural scientists, social scientists and 
philosophers take a different view. 
Solow, for example, advised economists to use models to organise thoughts, discover unexpected 
links, develop plausible causal narratives, and to make “rough quantitative judgements” (Solow, 
1985). Another perspective is that models are an effective way to explore the implications of a 
theory, to differentiate between theories, and to compare and contrast them. When different 
models are used to simulate the consequences of the same set of assumptions, examining the 
differences between the results produced can help illustrate how modelling frameworks influence 
the projected outcome. In addition to exploring theories, models can be used to probe how different 
processes may influence and interact with one another (Bharwani et al., 2005). Agent-based models 
(ABMs), for example, can help explore the emergent behaviour of interacting processes and complex 
systems. They can also be used to generate scenarios to explore a range of possible outcomes and to 
see if counterintuitive outcomes could occur. Similarly they can help one better understand policy 
questions and problems (Morgan, 2017). Explicitly speculative models and theories have even been 
put forward with the stated aim of prompting discussion and highlighting areas about which there is 
a paucity of knowledge. The Kuznets curve, which suggests a relationship between economic 
development and economic inequality, is an example of this (Kuznets, 1955). By highlighting areas 
where our understanding is deficient, models can thus help direct further research and data 
gathering (Oreskes et al., 1994). 
In the face of deep uncertainty, some argue that expert guesses are good alternatives to formal 
modelling. Thinking qualitatively, however, can be vague and open to inconsistencies. Expert 
guesses are filled with just as many assumptions as formal models, only they are less transparently 
stated; in fact, they probably won’t be declared at all. Expert guesses may also suffer from cognitive 
biases of which the expert is unaware (Goodwin and Wright, 2010). Building a model forces one to 
state all assumptions, to think through them as a collective package, and to identify and eliminate 
logical contradictions in one’s theory. 
Climate change is arguably the biggest challenge of our generation. Its estimated effects range from 
negligible to the complete collapse of ecosystems. Some even argue that global warming may bring 
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benefits. These varying consequences demand different responses from individuals, firms, non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) and governments. Fossil fuels, for example, have historically 
been one of the biggest drivers of economic development (Asafu-Adjaye et al., 2016). In this light, is 
it preferable to curb carbon emissions and potentially reduce economic growth? If so, what are the 
pros and cons of the different ways to do this, and, if future generations are likely to be wealthier 
than people today, won’t they be better placed to cut consumption? These are the questions that 
IAMs and impact studies address; it would be absurd and irresponsible for academics to not consider 
these issues. Macroeconomics, similarly, should not disappear despite the profession’s frequent 
failure to make successful predictions. 
So the question is not ‘should one model the impacts of climate change’, but rather ‘at what point 
do these models become misleading rather than helpful?’ The answer is when results are oversold. 
Even Robert Pindyck, perhaps the most vocal critic of IAMs of the second kind, acknowledges that 
the problem is not people trying to model uncertain interactions between the economy and GHG 
emissions, but rather that results are sometimes communicated with the same degree of confidence 
one would expect from a scientific experiment or randomised controlled medical trial (Pindyck, 
2017). He calls this “the veneer of scientific legitimacy”, and takes particular issue with precise 
quantitative conclusions, such as calculating the SCC, or prescribing an optimal greenhouse gas 
mitigation strategy (Pindyck, 2017). 
IAMs thus can have many purposes, even if they can’t confidently be used to make precise, verifiable 
predictions. They can help identify key relationships between the climate and economies, help us 
better understand current theories surrounding growth and climate change, eliminate logical 
contradictions, help organise thoughts, force one to identify and understand assumptions, highlight 
areas where understanding is deficient, encourage debate and future research, and provide a logical 
and consistent framework for developing scenarios. The questions one asks and how results 
generated by IAMs are viewed, however, should differ to approaches taken when dealing with 
models with high predictive power. 
This thesis uses IAMs and damage studies in this light. Precise estimates and confidence intervals for 
the effect of climate change on income inequality in various countries will not be attempted; nor will 
any ‘laws’ be formulated. The focus is on exploring tendencies and the factors driving them, seeing if 





3.2 Modelling under uncertainty 
3.2.1 Frameworks for dealing with climate and economic uncertainties in IAMs 
While the PDFs used and generated by the second category of IAMs are likely to be highly flawed, 
they are, however, still useful and interesting. They are an attempt to explore the propagation of 
uncertainty, can indicate which uncertainties may have the greatest impact on results and so help 
prioritise future research, and have prompted academic debate52. Academics should continue trying 
to improve the quantification of climate and economic uncertainties and understand their 
propagation, while making it very clear that the degree of confidence in many of the model’s PDFs is 
currently low, and so, given the current deep uncertainty, the output PDF is only exploratory. 
The preceding analysis, however, casts doubt on the ability to use CBA to recommend, for example, 
cost-optimal emissions trajectories. Instead non-probabilistic decision frameworks that were 
specifically developed for dealing with deep uncertainty will often be more appropriate. 
Non-probabilistic methods generally consider how robust decisions are to assumptions about the 
future being wrong. Robustness is defined to be how well a decision, such as investment to facilitate 
adaptation to climate change, performs across many different non-probabilistic scenarios, say, the 
different future climates that may result. Performance can be evaluated, for example, using 
scenarios of the different costs and benefits that could emerge from each climate scenario, and 
netting these against the cost of the adaptation investment. This result could then be compared to a 
specified threshold for strategy failure. The policy that is most robust to different possible futures 
might not be the ‘optimal’ policy in any given future. Model users are, thus, forced to entertain the 
idea that decisions may involve trade-offs, for example, between maximising growth in one possible 
future, versus making decisions that perform satisfactorily across many different futures. The goal is 
generally not to definitively rank policies, but to inform policy makers about uncertainties, 
vulnerabilities, and trade-offs. Rather than policy makers being given the impression that there is an 
objectively ‘best’ policy, these methods encourage the decision maker to consider their priorities. 
For example, what is the maximum cost the decision maker is prepared to potentially endure? What 
gains would the decision maker be happy to sacrifice to avoid potentially triggering this cost 
threshold? The recommended decision may thus differ for different decision makers in line with 
their values and goals. For example, when probability distributions are unknown, some argue that a 
maximin approach should be followed, where the focus is on optimising the worst case scenario. 
Homeowners buying home insurance and large US defence spending during the Cold War are 
 
52 For example, see Weitzman (2009). 
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examples of this ‘precautionary principle’ in action (Woodward and Bishop, 1997). 
Scenario analysis is a common starting point for exploring highly uncertain futures. Scenarios must 
be plausible and internally consistent, although many may be deemed unlikely. With a mind to the 
questions being addressed, uncertainties that could have a large effect on outcomes are identified 
via a literature review or through discussions with stakeholders, and used to inform the choice of 
scenarios. A different “axis of analysis” spanning each key uncertainty is often created (Laurent et 
al., 2015). One should then attempt to select scenarios so that the ranges of these axes are well 
explored. Scenarios are typically not ascribed a probability, so unlikely but disastrous events are 
given the same consideration as seemingly probable, but more minor outcomes. Note that there is 
no claim, however, that the full range of possible outcomes has been represented. One is exploring 
uncertainties, without attempting to quantify them. 
These ensembles of scenarios are then used to stress test decisions, identify weaknesses, explore 
key drivers and relationships, make precautionary investments, and develop contingency plans. The 
emphasis is not to identify a ‘best’ solution, but instead to encourage decision makers to understand 
and explore different trade-offs. What are the objectives? What trade-offs are tolerable? Do any 
decisions perform acceptably in all possible worlds? What decisions leave one locked-in and unable 
to manoeuvre should the future not turn out as expected? By considering their values, decision 
makers should come to their own idea about the most appropriate choice; this should not be 
decided by the model or modeller, who exists merely to present alternatives and their pros and 
cons. 
As discussed in this chapter, scenario analysis is already a popular tool for exploring climate change, 
since the IPCC uses different IAMs in the first category to generate a range of future population, 
economies, technology and GHG emissions scenarios, which are not assigned probabilities. IAMs in 
the second category also typically use these scenarios as non-probabilistic exogenous inputs, before 
attempting to quantify the uncertainty around their output variable in each of these scenarios. 
Scenario analysis is also frequently used in other disciplines. The Bank of England, for example, used 
scenarios to explore the possible impacts of Brexit (BoE, 2018). In addition, businesses sometimes 
use scenario analysis to aid decision making under deep uncertainty, as do defence ministries and 
armed forces (Bradfield et al., 2005; Brown, 1968). 
Scenario analysis is sometimes used in combination with formal decision-making techniques. Robust 
decision making (RDM), for example, explores which decisions perform well in a variety of plausible 
future scenarios, and highlights trade-offs between satisfactory outcomes in a wide variety of 
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futures and optimal performance (Lempert et al., 2003)53. A decision is proposed, and then a large 
number of scenarios in which the decision succeeds or fails as per specified terms are then collected. 
Statistical techniques are then often used to identify which uncertainties or assumptions seem key 
to success or failure. RDM has been used in a variety of environmental economic decision contexts, 
including resource management, and capital investment (Kalra et al., 2014). 
Non-scenario, non-probabilistic frameworks for decision making under deep uncertainty have also 
been developed. Info-gap theory, for example, starts with a ‘best-guess’ of parameters and model 
structure, and then explores how wrong one would have to be in one’s assumptions for a given 
decision to not meet a given target. Decisions that can withstand the greatest error in uncertain 
parameters or structure are then highlighted. Where multiple parameters are uncertain, they can be 
assigned weights to indicate if some are more uncertain than others, or can all given equal weight if 
they are all equally uncertain. The methodology is frequently used in ecological modelling to help 
determine, say, conservation strategies (Hayes et al., 2013), or to help tackle environmental 
problems, such as, flood risk (Hine and Hall, 2010). The initial ‘best guess’ for a parameter or the 
model structure, however, affects info-gap results. 
3.2.2 Choice of scenario analysis 
Due to the deep uncertainties present, a non-probabilistic approach was favoured in this thesis. 
RDM, info-gap theory, maximax and maximin analysis are all focused on assessing strategies. The 
goal of this project was not to rank policies, but rather to explore mechanisms, tendencies, resilience 
and vulnerabilities. As such, scenario analysis was deemed the most appropriate methodology. 
Two axes of analysis for scenarios were identified. The first was uncertainty surrounding the extent 
of climate change damages. Here, IAMs and impact studies were used to generate a range of climate 
impact scenarios across this axis. 
The second axis of analysis was uncertainty around the structure of economies when damages 
occur. IAMs estimate damages in a series of time-steps, for example, 2020, 2030, etc, so ideally one 
would have a social accounting matrix (SAM)54 for each selected country at the start of each time 
period. As described in Chapter 4, a SAM is a map of monetary flows between different sectors, 
institutions, and household groups in an economy over a given time period, usually a year. The idea 
that a detailed map of a nonlinear system could be projected far into the future is absurd. To explore 
uncertainty around future economic structures, scenarios were instead run using SAMs for a wide 
 
53 Sometimes probabilities are ascribed to different scenarios; see Hall et al. (2012) for an example. 
54 The methodological choice to use input-output analysis (IOA) on Social Accounting Matrices (SAMs) is 
explained in Section 3.3. 
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range of existing economies, with many different drivers of growth, and starting levels of income 
and inequality55. This helped explore how climate change induced income inequality may vary 
according to the structure of underlying economies. Moreover, while significant climate change 
damages are not generally anticipated until the end of the twenty-first century, there is much 
uncertainty underlying this prediction. As seen in Chapter 2, studies such as Rozenberg and 
Hallegatte (2015) suggest that sizable effects could emerge as early as 2030, and economic 
structures today are likely to share similarities with economies over the next decade. This is explored 
in more detail in Chapter 5. 
3.2.3 IPCC scenarios 
This thesis’ case studies use the Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES) and the Representative 
Concentration Pathways (RCPs), which were compiled at the request of the IPCC, and so are the 
most commonly used scenarios in the climate change literature. Thanks to the IPCC, the research 
community is generally familiar with the scenarios, which expedites modellers’ understanding of one 
another’s work, and allows results from different studies to be compared. The available data also 
enables researchers without expertise in the socioeconomic, technological or emissions modelling 
used to generate the scenarios to explore consequences on, say, ecosystems or economies. 
Moreover, to save time, even researchers with the aforementioned skills can use the scenarios as a 
starting point for further analysis. 
The SRES are 40 scenarios that explore different plausible future emissions pathways from 1990 to 
2100 for various GHGs. They stem from assumptions about the factors driving emissions, such as the 
extent that societies prioritise the environment, the rate of economic growth, the degree of 
globalisation, technological developments, and changing demographics. They are split into four 
families, A1, A2, B1, and B2, with each family sharing characteristics yet containing different 
scenarios produced by different IAMs. The A1 family contains three sub-families, A1F1, A1T and A1B, 
which reflect three different fuel-type storylines, respectively, predominantly fossil fuels, 
predominantly zero-carbon sources, and a balance of both types. A summary of the key 
characteristics of each SRES family can be found in Appendix A. Six different models were used 
across the 40 scenarios. For the full description of the scenarios, see (IPCC, 2000). 
While the SRES assume different societal attitudes towards environmentalism, they do not contain 
any climate change policy interventions and so cannot be used to explore possible mitigation efforts. 
In addition, as various socioeconomic assumptions drive each scenario, one cannot change, say, 
 
55 The literature review in Chapter 2 suggested that starting levels of inequality and GDP may influence the 
extent that climate change affects inequality. 
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assumptions about energy intensity, without having to generate a new emissions scenario. This is 
why there are so many SRES. The sequential approach also makes it difficult to explore 
socioeconomic drivers and climatic effects separately. 
To address these shortcomings, a new set of benchmark scenarios, the RCPs, were later developed 
by the climate modelling and IAM communities at the request of the IPCC. There are four scenarios, 
called RCP 2.6, RCP 4.5, RCP 6.0 and RCP 8.5, which reflect possible low, intermediate, intermediate, 
and high concentration trajectories respectively for various GHGs. The numerical labels correspond 
to the likely radiative forcing56 in 2100, measured in watts per square meter, arising from the given 
GHG concentration pathways. As the starting points for the RCPs are radiative forcing projections, 
the socioeconomic conditions that give rise to the pathway and the changes to climatic systems 
associated with the pathway can be studied independently. They thus enable a parallel rather than 
sequential approach, which saves time57 and resources, and is easier logistically. One can change a 
socioeconomic assumption without then needing to generate a new climate scenario. For more 
information on the RCPs, see van Vuuren et al. (2011a).  
In parallel with the development of the RCPs, the IAM community developed Shared Socioeconomic 
Pathways (SSPs), to explore how the four RCPs might arise. Five qualitative narratives were 
developed, which covered different development, global cooperation and inter-country inequality 
trajectories, and these formed the basis of each SSP. Population, urbanisation and GDP projections 
were then estimated for each SSP. Finally, six different IAMs were used to interpret each pathway, 
resulting in a range of energy demand, land use change, and GHG and pollutant emissions projection 
scenarios within each SSP. The key differences between the pathways are summarised in Appendix 
B. The characteristics of each SSP collectively produce low to high challenges to adaptation and 
mitigation, as shown in Appendix C. See Riahi et al. (2017) for a more detailed summary of the SSPs.  
As different socioeconomic scenarios could give rise to each RCP, there is no unique matching 
between SSPs and RCPs (Riahi et al., 2017); although only SSP5 produces radiative forcing high 
enough for RCP 8.5. RCPs 4.5 and 6.0 could arise from any of the SSPs, while RCP 2.6 can be 
associated with SSPs 1, 2 and 4. RCP 8.5 combined with SSP5 approximately corresponds to SRES 
A1F1, while RCP 6.5 combined with SSP2 and RCP 4.5 combined with SSP1 approximately correspond 
to SRES B2 or A1B, and B1 respectively (van Vuuren and Carter, 2014). RCP 2.6 has no clear SRES 
comparison. 
 
56 Radiative forcing is the difference between energy absorbed and energy radiated by the Earth. A positive 
(negative) imbalance causes the Earth’s temperature to rise (fall). 
57 The models can take months to run on supercomputers. 
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3.3 Modelling inequality effects 
3.3.1 Different macroeconomic models 
We need a methodology to extend IAMs and impact studies so that they can estimate the impact of 
climate change on income inequality, and thus address the research questions outlined in Chapter 2. 
As such, let us briefly review the main tools currently used for macroeconomic modelling.  
3.3.1.1 Input-output analysis (IOA) 
IOA solves a set of linear simultaneous equations based upon a disaggregated map of monetary 
flows in an economy, either an input-output table (IOT) or a SAM58. It is a general equilibrium59 
model that assumes that the IOT or SAM is the initial equilibrium state, and then uses linear algebra 
to model the new equilibrium state after a given exogenous change. The model is typically highly 
disaggregated, as it is geared towards exploring interconnections between different parts of an 
economy. Due to its linearity, it is a simple model with restrictive assumptions, which generally 
makes it less popular with academics. Its simplicity does, however, lend itself to identifying direct 
versus indirect effects. It is, thus, frequently used to address questions involving economic 
interdependence; particularly when it is important to understand the mechanisms driving indirect 
effects, such as when conducting disaster impact analysis, studying resilience, exploring the carbon 
and water footprints of commodities, or estimating the impact of proposed emissions reduction 
targets on an economy. 
3.3.1.2 Computable general equilibrium (CGE) models 
A CGE model is a set of nonlinear simultaneous equations that draw on economic theory to describe 
an economy. Computer programming is used to iterate parameter values until the model is 
consistent with a calibration SAM. This SAM is taken to be the initial equilibrium state. An exogenous 
change is then simulated, and elasticities60 in the model inform how the economy reacts. Computer 
programming estimates the new equilibrium state by maximising utility for consumers and profits 
for producers, while fulfilling given constraints. CGE models are highly popular with policy-focused 
institutions, such as the World Bank (Grabner, 2014). 
 
 
58 IOTs and SAMs are described in Chapter 4. 
59 General equilibrium occurs when intersecting supply and demand set prices such that all markets clear, i.e. 
there is no unmet supply or demand. 
60 Elasticities estimate the responsiveness of demand or supply of a good or factor to changes in that good or 
factor’s price, other prices in the economy, and income levels. 
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3.3.1.3 Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models 
DSGE models are based upon behavioural equations for various economic actors, such as 
households and firms. They are thus bottom-up models with microeconomic foundations, which, in 
theory, means they should be able to produce a reliable picture of an economy even if the policy 
environment changes. This, coupled with their relatively good predictive power, makes them 
extremely popular with academics (Grabner, 2014). After an exogenous change, programming is 
once again used to find the new equilibrium state, and, like CGE models, DSGE models assume utility 
and profit maximisation. Unlike CGE (and IOA) models, they also show the transition between 
equilibria. They are, thus, dynamic models, as they explore the evolution of variables over time. They 
are also stochastic61, as variables are affected by random shocks that cause their values to fluctuate. 
3.3.1.4 Agent-based models (ABMs) 
ABMs specify behavioural algorithms for agents, where decisions are often assigned a probability 
distribution. They are typically calibrated against survey data, interviews, experiments, or 
econometrically estimated preferences. Monte Carlo simulations can then be run to provide a 
computer simulation of the evolution of a complex adaptive system. Some models also introduce 
interdependencies between agents. When running the model, equilibrium could emerge, but there 
is no assumption that it will. ABMs were built to explore the emergent behaviour of systems of 
multiple, often heterogeneous, agents, and so are frequently used to model social networks, 
including economies. In ecological economics, for example, ABMs have been used to model land 
markets, emissions trading, and land use decision-making (Heckbert et al., 2010). 
3.3.1.5 Vector autoregression (VAR) 
VAR models are econometric, and so use statistics to analyse economic data, specifically time-series. 
One regresses the current values of variables on their previous values, and sometimes also 
contemporaneous values of other variables (Rudebusch, 1998). Residuals are then interpreted as 
exogenous shocks. VAR models are used for forecasting, and do not attempt to explore the 
mechanisms driving results, while structural VAR (SVAR) models combine VAR with economic theory 




61 Stochastic models contain random elements, and so will generate different results from different runs of the 
model that start from the same given point. 
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3.3.2 Comparing the macroeconomic models 
To help decide which modelling approach is most appropriate to answer the research questions 
outlined in Chapter 2, let us first compare key characteristics across the different models. 
3.3.2.1 Level of disaggregation 
IOA and CGE models specialise in exploring how different parts of an economy interact with one 
another and how indirect effects are transmitted across an economy. As such, these deterministic 
models62 are typically disaggregated into many economic sectors. In contrast, as DSGE models are 
stochastic, they are harder to solve, and so these models are generally highly aggregated to expedite 
programming. The Bank of England’s DSGE model, for example, has only five actors, households, 
enterprises, the central bank, the government, and the rest of the world (ROW) (Nachane, 2016). 
Multi-sector DSGE models do, however, exist, for example, Rees et al. (2016), but they are far less 
common. Similarly, different types of firms can feature in ABMs, such as in Caiani et al. (2019), but 
this is relatively unusual, as ABMs typically focus on heterogenous households rather than 
heterogenous firms. Finally, while this is unusual, one can include many different economic sectors 
in a VAR model provided one has a sufficient time-series for each sector; for example, Partridge and 
Rickman (1998). 
ABMs are often designed specifically to incorporate heterogeneity between agents, and to explore 
the subsequent consequences. IOA models also frequently involve many agents who represent the 
aggregates of various household groups, such as income deciles, rural and urban households, 
households with different levels of educational attainment, or different ethnicities. Many CGE and 
DSGE models, however, have only one representative household. Herault (2007), Mohammed 
(2018), Verikios and Zhang (2016) and Wang et al. (2017), for example, needed to couple CGE 
models up with microsimulation models to study the inequality effects of macroeconomic policy. 
CGE and DSGE models with disaggregated household groups do exist for a few economies, for 
example, Mahadevan et al. (2017) for Indonesia, Maisonnave et al. (2016) for South Africa, Mythili 
(2015) for India, Hoagland et al. (2015) for Rhode Island and Massachusetts, and Pouliakas et al. 
(2014) for the European regions of Archanes-Heraklion, Latgale, and the East Highlands. Where 
inequality is considered, however, it is much more common to model it only on an inter-regional 
level, with a representative household for each nation, for example Berrittella and Zhang (2014) or 
the well-known GTAP model (Hertel, 2012). Finally, one can use VAR to explore questions 
surrounding income inequality provided one has a suitable time series on heterogenous households 
 
62 Randomness does not feature in deterministic models, so, for a given starting point, the model will always 
produce the same result. 
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or an inequality index, such as the Gini coefficient63. 
3.3.2.2 Realism of assumptions 
Linear or nonlinear processes 
As discussed in Section 3.1.3, the economy is a nonlinear system. CGE, DSGE and ABMs are also 
nonlinear; although linearisation64 is typically used in DSGEs so that a single, stable equilibrium 
solution can be found. ABMs do not assume equilibrium and so do not need to linearise nonlinear 
processes, as the model is run and allowed to develop, rather than solved for a unique solution. 
CGEs can use nonlinear programming, so do not need to linearise, as, unlike DSGE, they are not 
stochastic, which makes them simpler to solve. Meanwhile, IOA and VAR are linear models. 
Linear models of nonlinear systems, while simple and transparent, will be overly rigid as they cannot 
reflect the ways in which nonlinear systems can adapt to exogenous changes. For example, IOA 
assumes fixed production recipes, which is equivalent to firms minimising costs under perfect 
competition and fixed prices, assuming no technological innovation (Oosterhaven, 1989). This means 
that, in the event of a shortage of, say, a good used in a given production process, alternative goods 
or factors of production cannot be used as substitutes. Likewise, in IOA, consumers can’t alter their 
spending patterns and imports cannot increase to compensate for domestic shortages. As such, IOA 
likely overestimates the consequences of demand and supply shocks, as the modelled economy 
cannot adapt to mitigate the fallout65. CGE, DSGE and ABM models, in contrast, can attempt to 
model behavioural responses; for example, by incorporating general equilibrium economic theory 
and data on elasticities. 
Nonlinear models, however, are not without their own problems. Mathematising human behaviour, 
on either the individual or aggregate level, is obviously extremely difficult. The more complicated a 
model, the more parameters and functional forms must be estimated. This introduces further 
uncertainty. The behavioural algorithms underpinning ABMs, for example, are frequently hard to 
validate (Heckbert et al., 2010), particularly as statistical data or econometrically estimated 
preferences are often available only on an aggregate level. The elasticities used in CGE modelling, 
similarly, are criticised for not being sufficiently supported by empirical evidence, for example 
Burfisher (2011). Such problems can occur due to low statistical significance of underlying studies, a 
 
63 Inequality indices, including the Gini coefficient, are explained in Section 3.6. 
64 Linearisation gives a linear approximation of a nonlinear function around a given point. It enables linear 
algebra to then be used to solve the equation, which is faster and simpler than using nonlinear techniques. The 
approximation, however, is only good very close to the given point. 
65 Although attempts have been made to bypass some of IOA’s constricting assumptions, for example, by 
considering the role of inventories in mitigating supply shocks (Hallegatte, 2014). 
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lack of studies available on particular goods, and the use of different algebraic forms in the 
underlying studies compared to the CGE model (Burfisher, 2011). A lack of data has also influenced 
the choice of model functional forms. For example, it explains the popularity of constant elasticity of 
substitution functions (Arndt et al., 2002). In addition, CGE and DSGE models are forced to make 
questionable assumptions to enable a unique stable equilibrium (Grabner, 2014). Such assumptions 
include only being able to use a restricted set of utility and production functions. 
Changing prices and quantities 
A further problem with the simplicity of IOA is that it allows either prices or quantities to vary, but 
not both, which is unrealistic. The other modelling techniques do not have this constraint. 
Equilibrium 
IOA, CGE and DSGE models assume that markets move from and to general equilibrium. 
Disequilibrium modelling is far more mathematically challenging (Boland, 2014), and is counter to 
neoclassical theory. In addition, a non-equilibrium model does not produce a single, steady solution, 
which makes it harder to draw conclusions or make recommendations. The likelihood of real 
markets achieving general equilibrium is, however, frequently challenged due to evidence of 
instability (Cohen and Harcourt, 2003). Many of the assumptions required for general equilibrium 
are also criticised, including rational expectations and perfect competition; for example, see Boland 
(2014) or Nachane (2016). Although DSGE models with more realistic market conditions, such as 
sticky prices or imperfect information, have been solved for general equilibrium; for example, Edge 
and Gurkaynak (2011). ABMs, meanwhile, don’t solve for equilibrium solutions. While equilibrium 
could occur, there is no assumption that it does. ABMs instead view economies as complex systems, 
whose emergent properties cannot be analytically derived, and so solutions cannot be presupposed 
(Heckbert et al., 2010). Finally, no economic theory underpins VAR, and so no assumption is made 
about equilibrium.  
3.3.2.3 Understanding results 
Linear models have the advantage of being simple and transparent. VAR, however, is a statistical, 
not economic, model, which is generally used to make predictions, and so there is no attempt to 
discover the economic structure underlying results, i.e. to differentiate between correlation and 
causation. Therefore, if changes to, say, the agricultural sector were found to have a sizable impact 
on economic inequality, a VAR model could provide no insight as to why this result occurs. Similarly, 
direct and indirect effects cannot be separated. In contrast, IOA is a structural model where direct 
and indirect transmission mechanisms between different sectors and institutions in an economy can 
easily be seen and understood.  
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ABMs, CGE and DSGE models, meanwhile, feature complex, nonlinear interactions, and so it can be 
hard to see why results have emerged. ABMs, CGE, and DSGE models are thus often criticized for 
being ‘black boxes’ (Grabner, 2014; Topping et al., 2010). 
3.3.2.4 Lucas critique 
Statistical analysis of historical data, such as VAR, may produce results that are only valid at a given 
time and situation as, if the policy environment changes, economic agents could adapt their 
behaviour accordingly, so deviating from past trends. This is known as the ‘Lucas critique’, and Lucas 
recommended building bottom-up models of individual behaviour, as these would still be valid in 
different policy environments (Lucas, 1976). This partly explains the popularity of microfounded 
DSGE models. DSGEs and ABMs are, in theory, immune to the Lucus critique, as they are bottom-up 
models of individual behaviour. Such models have, however, been criticised for not being adequately 
tested against empirical evidence (Wren-Lewis, 2011) and, thus, they can be highly deductive66. The 
usefulness of deductive reasoning is, of course, dependent on the realism of the underlying axioms. 
IO and CGE models are based around a SAM for a given year, and thus are strongly influenced by the 
behaviour of economic actors in that particular year. This is especially an issue for models with many 
different industries and households, as noise67 can cancel out when variables are aggregated, so 
disaggregated data is typically noisier.  
3.3.2.5 Demand and supply-side responses to exogenous change 
IOA is a demand-driven model. While exogenous supply constraints can be modelled, the only 
estimated consequences, direct and indirect, stem from the reduced spending by the affected 
industry on intermediate goods and payments to factors. With CGE, DSGE and ABMs, conversely, the 
demand and supply side effects of exogenous changes can be modelled simultaneously.  
Meanwhile, VAR is used for forecasting, not for modelling counterfactual exogenous changes. 
3.3.2.6 Treatment of uncertainty 
IOA and CGE models typically do not consider uncertainty, while, as the name implies, DSGE models 
take a stochastic approach. ABMs are also typically stochastic, as agent’s decisions are frequently 
drawn from PDFs. Meanwhile, VAR uses statistics to estimate confidence intervals, which specify the 
range of values that one can, to a given percentage degree of confidence, be sure a parameter lies 
 
66 In deductive reasoning, logic is used to draw conclusions from a series of starting statements, called 
‘axioms’, which are assumed to be true. 
67 Statistical noise is random variation in data, for example, random errors in measurement. The greater the 




3.3.2.7 Dynamic or static 
Dynamic models evolve across time, whereas comparative static models only show the equilibrium 
states of a system before and after a given exogenous change, and so are time independent. IOA and 
CGE are traditionally static models; although dynamic extensions do exist; for example, Okuyama 
(2004) and Tang et al. (2016). ABMs, DSGEs and VAR are dynamic, so one can explore how an 
economy progresses over time and, in the case of DSGE, the path an economy follows to re-establish 
equilibrium after an exogenous change. 
A summary of all the aforementioned characteristics can be found in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2 – Key characteristics of different macroeconomic models 
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Dynamic Dynamic Dynamic 
 
Notes: Table contrasts key characteristics of input-output analysis (IOA), computable general equilibrium (CGE), dynamic stochastic 
general equilibrium (DSGE), agent-based models (ABM) and vector autoregressive (VAR) macroeconomic modelling methodologies. Rows 
in the table are different characteristics. Columns are different models. These attributes indicate that IOA is the most suitable approach to 
explore the research questions outlined in Chapter 2. 
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3.3.3 Why input-output analysis? 
To answer the research questions outlined in Chapter 2, the methodology must be able to explore 
effects arising from impacts to different economic sectors. While all the modelling types can contain 
multiple industries, IOA and CGE models are specifically set-up to estimate how different parts of an 
economy impact on one another. Similarly, to explore questions around income inequality, the 
modelling framework must also be able to incorporate different household income groups. As seen 
in the previous section, heterogenous households are possible in all the models; although they are 
not common in CGE and DSGE. 
As this thesis does not attempt to make predictions, but rather is exploring plausible possible 
mechanisms, tendencies and vulnerabilities, it is crucial that one can understand both which 
variables are driving results and why these variables have an effect. Intricate mathematics, such as 
that found in CGE, DSGE and ABMs, can make a model opaque, so, while one can perform a 
sensitivity analysis and change variables to explore how results in turn alter, it can be difficult to 
understand why results emerge. Meanwhile, VAR is used for predictions, and so does not attempt to 
identify causal structural mechanics. The transmission mechanisms in IOA, however, are transparent. 
One can easily understand why results have emerged, and can also, unlike in VAR, distinguish 
between direct and indirect effects. 
An economy is a nonlinear system, however, VAR and IOA are linear models. This means they cannot 
reflect the ways in which an economy can adapt to exogenous change. For example, IOA assumes 
fixed production recipes, which means that alternative goods or factors of production, or increased 
imports, cannot be used as substitutes for a good that is in short supply. In Chapter 5, SAM time 
series are used to empirically test how well IOA linear assumptions perform over different time-
scales. While the linearity swiftly becomes unrealistic, the model is still found to have reasonable 
predictive power for approximately a decade, and so can be used to generate plausible scenarios of 
economic responses to climate change impacts in a given year. Moreover, as discussed in Section 
3.1.3, one cannot realistically expect any model to make good long-term predictions about complex 
nonlinear systems. As explained in Section 3.2, this is why this thesis does not do statistical 
hypothesis testing, and instead takes a scenario approach to uncertainty.  
In addition, while nonlinear models, such as CGE, DSGE68 and ABMs, are less rigid, the additional 
parameters and functional forms introduce further uncertainty, and are frequently criticised for 
being hard to validate. Complexity, thus, does not necessarily add value. Many also argue that more 
flexible approaches, such as CGE models, are overly optimistic about the extent that economies can 
 
68 Although, as discussed, DSGE models are frequently linearised to help estimate equilibrium solutions. 
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adapt to shocks, and so may underestimate economic impacts (Galbusera and Giannopoulos, 2018; 
Rose, 2004). 
Nevertheless, rigidity of fixed production recipes means that IOA likely overestimates economic 
impacts. It also implies that they are more appropriately used to analyse relatively small demand or 
supply shocks, not large structural changes69. The rigidity of only being able to vary prices or 
quantities is another disadvantage of the simplicity of IOA but, as demonstrated in Chapter 5, the 
model empirically still appears to be useful. 
Based on the aforementioned criteria, particularly the ability to transparently see causal structural 
mechanics, combined with the model’s empirical performance over short and medium time-
horizons, IOA appears to be the most appropriate methodology to address the research questions 
outlined in Chapter 2. It is ideally placed to model multiple household groups and industries, and to 
understand how indirect effects ripple across different parts of the network structure of an 
economy. The linear nature of IOA is not realistic and it models the economy in an excessively rigid 
way, for example, via fixed production recipes. Empirical analysis in Chapter 5, however, indicates 
that the model performs reasonably well over short and medium time-scales and so can be used to 
generate plausible scenarios of economic responses to climate change impacts in a given year. In 
addition, one should remember that none of the proposed modelling techniques can reliably project 
out over many decades. The scenario approach taken in this thesis also neutralises the Lucas 
critique, as the scenarios generated are explicitly viewed as being only a sample of many possible 
future worlds. There is no claim that the scenarios are likely to reflect policy environments in, say, 
2100. Similarly, while IOA traditionally does not consider uncertainty, this is not an issue as the 
thesis is taking a scenario rather than probabilistic approach. The transparency of IOA lends itself to 
a scenario approach, as one can easily understand why results emerge. While IOA is not dynamic, 
the research questions in Chapter 2 are focused on new long-run states, not the transitions to these 
new states, so the static nature of IOA is not troubling. IOA assumes that the economy moves 
towards a stable equilibrium, which could be unrealistic. IOA’s inability to model supply-side 
responses is also a disadvantage, because the methodology thus models only half of the picture. As 
has been shown, however, IOA has many significant advantages over the other modelling types, and 
these are well-suited to address the research questions outlined in Chapter 2. So, for this purpose, 
IOA’s strengths outweigh its limitations. 
 
69 This restriction does not mean that IOA cannot be used to study disasters, as disasters often do not produce 
large structural changes. As discussed, IOA is a popular tool for disaster impact analysis (Galbusera and 
Giannopoulos, 2018; Okuyama and Santos, 2014). 
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3.4 Measuring inequality 
The final key methodological choice is how income inequality should be measured in this thesis, as 
there is no single measure of inequality.  
An income distribution contains lots of information, which various inequality indices attempt to 
encapsulate in a single number to enable easy comparison of different distributions. Lots of 
information is inevitably lost in this process, so all measures of inequality have varying pros and 
cons. The most appropriate measure of inequality may, thus, vary depending on the specific 
question being addressed. 
Figure 3.1 – Graphical explanation of the Gini coefficient 
 
 Notes: The figure shows a graphical representation of the Gini coefficient using a Lorenz curve, which plots cumulative population 
share against cumulative income share. The Lorenz curve for a perfectly equal society is a line going through the origin at 45o. The 
Gini coefficient is the ratio of the area between the realised Lorenz curve and the Lorenz curve for a perfectly equal society, C, to the 
area under the latter, C + D. 
The Lorenz curve, which forms the basis of many inequality indexes, plots cumulative population 
share against cumulative income share. The Gini coefficient, which is the most commonly-used 
measure of inequality, is the ratio of the area between the realised Lorenz curve and the Lorenz 
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curve for a perfectly equal society70, to the area under the latter. See Figure 3.1 for a diagram. 
Assuming that no one has a negative income, the Gini coefficient can vary between 0 and 1.  
As the Gini coefficient is derived from income shares, it will not change if all incomes increase by the 
same factor. This is called ‘scale invariance’. In contrast, some common measures of dispersion, such 
as the range, variance or standard deviation, are not scale invariant. The Gini coefficient also fulfils 
the ‘transfer principle’, where a transfer from a higher income person to a lower income person 
decreases inequality, provided the transfer does not reduce the former’s income to below the 
latter’s. Finally, it meets the ‘anonymity principle’, as it does not matter which particular individuals 
in a group have which incomes. 
To calculate the Gini coefficient, one often estimates the Lorenz curve. This is frequently done by 
plotting known data points, and then assuming straight lines between these points (Morgan, 1962). 
One can then estimate the Gini coefficient from areas of trapezia and triangles. As the Lorenz curve 
is convex, this always leads to the Gini coefficient being underestimated, with the approximation 
improving as the quantity of available data increases. Parametric estimates are also often used to 
estimate the Lorenz curve (Schader and Schmid, 1994). Other methods for estimating the Gini 
coefficient can involve using the covariance of incomes and income rankings, for example, Milanovic 
(1997), or using the mathematically equivalent expression of the Gini coefficient as half the relative 
mean absolute difference of all pairs of incomes (Dorfman, 1979). The Gini coefficient is generally 
more complicated to calculate than other inequality indexes, particularly when dealing with grouped 
data, such as quantiles (Gastwirth, 1972). 
Atkinson (1970) argued that inequality indexes, such as the Gini coefficient, while seemingly 
providing an objective way to rank different distributions, involve implicit value judgements, and 
that it would be preferable to transparently state the underlying social welfare function71 so that it 
can be debated. Atkinson proposed an index that is scale invariant, and meets the transfer and 
anonymity principles, but where one can alter an inequality aversion coefficient, 𝜀, to change the 
weight placed on different parts of an income distribution. The Atkinson index, 𝐴 , takes the form 
𝐴 = 1 − ∑ (𝑦 ) , 
where 𝑛, 𝜇 and 𝑦  are the number of people in the population, the mean income, and individual 𝑖’s 
income respectively. 𝜀 varies between 0 and 1, and when it is nearer the former or the latter, the 
index is more sensitive to the wealthiest and poorest ends respectively of the income distribution. 
 
70 The Lorenz curve for a perfectly equal society is a line going through the origin at 45o. 
71 See Chapter 2 for a definition and discussion of social welfare functions. 
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The Atkinson index can also be additively decomposed into within group and between group 
inequalities, and thus can be a more appropriate index than the Gini when dealing with grouped 
data. 
Generalised entropy (GE) measures of inequality are also common, with the Theil T index being 
particularly popular. The latter takes the form 
𝑇 = ∑ ln . 
Like the Atkinson index, GE measures satisfy scale invariance, the transfer and anonymity principles, 
and can be additively decomposed. Both the Atkinson and Theil T indexes, however, are not very 
intuitive. Moreover, as SAMs do not contain information on within-household-group income 
inequality, the ability to decompose an inequality index into within-group and between-group 
inequality was not useful for this thesis. 
Inequality ratios, such as the ratio of incomes at the 90th and 10th percentiles72, are also popular, as 
they are much easier to understand than inequality indices. However, they do not use all the 
information in an income distribution, as all but two data points are ignored. 
While condensing an income distribution down into one number enables ranking of different 
distributions, the implicit or explicit value judgements required to do this mean the ranking is not 
objective. As was seen in Chapter 2, collapsing a multi-dimensional problem down onto one-
dimension is never value-free. For this thesis, it was thus decided to use inequality ratios, to paint a 
clear picture of how income distributions evolved, and to allow readers to make their own value 
judgements about the desirability of different distributions. For example, the Q5/Q1, 
(Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2), Q5/Q3 and Q3/Q1 ratios73 were estimated in Chapter 6’s IAM case study, where 
Q1 and Q5 were the incomes of the bottom and top income or expenditure74 quintiles respectively. 
The ratios allowed changes in inequality between the top and bottom and within the upper and 
lower halves of the income distribution to be transparently explored, and the ratios collectively used 
all the information in the SAM income distributions, as would be the case if using an inequality 
 
72 An income percentile is the value of income below which a given percentage of the population’s incomes lie. 
For example, the 90th percentile is the value of income below which 90% of the population’s incomes lie. 
73 While four inequality ratios were calculated, it should be noted that inequality is being captured using three 
rather than four dimensions, as (Q5/Q3)*(Q3/Q1) = Q5/Q1. Results for all four ratios were quoted to make 
changes to the different parts of the income distribution explicitly clear. 
74 The Egypt and India SAMs break households down into expenditure deciles. The Ethiopia, Vietnam and 
Zambia SAMs break households down into expenditure quintiles. The Mexico SAM breaks households down 
into income deciles. The USA SAM breaks households down into income quintiles.  
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index. Unlike the latter, however, this collection of ratios is intuitive and does not pretend that an 
income distribution can objectively be captured by a single number.  
3.5 Choice of IAM case study 
Having established the research questions in Chapter 2, and chosen a scenario analysis approach to 
uncertainty and IOA modelling of inequality effects earlier in this chapter, one must now consider 
which IAM is best placed to generate the climate scenarios and associated economic impacts that 
will form the exogenous changes underpinning the case study in Chapter 6. Similarly, as the research 
questions require analysis of multiple countries, one must establish the criteria for selecting these 
countries and then locate appropriate SAMs. 
3.5.1 Why FUND? 
To answer the research questions outlined in Chapter 2, the methodology must be able to explore 
effects arising from impacts to different economic sectors. FUND is the only IAM to have broken 
economic impacts down by sector. It would be extremely time-consuming to go through all the 
impact studies used by another IAM, use these to suggest sector-level damage functions, and then 
calibrate the latter. FUND is also the model where the most effort has been put into calibrating 
damage functions for different regions based on region-specific impact studies. Finally, it is relatively 
transparent, with all the impact studies used clearly listed in its model documentation. One can thus 
assess FUND’s assumptions and shortcomings more readily than one can for many other prominent 
IAMs, such as DICE and PAGE. 
As such, FUND 3.9, the most recent version of FUND, was used for the IAM case study in Chapter 6.   
3.5.2 Choice of countries explored in FUND case study 
As seen in Chapter 2, existing studies suggest that initial inequality and average income may 
influence how vulnerable a country is to climate change induced inequality. It was thus important for 
this thesis to use a sample of economies with a wide range of starting inequalities and overall levels 
of development. Coastal countries were also desirable, so that the effect of sea-level rise (SLR) could 
be explored, as were countries from a range of FUND geographical regions, because FUND estimates 






Table 3.3 – Countries featuring in the FUND case study, their characteristics that demonstrate that 
they meet the country criteria, and the sourced SAMs that form the basis of each country’s analysis 














Egypt 2010/11 0.31 2,413 Lower-
middle 
Yes NAF Al-Riffai et al. 
(2016) 
Ethiopia 2010/11 0.33 768 Low No SSA Ahmed et al. 
(2017) 
India 2007/08 0.37 1,979 Lower-
middle 
Yes SAS Pal and 
Bandarlage 
(2017) 
Mexico 2008 0.44 8,910 Upper-
middle 




2016 0.43 59,928 High Yes USA SAM was 
constructed in 
this thesis, as 
described in 
Chapter 4 
Vietnam 2007 0.34 2,342 Lower-
middle 
Yes SEA Arndt et al. 
(2014) 
Zambia 2007 0.55 1,513 Lower-
middle 
No SSA Chikuba et al. 
(2013) 
* From World Bank (2019a). ** From World Bank (2016b). *** See Anthoff and Tol (2014b) for the full list of countries in each FUND 
region. 
Notes: The table details the seven countries that feature in the FUND case study in Chapter 6, along with the year of the sourced SAM that 
will form the basis of that country’s analysis, the Gini coefficient indicated by this SAM, the 2017 GDP per capita in the country, the World 
Bank income group in which the country is classified, whether or not the country is coastal, the FUND geographical region the country is 
in, and the reference to the study where the sourced SAM can be found. The Gini coefficient is the most commonly used inequality index. 




Table 3.3 lists the countries that were explored in the FUND case study. According to World Bank 
data for all countries, the average inequality Gini coefficient for a country between 2008 and 2016 
ranged from 0.25 (the Ukraine) to 0.63 (South Africa). From Table 3.3, one can that see that the 
countries explored in the FUND case study span 63% of this range, so the case studies include 
countries with a wide range75 of starting levels of inequality. All four World Bank country income 
groups, high, upper-middle, lower-middle and low, are also represented in the set of countries 
studied, as are coastal countries and six FUND geographical regions. A suitably disaggregated76 
existing SAM could not be found for a high-income country, so one77 was constructed from scratch 
for the United States (US). The US was chosen above other high-income countries because it is one 
of the wealthiest countries in the world by GDP per capita, is currently relatively unequal compared 
to most of the other countries featuring in the study, is coastal, and is from a FUND geographical 
region that would not otherwise feature in the study. It also has readily available, reliable data. 
3.6 Choice of impact studies case study 
Finally, the subject of the impact studies case study had to be chosen. An area with potentially large 
and diverse impacts from climate change was needed, as such a place could conceivably see 
significant changes in inequality from global warming. 
Mean near-surface warming near the Earth’s poles has occurred at twice the rate as warming at 
 
75 The whole range is not spanned because suitable SAMs could not be found for countries at the extremes of 
the range. In addition to being sufficiently disaggregated, SAMs had to be considered reliable. This project thus 
used only SAMs created in this thesis, SAMs produced by government agencies or the International Food Policy 
Research Institute (IFPRI), or SAMs presented in peer-reviewed papers. The IFPRI runs the Nexus Project, 
which aims to build high quality SAMs to calibrate CGE models. The project was launched to improve 
transparency and consistency between SAMs, and it has assembled a large number of SAMs for lower-income 
countries. SAMs published in peer-reviewed journals, for example, Diao et al. (2012), and produced by national 
statistics offices, for example, IFPRI and CAPMAS (2016), are part of this project. United Nations institutions, 
such as the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the International Fund for 
Agricultural Development help deliver the Nexus project, and IFPRI SAMs have been sponsored by the World 
Bank; for example, see IFPRI (2015). It was consequently deemed a trustworthy source. As a final check that 
only reliable SAMs were used, key macroeconomic data, such as GDP, the main sectors contributing towards 
GDP, and the Gini coefficient, were taken from the SAMs and compared to national statistics and World Bank 
Gini estimates (World Bank, 2016a) to check that that SAMs were consistent with reputable macroeconomic 
statistics. 
76 In addition to having disaggregated household accounts, to meaningfully explore drivers of inequality a SAM 
must also have sufficiently disaggregated factors of production accounts. If the labour account, say, is not 
disaggregated, for example, by the educational-level of workers, then household groups will receive a fixed 
percentage of any new wages, regardless of which industry has generated these wages. This is a very 
incomplete picture of the drivers of inequality in an economy (Pieters, 2010). 
77 As the US SAM was constructed from scratch from national statistics data that was available in time-series, a 
time-series of three SAMs, for 2003, 2010 and 2016, could thus be relatively quickly constructed. This series 
was then used in Chapter 5, along with two existing SAM time-series, to test the assumptions underpinning 




more central latitudes (Cohen et al., 2014). The Arctic and Antarctic are thus likely to experience 
more severe climate change than the rest of the globe. While there is no significant economy in 
Antarctica, Arctic economies are particularly linked to the environment and natural resources 
(Berman and Schmidt, 2019), and the effects of global warming could vary considerably from sector-
to-sector. For example, ships with ice-breaking capabilities are expensive, and so Arctic shipping and 
fishing are only economically viable in ice-free waters. Loss of sea ice is thus expected to open up 
more Arctic shipping routes (Smith and Stephenson, 2013). The Arctic seabed is also thought to be 
rich in undiscovered minerals, oil and gas (Gautier et al., 2009). In addition, industrial activities in the 
Arctic give rise to local production networks (Stephenson and Agnew, 2016), and such infrastructure 
and supporting settlements would probably expand to facilitate increased industry. 
There are, however, also likely to be large costs to Arctic economies from climate change. For 
example, as permafrost thaw damages infrastructure (Melvin et al., 2017), sea-level rise and 
increased coastal erosion jeopardises communities (Berman and Schmidt, 2019), more intense Arctic 
cyclones cause disruption (Day et al., 2018), and subsistence activities, such as hunting, are affected 
by impaired ecosystems (Markon et al., 2012). 
Finally, it is unclear whether some sectors will likely benefit or suffer. For example, the central Arctic 
Ocean, currently protected by ice, may be an abundant source for fisheries (Hoag, 2017), and 
warmer Arctic oceans and reduced sea ice might boost primary production78 through 
photosynthesising phytoplankton (Park et al., 2015), which, in turn, could increase Arctic fish stocks. 
On the other hand, as a result of reduced sea-ice, Arctic oceans may absorb more CO2, and thus 
become more acidic (Thor et al., 2018), which could undermine calcifying species (Lischka and 
Riebesell, 2012), such as pteropods, mussels, and clams. In addition, changing ocean temperatures 
could lead to fish migrating from lower latitudes to higher latitudes, with invasive species possibly 
disrupting existing species (Frainer et al., 2017). Similarly, while climate change may increase the 
agricultural growing season in the Arctic, it could also dry out the soil (Markon et al., 2012). The 
likely effects on tourism are also debated, as warming could increase summer tourism opportunities 
but decrease winter ones (Yu et al., 2009). 
Different economic sectors in the Arctic may, thus, see large and diverse impacts from climate 
change, which could, in turn, have large and diverse economic impacts on different households. To 
explore this, an Arctic economy was chosen for the impact studies case study.  
 
78 Primary producers use photosynthesis and chemosynthesis to make carbon compounds from CO2. Examples 
include phytoplankton, such as algae and photosynthesising bacteria. Primary producers are the foundation of 
aquatic ecosystems.  
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The US provides extensive economic data on a state-by-state basis, far more so than, say, Russia or 
Norway do for their internal regions. There is also an existing suitable SAM for Alaska (Seung, 2014), 
while one couldn’t be found for Arctic regions in any other country. In addition, there are impact 
studies covering many different sectors in Alaska.  
As one can see from Table 3.3, while all World Bank country income groups are represented in the 
FUND case study, five of the seven countries that feature are low or lower-middle income. Alaska’s 
GDP per capita in 2017 was USD 71,274, even higher than the US average of USD 59,928. As the US 
was the wealthiest country in the FUND case study, Alaska’s inclusion in this thesis improves 
representation of the upper end of the global income distribution. This was an additional benefit, as 
the literature review in Chapter 2 suggested that average income may influence how vulnerable a 
country is to climate change induced inequality. 
3.7 Summary 
This chapter explained the main methodological and subject choices made in this thesis.  
Firstly, it introduced the different types of IAMs, and explained that IAMs that specialise in 
estimating the economic impacts of changes in climate variables will be explored in this thesis. 
Common criticisms of these types of IAMs were then presented, including concerns around 
discounting, equity weights, commensurability, uncertain climate projections and damage functions, 
and the inherent difficulties of testing counterfactual models. Much of the criticism stems from 
these IAMs’ use of CBA, which is not a tool used in this thesis. Nevertheless, in light of the high levels 
of uncertainty in the model and the difficulties, in general, of modelling complex nonlinear systems 
over long periods of time, this thesis does not attempt to make predictions, do statistical hypothesis 
testing, or run Monte Carlo simulations. It instead takes a scenario approach to uncertainty, to get 
an idea of the range of outcomes that may occur. The focus will be on exploring tendencies and the 
factors driving them, seeing if any persuasive patterns emerge, and putting forward qualitative 
propositions. The IPCC SRES and RCP scenarios will be used. 
To decide which methodology is most appropriate to extend IAMs and impact studies so that they 
can estimate the impact of climate change on income inequality, and so address the research 
questions outlined in Chapter 2, this chapter then reviewed the main tools currently used for 
macroeconomic modelling and compared their key characteristics, strengths and weaknesses. This 
review suggested that IOA should be used in this thesis, as it is well placed to model multiple 
industries and households, and to understand how indirect effects ripple across different parts of 
the network structure of an economy. Different common ways of measuring inequality were then 
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presented, and it was argued that inequality ratios are transparent and allow readers to make their 
own value judgements about the desirability of different distributions. Inequality ratios will thus be 
used to measure inequality in this thesis. 
Given the research questions outlined in Chapter 2, it was then explained that FUND is the most 
appropriate IAM to be used for the IAM case study in Chapter 6. Criteria for choosing which 
countries were the focus of this study were subsequently outlined by drawing upon the literature 
review in Chapter 2, and SAMs for appropriate countries were identified. Finally, Alaska, an area 
with potentially large and diverse impacts from climate change that could conceivably produce 





















Chapter 4 – The Social Accounting Matrices 
(SAMs) 
This chapter describes the compilation and adaptation of social accounting matrices (SAMs) needed 
for the case studies. Section 4.1 introduces input-output tables (IOTs) and SAMs, and how they are 
generally constructed. Section 4.2 described the algorithmic and residual methodologies that are 
typically used to balance SAMs, and explains and justifies the balancing procedures used in this 
thesis. Section 4.3 documents the construction of the United States (US) SAMs that are used to 
empirically test input-output analysis (IOA) assumptions in Chapter 5, and in the IAM case study in 
Chapter 6. Section 4.4 explains adaptations made to existing SAMs for other countries that form part 
of the IAM case study in Chapter 6, and to an existing Alaskan SAM, which is needed for the impact 
studies case study in Chapter 7. 
4.1 Introduction to SAMs 
4.1.1 What are input-output tables (IOTs) and social accounting matrices (SAMs)? 
IOTs map inter-industry monetary flows over a given time period, usually a year. The manufacturing 
sector, for example, may need to buy energy to enable production. Similarly, the agricultural 
industry may need manufactured products, such as tractors, to help cultivate and harvest crops. 
IOTs track such purchases, and also document consumption from institutions, such as households, 
government and the rest of the world (ROW). The inter-industry purchases, referred to as 
‘intermediate demand’, are compiled into a square matrix whose elements represent monetary 
flows from the column industries to the row industries. Meanwhile, value added, total output, and 
institutional consumption, which is traditionally called ‘final demand’, are defined as vectors. Figure 










Figure 4.1 – A typical IOT layout 
 







Intermediate demand Final demand Total output 
Industry 2 
Value-added 
Indirect taxes, compensation of 
employees and retained earnings 
 
Total output Total output 
 
Notes: The figure shows the constituent parts and layout of a typical input-output table (IOT). Column accounts make payments to row 
accounts. The payments an industry makes to other industries plus indirect taxes, compensation of employees that it pays and retained 
earnings must be equal to payments it receives from other industries, households, government and the rest of the world (ROW). 
SAMs continue this accounting procedure of mapping flows over the course of a year from column 
to row sectors, but provide a more complete picture of an economy. They are square matrices that 
typically include factors of production and the capital account, in addition to the usual industries, 
commodities and institutions. As they are square matrices, they contain information on flows 
between institutions, such as direct taxes and benefits, and value-added payments to institutions, 
such as wages and profits. SAMs thus capture the expenditure-production-income circular flow 
around an economy more comprehensively than an IOT. SAMs also often disaggregate households 
into different groups, so one can show, for example, households with different levels of income 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Notes: The figure shows the constituent parts and layout of a typical social accounting matrix (SAM). Column accounts make payments to 




4.1.2 How SAMs are constructed 
Constructing a SAM is a large undertaking as they are extremely data-intensive. The first frameworks 
for constructing SAMs were provided by Richard Stone (Stone and Brown, 1962), the World Bank 
(Pyatt and Round, 1977) and Keuning and Ruuter (1988), while more recent manuals on SAM 
construction include Pyatt (1991), Round (2003) and Breisinger et al. (2009). In addition, the UN 
System of National Accounts advises on compiling national statistics and encourages similar 
practices across different countries, along with the collection of data, such as ‘make-matrices’, that 
are useful for building IOTs and SAMs. 
When constructing a SAM, one typically starts by compiling a highly aggregated SAM, called a 
‘macro-SAM’, where, for example, all industries are aggregated into a single industries account, and 
all household groups and different factors are combined into respective households and factors 
accounts. Figure 4.2 is an example structure for a macro SAM. 
For a SAM to be internally consistent, the money flowing into an account over a year must be equal 
to the money flowing out of that account over the year. This ensures that all spending and saving is 
financed, and that money does not appear from nowhere or vanish into the ether. When this 
condition is fulfilled, a SAM is said to be ‘balanced’. 
One must draw upon data from a variety of sources when building a SAM. Typical sources include 
national statistics, government reports, household and business surveys, and central bank data. 
Discrepancies are often found between estimates of an element from different sources due to 
differences in estimation procedures, slightly different classification schemes or exchange rates, and 
omissions or errors. As detailed in the following section, algorithmic or residual techniques are then 
used to balance a SAM; although judgements can also be made about which source is more reliable 
(Round, 2003). 
Each element in a macro-SAM represents a matrix of flows between disaggregated accounts; for 
example, interindustry purchases or consumption flows from households to commodities. So after 
assembling a macro-SAM, one typically disaggregates all macro-SAM elements into their underlying 
matrices to create a ‘micro-SAM’79. This typically uses weights derived from survey data. Each 
submatrix in the micro-SAM will be equal to its corresponding element in the macro-SAM. 
Algorithmic or residual techniques are then used to balance the micro-SAM. 
 
79 One could build a micro-SAM without a macro-SAM; however, this is relatively uncommon, as aggregate 




4.2 Balancing SAMs 
4.2.1 Algorithmic balancing 
One typically knows what the row, 𝑢 , and column, 𝑣 , totals should be, but has a raw matrix, 𝒁(0), 
with elements 𝑧 (0) describing the monetary payment by account 𝑗 to account 𝑖, that doesn’t 
generate those row and column totals. There are many different matrices that could generate 𝑢  and 
𝑣 . So which estimate, 𝒁(1), of the true matrix, 𝒁(1), should one choose? The standard approach is 
to define a matrix of ‘technical coefficients’, 𝑨(0), with elements 𝑎 (0) describing the monetary 
payment by account 𝑗 to account 𝑖, per unit of account 𝑗’s total expenditure, such that 𝑨(0)  =
𝒁(0)𝒙 , where 𝒙 is a vector of respectively ordered known account totals, 𝑥 , 𝒙 is a diagonal matrix 
with the elements of 𝒙 forming its main diagonal, and 𝒙  is its inverse. One then uses linear or 
nonlinear optimisation to find a new estimated matrix, 𝑨(1), with corresponding elements 𝑎 (1), 
which satisfies known constraints whilst minimising the deviation from the 𝑨(0). There are, 
however, many different measures of closeness one could minimise. 
Let us explore the most popular measures. 
4.2.1.1 Linear and quadratic closeness measures 
Quadratic measures of closeness, such as ∑ ∑ 𝑎 (0) − 𝑎 (1) , penalise larger deviations over 
smaller ones, whereas linear measures, for example ∑ ∑ 𝑎 (0) − 𝑎 (1) , give all deviations equal 
weight. Both quadratic and linear techniques do not necessarily protect the signs of coefficients, 
which is problematic, as economic flows are unlikely to suddenly reverse direction. One can, 
however, achieve this by adding 𝑚 × 𝑚 𝑎 (1) ≥ 0 constraints, where 𝑚 is the number of elements 
in a column or row, having moved elements within the 𝒁(0) matrix before generating 𝑨(0) and 
running the balancing programme, so that a negative value at 𝑧 (0) is removed, multiplied by -1, 
and then added to 𝑧 (0). If account A pays account B -£x, for example, this entry could be moved 
within the matrix so that B instead pays A £x. With these additional constraints, programming must 
be used to minimise even quadratic measures of closeness, as an optimisation problem with 
inequality constraints cannot be solved analytically. 
Many different linear and quadratic approaches have been proposed for minimising the deviation of 
𝑨(1) from 𝑨(0) subject to ∑ 𝑎 (1)𝑥 = 𝑢 , ∑ 𝑎 (1)𝑥 = 𝑣 , and ∑ 𝑎 (1) = 1. The relative 
squared deviation, ∑ ∑
[ ( ) ( )]
( )
, for example, allows for greater variation in larger 
coefficients, and the relative absolute deviation, ∑ ∑
| ( ) ( )|
( )
, has also been used. Similarly, to 
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prioritise reducing changes in larger elements, which typically have greater input-output analysis 
(IOA) multiplier effects80, the weighted squared deviation or weighted absolute deviation can be 
used. Here the deviations are multiplied by the base coefficient, for example, ∑ ∑ 𝑎 (0) 𝑎 (0) −
𝑎 (1) . Sometimes, instead of using the base coefficients as weights, the latter can reflect 
subjective assessments of the accuracy of starting coefficients. 
4.2.1.2 Information gain 
‘Information’, as introduced by Hartley (1928), is a measure of the uncertainty that is resolved when 
one of many possible messages is received. It is therefore dependent on the probability, 𝑝 , that 
message 𝑘 occurs. Logarithms lend themselves to measuring information. The logarithm power rule, 
ln (s ) = nln(s), for example, means that the information contained in rolling a dice three times 
will be equal to three times the information contained in rolling that dice once. Similarly, the 
logarithm power rule, ln(AB) = ln (A) + ln (B), means that the information contained in flipping a 
coin and rolling a dice will be equal to the information contained in flipping a coin plus the 
information contained in rolling a dice. Finally, ln (x) is a continuous, monotonically increasing 
function, so the more surprising an event, the higher its information content. Shannon (1948) 
proved that the logarithm was the only function that had these necessary properties, so information 
is defined to be −ln (𝑝 ). As 𝑝 ≤ 1, the negative logarithm is used so that information is not 
negative. 
‘Information entropy’ or ‘Shannon entropy’, 𝐻, as defined by Shannon (1948), is the expected 
information content of a message transmitted by a source from among multiple possible messages. 
Specifically, 𝐻 = − ∑ 𝑝 ln (𝑝 ). Imagine that one has an estimate, 𝑞, of a true probability 
distribution, 𝑝. If the information coding system is designed for 𝑞 instead of 𝑝, then the information 
received is based upon 𝑞, but the actual probability that a message occurs will still be 𝑝. The 
expected information content, 𝐻(𝑝, 𝑞), will thus be 𝐻(𝑝, 𝑞) = − ∑ 𝑝 ln (𝑞 ). This is called the 
‘cross-entropy’ between 𝑝 and 𝑞. The error introduced by calculating the cross-entropy instead of 
the actual entropy of the probability distribution 𝑝 is called the ‘Kullback–Leibler divergence’, 
𝐷 (𝑃||𝑄), where 
𝐷 (𝑃||𝑄) =  − ∑ 𝑝 ln (𝑞 ) − (− ∑ 𝑝 ln (𝑝 )) =  ∑ 𝑝 ln . 
This is the expected increase in information required to communicate messages when the coding 
system has been designed for an approximation of the actual probability distribution. The Kullback–
 
80 See Chapter 5 for an explanation of multiplier effects. 
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Leibler divergence, which is also never negative, is often called the ‘information measure of 
distance’. 
As a SAM is a table of inputs which can be expressed as percentages of each sector’s output, Theil 
(1967) noted that this is analogous to a joint probability distribution, and so information theories can 
be applied. For example, for balancing a SAM, the information divergence will be 




One is then seeking the A(1) that minimises D (A(1)||A(0)), under the constraints  
∑ 𝑎 (1)𝑥 = u  and ∑ 𝑎 (1)𝑥 = 𝑣 . Using a Lagrangian function81, 𝐷 (𝑨(1)||𝑨(0)) can be 
minimised to give 𝑎 (1) = 𝑟 𝑎 (0)𝑠 , or 
𝑨(1)  = 𝒓𝑨(0)𝒔, 
where 
𝑟 = ∑ ( )
𝑖𝑓 𝑖 = 𝑗
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗
  , 𝑠 = ∑ ( )
𝑖𝑓 𝑖 = 𝑗
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗
, 
and 𝑟  and 𝑠  are the components of the diagonal matrices 𝒓 and 𝒔 respectively. One can then 
iteratively solve for 𝒓 and 𝒔. This popular process, known as ‘RAS’, was introduced by Stone (1961). 
Note that as 𝐫 and 𝐬 will always be positive, the RAS approach preserves the signs of coefficients.  
One can add more constraints if desired; for example, to ensure that a submatrix of a micro-SAM 
sums to the equivalent element in the macro-SAM. With additional constraints, however, one can no 
longer use RAS iteration and must instead use nonlinear programming. In such cases, to avoid 
undefined limits arising from zeros, one typically lets 𝑎 = 𝑎 + 𝛿, where 𝛿 is a very small positive 
number (Robinson et al., 2001). 
4.2.2 Residual accounts 
Different parts of a SAM are often known with different levels of confidence. The Federal Reserve, 
say, does not collect data on household changes in assets and liabilities in its Financial Accounts of 
the United States (FED, 2018a). Changes in household positions are instead assumed to be changes 
in total assets and liabilities less changes in government, business and ROW positions. Many SAM 
builders, similarly, take the most uncertain account to be a residual account that balances the SAM. 
Pyatt (1991) and IMPLAN (Cheney, 2018), for example, take this approach and make the 
 
81 See Miller and Blair (2009) for the full derivation. 
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savings/capital account residual, while Jemio et al. (2015b) lets the enterprise current account be a 
residual. Residual accounts are then typically assumed to be exogenous in any IOA, i.e. they are 
determined outside of the model and so do not contribute towards multiplier effects. It is also 
common to use a residual account to balance a macro-SAM and then use algorithmic techniques to 
balance the micro-SAM. This approach is taken, for example, by Ahmed et al. (2017), Randriamamon 
and Thurlow (2016), and Thurlow and Van Seventer (2016). 
The advantage of using a residual account is that one preserves the elements one has confidence in 
and that are important to the study. One is only altering exogenous accounts that, by definition, will 
not be a focus of subsequent IOA. Moreover, values produced by national statistics offices are not 
altered by algorithms that frequently do not have economic justification. 
4.2.3 Chosen balancing methodology 
Which balancing methodology is the best? This is difficult to answer as the ‘true’ balanced 
underlying economy is unknown, and tests that take a balanced matrix, unbalance it, and then see 
which technique gets closest to the prior balanced matrix are inherently biased by the measure of 
closeness chosen to assess errors. An entropy-distance measure of error, for example, will find that 
an entropy-distance minimising algorithm performs best. 
Papers typically provide no economic justification for algorithmically balancing SAMs or the choice of 
algorithm. Information-distance minimisation techniques, however, are very popular (Round, 2003). 
If a SAM is only slightly unbalanced, then thankfully only small differences typically emerge when 
using different algorithmic balancing techniques (Round, 2003). 
For this thesis, residual accounts were used to balance the US macro- and micro-SAMs, as described 
in the subsequent section. This ensured that the US National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) 
data used to construct the macro-SAMs was preserved. It also meant that survey data used to 
disaggregate crucial submatrices in the micro-SAMs would not be arbitrarily adjusted. As a statistical 
discrepancy forms part of the NIPAs, this was given its own account in the SAMs, and balancing 
adjustments took place here. The account was then assumed to be exogenous to the model in all 
subsequent IOA82, so it did not influence results. The adjustments required to balance both the 
macro- and micro-SAMs in all cases summed to the statistical discrepancy quoted for that year in the 
NIPAs. 
Sometimes, using two different surveys to disaggregate a macro-SAM element, or using the same 
survey in different ways, would occasionally produce different results. In such cases, the RAS 
 
82 The IOA models are described in Chapter 5. 
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procedure was, however, used to reconcile the different survey results by adjusting the less 
confidently known disaggregated sub-matrix elements to the more confidently known submatrix 
row and column totals. Such instances are clearly indicated in Appendix D and, as discussed, such 
reconciliation procedures are common in SAM construction. 
As described in section 4.4, the Alaska-SAM (Seung, 2014) required further disaggregation and then 
rebalancing. Existing residual elements were used for the latter. In addition, the RAS procedure was 
used to reconcile survey results with known submatrix row and column totals, so that all the data in 
the original peer-reviewed Alaskan SAM was preserved. All such instances are clearly indicated in 
section 4.4. 
4.3 Constructing US SAM time-series 
The Bureau of Economic Analysis’ NIPAs provide extensive national accounting data, with historical 
data available from the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) database (FED, 2018b). As time-series 
could thus be obtained, it was decided that a time-series of US SAMs, for 2003, 2010 and 2016, 
should be compiled to empirically test the extent that useful lessons for a country’s future might be 
learnt from an IOA of a recent SAM83. This analysis can be found in Chapter 5, and it was also used to 
guide which accounts were assumed to be exogenous to the model in the IOA in Chapters 6 and 7. 
As compiling SAMs is highly time and data intensive, very few SAM time series currently exist. 
Constructing such a time-series was, thus, a useful extension, and a methodological contribution to 
IOA, as such empirical tests could hitherto only be found for IOT, not SAM, time-series. 
4.3.1 US macro-SAMs 
The NIPA ‘selected tables’ (BEA, 2018a) clearly show how the different NIPA components are 
combined to get balanced accounts. These national accounting identities were followed to construct 
the US SAMs. Figure 4.3 shows the codes used in this thesis to label the different elements in the US 
macro-SAMs, and Appendix D details the data series title(s) and source database(s) used to compile 
each element.  
The statistical discrepancy in the NIPAs arises from the different methodologies used to estimate 
gross domestic product (GDP) and gross domestic income (GDI). Theoretically, these should be 
equal. In practice, however, they are always slightly different, as they are compiled using the 
 
83 Earlier SAMs were not compiled, as some data series changed in 2003, so SAMs before and after this year 
would not be directly comparable. 
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expenditure and income approaches respectively. The same statistical discrepancy also features in 
the savings and investments component of the NIPAs, because gross saving is estimated as part of 
the income method, while capital account expenditures are estimated as part of the expenditures 
approach. 









































































Commodities  I1  Hcur1  Gcur1 Inv Sd Cap1 R1 Tcom 
Industries C1          Tind 









Households   F1  Ecur1 Gcur2    R3 Thcur 
Enterprises   F2 Hcur2  Gcur3    R4 Tecur 
Government    F3 Hcur3 Ecur2     R5 Tgcur 
Inventories         Cap2  Tinv 
Statistical 
discrepancy         Cap3  Tsd 
Capital account    Hcur4 Ecur3 Gcur4     Tcap 
ROW C2  F4 Hcur5 Ecur4 Gcur5   Cap4  Trow 
Column totals Tcom Tind Tfac Thcur Tecur Tgcur Tinv Tsd Tcap Trow  
 
Notes: Figure shows the codes used in the chapter text to refer to the different elements of the US SAMs. Grey cells without labels are not 
populated in the SAM and so are not assigned codes. Appendix D details the data series title(s) and source database(s) used to compile 
each element. 
Two elements, intermediate consumption (I2) and gross operating surplus (F2), are not explicitly 
115 
 
estimated as part of the NIPAs, but are the residual of data, so could easily be calculated. In addition, 
a few account totals are not explicitly estimated in the NIPAs, but could be calculated by summing 
together the relevant NIPA elements. For example, the household current account total (Thcur) was 
equal to personal income plus household consumption of fixed capital, contributions for government 
social insurance and transfer receipts from ROW to persons. The two latter components had to be 
added on as personal income in the NIPAs includes the net of these payments, whereas the SAM 
required gross flows. All such calculations are detailed in Appendix D.  
The NIPA breakdown of different receipts and payments between households, enterprises and 
government is comprehensive, with the exception of interest payments and receipts. These are 
given as totals for each institutional account, but the NIPAs do not specify, for example, how receipts 
from personal interest payments are split between the government and enterprises current 
accounts. As total interest payments and receipts to and from each institutional account are known, 
one is faced with six unknowns and six equations, so the system can be solved simultaneously. 
The determinant of the matrix of coefficients is, however, zero, so the system has infinite or non-
existent solutions. As a solution was subsequently found, one was dealing with the former. 
Household and enterprise balance sheet data from the Federal Reserve’s Financial Accounts of the 
United States were used to choose a solution84. Specifically, the ratio of household and enterprise 
holdings of government debt and municipal securities in each relevant year was used as the ratio to 
split government interest payments to persons and business between the household and enterprise 
current accounts. All other interest payments could then be determined from the simultaneous 
equations. 
The produced macro SAMs were very slightly imbalanced due to rounding errors in NIPA data. These 
errors were extremely small in all cases. The largest deviation of a row or column sum from its total 
amounted to 0.00023%. Most of the errors were much smaller, with the average error across all 
SAMs being 0.00001%. As discussed, the statistical discrepancy account was used as a residual to 
correct these imbalances. The account total was still equal to the quoted statistical discrepancy in 
the NIPAs. 
The balanced US macro-SAMs for 2003, 2010 and 2016 can be found in Appendix E. 
4.3.2 US micro-SAMs 
The US macro-SAMs were disaggregated into 73 commodities, 71 industries, 71 value added 
 
84 Leung and Secrieru (2012) similarly use balance sheet data to estimate how property income payments are 
split across institutions when building a Canadian SAM. 
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accounts, and five household accounts. With the additional accounts for enterprises, government, 
inventories, capital, ROW and statistical discrepancies, the micro-SAMs are 226 × 226 matrices. 
Appendix F provides a full list of the micro-SAM accounts. The level of disaggregation was 
determined by data availability. The number of commodities and industries accounts, for example, 
was determined by the number of commodities and industries categories in the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis’ (BEAs’) make (BEA, 2018b) and use (BEA, 2018c) tables. Similarly, households were broken-
down into income-quintiles as much of the required household survey data was available at this 
level. 
Appendix D lists the data used to disaggregate each macro element. All these sources indicated the 
proportions by which the relevant macro-SAM element was broken-down. As is usual with SAM 
compilation, the macro-SAM elements were thus preserved, as one has greater confidence in 
national accounts data than other survey data. 
A few surveys were not available on an annual basis, and so disaggregation used data from the 
survey closest to the SAM year. The BEA’s data on value-added data from US direct investment 
abroad broken-down into different industries (BEA, 2018d), for example, was used to disaggregate 
R2, but was only available from 2009 onwards. So R2 in the 2003 SAM was disaggregated using 2009 
proportions. This was a reasonable approximation, as the average standard deviation of percentage 
shares of value-added from abroad for the different industries was only 0.3% from 2009 to 2016. 
This suggests that the breakdown of value added from abroad across different industries does not 
vary much over time. Similarly, the BEA’s data on value added from foreign direct investment (FDI) in 
the US broken down by industry (BEA, 2018e) was used to disaggregate F4, but was only available 
from 2007 onwards. F4 in the 2003 SAM was thus disaggregated using 2007 proportions. Once again, 
this was a reasonable approximation, as the average standard deviation of percentage shares of 
value-added from FDI for the different industries was only 0.5% from 2007 to 2016. There also 
wasn’t a 2003 edition of the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) (Fed, 2018), so 
Hcur2 in the 2003 micro-SAM was disaggregated using the 2004 SCF. Finally, there has only been 
one nationwide survey of household money sent to and received from abroad that covered both 
native and foreign-born households – the 2008 Current Population Survey (CPS) 
immigration/emigration supplement (Census, 2018a). As such, Hcur5 and R3 in all micro-SAMs were 
disaggregated in the proportions indicated in 200885. 
Sometimes, surveys used slightly different industry classifications than the SAMs. For example, while 
 
85 2008 household income quintile income limits from Census Bureau’s historical income tables (Census, 
2018b) were used to determine the proportional split between the household income groups.  
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both the SAM and the CPS (Census, 2018a) use the North American Industry Classification System 
(NAICS), they use different levels of aggregation, so a few of the SAM industries span more than one 
CPS category. In such cases, the wages paid in the CPS by each industry to each household income 
quintile were added together before the proportional split between income quintiles was estimated 
for the given SAM industry. This thus took account of the relative employee numbers and wage 
levels in the different CPS industries in the SAM category. Similarly, when looking at FDI in the US 
and US direct investment abroad for F4 and R2 respectively, where a BEA NIACS category spanned 
more than one SAM NIACS categories, the former’s value-added to or from abroad was distributed 
across the relevant SAM categories in proportion to each SAM categories’ domestic value added. 
This assumed that US companies operating abroad in a given industry have similarly specialisms to 
all other US companies operating in that industry, and that foreign companies operating in a given 
industry in the US are similarly focused to domestic companies operating in that industry. 
Finally, it was necessary to interpolate between data for different household income groups in the 
CPS to allocate wages to household income quintiles. In F1, for example, to estimate the percentage 
breakdown of labour payments from each sector to each household income quintile, data on 
average weekly earnings paid by each industry to employees in 15 different average weekly earnings 
‘bins’86 were used in combination with data on the number of employees in that industry in each 
average weekly earnings bin, broken-down across the 16 CPS annual household income bins to 
which those respondents belonged. The CPS annual household income bins, however, generally did 
not correspond to household income quintile limits estimated by the United States Census Bureau 
(Census, 2018b). In such cases, linear interpolation was used to estimate how many employees in 
the income bin in question fell above and below the relevant quintile income limit.  
While economists sometimes approach such problems by fitting parametric distributions, curve 
fitting is time and computationally intensive, as different distributions must be tried and compared. 
Creating the three micro-SAMs would require fitting 2,340 curves, even without trying different 
distributions, so this approach was not feasible. Distribution fitting can also result in a curve that 
produces large errors for individual bin counts (von Hippel et al., 2017). An alternative popular 
method is to assume that everyone in a household income bin earns the income at the bin mid-
point; however, as the F1 submatrix is a crucial part of the micro-SAM for understanding inequality 
dynamics, this method was deemed too crude. Given that the results of subsequent IOA were not 
being viewed as precise predictions, only approximate estimates to help reveal possible tendencies 
and channels of impact, interpolation was deemed an appropriate compromise between the two 
 
86 An example of an earnings bin is an employee earning between 400.01 USD and 600 USD per week. 
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approaches. Linear interpolation was chosen over cubic-splines because, when estimating Gini 
coefficients from binned income data for each of the 3,221 US counties, linear and cubic-spline 
interpolations were found to produce very similar results (von Hippel et al., 2017). Linear 
interpolation is also used by US national statistics bodies, such as the U.S. Census Bureau, to 
estimate population density within an income interval (FED, 2018c). 
All CPS data had to be weighted so that survey results would reflect characteristics for the entire US 
population. The weights coded ‘HWHHWGT’ were used, as the U.S. Census Bureau recommends 
these for studies focused on household characteristics. 
As discussed, the SAMs were balanced using the statistical discrepancy account as a residual, with 
the account total corresponding to the statistical discrepancy in the NIPAs. Prior to balancing, the 
2003, 2010 and 2016 micro-SAM account totals deviated from their target values, on average, by 
0.6%, 0.8% and 1.1% respectively. 
4.3.3 US edu-SAM 
In addition to having disaggregated household accounts, to meaningfully explore drivers of 
inequality a SAM must also have sufficiently disaggregated factor accounts. If the labour account, 
say, is not disaggregated, then household groups will receive a fixed percentage of any new wages, 
regardless of which industry has generated these wages. This is a very incomplete picture of the 
drivers of inequality in an economy (Pieters, 2010). Pieters (2010), in addition, proposed that labour 
accounts disaggregated by industry, not just labour accounts disaggregated by, say, level of 
education, are required to observe differing inequality effects from growth in different sectors. An 
alternatively disaggregated 2016 US micro-SAM was thus created to test this conjecture. This thesis 
was, consequently, able to make a further methodological contribution to IOA, in terms of the 
information and model set-up required to enable proper exploration of inequality questions. This 
analysis can be found in Chapter 8. 
The alternative 2016 SAM, hereafter called the ‘edu-SAM’, was identical to the 2016 micro-SAM, 
except that value added was disaggregated into seven value added accounts, five of which were 
labour accounts broken down by educational attainment87, instead of 71 industry value added 
accounts. The educational categories that feature in the CPS were used. Appendix F lists these 
alternative accounts, while Appendix D lists the data used for each alternatively disaggregated 
element. 
When using CPS data for I2, the same weekly earnings bin approach was taken as with the other 
 
87 The other two value added accounts were capital and indirect taxes less subsidies. 
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micro-SAMs. Instead of looking at the spread of employees in each industry in each earning bin 
across each household income group, the distribution of employees in each industry in each earning 
bin across each educational category was used in combination with earnings paid by each industry to 
each earnings bin. 
F1 was first disaggregated across educational categories in proportion to CPS data on total earnings 
across all industries broken down by employees’ level of education. It was then further 
disaggregated using data on the number of employees in each education groups across the different 
household income quintiles. Linear interpolation across CPS household income bins was once again 
used. 
Finally, F4 and R2 were disaggregated into labour, capital and indirect taxes less subsidies using the 
usual BEA data on FDI in the US and US direct investment abroad respectively. Data on indirect taxes 
less subsidies was not directly available, but could be calculated as its equal to total value added less 
compensation of employees and net income. The labour components of F4 and R2 were then 
disaggregated using CPS data on total earnings across the different educational categories. This 
assumed that US companies operating abroad and foreign companies operating in the US employ 
similarly educated workers to US companies operating domestically. 
Prior to balancing, the edu-SAM account totals deviated from their target values by 0.9% on average. 
4.4 Adapting other SAMs 
4.4.1 Alaska 
The 2008 Alaskan SAM (Seung, 2014) is disaggregated into 35 commodities, 35 industries, 3 Alaskan 
household income groups88, but only one labour account. As discussed, in addition to having 
disaggregated household accounts, to meaningfully explore drivers of inequality a SAM must also 
have sufficiently disaggregated factor accounts. The Alaskan labour account thus needed to be 
disaggregated into industry labour accounts so that fuller inequality effects could be observed.  
Like the transition from US macro-SAMs to micro-SAMs, data from surveys was used only to indicate 
the proportions by which elements in the original SAM were disaggregated; the total value of 
aggregates remained unchanged to preserve the information contained in the peer-reviewed 
Alaskan SAM. 
 
88 The three household income groups are annual incomes of (i) less than USD 25,000, (ii) USD 25,000 to 
75,000, and (iii) greater than USD 75,000. 
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In the original Alaskan SAM, the labour account receives 99.8% of its income from Alaskan 
industries, and only 0.2% of its income from savings-investment account. The latter was a residual 
payment to balance the labour account. As such, the labour account total was disaggregated into 
industry labour account totals in proportion to the labour payments made by each Alaskan industry. 
As the income from the savings-investment account was already a residual, it was disaggregated in 
the proportions required to balance the industry labour accounts. 
On the payments side of the Alaskan labour account, there were flows to the state and local 
government and federal government accounts. These payments do not represent direct or indirect 
taxes, as these are paid elsewhere in the SAM, so they were assumed to be transfers from the 
Alaskan state and local government and federal government labour accounts respectively to the 
state and local government and federal government current accounts. The wages paid out by the 
Alaskan state and local government and federal government labour accounts could then be 
estimated as the residual of the account totals minus the aforementioned transfers to the state and 
local government and federal government current accounts. These wages, and the account totals for 
all other Alaskan labour accounts89, then needed to be split between wages paid to Alaskan 
households and wages paid to the rest of the US90.  
The Alaskan Department of Labor and Workforce Development publishes data estimating total 
wages paid to residents and non-residents by industry (DOLWD, 2010). The proportions indicated for 
each industry were thus used to disaggregate the wages paid by each industry between Alaskan 
households and the rest of the US. DOLWD (2010) does not collect data on the fish-harvesting 
industry, so it was assumed that the agricultural and fish-harvesting labour accounts paid the same 
proportion of total wages to out-of-state workers. Similarly, DOLWD (2010) also does not collect 
data on federal government wage payments in Alaska, so it was assumed that the Alaskan state and 
local government and Alaskan federal government labour accounts paid the same proportion of 
total wages to out-of-state workers 
Having estimated the breakdown of labour payments by each industry to Alaskan households, these 
were allocated to the different household income groups using CPS data, as the latter could be 
extracted at the state-level. The same process was followed as with the US micro-SAMs. Out of the 
35 industries, there were five, agriculture, food manufacturing, other manufacturing91, wholesale 
 
89 All other Alaskan labour accounts make only two payments; the first to Alaskan households and the second 
to the rest of the US. 
90 Seasonal non-resident workers make up approximately 20% of Alaska’s workforce (DOLWD, 2010). 




trade, and management of companies and enterprises, for which no Alaskan CPS data was available. 
For these industries, the distribution of wages across the three household groups was determined 
using the distribution indicated by US, not Alaska-specific, data. As other manufacturing contained 
13 different NIACS manufacturing codes, to estimate the overall distribution, the distributions 
indicated for each code were weighted by the relative compensation of employees in Alaska in 2008 
for each relevant industry, which were obtained from the BEA (BEA, 2018f). One of the industrial 
categories in the Alaska SAM, ‘miscellaneous’, could not be associated with any NIACS industry code. 
So the overall CPS distribution of wages across the three household groups from Alaskan industries 
collectively was used for this category. 
The RAS procedure was then used across these disaggregated labour account payments to reconcile 
the survey data with the submatrix totals in the original peer-reviewed SAM.  
4.4.2 Adjustments to other SAMs 
Slight adjustments were made to all the other SAMs. Firstly, as FUND estimates changes to total 
agricultural production and does not break this down by product, all agricultural activities and 
commodities in the original SAMs needed to be aggregated into one agriculture activity and one 
agriculture commodity account. Secondly, all the original SAMs had disaggregated households in 
varying ways; for example, broken down by location, i.e. the region or rural or urban, by the gender 
of the head of household, or by the tribal group. In the original SAMs, within these groups, 
households were then further broken-down into national income or expenditure quintiles or deciles. 
To enable comparisons across SAMs, households were aggregated into income or expenditure 
quintiles, with all further divisions removed. Finally, as all FUND damage and income growth 
estimates are in 1995 USD billions, all SAMs were converted into 1995 USD billions. 
Micro-SAMs for all seven countries and Alaska are available from the author upon request92, and a 
list of all accounts in each micro-SAM is provided in Appendix F. 
4.5 Summary 
This chapter introduced SAMs and explained how they are constructed; in particular, how 
algorithmic and residual techniques are used to balance the SAM to ensure that all spending and 
saving is financed. In this thesis, residual accounts were used to balance SAMs to ensure that 
national accounts data was preserved. It also meant that survey data used to disaggregate 





exogenous to the model in the IOA in chapters 6 and 7, so they will not influence results. Where 
using two different surveys to disaggregate a SAM element or using the same survey in different 
ways would produce different results, the RAS procedure was used to reconcile the different survey 
results by adjusting the less confidently known disaggregated sub-matrix elements to the more 
confidently known submatrix row and column totals. Such reconciliation procedures are common in 
SAM construction.  
This chapter then detailed the data sources used to compile the US SAMs and how the data was 
used. As data time-series were available, a time-series of US SAMs, for 2003, 2010 and 2016, was 
compiled to empirically explore the extent that useful lessons for a country’s future can be learnt 
from an IOA of a recent SAM. This analysis can be found in Chapter 5. As compiling SAMs is highly 
time and data intensive, very few SAM time series currently exist. Constructing such a time-series 
was, thus, a useful extension, and a methodological contribution to IOA. Such empirical tests could 
hitherto only be found for IOT, not SAM, time-series. The analysis was also used to guide which 
accounts were assumed to be exogenous to the model in the IOA in Chapters 6 and 7. 
This chapter then went on to compile an alternatively disaggregated US 2016 micro-SAM to test the 
result in Pieters (2010) that labour accounts disaggregated by industry, not just labour accounts 
disaggregated by level of education, are required to observe differing inequality effects from growth 
in different sectors. This thesis was, thus, able to make a further methodological contribution to IOA, 
in terms of the information and model set-up required to enable proper exploration of inequality 
questions. This analysis can be found in Chapter 8. 
Finally, this chapter then detailed how the labour account in the Alaskan SAM that was needed for 
the impact studies case study in Chapter 7 was disaggregated so that fuller inequality effects could 
be observed. The small adjustments made to the SAMs for the other countries that feature in the 









Chapter 5 – Coupling methodology 
This chapter introduces input-output analysis (IOA), the strengths and weaknesses of demand-side 
and supply-side models, the plausibility of assumptions, and equivalence of the models under a 
specific interpretation. This analysis suggests that the Leontief quantity model is most appropriate 
for this thesis, with the mixed endogenous-exogenous (MEE) version used to incorporate supply 
constraints where necessary. The chapter then details the coupling methodology used in the case 
studies to estimate income inequality effects from climate impacts. Approaches for different types 
of impacts are provided. Finally, the chapter analyses social accounting matrix (SAM) time-series to 
explore if useful lessons for the future of a country might be learnt from its recent SAM, or if, instead 
of concentrating on a country’s specific results, general lessons should be drawn from across a range 
of countries. 
5.1 Introduction to input-output analysis 
Having established in Chapter 3 that IOA is the most appropriate tool to bring economic inequality 
into couple economic-environmental models and thus answer the research questions outlined in 
Chapter 2, let us now explore the theory underpinning IOA, and the different ways it can be applied. 
5.1.1 The Leontief model  
The macroeconomy can be affected by demand or supply-side events. In a demand-side shock, for 
example, consumer demand for specific goods falls, resulting in these industries having fewer orders 
to fulfil, and so they themselves need fewer intermediate goods, i.e. goods used in production 
processes. This translates into changed demand for other industries, so the initial demand shock has 
a multiplier effect across the economy, which can be modelled using Wassily Leontief’s input-output 
quantity model (Leontief, 1936).  
The latter starts with a social accounting matrix (SAM), where some of the accounts are deemed 
exogenous93 to the model, while the remaining endogenous accounts are taken to form a matrix of 
inter-and intra-account transactions, 𝒁. One then defines a matrix of ‘technical coefficients’, 𝑨 , with 
elements 𝑎  describing the monetary payment94 by account 𝑗 to account 𝑖, per unit of account 𝑗’s 
total expenditure, such that 𝑨 = 𝒁𝒙 , where 𝒙 is a vector of the total expenditures of each 
endogenous account,  𝒙 is a diagonal matrix with the elements of 𝒙 forming its main diagonal, and 
 
93 Exogenous variables are inputs into the model, but they are not themselves affected by relationships 
specified in the model. Endogenous variables, in contrast, are determined by the model. 
94 𝒁 typically captures monetary flows; although physical flows are sometimes used. 
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𝒙  is its inverse. As the SAM is balanced, total expenditure is equal to total income for every 
account, so 𝒙 can also be interpreted as a vector of the total incomes of each endogenous account. 
If 𝒇 is a vector of the aggregate monetary flows from all exogenous accounts to each endogenous 
account then, by definition95, 𝒙 = 𝒁𝒊 + 𝒇, and so 𝒙 = 𝑨𝒙 + 𝒇, where 𝒊 is a vector of ones of length 
𝑚, and 𝑚 is the length of 𝒁. This can be rearranged to give 𝒙 = 𝑳𝒇, and, if the technical coefficients 
remain constant, one can take derivatives to get 
𝑑𝒙 = 𝑳𝑑𝒇                  (5.1) 
where 𝑳 is the ‘Leontief inverse matrix’, 𝑳 = (𝑰 − 𝑨) , and 𝑰 is the identity matrix. If the 
determinant of 𝑰 − 𝑨 is nonzero, which will be true for any typical economy96, then this system of 
linear equations has a unique solution. As can be seen from 𝑳‘s Taylor series, the elements of the 
Leontief inverse reflect the infinite round-by-round effects of the direct change in exogenous 
spending, plus the indirect effects of the latter on all sectors, and the subsequent indirect effects of 
those changes on all sectors, and so on97. Changes in exogenous demand thus instigate changes in 
total output. 
This is a linear model that assumes Leontief production functions. These are fixed production 
recipes, so no substitution can occur between intermediate goods or factors of production, and it is 
assumed there is no technological change. As the technical coefficients in 𝑨 remain constant, this 
implies that economies of scale have been realised, and no diseconomies of scale have been 
triggered. A monetary flow from sector 𝑗 to sector 𝑖, 𝑍 , is equivalent to the price of the good or 
service supplied by 𝑖, 𝑃 , multiplied by the quantity of the good or service that sector 𝑗 has bought, 
𝑄 . The Leontief quantity model assumes that prices are constant, and ∆𝒇 and ∆𝒙 both represent 
quantity changes98. 
Constant prices require perfectly elastic supply. This means a horizontal supply curve, where any 
decrease in price would cause supply to collapse. It also means that an infinite supply of the good 
could theoretically be provided at the current price, i.e. there are no shortages or other constraints 
 
95 Leontief’s model was developed for input-output tables (IOTs), where this national accounting identity is 
interpreted as total output is equal to intermediate demand plus final demand. The latter means institutional 
demand, i.e. demand from households, government and the rest-of-the-world (ROW). 
96 For the determinant to be zero, there would need to be linear dependence between rows or columns of 𝑳. 
This is highly unlikely due to the identity matrix, which is linearly independent. In addition, in a typical 
economy, the elements of 𝑨 are less than one, as economic sectors and institutions interact with one another. 
For the determinant of 𝑳 to be zero, at least one sector or institution would have to be completely isolated, so 
that the only nonzero technical coefficient for that sector would be a 1 on the leading diagonal, and even this 
could be avoided by disaggregating the account. 
97 The Taylor series is presented in Miller and Blair (2009), along with an explanation. 
98 Leontief also presented an alternative IO model where prices change while quantities remain constant. 
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on production. In reality, no goods or services have perfectly elastic supply, so, as stated in Chapter 
3, the assumptions underlying input-output analysis (IOA) are imperfect approximations. 
5.1.2 The Ghosh model 
Supply-side effects stem from changes in the availability of goods or services that are used in other 
production processes. Supply constraints in the oil and gas industry, for example, could reduce 
output in sectors that need these fuels in their own production processes. Reduced output in these 
affected industries, in turn, can then affect production in yet more sectors, and so on. Ambica Ghosh 
proposed an alternative input-output framework to model these multiplier effects (Ghosh, 1958). 
Leontief’s matrix of technical coefficients, 𝑨, divided the elements in each column of 𝒁 by their 
respective column totals. This shows how an account’s total expenditure is distributed across 
different sectors and institutions. Ghosh’s innovation was to instead divide elements of 𝒁 by their 
row total, and thus explore the distribution of sources of income for each account. A new square 
matrix, 𝑩 = 𝒙 𝒁, was defined and called the matrix of ‘allocation coefficients’, where elements 𝑏  
describe the percentage of sector 𝑖’s income that stems from sector 𝑗. If 𝒗 is a vector of the 
aggregate monetary flows from each endogenous account to all exogenous accounts then, by 
definition, 𝒙 = 𝒊 𝒁 + 𝒗 = 𝒙 𝑩 + 𝒗 , where the 𝑇 superscript indicates transposition. If allocation 
coefficients remain constant, then one can differentiate to get 𝑑𝒙 = (𝑑𝒗 )𝑮, where 𝑮 =
(𝑰 − 𝑩) , and is called the ‘output inverse matrix’. 
If at least one factor of production, i.e. land, labour or capital, is assumed exogenous, then this 
model can be used to estimate how changes in the availability of primary inputs can drive changes in 
total output99. Once again, prices are assumed to be fixed, so fixed allocation coefficients imply 
perfectly elastic demand, i.e. at the given price any additional output will be purchased. This is, of 
course, an imperfect approximation of real economic behaviour. Fixed allocation coefficients are 
more controversial than fixed technical coefficients, as they cannot be explained by microeconomic 
theory. In contrast, fixed technical coefficients are consistent with firms minimising costs under 
perfect competition and fixed prices, assuming no technological innovation (Oosterhaven, 1989).  
Ghosh developed his model for “a monopolistic market with scarce resources”, and cautioned that 
“allocation functions will play a minor role” when these conditions are not met (Ghosh, 1958). He 
argued that “our discussion is confined to a consideration of economies with a high rate of 
investment, with inadequacy of the supply of productive plants and materials and with a rationing 
system in allocation.” Ghosh argued, for example, that planned economies have social goals, and 
 
99 The Ghosh model was developed for IOTs, where 𝒗 captures only value added. 
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firms are instructed to distribute their products to help realise these targets, even though this may 
mean not minimising costs and maximising profits. Ghosh also noted that in times of extreme 
scarcity, market economies can become at least partially planned; for example, the government may 
ration food, as the British government did during World War II. Ghosh thus thought that technical 
coefficients would be more stable under some circumstances and allocation coefficients more stable 
under others. Economists have mostly applied Ghosh’s model to market economies in times of 
shortages. Giarratani (1981) justifies this by arguing that when businesses are forced to ration 
output they distribute amongst clients in proportion to the latter’s former purchases to avoid losing 
customers. 
A further problem with the Ghosh model is that, when applied to input-output tables (IOTs), it 
assumes that output in sectors that are not subject to the exogenous change in primary inputs100 can 
be increased without additional capital, land or labour. This is implausible, except in the unusual 
situation where factor inputs in these industries are originally underutilised (Oosterhaven, 1988). 
When such hoarding does not take place, the Ghosh model implies that intermediate goods can be 
substituted for factor inputs in production. 
A final concern surrounding the Ghosh model is that, as 𝑨 = 𝒁𝒙  and 𝑩 = 𝒙 𝒁, 𝑨 = 𝒙𝑩𝒙 . To 
see why this is problematic, consider two years, 𝑡  and 𝑡 , and let the superscripts 𝑡  and 𝑡 , indicate 
the values of variables in those years. 𝑨 = 𝒙 𝑩 (𝒙 ) . If 𝑩 is constant, however, then 𝑩 =
𝑩 , and so 𝑨 = 𝒙 𝑩 (𝒙 ) = 𝒙 (𝒙 ) 𝑨 𝒙 (𝒙 ) . It is therefore impossible for both 𝑨 
and 𝑩 to remain constant given changes in output, unless the output of all sectors increases by the 
same proportion, 𝑟, so that 𝑨 = (𝑟𝑰)𝑨 𝑰 = 𝑨 . When this condition is not fulfilled, the key 
assumptions underpinning the Ghosh and Leontief models cannot simultaneously be correct. 
The Ghosh model thus assumes that all inputs can be substituted for one another in production 
processes. Gruver (1989) argued that such substitution is not arbitrary as it reflects the linearization 
of production functions in input-output economics. Oosterhaven (1989) countered that this will only 
be true under strict conditions, and that the Ghosh model does not allow output to increase in 
sectors whose products are substitutes for a constrained good. Many economists thus believe that 
technical coefficients adjustment in the Ghosh model is not consistent with the realities of 
production. 
Studies have empirically explored the extent that technical coefficients change when the Ghosh 
model is applied. Chen and Rose (1986), for example, modelled a supply-shock using an input-output 
 
100 ‘Primary inputs’ is a synonym for factors of production. 
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table for Taiwan, and observed that technical coefficients in the account subject to exogenous 
effects changed by more than five per cent; although technical coefficients in other accounts 
changed by less than this, and only three per cent of all coefficients were altered by more than one 
per cent. Rose and Allison (1989) similarly applied the Ghosh model on an IOT for Washington State 
and found that no technical coefficient changed by more than four per cent. Such studies thus 
indicate that while joint-stability issues are not negligible, most coefficients do not experience large 
changes. Rose and Allison (1989) further noted that the effects of coefficient changes are often more 
limited than those introduced by algorithmic matrix-updating techniques that are widely used in the 
IOA literature101. 
In addition, studies have taken time-series of IOTs to explore how allocation and technical 
coefficients vary over time. Giarratani (1981), for example, looked at United States (US) IOTs for 
1963 and 1967, and found that coefficients in the Leontief model did not, on average, appear to be 
more stable than their Ghoshian counterparts. In a United Kingdom (UK) study, Bon (1986) used 
1947 IOT technical and allocation matrices, combined with value added and final demand data for 
five years between 1958 and 1977, to project total output in those years using both Leontief and 
Ghoshian models. When comparing these forecasts to realised output data, he found that, while the 
Leontief model slightly outperformed the Ghosh for total output projections, one could not 
definitively support one model over the other, as the supply-side model performed better for certain 
sectors. Augustinovics (1970) compared changes in technical and allocation coefficients in Hungarian 
IOTs spanning from 1959 to 1964, and agreed that one cannot conclusively support one model over 
the other. Oosterhaven (1988) and De Mesnard (2009) also noted that empirical analyses are 
inconclusive. 
The aforementioned theoretical issues, however, led most economists to reject the Ghosh model 
until Dietzenbacher (1997) reinterpreted the model as a price model. Instead of taking prices as 
constants and allowing quantities to vary, which was how the Ghosh model was typically deployed, 
Dietzenbacher proposed that prices should instead be allowed to vary while quantities are held 
constant. In other words, as an industry’s factor inputs become more expensive, they will pass these 
costs on to the businesses and consumers who buy their products. Viewing the Ghosh model as a 
price model means that one does not need to worry about outputs increasing without a 
corresponding increase in primary inputs, as no quantities change. The coefficient joint-stability 
 
101 In addition to balancing matrices, the algorithmic processes described in Chapter 4 are often used to 
estimate a recent IOT or SAM from an older matrix using only a subset of the otherwise-required up-to-date 
information (Miller and Blair, 2009). 
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issues also are no longer a concern, as they now represent price adjustments, rather than 
substitution. 
Dietzenbacher (1997) further demonstrated that the Ghosh price model is equivalent to the price 
version of Leontief’s quantity model. Moreover, he proposed an alternative quantity model derived 
from allocation coefficients that gave the same results as Leontief’s quantity model. In short, 
regardless of whether technical or allocation coefficients are used, one has a single demand-pull 
quantity model and a single cost-push price model. The given research question will indicate which 
model should be utilised. Finally, Dietzenbacher (1997) observed that the Leontief and Ghosh 
models are the most computationally efficient expressions of the quantity and price models 
respectively. 
Note, however, that as the Ghosh price model assumes fixed quantities, it cannot be used to explore 
supply constraints. So how can the effects of limited resources be explored in an IO framework? 
5.1.3 The mixed-endogenous-exogenous (MEE) model 
As the Ghosh model is generally not considered to be a valid supply-driven model, a ‘mixed-
endogenous-exogenous’ (MEE) model was introduced. This approach adapted the Leontief quantity 
model so that total income is exogenous for some accounts, instead of demand. 
If 𝑨 is arranged so that the 𝑛 row and column accounts with endogenous account totals are at the 
top and left respectively, with the remaining 𝑚 − 𝑛 accounts with exogenous account totals at the 












where 𝑨𝟏𝟏, 𝑨𝟏𝟐, 𝑨𝟐𝟏 and 𝑨𝟐𝟐 are matrices containing the technical coefficients in rows 1 to 𝑛, 1 to 
𝑛, 𝑛 + 1 to 𝑚, and 𝑛 + 1 to 𝑚 respectively, and columns 1 to 𝑛, 𝑛 + 1 to 𝑚, 1 to 𝑛, and 𝑛 + 1 to 𝑚 
respectively of 𝑨. 𝑰 and 𝟎 are appropriately sized identity and null matrices respectively. 𝒙( ), 𝒙( ), 
𝒇( ) and 𝒇( ) are vectors of endogenous account totals, exogenous account totals, exogenous final 
demand and endogenous final demand respectively. By multiplying out these equations, one gets 
(𝑰 − 𝑨𝟏𝟏)𝒙
( ) − 𝑨𝟏𝟐𝒙
( ) = 𝒇( )                  (5.2)  
and 
(𝑰 − 𝑨𝟐𝟐)𝒙
( ) − 𝑨𝟐𝟏𝒙
( ) = 𝒇( )                  (5.3) 
These can then be rearranged so that all exogenous vectors are on the right hand side, which gives 
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where 𝑴 =
(𝑰 − 𝑨𝟏𝟏) 𝟎
−𝑨𝟐𝟏 −𝑰
 and 𝑵 =
𝑰 𝑨𝟏𝟐
𝟎 (𝑨𝟐𝟐 − 𝑰)
. This system of linear equations will have a 
unique solution provided 𝑴 is not ‘singular’, i.e. the determinant of 𝑴, det (𝑴), is non-zero.  
The determinant of a partitioned matrix 𝑪 𝑫
𝑬 𝑭
 is equal to 𝑑𝑒𝑡(𝑪 − 𝑫𝑭 𝑬) × 𝑑𝑒𝑡(𝑭) if 𝑭 is not 
singular, or 𝑑𝑒𝑡(𝑪)  ×  𝑑𝑒𝑡(𝑭 − 𝑬𝑪 𝑫) if 𝑪 is not singular (Powell, 2011). Since the negative 
identity matrix is invertible, det (𝑴) = 𝑑𝑒𝑡(𝑰 − 𝑨𝟏𝟏)𝑑𝑒𝑡(−𝑰) = (−1) 𝑑𝑒𝑡(𝑰 − 𝑨𝟏𝟏). 𝑴 will thus 
only be singular if 𝑑𝑒𝑡(𝑰 − 𝑨𝟏𝟏) = 0, which, as discussed earlier, is highly unlikely in an economy. 
The system of equations should, therefore, have a unique solution. 
(5.2) can be rearranged to give 𝒙( ) = (𝑰 − 𝑨𝟏𝟏) 𝒇( ) + 𝑨𝟏𝟐𝒙( ) . As this equation involves 
only  𝑨𝟏𝟏 and 𝑨𝟏𝟐, it shows that endogenously determined account totals are affected solely by the 
indirect effects stemming from accounts with endogenous and exogenous totals buying from 
accounts with endogenous totals. Indirect effects from accounts with endogenous and exogenous 
totals buying from accounts with exogenous totals are not included, which means that interactions 
between accounts with exogenous totals are ignored. This contrasts with the Leontief model, where 
totals are dependent on all indirect effects between sectors. 
Similarly, (5.3) can be rearranged to give 𝒇( ) = (𝑰 − 𝑨𝟐𝟐)𝒙( ) − 𝑨𝟐𝟏𝒙( ). This, along with (5.2), 
implies that 𝒇( ) = (𝑰 − 𝑨𝟐𝟐)𝒙( ) − 𝑨𝟐𝟏(𝑰 − 𝑨𝟏𝟏) 𝒇( ) + 𝑨𝟏𝟐𝒙( ) . As this expression 
involves 𝑨𝟏𝟏, 𝑨𝟏𝟐, 𝑨𝟐𝟏 and 𝑨𝟐𝟐, it demonstrates that endogenous final demand is determined by all 
indirect effects, whereas, in the Leontief model, it is exogenously specified and so independent of all 
indirect effects. 
This MEE quantity model is commonly used to explore the indirect effects of supply constraints, 
particularly those stemming from natural resources. For example, see Eiser and Roberts (2002) and 
Leung and Pooley (2001). However, as discussed, it cannot estimate the impacts that constrained 





5.1.4 Other input-output models of supply constraints 
Instead of the MEE model, some input-output economists use a process called ‘hypothetical 
extraction’ to model supply constraints. This assumes that a sector can no longer operate, so all 
elements related to that industry in A and 𝒇 are changed to zeros to create a new matrix of technical 
coefficients, 𝑨∗, and vector of final demands, 𝒇∗. The traditional Leontief model is then used to 
calculate new account totals, 𝒙∗, via 𝒙∗ = 𝑳∗𝒇∗, where 𝑳∗ = (𝑰 − 𝑨∗) . 𝒊 𝒙 − 𝒊 𝒙∗ is interpreted as 
the economic contribution of that sector to the economy; although, note that this methodology 
implicitly assumes that other sectors are able to use imports to replace the missing industry’s 
product in their production processes. 
Hypothetical extraction is traditionally used to estimate the importance of an industry to an 
economy, but it is sometimes adapted to model supply constraints by doing partial rather than full 
extraction (Dietzenbacher and Lahr, 2013). Partial extraction assumes that an industry has 𝛼% 
reduced capacity. All row elements in A related to that industry are then assumed to reduce by 𝛼% 
to reflect the reduced interindustry orders that industry can no longer fulfil. Note that the column 
elements of A related to that industry are not changed, as both the sector’s total output and its 
intermediate purchases off other industries reduce by 𝛼%, so these two reductions cancel out to 
leave the column technical coefficients unchanged.  
There are also dynamic input-output based models, such as ARIO (Hallegatte, 2008) and the dynamic 
inoperability input-output model102 (Barker and Santos, 2010), which model the recovery of an 
economy that is temporarily disrupted, for example, after a natural disaster. These typically also 
overcome some of the rigidity of traditional IO models by, for example, considering the role of 
imports or inventories in mitigating supply shocks, or allowing prices to change. 
5.2 Coupling methodology 
Having explored the mathematics and theory of IOA, and the different ways in which it has been 
adapted and applied, let us now consider how it can best be utilised to model the inequality effects 
of climate change impacts. 
Climate change may bring physical changes that result in, say, increased or decreased agricultural 
production, available water resources, or electricity use for heating or cooling. These are quantity 
changes, and so quantity models, rather than price models such as the Ghosh price model, will be 
 
102 The static inoperability input-output model is a normalised version of Leontief’s traditional model 
(Dietzenbacher and Miller, 2015). 
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used. While these quantity changes may result in price changes, the latter would be an effect, not 
the force driving change.  
5.2.1 Final demand changes 
Many climate change impact studies estimate final demand changes; for example, projected 
increased spending on coastal defence or energy for space cooling. Where this increased spending 
was by an exogenous account, such as government, the traditional Leontief model, i.e. equation 
(5.1), was easily applied.  
Some damage studies, however, estimate increased spending by accounts that need to be 
endogenous if one is to estimate impacts on household inequality. For example, as interindustry 
purchases and households need to be endogenous, changes in energy consumption would require 
changing business activities’ and household’s technical coefficients. The latter cannot be 
accommodated in an input-output framework, so changes in energy expenditure were instead 
modelled as changes in investment in electricity. This could be implemented, because, as explained 
in Section 5.3.5 of this chapter, spending from capital-savings accounts formed part of final demand. 
5.2.2 Output changes 
Most other impact studies estimate changes to commodity production. In such cases, this thesis 
used the MEE quantity model, i.e. production was specified exogenously for the relevant commodity 
accounts, and impacts on other account incomes were estimated using equation (5.4).  
The Ghosh quantity model has been widely discredited, so was not considered as a method for 
modelling output changes. Meanwhile, partial hypothetical extraction assumes that imports can 
compensate for the constrained industry’s product in other industries’ production processes. This 
was unrealistic for many of the industries that may be affected by climate change. For example, if 
domestic water resources are reduced, it seems unlikely that agricultural businesses will be able to 
import large quantities of water for use in irrigation, as large international trade of water for 
industrial purposes does not currently take place. Similarly, one cannot take for granted that food 
shortages in one country may be offset by agricultural production in another. It is plausible that 
climate change could increase global undernutrition (Wheeler and Von Braun, 2013). Similarly, 
global fisheries’ revenues could decline (V. W. Lam et al., 2016). The MEE model assumes no changes 
to production recipes, so imports cannot mitigate supply constraints. Given the sectors being 
constrained by climate change, this assumption seemed most realistic. 
Finally, sectors such as agriculture whose production may be impacted by climate change are most 
likely dealing with long-term changes in production, not once-off impacts. As such, the dynamic IOA 
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based models that explore how an economy recovers after a natural disaster are not modelling the 
sort of impacts that feature this thesis103.  
5.2.3 Changes in economic surplus 
Some partial equilibrium impact studies estimate impacts in terms of the change in ‘economic 
surplus’ or ‘total welfare’. These terms, used interchangeably, refer to the sum of the ‘consumer 
surplus’ and the ‘producer surplus’. The former is the amount that consumers have saved when 
paying the market price for a product versus the price that they would have been prepared to pay. 
The producer surplus, meanwhile, is the amount that producers have received by selling a product at 
the market price versus the price at which they would have been prepared to sell. The consumer 
surplus is the area below the demand curve and above the equilibrium price level, and a change in 
consumer surplus could be framed as a change in consumer savings. Meanwhile, the producer 
surplus is the area above the supply curve and below the equilibrium price level, and is often viewed 
as being approximately equal to profit.  
Most partial equilibrium studies, while estimating the change in economic surplus, will also provide 
other economic measures of impact. For example, the partial equilibrium impact studies underlying 
the Climate Framework for Uncertainty, Negotiation and Distribution’s (FUND’s) forestry damage 
function estimate both the change in economic surplus and the change in forestry production. 
FUND’s forestry damage function, however, only uses the economic surplus results, and so FUND’s 
forestry damage estimates are expressed as a change in forestry consumer and producer surplus. 
Changes in consumer savings or producers profits are, of course, the end-point of an analysis into 
the economic effects of climate change on forestry. The force driving effects is the change in forestry 
yields. Consequently, results quoted purely in terms of changes to the economic surplus 
unfortunately cannot be used as inputs in an IOA of the inequality effects of climate change. 
5.3 Empirically testing IOA assumptions 
Having established the IOA coupling methodology that will be used in this thesis, let us now 
empirically explore the key limitation of IOA highlighted in Chapter 3, namely the linear nature of 
IOA and the resulting restrictive assumption of fixed production recipes. As discussed in Chapter 3, 
economies are nonlinear, and linear models are unable to capture the ways in which economies 
evolve and adapt over time. Chapter 3, however, argued that such disadvantages are, given this 
thesis’ research questions, outweighed by IOA’s advantages, particularly its simplicity, which means 
 
103 Note that the natural disaster impacts in Chapter 6 represent increased expenditure on reconstruction, not 
reduced production in impacted sectors. 
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that the mechanisms driving results are transparent and direct and indirect effects can easily be 
distinguished from one another. But how much can a simple linear model tell one about a complex 
nonlinear system? Can it capture enough of an economy’s key attributes to contain useful 
information about what that economy might look like in the future, and, if so, over what 
approximate time period does this remain true?  
While this thesis does not try to make precise predictions, it is still crucial to gauge the extent that 
lessons about the future can be learnt from an IOA of current SAMs. For example, this helps inform if 
analysing a country’s results to get information for that specific country is implausible given the 
time-scales in questions, and if instead general lessons should be drawn from across a range of 
economies. It can also help guide which accounts are assumed exogenous as, if accounts that are 
highly variable do not feature in the internal mechanisms of the model, the model should remain 
realistic for longer. 
5.3.1 Existing empirical tests of IOA 
To the author’s knowledge, there are no existing empirical tests of IOA using SAMs. This is most 
probably because creating a SAM is time and data-intensive, so very few SAM time-series currently 
exist. There are even fewer where all matrices have been produced by the same research team, and 
so use consistent methods, classification schemes and data-sources. IOT time-series are, however, 
commonplace, and studies have used these to empirically test IOA assumptions and predictions. 
Bon (1986), for example, used the 𝑳 and 𝑮 matrices from UK IOTs from 1947, 1958, 1963, 1967, 
1972 and 1977, along with final demand data for each of these years, to project sector and total 
output for future years. The total output estimates were found to be, on average, 5% and 7% away 
from the realised values, when using the Leontief and Ghosh models respectively. Meanwhile, the 
equivalent deviations for individual sector outputs were 17% and 10%, indicating that reliability 
increases with aggregation. The longest time-span covered in the study used the 1947 IOT to make 
projections for 1977. This produced total output estimates that were 6% and 11% away from the 
realised values, using the Leontief and Ghosh models respectively. At the sector level, the equivalent 
average deviations are 36% and 16%; however, much of this is down to one sector. Removing the 
latter brings the average deviations to 17% and 7%. 
These predictions are far from perfect, particularly at the sector level, and suggest that precise 
predictions from IO models become implausible within decades. The projections, however, are 
reasonably close to the realised values, particularly given the thirty-year time horizon. This suggests 
that out-of-date models can still contain useful information. For example, some key attributes of the 
UK economy are retained between 1947 and 1977. Excluding the greatly altered sector, the relative 
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importance of sectors to the UK economy was the same in both the predicted and realised data. 
Such continuity is of great value when conducting vulnerability analysis. 
In a similar study, Dietzenbacher and Hoen (2006) used a 1948 – 1984 time-series of Dutch IOTs to 
empirically test how technical and allocation coefficients varied over the course of a year. Nearly 
four fifths of the coefficients were found to have a coefficient of variation104 less than 0.3, which is 
generally considered low-variance. In addition, the larger coefficients, which have a greater impact 
on results, typically had lower coefficients of variation than their smaller counterparts. 
The study also looked at how well an IOA using these IOTs could forecast outputs for a year later 
when (a) using the realised 𝒇 vectors from later IOTs, i.e. perfect foresight scenarios, and (b) 
assuming the 𝒇 vectors change by the same amount they did over the previous time period, i.e. 
scenarios without perfect foresight. The forecast root mean squared errors were, on average, 2.4% 
and 7.1% with and without perfect foresight respectively. This led Dietzenbacher and Hoen (2006) to 
conclude that it is more important to have realistic projections of exogenous changes than it is to 
project the evolution of technical or allocation coefficients. 
Coefficients associated with flows from, say, households to enterprises or government may, 
however, not display the same degree of stability as those representing inter-industry consumption 
of good and services, and this could, in turn, change the predictive power of the model. 
Consequently, historic SAMs and IOTs could remain useful for different periods of time. This thesis 
will thus explore the reliability of SAM IOA predictions, along with the stability of SAM coefficients 
and other economic properties over time, to assess the extent that useful lessons for the future can 
be learnt from an IOA of recent SAMs. 
5.3.2 Testing methodology 
As discussed, SAM time-series are rare, which was the motivation behind creating one for the US in 
Chapter 4. Only three other series could be found where all matrices had been produced by the 
same research team, and so use consistent methods, classification schemes and data-sources. Only 
two of the series, those for Indonesia and Tanzania, had disaggregated factors and households. As 
this thesis is concerned with inequality dynamics, the time-series without the necessary 
disaggregation was dropped from the analysis. Indonesia and Tanzania do not feature in the case 
studies in Chapter 6 and 7, but one can still learn useful general lessons about the plausibility of IOA 
assumptions, and how SAMs vary with time, from studying non-case-study countries. While it would 
 
104 The coefficient of variation is the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean. 
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have been ideal to include case study regions, with the exception of the US, appropriate SAM time-
series weren’t available. 
The time-series for Tanzania, Thurlow and Wobst (2015), allows one to compare SAMs three years 
apart, for 1998 and 2001, while the time series for Indonesia, BPS (2011), allows one to compare 
three pairs of SAMs ten years apart, 1975 and 1985, 1985 and 1995, and 1995 and 2005, two pairs of 
SAMs twenty years apart, 1975 and 1995, and 1985 and 2005, and one SAM pair thirty years apart, 
1975 and 2005. The US time series constructed in Chapter 4 provides a pair of SAMs six years apart, 
2010 and 2016, a pair of SAMs seven years apart, 2003 and 2010, and a pair of SAMs 13 years apart, 
2003 and 2016. This thesis thus had short-term, medium term, and longer-term105 SAM evolutions to 
study courtesy of Tanzania, the US and Indonesia, and Indonesia respectively. 
Three analyses were performed. Firstly, the percentage change of technical coefficients in the SAMs 
over time was calculated to explore how well the key IOA assumption of fixed coefficients performs 
empirically. Secondly, following Bon (1986), Leontief inverse matrices derived from earlier SAMs 
were used, with realised exogenous demand data from later SAMs, to project output for those later 
years. Percentage errors between projected and realised output were then computed to examine 
forecasting power. Finally, ‘backwards linkages’, which are often used to estimate the relative 
interconnectedness of sectors and institutions, were analysed to assess whether the sectors 
relatively strongly and weakly connected with each household group changed over time. 
The total backward linkage of a given sector is the change in the total income of all accounts 
produced by multiplier effects from a unit increase in exogenous money flowing into the given 
sector. A vector, 𝒃𝒍, containing the backwards linkages of each sector is thus given by 𝒃𝒍 = 𝒊 𝑳. To 
normalise the measure, each linkage, 𝑏𝑙 , is often divided by the average linkage, ∑ 𝑏𝑙 𝑛⁄ , where 
𝑛 is the number of sectors. Sectors with normalised linkages greater (or less) than one are then 
interpreted as being relatively strongly (weakly) interconnected with other parts of the economy. 
The sizes of the coefficients 𝑙  in each column of 𝑳 indicate what each sector 𝑖 receives from the 
multiplier effects of a unit increase in exogenous money flowing into 𝑗. This thesis is primarily 
interested in changes to household accounts, as these will be used to assess income inequality. Thus, 
rather than summing coefficients down each column of 𝑳, for each household account, ℎ, 
coefficients 𝑙 were normalised106 to see if account 𝑗 was relatively strongly or weakly 
interconnected with that household group. 
 
105 Although 30 years, the longest time-lapse in this study, is short-term on a climate change time-scale. 
106 Only nonzeros were included when calculating average linkages for normalisation. 
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For this analysis, some accounts had to be assumed exogenous for each economy, or one would 
have infinite multiplier effects, reflected in 𝑰 − 𝑨 being singular. For all countries, the rest-of-the-
world (ROW) and capital accounts were assumed exogenous, as is common in IO literature. For the 
reasons outlined in Chapter 4, the statistical discrepancy account was also assumed exogenous for 
the US, and, following the coefficient stability analysis, as was the inventories account. 
5.3.3 Testing fixed coefficients 
Starting with the shortest time-span, the mean percentage change of nonzero Tanzanian technical 
coefficients between 1998 and 2001 was 12%. The mean percentage change of nonzero technical 
coefficients for each SAM account was 10%, with a standard deviation of 12%. Table 5.1 shows how 
this varied, on average, when these accounts were broken down into categories. Thus, even across a 
short four-year time horizon, one can see that coefficients aren’t fixed. While the approximation 
seems very reasonable for value-added and government accounts, where coefficients vary, on 
average, by only 1%, coefficients in other accounts see more significant variation. Activities 
accounts, for example, saw the greatest variation, with coefficients changing, on average, by 14%, 
with a standard deviation of mean percentage changes of 17%. 
Table 5.1 Mean percentage change of nonzero Tanzanian technical coefficients in each account, 
broken down by type of account 
Type of account Mean percentage change 
Standard deviation of mean 
percentage change 
Commodities 10% 5% 
Activities 14% 17% 
Value-added 1% 1% 
Households 9% 4% 
Enterprises 10% 0% 
Government and taxation 1% 3% 
 
Notes: Table shows the mean percentage changes of nonzero Tanzanian technical coefficients in each of the 121 Tanzanian SAM accounts 
between 1998 and 2001. The standard deviations of the mean percentage changes are also shown. Results are broken down by category 
of account, specifically into commodities, activities, value-added, households, enterprises, and government and taxation accounts. Results 
were derived from a Tanzanian SAM time series (Thurlow and Wobst, 2015). 
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Moving on to a medium time-horizon, the mean percentage changes of nonzero US technical 
coefficients between 2003 and 2010, 2010 and 2016, and 2003 and 2016 were 54%, 67% and 86% 
respectively. Table 5.2 shows how coefficients in each account performed, on average, when these 
accounts were broken down into categories. One can see that coefficients in the inventories account 
varied widely across all time periods, up to a maximum mean percentage change of 929% between 
2003 and 2016. This suggests that the inventories account should be held exogenous in any 
multiplier analysis. Relatively large changes were also observed in the highly disaggregated 
commodities, activities and value-added accounts, with these accounts seeing maximum average 
mean percentage changes of 167%, 74% and 36% respectively. Between 2003 and 2010, the 
government account, which is not disaggregated, also saw large changes, with coefficients having a 
mean percentage change of 50%. This variance was likely down to policy changes and it supports the 
commonly held view that government spending patterns, like ROW spending patterns, frequently 
alter for reasons beyond the domestic economy. This is why government accounts are typically set 
exogenously in IOA. One can see from Table 5.2 that, in general, over the 13-year horizon, the 
assumption of fixed technical coefficients starts to look somewhat implausible. Although, the 
relatively poor performance of the seven and six-year US time periods versus the four-year 
Tanzanian example is likely down to a mixture of the longer time period and the US SAMs being 
more disaggregated107. As previously discussed, more disaggregated data is typically noisier. 
Finally, moving on to Indonesia and longer time-steps, Table 5.3 shows the mean percentage 
changes of nonzero Indonesian technical coefficients between the different SAM years, while Table 
5.4 shows how coefficients in each account performed on average, when these accounts were 
broken down into categories. One can see that changes are large across all account types in all time 
periods; in some cases, extremely large. Between 1985 and 2005, for example, the mean percentage 
change of nonzero technical coefficients was 4,989%. Once again, very large changes were at times 
observed in the government account, with the mean percentage changes of coefficients in this 
account being 21,388% and 19,265% between 1995 and 2005 and 1985 and 2005 respectively. 
Coefficients in activities accounts also sometime saw very large variation. Between 1985 and 2005, 
for example, the mean percentage change across activities accounts was 8,077%. The Indonesian 
SAM time-series thus suggests that even over the course of a decade, and particularly when going 
out twenty or thirty years, the assumptions of fixed technical coefficients become highly unrealistic. 
 
 
107 The US SAMs each have 222 accounts, whereas the Tanzanian SAMs each have 122. 
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Table 5.2 Mean percentage change of nonzero US technical coefficients in each account, broken 
down by type of account 
 2003-2010 2010-2016 2003-2016 

























Commodities 69% 121% 160% 451% 167% 635% 
Activities 50% 34% 43% 43% 74% 105% 
Value-added 36% 29% 36% 61% 33% 17% 
Households 22% 3% 24% 8% 23% 2% 
Enterprises 19% 0% 89% 0% 22% 0% 
Government 50% 0% 29% 0% 18% 0% 
Inventories 516% 0% 284% 0% 929% 0% 
 
Notes: Table shows the mean percentage changes of nonzero American technical coefficients in each of the 222 US SAM accounts across 
three time periods, 2003 to 2010, 2010 to 2016, and 2003 to 2016. The standard deviations of the mean percentage changes are also 
shown for each time period. Results are broken down by category of account, specifically into commodities, activities, value-added, 
households, enterprises, government, and inventories accounts. Results were derived from the US SAM time-series compiled in Chapter 4. 
Table 5.3 Mean percentage change of nonzero Indonesian technical coefficients 
 Mean percentage change of nonzero coefficients 
10-year time step 
1975 - 1985 768% 
1985 - 1995 549% 
1995 - 2005 1379% 
20-year time step 
1975 - 1995 967% 
1985 - 2005 4989% 
30-year time step 
1975-2005 2434% 
 
Notes: Table shows the mean percentage change of nonzero Indonesian technical coefficients for six time-steps of lengths varying from 
ten to thirty years. Time steps are 1975 to 1985, 1985 to 1995, 1995 to 2005, 1975 to 1995, 1985 to 2005, and 1975 to 2005. Results were 




Table 5.4 Mean percentage change of nonzero Indonesian technical coefficients in each account, 
broken down by type of account  
10-year time step 1975 - 1985 1985 - 1995 1995 - 2005 

















of mean percentage 
change 
Domestic commodities 125% 185% 133% 314% 31% 20% 
Imported commodities 168% 574% 92% 133% 78% 100% 
Activities 1047% 2114% 739% 1742% 1089% 1555% 
Value-added 72% 39% 123% 139% 134% 139% 
Households 558% 196% 463% 359% 167% 128% 
Enterprises 38% 0% 79% 0% 4745% 0% 
Government 135% 0% 472% 0% 21388% 0% 
20-year time step 1975 - 1995 1985 - 2005 












of mean percentage 
change 
Domestic commodities 218% 413% 221% 541% 
Imported commodities 717% 2998% 100% 152% 
Activities 1145% 2585% 8077% 27238% 
Value-added 192% 211% 214% 218% 
Households 1111% 617% 418% 203% 
Enterprises 89% 0% 187% 0% 
Government 117% 0% 19265% 0% 
30-year time step 1975 - 2005 






of mean percentage 
change 
Domestic commodities 336% 955% 
Imported commodities 49% 59% 
Activities 3887% 13842% 
Value-added 315% 357% 
Households 556% 185% 
Enterprises 254% 0% 
Government 125% 0% 
 
Notes: Table shows the mean percentage change of nonzero Indonesian technical coefficients in each of the 95 Indonesian SAM accounts, 
along with the standard deviations of the mean percentage changes. Results are broken down by category of account, specifically into 
domestic commodities, imported commodities, activities, value-added, households, enterprises, and government, and are shown for six 
time-steps of lengths varying from ten to thirty years. Time steps are 1975 to 1985, 1985 to 1995, 1995 to 2005, 1975 to 1995, 1985 to 
2005, and 1975 to 2005. Results were derived from an Indonesian SAM time-series (BPS, 2011). 
Given this evidence, is IOA useless when applied to medium to long-term time-periods? 
Dietzenbacher and Hoen (2006) found that larger coefficients generally exhibited lower variance 
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than smaller coefficients. Thus, as larger coefficients have a greater impact on results, IOA might still 
generate decent predictions despite some coefficients showing large variance. Let us now 
empirically explore this conjecture. 
5.3.4 Predictive power 
Using the 1998 Tanzanian Leontief inverse matrix and realised exogenous data from 2001 to project 
2001 account totals led to an average 12% error across the 121 account totals, with a standard 
deviation of 33%. Most of this error was concentrated in one account, VAT, where the prediction 
was off by 365%. Ignoring this account brought the average error across accounts down to 9% with a 
standard deviation of 8%. Table 5.5 shows the mean percentage error and the standard deviation of 
the latter across the accounts when broken down into categories. Predictions for government and 
taxation accounts are many multiples worse than predictions for other types of accounts, even when 
excluding VAT. The distribution of mean percentage errors across other types of accounts are 
perhaps indicative of the different levels of aggregation. The enterprise account outperforms all 
other account categories, but is a single aggregated account, while the 12 household and 13 value 
added accounts outperform the 43 commodities and 43 activities108 accounts. This is consistent with 
existing evidence, such as Bon (1986), that predictive power improves with aggregation. Overall, 
with the exception of government and taxation accounts, percentage coefficient changes and 
percentage prediction errors were of approximately similar magnitudes for Tanzania. 
Moving on to America, using the 2003, 2010 and 2003 Leontief inverse matrices and realised 2010, 
2016 and 2016 exogenous data respectively to project 2010, 2016 and 2016 account totals led to 
16%, 13% and 20% errors respectively, on average, across the 222 account totals, with standard 
deviations of 21%, 17% and 23%. IOA forecasting power, thus, appears to be significantly better than 
a quick glace at percentage changes in coefficients would indicate, as the mean percentage changes 
of nonzero US technical coefficients were 54%, 67% and 86% between 2003 and 2010, 2010 and 
2016, and 2003 and 2016 respectively. 
Table 5.6 shows the mean percentage errors of predictions of account totals and the standard 
deviations of these errors across different categories of accounts. The largest errors were found in 
projections of commodities, activities and value-added accounts, while projections were most 
reliable for households and government. The level of aggregation could be a key factor here, as 
there were 73, 71 and 71 commodities, activities and value-added accounts respectively, but only 
five household accounts and one government account. The enterprise account, however, was also a 
 
108 ‘Activities’ is a commonly used synonym for ‘industries’ in national accounts. 
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single account, yet had large projection errors across two of the time periods. This demonstrates 
that although predictions, in general, appear more reliable for more aggregated accounts, this is not 
always the case. If one compares the percentage errors in Table 5.6 with the mean percentage 
changes of coefficients in Table 5.2, one can see that, once again, predictions perform far better 
than one might assume from looking at the average extent that coefficients change. Using the 2003 
technical matrix and 2010 𝒇 vectors, for example, the average mean percentage error of predictions 
of commodities accounts totals was 15%, while the mean percentage change in coefficients in a 
commodities account was 69%. 
Table 5.5 – Mean percentage error and standard deviation of mean percentage error of projected 
versus realised 2001 Tanzanian account totals, across different categories of accounts 
Type of account Mean percentage error 
Standard deviation of mean 
percentage error 
Commodities 9% 6% 
Activities 8% 5% 
Value-added 6% 5% 
Households 6% 2% 
Enterprises 4% 0% 
Government and taxation 87% 125% 




Notes: Table shows the mean percentage errors and standard deviations of mean percentage errors of projected vs. realised 2001 
Tanzanian account totals. Realised account totals are taken from the appropriate Tanzanian SAM (Thurlow and Wobst, 2015). Projected 
account totals are calculated using the traditional Leontief demand model with the realised 𝐟 vector from the 2001 Tanzanian SAM and the 
technical coefficient matrix from the 1998 SAM. Results are broken down by category of account, specifically into commodities, activities, 
value-added, households, enterprises, and government and taxation accounts. 
When moving onto Indonesia and larger time-steps, however, predictions become less convincing. 
Table 5.7 shows the mean percentage errors and standard deviations across the six time-steps. 
Some predictive errors look tolerable. For example, when using technical coefficients from the 1975 
SAM with the 2005 𝒇 vector, predictive errors in household account totals were, on average, 34%. 
Given the thirty-year time-scale, these predictions look reasonable. Others, however, are extremely 
large. Using technical coefficients from the 1975 SAM with the 2005 𝒇 vector, for example, 
predictive errors in activities accounts’ totals were, on average, 1,090%. Some of the large average 
errors observed are, albeit, the result of very poor predictions in just one account. Using technical 
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coefficients from the 1975 SAM with the 1985 𝒇 vector, for example, the total for one imported 
commodity account, wood and wood products, was out by 62,300%. Ignoring this account, the mean 
percentage error across all accounts fell from 708% to 53%, and the mean percentage error across 
imported commodities fell from 3065% to 102%. Similarly, using technical coefficients from the 1975 
SAM with the 2005 𝒇 vector, the total for one activity, services provided by individuals, households 
and other services, deviated from the realised total by 23,000%. Ignoring this account, the mean 
percentage error across all accounts fell from 301% to 60%, and the mean percentage error across 
imported activities fell from 1090% to 45%.  
Table 5.6 – Mean percentage error and standard deviation of mean percentage error of projected 
versus realised 2010 and 2016 US account totals, across different categories of accounts 



























Commodities 15% 17% 15% 22% 19% 21% 
Activities 18% 28% 14% 17% 22% 23% 
Value-added 16% 18% 11% 11% 21% 26% 
Households 2% 1% 6% 2% 8% 3% 
Enterprises 0% 0% 12% 0% 12% 0% 
Government 4% 0% 1% 0% 3% 0% 
 
Notes: Table shows the mean percentage errors and standard deviations of mean percentage errors of projected vs. realised 2010 and 
2016 US account totals. Realised account totals are taken from the appropriate US SAMs (constructed in Chapter 4). Projected account 
totals are calculated using the traditional Leontief demand model with the realised 𝐟 vectors from the 2010 and 2016 US SAMs and the 
technical coefficient matrices from the 2003 and 2010 US SAMs. For example, results in the column marked ‘2003 – 2010’ were calculated 
using 2003 technical coefficients and the 2010 𝐟 vector. Results are broken down by category of account, specifically into commodities, 







Table 5.7 – Mean percentage error and standard deviation of mean percentage error of projected 
versus realised 1985, 1995 and 2005 Indonesian account totals, across different categories of 
accounts 
10-year time step 1975 - 1985 1985 - 1995 1995 - 2005 

















of mean percentage 
error 
All accounts 708% 6356% 56% 198% 66% 283% 
Domestic commodities 26% 18% 31% 21% 31% 26% 
Imported commodities 3065% 13252% 127% 407% 53% 35% 
Activities 56% 138% 47% 69% 161% 576% 
Value-added 48% 68% 31% 20% 38% 18% 
Households 26% 18% 34% 14% 27% 11% 
Enterprises 3% 0% 2% 0% 27% 0% 
Government 15% 0% 2% 0% 16% 0% 
20-year time step 1975 - 1995 1985 - 2005 












of mean percentage 
error 
All accounts 141% 541% 66% 283% 
Domestic commodities 40% 25% 31% 26% 
Imported commodities 317% 847% 53% 35% 
Activities 200% 723% 161% 576% 
Value-added 55% 43% 38% 18% 
Households 50% 15% 27% 11% 
Enterprises 1% 0% 27% 0% 
Government 15% 0% 16% 0% 
30-year time step 1975 - 2005 






of mean percentage 
error 
All accounts 301% 2347% 
Domestic commodities 41% 41% 
Imported commodities 121% 208% 
Activities 1090% 4789% 
Value-added 48% 31% 
Households 34% 25% 
Enterprises 25% 0% 
Government 33% 0% 
Notes: Table shows the mean percentage errors and standard deviations of mean percentage errors of projected vs. realised 1985, 1995 
and 2005 Indonesian account totals. Realised account totals are taken from the appropriate Indonesian SAMs (BPS, 2011). Projected 
account totals are calculated using the traditional Leontief demand model with the realised 𝐟 vectors from the 1985, 1995 and 2005 
Indonesian SAMs and the technical coefficient matrices from the 1975, 1985 and 1995 Indonesian SAMs. For example, results in the 
column marked ‘1975 – 1985’ were calculated using 1975 technical coefficients and the 1985 𝐟 vector. Results are broken down by 




In summary, the short-term errors in predictions from the Tanzanian time series were approximately 
the same magnitude as changes in the technical coefficients, and both were generally reasonably 
small. When looking at the US time-series, which covered more medium-term time periods, 
predictions typically outperformed expectations given coefficient changes. While coefficient changes 
often seemed large, predictive errors were generally moderate. Errors in predictions were also much 
smaller than changes in coefficients when using the medium and longer-term time horizons from the 
Indonesian SAMs. They were still, however, typically sizable. While average errors could be greatly 
reduced by ignoring a small number of outlier accounts that had very large predictive errors, even 
with this adjustment, accurate medium to long-term predictions from IOA look unlikely. 
As was seen when exploring changes in coefficients, government accounts sometimes generated 
high predictive errors; for example, in the Tanzanian time-series. This was not, however, always the 
case, as, for example, government accounts predictions for Indonesia were typically good. Similarly, 
in general, predictive errors were higher for more disaggregated accounts; although, once again, not 
in every case. 
5.3.5 Constancy of relatively strongly and weakly connected sectors 
While the preceding analysis casts doubt on IOA’s ability to make long-term forecasts, it could still be 
useful for vulnerability analysis if key economic characteristics, such as the accounts relatively 
strongly interlinked with certain household groups, remain approximately constant over time. To 
explore this, the household backward linkages of each sector were calculated for each household 
group, and then normalised within each household group. Sectors with normalised linkages greater 
(or less) than one were interpreted as being relatively strongly (weakly) interconnected with that 
household group. Sectors in these categories were then compared at different points in time to see 
if relatively strongly connected sectors typically stayed relatively strongly connected, or if the sectors 
most important to different household groups changed with time. 
Starting with Tanzania, only minor changes were observed over the four-year period. For one of the 
twelve household accounts there were no changes, while for the others an average of 5% of the 121 
accounts changed from being relatively strongly connected to being relatively weakly connected, or 
vice versa. Moreover, all such changes were accounts transitioning immediately around the 
normalised linkages equal to one threshold, and they were mostly highly disaggregated commodities 
and activities accounts. Moving on the US, across the largest time-period, 2003 to 2016, 11% of 
accounts, on average, transitioned across the normalised linkages equal to one threshold for each 
household group. Once again, it was mostly very disaggregated accounts that transitioned, with, on 
average, 8%, 12% and 15% of commodities, activities and value-added accounts respectively 
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transitioning. Finally, when looking at the longest time period covered by the Indonesian SAMs, 1975 
to 2005, 21% of accounts, on average, transitioned across the normalised linkages equal to one 
threshold for each household group. Moreover, when ignoring the household group that saw 43% of 
accounts transition, the average was reduced to 18%. Better continuity was observed over the 
twenty-year time frame, with, on average, 13% of accounts transitioning. Meanwhile, changes were 
relatively minor over a ten-year period. Between 1995 and 2005, for example, only 8% of accounts 
transitioned. 
These results suggest that, over short to medium time-scales, the vast majority of relatively strongly 
(weakly) connected sectors typically stayed relatively strongly (weakly) connected. Moreover, for all 
except one household group, this was also true over even a thirty-year period. Key economic 
attributes are, thus, retained even over time-horizons where predictions can become spurious. 
5.3.6 Reflections on stability analysis 
These empirical tests suggest that IOA’s assumption of fixed production coefficients is a decent 
approximation only over a short time-scale. While Tanzanian coefficients changed between 1998 
and 2001, the changes were relatively small. When looking at the US’ six and seven-year time-
periods, however, average coefficient changes were multiples larger, and, in the longer time-
horizons considered for Indonesia, coefficients sometimes changed by thousands of percent. 
In light of often sizable coefficient changes, one might expect IOA to have poor predictive power. 
However, predictions were found to be generally reasonable in the short and medium-term. When 
looking at longer time-scales, the empirical analysis in this chapter found that many accounts were 
still reasonably well predicted. However, others saw errors of over a thousand percent. Thus, it 
seems unlikely that IOA can be used to confidently generate meaningful medium to long-term 
predictions. This is, however, not surprising, given the observation in Chapter 3 that most 
macroeconomic models struggle to make such predications – a consequence of modelling complex, 
dynamic nonlinear systems. 
The empirical analysis thus indicates that IOA works in practice, albeit not in theory, over short and 
medium time-horizons, and thus can be used to generate plausible scenarios of economic responses 
to climate change impacts in a given year. As the SAMs, however, change significantly over the 
medium to long-term, the results from the case studies in Chapters 6 and 7, which extend out to 
2100 and 2050 respectively, should be viewed as plausible scenarios, not predictions. 
The empirical analysis does, however, also suggest that some economic characteristics, such as 
which accounts are relatively strongly or weakly interlinked with certain household groups, remain 
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approximately constant over time. This suggests that IOA could be useful for scoping out 
vulnerabilities, even over time-horizons where predictions become meaningless. However, given the 
long time-scales of the case studies in Chapter 6 and 7, results generated for more than a decade or 
two in the future should not be viewed as a vulnerability analysis for any specific country. Results for 
all countries should instead be considered collectively to explore if any patterns emerge or if climate 
change induced inequality varies according to characteristics of economies. 
Finally, as extremely large coefficient changes were observed in inventories, such accounts, in 
addition to the usual statistical discrepancy, ROW and capital accounts, were assumed exogenous in 
all IOA in Chapters 6 and 7. Similarly, on occasions, the government account produced sizable 
discrepancies. This corroborated the commonly held view that government spending patterns, like 
ROW spending patterns, frequently alter for reasons beyond the domestic economy, and so 
government accounts were also be taken to exogenous in all subsequent IOA. 
5.4 Summary 
This chapter explained how IOA will be used to bring economic inequality into coupled economic-
environmental models, and empirically tested IOA’s assumption of fixed production recipes, to 
explore how the methodology performs as an economic model. 
The chapter first detailed the linear algebra of traditional IOA, which can be used to model the direct 
and indirect effects of changes in demand. The chapter then gave an overview of how economists 
have adapted IOA so that it can model effects stemming from supply changes. These extensions 
include the Ghosh and MEE models, partial hypothetical extraction and dynamic IOA based models. 
The chapter then outlined the coupling methodology used in the case studies in Chapters 6 and 7 to 
bring economic inequality into coupled economic-environmental models. Quantity models are used, 
as it is quantity changes that are driving economic change. The traditional Leontief model was used 
for changes in final demand, while the MEE model was used for output changes. The MEE model was 
chosen because the Ghosh quantity model has been widely discredited, partial hypothetical 
extraction assumes that imports can compensate for reduced domestic production, and dynamic IOA 
based models estimate how an economy recovers from once-off events, not how it adjusts to long-
term changes. 
To empirically test the key IOA assumption of fixed technical coefficients, this chapter used SAM 
time-series for Tanzania, Indonesia and the US. Firstly, percentage changes in technical coefficients 
were calculated. IOA was then used to forecast account totals using SAM technical coefficient 
matrices and final demand vectors from different years. Finally, household backward linkages were 
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calculated and normalised within a household group to see which accounts were relatively strongly 
and weakly connected with each household group.  
This empirical analysis indicated that IOA’s assumption of fixed allocation coefficients is, beyond the 
short term, a crude assumption that puts the model at a disadvantage to others, such as computable 
general equilibrium (CGE) models, that are nonlinear and so allow the economy to adapt to an 
exogenous change. The model, however, still generates decent predictions over the short and 
medium term, and so can be used to generate plausible scenarios of economic responses to climate 
change impacts in a given year. In addition, general characteristics, such as which accounts are 
relatively strongly and weakly connected with each household group, appear to be preserved for a 
couple of decades, which is useful for vulnerability analysis.  The results, however, demonstrate that 
economies change considerably over longer time horizons. Thus, after a decade or two, economies 
are likely to be sufficiently different from SAMs that results should not be viewed as a vulnerability 
analysis for any specific country. Instead, lessons should be drawn from a cross-country analysis to 
see if any general patterns emerge or to explore how responses to exogenous changes vary 
according to characteristics of economies.  
As explored in Chapter 3, for addressing the research questions outlined in Chapter 2, IOA has many 
advantages over other models. This chapter has demonstrated that IOA’s primary disadvantage, 
fixed allocation coefficients, is workable in practice, if not in theory, providing one interprets the 
results as plausible scenarios, not predictions, which should be viewed collectively across countries, 
rather than interpreted as impact or vulnerability analyses for specific countries. As this key 












Chapter 6 – Impact of climate change on income 
inequality in Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, the 
United States, Vietnam and Zambia 
This chapter presents the first case study, which uses the popular integrated assessment model 
(IAM) the ‘Climate Framework for Uncertainty, Negotiation and Distribution’ (FUND) (Anthoff and 
Tol, 2014a) to explore the impact of climate change on income inequality in seven countries. A 
description of the model is provided in Section 6.1, along with the methodology used to implement 
the case study, such as how the coupling methodology outlined in Chapter 5 was applied, how 
regional results were disaggregated to estimate country-level impacts, how budget constraints were 
imposed, and how scenarios were generated. Section 6.2 explains FUND’s impact functions and 
explores the estimated impacts used in the case study, while case study results are presented in 
Section 6.3. These results are analysed in Chapter 8, as this enabled results from the Alaska case 
study in Chapter 7 to also be used to address the research questions outlined in Chapter 2.  
6.1 Introduction and methodology 
6.1.1 FUND overview 
As explained in Chapter 3, FUND is an IAM that aims to estimate the economic consequences of 
different greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions trajectories, along with mitigation and adaptation 
strategies. FUND divides the world into 16 regions109, and estimates regional impacts on agriculture, 
forestry, water resources, energy consumption, wetland loss, dryland loss, cost of coastal protection, 
ecosystems, morbidity and mortality from health impacts and tropical and extratropical storms, and 
economic damages due to tropical and extratropical storms. Sector impacts that are not readily 
measured in monetary units, such as mortality, are valued in dollars using the hedonic pricing and 
contingent valuation techniques described in Chapter 3. 
FUND estimates annual climate change impacts from110 1950 to 3000. The IAM uses exogenous 
projections of population growth, per capita income growth and technological progress for four 
scenarios from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC’s) Special Report on 
Emissions Scenarios (SRES) (IPCC, 2000); specifically, SRES A1B, A2, B1 and B2. This exogenous data 
was taken from the Integrated Model to Assess the Global Environment (IMAGE)111 (van Vuuren et 
 
109 For a list of the countries included in each region, see (Anthoff and Tol, 2014b). 
110 FUND must be run from 1950 onwards to initiate the climate component of the model. 
111 Although FUND assumes a steady-state from 2300 onwards, with constant populations and per capita 
income growth rates. 
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al., 2011b). Using the dichotomy established in Chapter 3, IMAGE falls into the first category of IAMs, 
i.e. is large, complex, computationally intensive, and focused on deriving scenarios for different 
demographic, economic and technological futures and associated GHG emission trajectories and 
their impact on climate variables and the biosphere. FUND, in contrast, is in the second category of 
IAMs, as it is primarily focused on economic consequences, and is much smaller and simpler. FUND 
uses the IMAGE data as exogenous inputs into simple emissions, atmospheric gas concentrations112, 
radiative forcing, temperature and sea-level rise (SLR) models113. Regional, sector-level economic 
damage functions then estimate the cumulative monetary costs and benefits of the projected 
changes in temperature, GHG concentrations, SLR, income and population. As explained in Chapter 
3, these damage functions are derived from a pool of external impact studies. 
73 uncertain variables are modelled probabilistically using Monte Carlo simulations, and are drawn 
from a mixture of normal, truncated normal, triangular, exponential and gamma distributions, as 
specified in Anthoff and Tol (2014b). FUND 3.9, the most recent version of the model, was used in 
this thesis, and the technical documentation, which includes a list of all the impact studies used to 
estimate each damage function, can be found in Anthoff and Tol (2014a). 
6.1.2 Applying coupling methodology outlined in Chapter 5 
As explained in Chapter 5, the impacts of a mixture of exogenous demand changes and exogenous 








(𝑰 − 𝑨𝟏𝟏) 𝟎
−𝑨𝟐𝟏 −𝑰
 and 𝑵 =
𝑰 𝑨𝟏𝟐
𝟎 (𝑨𝟐𝟐 − 𝑰)
. If the matrix of technical coefficients, 𝑨, is 
arranged so that the 𝑛 row and column accounts with endogenous account totals are at the top and 
left respectively, with the remaining 𝑚 − 𝑛 accounts with exogenous account totals at the bottom 
and right respectively, then 𝑨𝟏𝟏, 𝑨𝟏𝟐, 𝑨𝟐𝟏 and 𝑨𝟐𝟐 are matrices containing the technical coefficients 
in rows 1 to 𝑛, 1 to 𝑛, 𝑛 + 1 to 𝑚, and 𝑛 + 1 to 𝑚 respectively, and columns 1 to 𝑛, 𝑛 + 1 to 𝑚, 1 to 
𝑛, and 𝑛 + 1 to 𝑚 respectively of 𝑨. 𝑰 and 𝟎 are appropriately sized identity and null matrices 
respectively. 𝒙( ), 𝒙( ), 𝒇( ) and 𝒇( ) are vectors of endogenous account totals, exogenous 
account totals, exogenous final demand and endogenous final demand respectively. The inventories, 
rest-of-the-world (ROW), capital-savings, government and statistical discrepancy accounts were 
 
112 FUND models atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide and sulfur 
hexafluoride. 
113 Although emissions from land use changes and deforestation, and radiative forcing from sulphur dioxide are 
also specified exogenously for each scenario. 
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assumed to lie outside of the model and so comprised final demand. The reasoning behind this was 
detailed in Chapter 5. 












and changes to household incomes could be seen in the vector of account totals, 𝒙
( )
𝒙( )
, there was 
no need to calculate 𝒇( ), as one could determine 𝒙( ) from 
(𝑰 − 𝑨𝟏𝟏)𝒙
( ) − 𝑨𝟏𝟐𝒙
( ) = 𝒇( ). 
As the above is a linear model and 𝑨 is assumed to be constant, 
∆𝒙( ) = (𝑰 − 𝑨𝟏𝟏) ∆𝒇
( ) + 𝑨𝟏𝟐∆𝒙
( ) . 
FUND’s estimated changes in agricultural production, the monetary value of available water 
resources, expenditure on space heating and cooling, expenditure on coastal protection, and 
economic damages from tropical and extratropical storms were economic costs or benefits, and so 
were easily incorporated into this framework. Changes in agricultural production and water 
resources were commodity output changes, and so could form the ∆𝒙( ) vector. Meanwhile, 
expenditure on space heating and cooling, coastal protection, and repairing economic damages from 
tropical and extratropical storms were demand changes, and so formed part114 of the ∆𝒇( ) vector.  
Energy expenditures were assumed to be paid to the electricity commodity account, while 
expenditures on coastal protection and repairing storm damages were assumed to be paid to the 
construction commodity account. The storm damage repairs analysis also assumed that storm 
damages were valued at replacement cost115. Coastal protection was assumed to be entirely funded 
by the government current account, while storm damage repairs were modelled as funded by the 
investment account, and so assumed collective household, enterprise and government funding. 
Changes in energy consumption could not be modelled, as this would require changing business 
activities’ and household’s technical coefficients. The latter cannot be accommodated in an input-
output framework, so changes in energy expenditure were instead modelled as changes in 
investment account spending on electricity. This could be implemented, as spending from capital-
 
114 Another component of the ∆𝒇( ) vector was determined by imposing a budget constraint. See section 
6.1.4 of this chapter for details. 
115 The EM-DAT database (CRED, 2018), which was used to calibrate FUND’s storm damage functions, does not 
explain how damages were valued. Damages may be valued inconsistently in the database across different 
disasters, as the data was compiled from many different sources. 
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savings accounts formed part of final demand. 
FUND’s forestry impact estimates could not be included in the analysis, as FUND’s output for this 
sector estimates changes to producer and consumer surplus. As discussed in Chapter 5, the latter is 
the end-point of an analysis into the economic effects of climate change on forestry, not a driving 
force, and so should not be used as an input in input-output analysis (IOA). The force driving effects 
is the change in forestry yields, which FUND does not estimate. 
Similarly, while hedonic pricing and contingent valuation techniques have been used to monetise 
impacts on health and ecosystems, such estimates cannot readily be interpreted as either changes in 
spending or production. IOA was designed to estimate the effects of economic changes to economic 
systems; it cannot model effects due to aspects of life that are not traded on markets. These sectors 
were thus not considered in this thesis. 
Moving onto dryland and wetland116 losses, the value of dryland is assumed in FUND to be 
proportional to the income density in that region, and wetland value is assumed to be proportional 
to regional population and income density. It is not clear, however, how the values of lost wetlands 
and drylands from SLR could be used as inputs in an IOA. While a reduction in available dryland 
could reduce production in sectors that operated on that land, incorporating this would require a 
coastal land use analysis to determine which sectors would be affected. This was beyond the time-
scope of this project. Meanwhile, wetlands are of great importance to ecosystems, but limited direct 
importance to economies, so it is also unclear how such damages could be assigned to a given sector 
in a SAM. Finally, FUND gives back-of-the-envelope estimates of the cost of immigration and 
emigration due to SLR. The estimated cost of each immigrant or emigrant and the number of people 
forced to move is, however, not robust, as no substantial analysis takes place. These guesses were 
thus excluded from this thesis. 
This case study consequently considers only five of FUND’s impact categories: changes in agricultural 
production, water resources, expenditure on space heating and cooling, expenditure on coastal 
protection, and economic damages from tropical and extratropical storms. In FUND, the first three 
of these impact categories generally dominate all other tangible economic damages, including the 
tangible economic damages that were not considered in this case study. Between 2020 and 2100 in 
the A1B scenario for the United States (US), for example, the five impacts listed above represented, 
on average, 90.6% of FUND total impacts. In 65% of years, the five impacts collectively represented 
 
116 Wetlands contain soil that is saturated with water for at least part of the year, which results in distinctive 




more than 95% of total impacts, and only in the few years where total impacts were small due to the 
larger agricultural, water or energy impacts cancelling each other out, did other impact categories 
make a sizable contribution towards the total tangible impacts. This suggests that the most 
significant drivers of climate change impacts were captured in this case study. 
6.1.3 Disaggregating regional impacts 
FUND estimates impacts for 16 regions, and these typically include multiple countries. For example, 
the Central America region contains Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, and Panama. The US and Canada regions are exceptions, as they each contain only one 
country. Regional impacts thus generally needed to be disaggregated into country-level impacts. 
FUND models average temperature for a region; there is no higher resolution analysis that is then 
aggregated up to the regional level. As such, regional impacts are assumed to proportionately apply 
to all countries in the region. The fractional reduction in agricultural production, for example, is 
explicitly “assumed to hold for each country in the respective regions” (Anthoff and Tol, 2014a). In 
this thesis, regional impacts were thus disaggregated in proportion to a country’s sector size versus 
the total size of that sector aggregated across all countries in the region. 
For agricultural production impacts, regional data was disaggregated between countries in 
proportion to each country’s percentage of regional agricultural value-added. Value-added data was 
taken from the World Bank (World Bank, 2018). The same approach was taken for water resources, 
energy consumption, coastal protection, and repairing storm damages, using, respectively, data on 
total renewable water resources, taken from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations’ (FAO’s) Aquastat database (FAO, 2018), electricity consumption in kilowatt hours (kWh), 
taken from the US Central Intelligence Agency’s World Factbook (CIA, 2018), 2010 population living 
in a less than one meter high117 low elevation coastal zone (LECZ), available from Columbia 
University’s Center for International Earth Science and Information Network (CESIN, 2013), and total 
damages from storms between 2000 and 2018, valued in 2000 USD, from the Centre for Research on 
the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) at the Université Catholique de Louvain’s Emergency Events 
Database (EM-DAT) (CRED, 2018). 
6.1.4 Budget constraints 
It was crucial to impose a budget constraint on a domestic institution with projected increases in 
climate change related expenditures, or any increase in expenditure in ∆𝒇𝒆𝒙 would always result in 
economic growth. A change in expenditure thus had to be funded through changed savings, 
 
117 FUND’s largest SLR projection across the four scenarios is 0.8m. 
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borrowing, or expenditure on other goods and services. Only the latter was modelled in this thesis, 
as the first two options would require an endogenous capital-savings account. As discussed in 
Chapter 5, such accounts are typically assumed to be exogenous, due to concerns around technical 
coefficient variability. In addition, as explained in section 6.1.2 of this chapter, this account was 
assumed to be determined outside of the model so that investment could be a component of final 
demand. This was needed to explore the impacts of changes in expenditures on energy and storm 
repairs. 
As per section 6.1.2 of this chapter, depending on the type of expenditure, changes in expenditure 
were funded by government or investment. It was assumed that an increase (decrease) in 
expenditure on energy or construction by government or investment was funded by a decrease 
(increase) in spending on all other commodities purchased by government or investment, with this 
change spread across commodities in proportion to government or investment’s spending on those 
services in the SAM. 
6.1.5 Scenarios 
As discussed, FUND is set-up to model four scenarios, SRES A1B, A2, B1 and B2. While FUND runs 
until 3000 so that larger climate change effects can be explored, this time-scale was deemed 
inappropriate for economically-focused research questions. One has no idea what economies will 
look like in a thousand years, and it is doubtful that much can be learnt from speculating, so this case 
study explored cumulative impacts in annual time-steps from 2020 to 2100. The latter is a common 
cut-off point for IAM studies of climate change. Moreover, considering the vast economic and 
technological changes that occurred between 1930 and 2010, economies beyond the end of the 
century are unlikely to share many similarities with those today. Modelling even up to this point is 
already highly speculative, but it does allow exploration of the possible impacts of more sizable 
climate change effects. This is only useful, however, if results are understood to be exploratory. 
As discussed in Chapters 3 and 5, the results generated in this case study are not predictions, but 
rather scenarios to help explore uncertainty. Firstly, as discussed in Chapter 3, results from IAMs 
should never be treated as precise predictions, due to the difficulties of modelling complex, dynamic 
nonlinear systems, such as the climate and economies. The stability analysis in Chapter 5 also 
illustrated that IOA struggles to make precise predictions over long time-horizons. Chapter 5 
suggested that key structural properties of an economy, such as the relative interconnectedness of 
sectors with households, can sometimes be maintained for longer periods, which is useful for 
vulnerability analysis. The maximum, thirty-year, time horizon explored in Chapter 5, however, is 
much shorter than the proposed eighty-year analysis for this case study. As such, results from the 
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latter half of this time period should be viewed as particularly exploratory. They should be 
approached as an exploration of vulnerabilities across economies, rather than predictions or 
vulnerability analyses for seven specific countries. IOA provides a plausible model of how economies 
could react to exogenous unit changes to certain sectors, while the FUND model gives an indication 
of possible relative magnitudes of the exogenous changes to sectors. All results should be viewed in 
this light. 
Let 𝑡 represent the time period, 𝑟 the FUND region containing the country, 𝑐, of interest, and 𝑠 the 
SRES scenario being explored. When moving from one time period to the next, to get the region’s 
income in 𝑡 before climate impacts in 𝑡 are considered, FUND inflates the region’s 𝑡 − 1 income by 
1 + 𝑔( , ) . Specifically, 
1 + 𝑔( , ) = 1 + 𝑝𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ( , ) 1 + 𝑦𝑝𝑐𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ( , ) , 
where 𝑝𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ and 𝑦𝑝𝑐𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ are, respectively, annual population and income per capita growth 
rates. As discussed, 𝑝𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ and 𝑦𝑝𝑐𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ are specified exogenously for each region, scenario 
and time period. All of FUND’s estimated impacts and incomes are quoted in 1995 USD billions, and, 
as outlined in Chapter 4, all SAMs used in this case study were converted into 1995 USD billions. In 
this case study, it was thus assumed that all parts of a country’s economy grew by 𝛾( , ) =
1 + 𝑔( , )  between 𝑡 − 1 and 𝑡. For ease of notation, the (𝑟, 𝑠) superscript will be dropped from 
subsequent notation; however, it should be remembered that 𝛾  and 𝑔  varied by region and 
scenario. 
Meanwhile, let 𝒙( , ) =
𝒙( , , )
𝒙( , , )
 represent the vector of account totals for a given country and 
scenario at time 𝑡, after climate impacts in time 𝑡 have been taken into account. Similarly, let 
∆𝒙( , ) =
∆𝒙( , , )
∆𝒙( , , )
 represent the vector of changes in account totals at time 𝑡 due to climate 
impacts for the given country and scenario at time 𝑡. Once again, for ease of notation, the (𝑐, 𝑠) 
superscript will be dropped from subsequent notation; however, it should be remembered that 𝒙  
and ∆𝒙  varied by country and scenario. 
To get 𝒙  for the first year of analysis, 𝑡 = 2020, the vector of SAM account totals, 𝒙 , was 
inflated using the growth rates for each year, from the year after the SAM year, 𝑡 = 𝑆𝐴𝑀, to 2020, 
such that 
𝒙 = 𝒙 𝛾 + ∆𝒙 . 
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Where the SAM straddled two years, the SAM year was taken to be the lower of the two years, and 
the growth rate in year 𝑆𝐴𝑀 + 1 was taken to be half the FUND growth rate for that year. 
FUND’s estimated impacts at each time period are cumulative impacts from a counterfactual 
economic baseline, 𝒙 , where populations and incomes are consistent with the given SRES scenario, 
however, there have hitherto been no economic impacts from climate change. This meant that  






(𝑰 − 𝑨𝟏𝟏) ∆𝒇




Meanwhile, the counterfactual economic baseline, 𝒙 , was calculated using 
𝒙 = 𝒙 𝛾 . 
Once again, 𝒙  differed across countries and scenarios; however, for ease of notation, the (𝑐, 𝑠) 
superscript has been omitted.  
Time series of inequality ratios were determined from the generated 𝒙  time series. As an example, 
assume that the household quintiles’ account totals formed the first five entries of 𝒙 , with the 
bottom quintile, Q1, and top quintile, Q5, in rows 1 and 5 respectively. If 𝑥( )  represents the 𝑢th 
entry in 𝒙  then, for the given country and scenario, 
(𝑄5 𝑄1⁄ ) =
𝑥( )  
𝑥( )
. 





to explore changes in the ratios over time. Note that that baseline ratios were those in the SAMs, as 
a growth rate applied to the whole SAM would not affect these ratios. 
To assess whether ∆𝑥( )  was large or small for each household group, percentage changes, 𝑃( ) , 
were introduced that, as usual, varied across countries and scenarios. These explored cumulative 







They captured the proportion of baseline income at time 𝑡 that was gained or lost due to cumulative 
climate change impacts at 𝑡.  
6.1.6 Other methodological notes 
Uncertain variables, including damage function parameters, are modelled probabilistically in FUND 
using Monte Carlo simulations, where a ‘best-guess’ for each parameter is suggested along with a 
range of plausible values and accompanying PDF. As discussed in Chapter 3, probabilistic modelling 
was deemed inappropriate for this thesis, and a scenario analysis approach was instead adopted. As 
such, only best guess impacts were used for each scenario. 
The most recent US SAM, for 2016, was used for all the US estimates in this case study. However, 
Chapter 8 features an analysis of how results were affected by using earlier or alternatively 
disaggregated US SAMs. 
6.2 FUND-estimated sector impacts 
6.2.1 Introduction to FUND impact functions 
Graphs of FUND estimated impacts for all countries, scenarios and sectors can be found in Appendix 
G. 
FUND has three agricultural impact functions, which are dependent on the rate of climate change, 
the level of climate change, and CO2 fertilisation respectively. The first and last of these are always 
negative and positive respectively, while level effects can be negative or positive depending on 
whether the regional temperature exceeds the specified optimal temperature for the given region. 
CO2 fertilisation is a logarithmic function, so there are diminishing marginal benefits to increased 
CO2. The agricultural impact functions also depend on regional income per capita growth, 
specifically, the ratio of income per capita in the year in question to that in 1990, the calibration 
year. This is because the value of impacts will change as the economy grows overall. The calibration 
coefficients for all FUND sector impact functions differ by region. 
While the optimal regional warming above preindustrial times was projected to be exceeded by 
2100 in all regions and scenarios, impacts on agriculture were positive throughout the period for all 
countries in the study, as CO2 fertilisation still dominated rate and level effects at 2100. Benefits to 
agriculture in Ethiopia in A1B, for example, started at 0.6 1995 USD billions in 2020, rose to a 
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maximum of 3.5 1995 USD billions in 2073, and then fell to 1.7 1995 USD billions in 2100. All 
countries and scenarios followed this pattern of rising to a peak and then falling during the time 
period. All end points were positive and at a higher level at 2100 than 2020. 
The FUND water resources impact function depends on regional income per capita growth, regional 
population growth and global mean surface temperature (GMST). For a GMST higher than 
preindustrial levels, it always produces negative impacts. As can be seen in Appendix G, impacts 
became more negative as time progressed in all countries and scenarios. In India in B1, for example, 
direct impacts were -1.02 1995 USD billions in 2020, and -16.86 1995 USD billions in 2100. 
FUND models changes in energy consumption for space heating and cooling separately. Both are 
functions of regional population growth, regional income per capita growth, and GMST. Savings from 
reduced space heating display decreasing marginal benefits from temperature rises, which saturate. 
The costs of increased space cooling, however, do not saturate. As can be seen in Appendix G, the 
net change in energy expenditure was positive, i.e. increasing, for Egypt, Ethiopia, and Zambia 
throughout 2020 to 2100 in all scenarios. For India and Vietnam, the net change was negative in 
2020 in A2, but then positive for all other years, and in all other scenarios. For Mexico, there were 
net energy savings in all scenarios for twenty to twenty-five years, before increased space cooling 
costs started dominating reduced space heating benefits. In the US, there were projected net 
savings for the first 35 to 45 years, depending on the scenario, before net increases in energy 
expenditures.  
The level of coastal protection in FUND is determined by a cost-benefit analysis (CBA) that accounts 
for the cost of coastal protection and the value of wetland and dryland lost. The cost of coastal 
protection depends on costs per unit of protection, the SLR, the rate of pure time preference, and 
the consumption elasticity of marginal utility118. Meanwhile, the value of wetland lost is a function of 
income per capita, SLR and degree of coastal protection, and the value of dryland lost depends on 
income per square kilometre and lost land area. As discussed, only the costs of coastal protection 
were included in the impacts analysis in this case study. In addition, Ethiopia and Zambia are 
landlocked countries, and so were assumed to experience no SLR impacts. 
FUND’s economic damages from tropical storms impact function is dependent on the increase in 
regional income per capita and temperature, while FUND’s economic damages from extratropical 
storms impact function is dependent on regional income per capita and atmospheric CO2 
concentration. Damages from tropical and extratropical storms were summed and so taken 
 
118 The FUND default pure rate of time preference and consumption elasticity of marginal utility were used for 
this case study, i.e. these values were 1% and 1 respectively. 
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collectively in this case study. The historical storm data from (CRED, 2018) suggested that storms 
damages in Sub-Saharan Africa have been overwhelmingly concentrated in South-Eastern countries, 
such as Madagascar, South Africa, Zimbabwe and Mozambique. Historical storm damages in Ethiopia 
and Zambia have been negligible in comparison. These countries, thus, were allocated a similarly 
negligible percentage of the FUND SSA region’s storm damages. Likewise, while Egypt was allocated 
29% of its region’s estimated storm damage costs, the latter were so minimal that estimated storm 
damage repair costs in Egypt were also negligible. 
The estimated costs of coastal protection and storm damages were generally much smaller than all 
other impacts in all countries and scenarios, even though they increased over the 2020 to 2100 
period in all countries and scenarios. 
Before exploring the impacts estimated by FUND, one should note that the pools of impact studies 
that underpin FUND’s, and all prominent IAM’s, impact functions are generally not updated regularly 
(Prieg and Yumashev, forthcoming). This means that impact functions do not always reflect current 
expertise. Important examples of this are FUND’s agricultural impacts functions. The agricultural 
impact studies used for calibration and to establish functional forms were published between 1992 
and 1996. The literature on the impact of climate change on agriculture has moved on considerably 
since then, and this has led to criticism of FUND’s agricultural impacts functions; for example, see 
Ackerman and Munitz (2012).  
Concerns particularly surround FUND’s estimated impacts of CO2 fertilisation on agricultural yields. 
Older impact studies typically estimate a much greater positive impact than more recent studies. 
This is because early experiments took place in enclosed greenhouses rather than in the open air 
using more recent technological innovations, such as free-air concentration enrichment (FACE) 
technology (Long et al., 2006). Long et al. (2006), for example, suggests that benefits from CO2 
enrichment could be 50% lower than earlier estimates. Other studies raise doubts about FUND’s 
level of climate change agricultural impact function. Schlenker and Roberts (2009), for example, 
indicates that once the optimal temperature has been past, benefits should fall away and turn to 
costs at a much faster rate than the quadratic function specified in FUND. Schlenker and Roberts 
(2009) also casts doubt on the degree of agricultural adaptation to climate change assumed in FUND. 
These criticisms are important as FUND’s agricultural impacts are large in comparison to many other 
sectors, and so have a strong influence on results. As discussed, FUND’s estimate impacts on 
agriculture were positive throughout the period for all countries in the study, despite the optimal 
regional temperature above preindustrial times being exceeded in all regions and scenarios by 2100. 
This result is also contrary to observations that climate change is already having a negative impact 
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on global agricultural production (Lobell et al., 2011). With more moderate benefits from CO2 
fertilisation, level-related costs emerging rapidly after the optimal temperature is exceeded, and less 
optimistic adaptation assumptions, FUND could project agricultural costs rather than benefits. 
The impact of FUND’s assumptions on results will be discussed further in Chapter 9. 
6.2.2 How large are FUND-estimated impacts? 
To explore whether FUND-estimated sector impacts were large or small, for changes to agriculture 
or water output, one can express the FUND-estimated impact at each time as a percentage of the 
given commodity’s base output at that time. Similarly, for FUND-estimated changes to electricity or 
construction expenditure, one can express the IOA estimated change in the given sector’s output 
due to the final demand change, at each time, as a percentage of the given commodity’s base output 
at that time. Table 6.1 shows, for the given countries and scenarios, the largest cumulative 
percentage change in output observed in any year between 2020 and 2100, for the five FUND impact 
categories explored in this case study. 
Table 6.1 – Largest estimated cumulative percentage change in output for the applicable commodity 
(agriculture, water, electricity or construction) compared to the base output for that commodity, in 
any year between 2020 and 2100 
Agriculture 
Country A1B A2 B1 B2 
Egypt 4.7% 4.7% 4.5% 4.2% 
Ethiopia 3.6% 3.6% 3.4% 3.2% 
India 4.3% 4.6% 4.3% 4.3% 
Mexico 11.2% 11.7% 10.9% 10.6% 
US 8.2% 8.0% 7.6% 7.3% 
Vietnam 11.0% 11.7% 10.9% 10.9% 







Country A1B A2 B1 B2 
Egypt -116.2% -91.3% -107.1% -100.0% 
Ethiopia -12.0% -9.4% -11% -10.4% 
India -33.4% -27.5% -31.4% -34.9% 
Mexico -12.6% -10.4% -11.7% -11.5% 
US -127.5% -103.2% -127.6% -126.1% 
Vietnam -191.6% -159.8% -181.2% -201.1% 
Zambia -22.1% -18.7% -20.9% -20.7% 
 
Energy 
Country A1B A2 B1 B2 
Egypt 37.0% 43.2% 27.7% 48.5% 
Ethiopia 32.9% 38.5% 24.3% 43.3% 
India 7.3% 7.1% 2.2% 13.0% 
Mexico 2.6% 2.8% -1.7% 3.5% 
US 8.8% 6.7% -6.4% 11.9% 
Vietnam 27.9% 27.4% 8.5% 50% 









Country A1B A2 B1 B2 
Egypt 0.2% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 
India 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 
Mexico 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 
US 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 
Vietnam 0.8% 1.3% 1.1% 1.0% 
 
Storms 
Country A1B A2 B1 B2 
Egypt 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
India 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 
Mexico 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 
US 0.3% 0.3% 0.4% 0.4% 
Vietnam 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 
 
Notes: To explore how large FUND’s estimated impacts are in proportion to economies, the table shows FUND’s largest estimated impacts 
observed in any year between 2020 and 2100, as a percentage of base agricultural or water commodity output, or base electricity, 
construction or construction expenditure, for agricultural, water, energy, SLR and storms impacts estimates respectively. Agricultural and 
water impacts are commodity output changes, where positive (negative) numbers indicate increases (decreases) in output. Meanwhile, 
energy, SLR and storms impacts are changes in final demand, where positive (negative) numbers indicate increases (decreases) in 
expenditure. Note that an increase in expenditure does not necessarily produce an increase in economic growth, as budget constraints 
were imposed, as detailed in Section 6.1.4 of this chapter. Results are shown for the SRES scenarios A1B, A2, B1 and B2, for the seven 
countries that feature in the FUND case study. Note that there are no SLR impacts for Ethiopia and Zambia, as these are landlocked 
countries. There are also no estimated storm impacts for Ethiopia or Zambia, because historical storm data from CRED (2018) suggested 
that storms damages in Sub-Saharan Africa have been overwhelmingly concentrated in South-Eastern countries, such as Madagascar, 
South Africa, Zimbabwe and Mozambique. Historical storm damages in Ethiopia and Zambia have been negligible in comparison. These 
countries, thus, were allocated a similarly negligible percentage of the FUND SSA region’s storm damages. In contrast, as per historical 
storm data from CRED (2018), Egypt was allocated 29% of its region’s estimated storm damage costs; however, these were so minimal 
that estimated storm damage repair costs in Egypt were also negligible. Across all countries, one can see that agricultural, water and 
energy impacts at times dominate those from SLR and storms. There are, however, exceptions to this; for example, the relatively small 
agricultural impacts estimated for Zambia. 
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The data in Table 6.1 illustrates why it was desirable for countries from a variety of FUND regions to 
be included in the case study, as some regions were estimated to experienced far larger relative 
impacts to sectors than others. For example, demand for energy in Egypt was estimated to be 
affected by as much as 48.5%, whereas demand for energy in Mexico was never estimated to change 
by more than 3.5%. Such differences arose because the parameters of FUND’s impact functions were 
calibrated separately for each region based on relevant empirical studies. The correlations of these 
regional parameter values with the incomes of the regions in 1990 are low119, ranging from -0.35 to 
0.37, as parameter differences reflect differences in climate, geography and economic focus. The 
calibration coefficient for increased costs from space heating, for example, is nearly nine times larger 
in FUND for the North African region than for the United States. Such differences would not 
necessarily have been picked up had the focus solely been on using countries with a range of starting 
incomes and levels of inequality. In addition, exogenous growth projections in population and 
income were different in different regions, and these too feature in sector impact functions. 
Beyond observing that expenditures on increased coastal protection and repairing storm damages 
were typically relatively small in comparison to impacts on other sectors, one can see from Table 6.1 
that implausibly large, i.e. greater than 100%, decreases in water output were observed for many 
countries and scenarios. As FUND estimates output changes for the water sector, these overly large 
impacts do not include any IOA-estimated indirect effects. The implausibility must, thus, stem from 
problems with (a) the functional form or calibration of the FUND water impact function, (b) the 
method used in this case-study to disaggregate regional impacts down to a country-level, or (c) 
errors in the SAMs for, at least, the water sector. The second option appears unlikely, given that 
implausibly large impacts were also generated for the US, which has its own region in the FUND 
model, and so did not need to be disaggregated. It also seems unlikely that SAMs for Egypt, the US 
and Vietnam, all constructed by different researchers, all underestimated the size of the respective 
water sectors. Moreover, the sizes of the water sectors in the SAMs are consistent with those 
quoted in input-output tables (IOTs) for the applicable years. For example, according to the multi-
region IOT from the Asian Development Bank (ADB, 2007a), the output of the Vietnamese utilities 
sector in 2007 was 86 trillion Vietnamese Dong, while the SAM used in this case study estimated it to 
be 84 trillion Vietnamese Dong. In addition, the breakdown of utilities output between water and 
other utilities in the case study SAM is equivalent to that suggested by other ADB data (ADB, 2007b). 
This all implies that the most likely source of error is the FUND water impact function itself, which 
would be consistent with a common criticism of IAMs, as described in Chapters 3 and 7, that their 
 
119 1990 incomes were used because these were specified exogenously, whereas all more recent incomes were 
determined endogenously, so varied across scenarios. 
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damage functions are out-of-date and often based on expert guesses or extrapolation, rather than 
data, for higher temperature changes (Prieg and Yumashev, forthcoming). Unfortunately, FUND’s 
water impact function is based on studies from 1995 and 1996 that were not published in journals 
and can no longer be found online, so one cannot check the logic underpinning the function. 
6.2.3 Decision to exclude water impacts 
For scenario analysis to be useful, as described in Chapter 3, scenarios must be plausible and 
internally consistent. The data in Table 6.1 raises doubts about the plausibility of FUND’s water 
impact function. Not only are estimated losses greater than 100% in many countries and scenarios, 
the agriculture and water sectors appear to be constructed independently, without consideration of 
the consistency of results when agriculture and water are taken together. In Vietnam, for example, 
despite water resources being completely wiped out, the agricultural sector enjoys sizable increases 
in output. To generate plausible and internally consistent scenarios, FUND-estimated water impacts 
were, thus, omitted from the results and analysis in section 6.3 of this chapter. Chapter 8 does, 
however, use an IOA of the SAMs to estimate impacts from a unit change in water sector output, 
and then compares these to equivalent results generated for other sectors, to reflect on the possible 
effects that water sector impacts could have, relative to other sectors, on climate change income 
inequality effects. 
As FUND’s impact functions for different sectors are entirely independent from one another, and 
were constructed using separate analyses of impact studies, the removal of water impacts did not 
impact on estimates for any other sector, such as agriculture. 
6.3 Results 
Results are presented for Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, the US, Vietnam and Zambia, in alphabetical 
order. Results are aggregated effects from all four sectors, agriculture, energy, SLR and storms. A 
breakdown of the sector-by-sector contributions to the aggregate results presented in this chapter 
can be found in Chapter 8. 
6.3.1 Egypt 
As shown in Figure 6.1, cumulative impacts in absolute terms were unequally distributed across 
household groups, with higher expenditure quintiles experiencing greater deviations in incomes 
from the baseline, i.e. from the counterfactual world with no economic impacts from climate 
change. Impacts were positive for all household groups between 2020 and 2100, and continuously 
increased in all scenarios, except B1, where they rose to a peak around 2073 to 2074, and then fell. 
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Figure 6.1 – Cumulative changes (in 1995 USD billions) in Egyptian household expenditure quintiles’ 
incomes from counterfactual baseline incomes, in four SRES scenarios 
 
Notes: Figure shows the cumulative changes in income for each Egyptian household expenditure quintile as a result of FUND’s estimated 
climate change impacts on agricultural output, energy expenditure, expenditure building coastal defences and expenditure on 
reconstruction after storm damages. Results are aggregated direct and indirect effects from all four sectors. The case study was run from 
2020 to 2100 for SRES scenarios A1B, A2, B1 and B2. Q1 represents the income of the lowest expenditure quintile, and Q5 represents the 
income of highest expenditure quintile. 
When viewed as percentage changes from baseline incomes, these cumulative impacts did not alter 
any household group’s income by more than 2.64%, at any time, in any scenario. As shown in Figure 
6.2, impacts in percentage terms displayed much less variation across different household groups 
than when viewed in absolute terms, with the maximum difference of proportional impacts across 
household groups ranging over time from only 0.01 to 0.14 percentage points. The ‘impact ranking’, 




Figure 6.2 – Cumulative changes in Egyptian household expenditure quintiles’ incomes, as 
percentages of counterfactual baseline incomes, in four SRES scenarios 
 
Notes: Figure shows the cumulative changes in incomes, expressed as percentages of counterfactual baseline incomes, for each Egyptian 
household expenditure quintile, as a result of FUND’s estimated climate change impacts on agricultural output, energy expenditure, 
expenditure building coastal defences and expenditure on reconstruction after storm damages. Results are aggregated direct and indirect 
effects from all four sectors. The case study was run from 2020 to 2100 for SRES scenarios A1B, A2, B1 and B2. The counterfactual baseline 
incomes assume no effects from climate change. Q1 represents the income of the lowest expenditure quintile, and Q5 represents the 
income of highest expenditure quintile. 
The baseline ratios, i.e. the Q5/Q1, Q5/Q3, Q3/Q1 and (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) ratios in the Egyptian SAM, 
were 4.78, 2.70, 1.77, and 2.91 respectively. Table 6.2 shows the percentage difference between 
these ratios and the baseline ratios, e.g. (𝑄5 𝑄1⁄ ) − 𝑄5 𝑄1⁄ 𝑄5 𝑄1⁄ , at 2020 and 2100, and 
the maximum and minimum percentage difference observed during this time period, in the four 
SRES scenarios. One can see that cumulative climate change impacts reduced inequality at the start 
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of the time period, but increased inequality by the end of the time period. All differences from the 
baseline were, however, very small when compared to the baseline ratios themselves, with ratio 
changes ranging between -0.07% and 0.14%. 
Table 6.2 – Percentage difference of Egyptian Q5/Q1, Q5/Q3, Q3/Q1 and (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) ratios 
from baseline ratios at 2020 and 2100, and maximum and minimum percentage difference observed 
during this time period, in four SRES scenarios 
Scenario Ratio Change at 2020 Change at 2100 
Maximum change 
between 2020 and 
2100 
Minimum change 
between 2020 and 
2100 
A1B Q5/Q1 -0.06% 0.10% 0.10% -0.06% 
A1B Q5/Q3 -0.05% 0.04% 0.04% -0.05% 
A1B Q3/Q1 -0.01% 0.06% 0.06% -0.01% 
A1B (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) -0.07% 0.06% 0.06% -0.07% 
A2 Q5/Q1 -0.06% 0.06% 0.06% -0.06% 
A2 Q5/Q3 -0.05% 0.02% 0.02% -0.05% 
A2 Q3/Q1 -0.02% 0.05% 0.05% -0.02% 
A2 (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) -0.07% 0.02% 0.02% -0.07% 
B1 Q5/Q1 -0.06% 0.01% 0.01% -0.06% 
B1 Q5/Q3 -0.04% 0.00% 0.00% -0.04% 
B1 Q3/Q1 -0.01% 0.01% 0.01% -0.01% 
B1 (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) -0.06% 0.00% 0.00% -0.06% 
B2 Q5/Q1 -0.06% 0.14% 0.14% -0.06% 
B2 Q5/Q3 -0.04% 0.06% 0.06% -0.04% 
B2 Q3/Q1 -0.01% 0.08% 0.08% -0.01% 
B2 (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) -0.06% 0.08% 0.08% -0.06% 
 
Notes: Table shows the percentage difference of Egyptian Q5/Q1, Q5/Q3, Q3/Q1 and (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) ratios from counterfactual 
baseline ratios at 2020 and 2100, and the maximum and minimum percentage difference from counterfactual baseline ratios observed 
during this time period. Q1 represents the income of the lowest expenditure quintile, and Q5 represents the income of highest 
expenditure quintile. Differences arose as a result of FUND’s estimated climate change impacts on agricultural output, energy expenditure, 
expenditure building coastal defences and expenditure on reconstruction after storm damages. Results are aggregated direct and indirect 
effects from all four sectors. The case study was run from 2020 to 2100 for SRES scenarios A1B, A2, B1 and B2. The counterfactual baseline 




As shown in Figure 6.3, cumulative impacts in absolute terms were unequally distributed across 
household groups, with higher expenditure quintiles experiencing greater deviations in incomes 
from the baseline. Impacts were positive for all household groups between 2020 and 2100, and in all 
scenarios rose to a peak before falling. In A2, however, the peak occurred very close to 2100, and so 
only a minimal decrease was observed. 
When viewed as percentage changes from baseline incomes, these cumulative impacts did not alter 
any household group’s income by more than 2.72%, at any time, in any scenario. As shown in Figure 
6.4, greater differences in impacts, in percentage terms, across household groups were observed at 
the start of the time period in all scenarios, with an initial spread of proportional impacts of 
approximately 1.2 percentage points. These differences narrowed as time went on, and ultimately 
became very narrow, i.e. around 0.1 to 0.2 percentage points. The exception was in the A2 scenario, 
where the spread slightly increased until 2047, before reducing to around 0.6 percentage points in 
2100. The impact ranking across household groups remained the same across time and all scenarios, 
with lower expenditure quintiles seeing proportionately greater impacts. 
The baseline ratios, i.e. the Q5/Q1, Q5/Q3, Q3/Q1 and (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) ratios in the Ethiopian 
SAM, were 6.04, 2.95, 2.05, and 3.33 respectively. Table 6.3 shows the percentage difference 
between these ratios and the baseline ratios at 2020 and 2100, and the maximum and minimum 
percentage difference observed during this time period, in each of the four SRES scenarios. One can 
see that cumulative climate change impacts reduced inequality throughout the time period. 
Percentage differences from the baseline ratios were larger at the start of the period, but still 
relatively small. The largest ratio change observed, for example, was a 1.22% decrease in the Q5/Q1 
ratio in A1B at 2020. Ratio changes generally decreased as time went on, with the smallest observed 
being a 0.03% decrease in the Q3/Q1 ratio from the baseline in A1B at 2100. The A2 scenario was an 









Figure 6.3 – Cumulative changes (in 1995 USD billions) in Ethiopian household expenditure quintiles’ 
incomes from counterfactual baseline incomes, in four SRES scenarios 
 
Notes: Figure shows the cumulative changes in income for each Ethiopian household expenditure quintile as a result of FUND’s estimated 
climate change impacts on agricultural output and energy expenditure. Results are aggregated direct and indirect effects from both 
sectors. The case study was run from 2020 to 2100 for SRES scenarios A1B, A2, B1 and B2. Q1 represents the income of the lowest 







Figure 6.4 – Cumulative changes in Ethiopian household expenditure quintiles’ incomes, as 
percentages of counterfactual baseline incomes, in four SRES scenarios 
 
Notes: Figure shows the cumulative changes in incomes, expressed as percentages of counterfactual baseline incomes, for each Ethiopian 
household expenditure quintile, as a result of FUND’s estimated climate change impacts on agricultural output and energy expenditure. 
Results are aggregated direct and indirect effects from both sectors. The case study was run from 2020 to 2100 for SRES scenarios A1B, A2, 
B1 and B2. The counterfactual baseline incomes assume no effects from climate change. Q1 represents the income of the lowest 








Table 6.3 – Percentage difference of Ethiopian Q5/Q1, Q5/Q3, Q3/Q1 and (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) ratios 
from baseline ratios at 2020 and 2100, and maximum and minimum percentage difference observed 
during this time period, in four SRES scenarios 
Scenario Ratio Change at 2020 Change at 2100 
Maximum change 
between 2020 and 
2100 
Minimum change 
between 2020 and 
2100 
A1B Q5/Q1 -1.22% -0.10% -0.10% -1.22% 
A1B Q5/Q3 -0.87% -0.07% -0.07% -0.87% 
A1B Q3/Q1 -0.35% -0.03% -0.03% -0.35% 
A1B (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) -0.93% -0.08% -0.08% -0.93% 
A2 Q5/Q1 -1.14% -0.63% -0.63% -1.21% 
A2 Q5/Q3 -0.81% -0.45% -0.45% -0.86% 
A2 Q3/Q1 -0.33% -0.18% -0.18% -0.35% 
A2 (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) -0.87% -0.47% -0.47% -0.92% 
B1 Q5/Q1 -1.16% -0.21% -0.21% -1.16% 
B1 Q5/Q3 -0.83% -0.15% -0.15% -0.83% 
B1 Q3/Q1 -0.34% -0.06% -0.06% -0.34% 
B1 (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) -0.89% -0.16% -0.16% -0.89% 
B2 Q5/Q1 -1.10% -0.13% -0.13% -1.10% 
B2 Q5/Q3 -0.79% -0.09% -0.09% -0.79% 
B2 Q3/Q1 -0.32% -0.04% -0.04% -0.32% 
B2 (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) -0.84% -0.10% -0.10% -0.84% 
 
Notes: Table shows the percentage difference of Ethiopian Q5/Q1, Q5/Q3, Q3/Q1 and (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) ratios from counterfactual 
baseline ratios at 2020 and 2100, and the maximum and minimum percentage difference from counterfactual baseline ratios observed 
during this time period. Q1 represents the income of the lowest expenditure quintile, and Q5 represents the income of highest 
expenditure quintile. Differences arose as a result of FUND’s estimated climate change impacts on agricultural output and energy 
expenditure. Results are aggregated direct and indirect effects from both sectors. The case study was run from 2020 to 2100 for SRES 








As shown in Figure 6.5, cumulative impacts in absolute terms were unequally distributed across 
household groups, with higher expenditure quintiles experiencing greater deviations in incomes 
from the baseline. Impacts were positive for all household groups between 2020 and 2100, and in all 
scenarios rose to a peak before falling. 
When viewed as percentage changes from baseline incomes, these cumulative impacts did not alter 
any household group’s income by more than 1.3%, at any time, in any scenario. As shown in Figure 
6.6, impacts in percentage terms across household groups generally differed by around 0.19 
percentage points in 2020. In A1B and B1, the spread gradually narrowed as time progressed to 
around 0.11 and 0.05 percentage points respectively. Meanwhile, in A2 and B2, the spread first 
increased to 0.25 and 0.23 percentage points respectively, before decreasing to 0.19 and 0.21 
percentage points respectively. The ranking of proportional impacts across household groups 
remained the same across time and all scenarios, with lower expenditure quintiles seeing 
proportionately greater impacts. 
The baseline ratios, i.e. the Q5/Q1, Q5/Q3, Q3/Q1 and (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) ratios in the Indian SAM, 
were 6.11, 3.02, 2.03, and 3.63 respectively. Table 6.4 shows the percentage difference between 
these ratios and the baseline ratios at 2020 and 2100, and the maximum and minimum percentage 
difference observed during this time period, in the four SRES scenarios. One can see that cumulative 
climate change impacts reduced inequality throughout the time period. All differences from the 
baseline were, however, very small when compared to the baseline ratios themselves, with ratio 












Figure 6.5 – Cumulative changes (in 1995 USD billions) in Indian household expenditure quintiles’ 
incomes from counterfactual baseline incomes, in four SRES scenarios 
 
Notes: Figure shows the cumulative changes in income for each Indian household expenditure quintile as a result of FUND’s estimated 
climate change impacts on agricultural output, energy expenditure, expenditure building coastal defences and expenditure on 
reconstruction after storm damages. Results are aggregated direct and indirect effects from all four sectors. The case study was run from 
2020 to 2100 for SRES scenarios A1B, A2, B1 and B2. Q1 represents the income of the lowest expenditure quintile, and Q5 represents the 







Figure 6.6 – Cumulative changes in Indian household expenditure quintiles’ incomes, as percentages 
of counterfactual baseline incomes, in four SRES scenarios 
 
Notes: Figure shows the cumulative changes in incomes, expressed as percentages of counterfactual baseline incomes, for each Indian 
household expenditure quintile, as a result of FUND’s estimated climate change impacts on agricultural output, energy expenditure, 
expenditure building coastal defences and expenditure on reconstruction after storm damages. Results are aggregated direct and indirect 
effects from all four sectors. The case study was run from 2020 to 2100 for SRES scenarios A1B, A2, B1 and B2. The counterfactual baseline 
incomes assume no effects from climate change. Q1 represents the income of the lowest expenditure quintile, and Q5 represents the 







Table 6.4 – Percentage difference of Indian Q5/Q1, Q5/Q3, Q3/Q1 and (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) ratios from 
baseline ratios at 2020 and 2100, and maximum and minimum percentage difference observed 
during this time period, in four SRES scenarios 
Scenario Ratio Change at 2020 Change at 2100 
Maximum change 
between 2020 and 
2100 
Minimum change 
between 2020 and 
2100 
A1B Q5/Q1 -0.18% -0.11% -0.11% -0.19% 
A1B Q5/Q3 -0.09% -0.06% -0.06% -0.10% 
A1B Q3/Q1 -0.09% -0.06% -0.06% -0.09% 
A1B (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) -0.13% -0.08% -0.08% -0.14% 
A2 Q5/Q1 -0.19% -0.19% -0.19% -0.24% 
A2 Q5/Q3 -0.10% -0.10% -0.10% -0.12% 
A2 Q3/Q1 -0.09% -0.10% -0.09% -0.12% 
A2 (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) -0.14% -0.14% -0.14% -0.17% 
B1 Q5/Q1 -0.19% -0.05% -0.05% -0.19% 
B1 Q5/Q3 -0.10% -0.02% -0.02% -0.10% 
B1 Q3/Q1 -0.09% -0.02% -0.02% -0.09% 
B1 (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) -0.14% -0.03% -0.03% -0.14% 
B2 Q5/Q1 -0.18% -0.21% -0.18% -0.22% 
B2 Q5/Q3 -0.10% -0.10% -0.10% -0.11% 
B2 Q3/Q1 -0.09% -0.10% -0.09% -0.11% 
B2 (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) -0.13% -0.14% -0.13% -0.16% 
 
Notes: Table shows the percentage difference of Indian Q5/Q1, Q5/Q3, Q3/Q1 and (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) ratios from counterfactual baseline 
ratios at 2020 and 2100, and the maximum and minimum percentage difference from counterfactual baseline ratios observed during this 
time period. Q1 represents the income of the lowest expenditure quintile, and Q5 represents the income of highest expenditure quintile. 
Differences arose as a result of FUND’s estimated climate change impacts on agricultural output, energy expenditure, expenditure building 
coastal defences and expenditure on reconstruction after storm damages. Results are aggregated direct and indirect effects from all four 
sectors. The case study was run from 2020 to 2100 for SRES scenarios A1B, A2, B1 and B2. The counterfactual baseline incomes assume no 







As shown in Figure 6.7, cumulative impacts in absolute terms were unequally distributed across 
household groups, with higher income quintiles experiencing greater deviations in incomes from the 
baseline. Impacts were positive for all household groups between 2020 and 2100, and in all 
scenarios rose to a peak before falling. 
When viewed as percentage changes from baseline incomes, these cumulative impacts did not alter 
any household group’s income by more than 0.78%, at any time, in any scenario. As shown in Figure 
6.8, greater differences of impacts in percentage terms across household groups were observed at 
2020 than at 2100, with the spread starting off around 0.12 to 0.13 percentage points in all 
scenarios, increasing slightly, and narrowing to 0.04, 0.07, 0.03 and 0.05 percentage points in A1B, 
A2, B1 and B2 respectively. Overall, the spread varied between 0.02 and 0.16 percentage points. The 
ranking of proportional impacts across household groups remained the same across time and all 
scenarios, with higher income quintiles seeing proportionately greater impacts. 
The baseline ratios, i.e. Q5/Q1, Q5/Q3, Q3/Q1 and (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) in the Mexican SAM, were 
8.05, 4.35, 1.85, and 4.30 respectively. Table 6.5 shows the percentage difference between these 
ratios and the baseline ratios at 2020 and 2100, and the maximum and minimum percentage 
difference observed during this time period, in the four SRES scenarios. One can see that cumulative 
climate change impacts increased inequality throughout the time period. All differences from the 
baseline were, however, very small when compared to the baseline ratios themselves, with ratio 












Figure 6.7 – Cumulative changes (in 1995 USD billions) in Mexican household income quintiles’ 
incomes from counterfactual baseline incomes, in four SRES scenarios 
 
Notes: Figure shows the cumulative changes in income for each Mexican household income quintile as a result of FUND’s estimated 
climate change impacts on agricultural output, energy expenditure, expenditure building coastal defences and expenditure on 
reconstruction after storm damages. Results are aggregated direct and indirect effects from all four sectors. The case study was run from 
2020 to 2100 for SRES scenarios A1B, A2, B1 and B2. Q1 represents the income of the lowest income quintile, and Q5 represents the 







Figure 6.8 – Cumulative changes in Mexican household income quintiles’ incomes, as percentages of 
counterfactual baseline incomes, in four SRES scenarios 
 
Notes: Figure shows the cumulative changes in incomes, expressed as percentages of counterfactual baseline incomes, for each Mexican 
household income quintile, as a result of FUND’s estimated climate change impacts on agricultural output, energy expenditure, 
expenditure building coastal defences and expenditure on reconstruction after storm damages. Results are aggregated direct and indirect 
effects from all four sectors. The case study was run from 2020 to 2100 for SRES scenarios A1B, A2, B1 and B2. The counterfactual baseline 
incomes assume no effects from climate change. Q1 represents the income of the lowest income quintile, and Q5 represents the income 







Table 6.5 – Percentage difference of Mexican Q5/Q1, Q5/Q3, Q3/Q1 and (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) ratios 
from baseline ratios at 2020 and 2100, and maximum and minimum percentage difference observed 
during this time period, in four SRES scenarios 
Scenario Ratio Change at 2020 Change at 2100 
Maximum change 
between 2020 and 
2100 
Minimum change 
between 2020 and 
2100 
A1B Q5/Q1 0.13% 0.04% 0.14% 0.04% 
A1B Q5/Q3 0.12% 0.04% 0.13% 0.04% 
A1B Q3/Q1 0.01% 0.00% 0.01% 0.00% 
A1B (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) 0.10% 0.03% 0.11% 0.03% 
A2 Q5/Q1 0.12% 0.11% 0.16% 0.11% 
A2 Q5/Q3 0.12% 0.11% 0.15% 0.11% 
A2 Q3/Q1 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 
A2 (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) 0.10% 0.09% 0.13% 0.09% 
B1 Q5/Q1 0.12% 0.02% 0.13% 0.02% 
B1 Q5/Q3 0.12% 0.02% 0.12% 0.02% 
B1 Q3/Q1 0.01% 0.00% 0.01% 0.00% 
B1 (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) 0.10% 0.02% 0.10% 0.02% 
B2 Q5/Q1 0.12% 0.06% 0.13% 0.06% 
B2 Q5/Q3 0.11% 0.06% 0.12% 0.06% 
B2 Q3/Q1 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 0.00% 
B2 (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) 0.10% 0.05% 0.10% 0.05% 
 
Notes: Table shows the percentage difference of Mexican Q5/Q1, Q5/Q3, Q3/Q1 and (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) ratios from counterfactual 
baseline ratios at 2020 and 2100, and the maximum and minimum percentage difference from counterfactual baseline ratios observed 
during this time period. Q1 represents the income of the lowest income quintile, and Q5 represents the income of highest income quintile. 
Differences arose as a result of FUND’s estimated climate change impacts on agricultural output, energy expenditure, expenditure building 
coastal defences and expenditure on reconstruction after storm damages. Results are aggregated direct and indirect effects from all four 
sectors. The case study was run from 2020 to 2100 for SRES scenarios A1B, A2, B1 and B2. The counterfactual baseline incomes assume no 






6.3.5 United States 
As shown in Figure 6.9, cumulative impacts in absolute terms were unequally distributed across 
household groups, with higher income quintiles experiencing greater deviations in incomes from the 
baseline. Impacts were positive for all household groups between 2020 and 2100, and in all 
scenarios, except A2, rose to a peak before falling. In A2, impacts for all household groups 
continuously rose. 
When viewed as percentage changes from baseline incomes, these cumulative impacts did not alter 
any household group’s income by more than 0.17%, at any time, in any scenario. As shown in Figure 
6.10, differences in impacts in percentage terms between household groups started off at around 
0.06 percentage points at 2020. The spreads then increased slightly until peaking at around 2051, 
2067, 2046 and 2056 for A1B, A2, B1 and B2 respectively, before decreasing and ending the time 
period at 0.04, 0.07, 0.03, and 0.05 percentage points respectively. Overall the spread of percentage 
impacts across household groups ranged from 0.03 to 0.08 percentage points. The ranking of 
proportional impacts across most household groups remained the same across time and all 
scenarios, with higher income quintiles seeing proportionately greater impacts. The third and fourth 
income quintiles were exceptions, as proportional impacts in all scenarios started off more heavily 
skewed towards the third quintile; however, as time progressed, proportional impacts on the fourth 
quintile grew to exceed those on the third. 
The baseline Q5/Q1, Q5/Q3, Q3/Q1 and (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) ratios in the US SAM were 14.67, 3.51, 
4.18, and 6.07 respectively. Table 6.6 shows the percentage difference between the ratios after 
climate change impacts and the baseline ratios at 2020 and 2100, and the maximum and minimum 
percentage difference observed during this time period, in the four SRES scenarios. One can see that 
cumulative climate change impacts increased inequality throughout the time period. All differences 
from the baseline were, however, very small when compared to the baseline ratios themselves, with 




Figure 6.9 – Cumulative changes (in 1995 USD billions) in American household income quintiles’ 
incomes from counterfactual baseline incomes, in four SRES scenarios 
 
Notes: Figure shows the cumulative changes in income for each American household income quintile as a result of FUND’s estimated 
climate change impacts on agricultural output, energy expenditure, expenditure building coastal defences and expenditure on 
reconstruction after storm damages. Results are aggregated direct and indirect effects from all four sectors. The case study was run from 
2020 to 2100 for SRES scenarios A1B, A2, B1 and B2. Q1 represents the income of the lowest income quintile, and Q5 represents the 







Figure 6.10 – Cumulative changes in American household income quintiles’ incomes, as percentages 
of counterfactual baseline incomes, in four SRES scenarios 
 
Notes: Figure shows the cumulative changes in incomes, expressed as percentages of counterfactual baseline incomes, for each American 
household income quintile, as a result of FUND’s estimated climate change impacts on agricultural output, energy expenditure, 
expenditure building coastal defences and expenditure on reconstruction after storm damages. Results are aggregated direct and indirect 
effects from all four sectors. The case study was run from 2020 to 2100 for SRES scenarios A1B, A2, B1 and B2. The counterfactual baseline 
incomes assume no effects from climate change. Q1 represents the income of the lowest income quintile, and Q5 represents the income 







Table 6.6 – Percentage difference of American Q5/Q1, Q5/Q3, Q3/Q1 and (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) ratios 
from baseline ratios at 2020 and 2100, and maximum and minimum percentage difference observed 
during this time period, in four SRES scenarios 
Scenario Ratio Change at 2020 Change at 2100 
Maximum change 
between 2020 and 
2100 
Minimum change 
between 2020 and 
2100 
A1B Q5/Q1 0.06% 0.04% 0.08% 0.04% 
A1B Q5/Q3 0.02% 0.01% 0.03% 0.01% 
A1B Q3/Q1 0.04% 0.02% 0.05% 0.02% 
A1B (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) 0.04% 0.02% 0.05% 0.02% 
A2 Q5/Q1 0.06% 0.07% 0.08% 0.06% 
A2 Q5/Q3 0.02% 0.02% 0.03% 0.02% 
A2 Q3/Q1 0.04% 0.04% 0.05% 0.04% 
A2 (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) 0.04% 0.04% 0.05% 0.04% 
B1 Q5/Q1 0.06% 0.03% 0.07% 0.03% 
B1 Q5/Q3 0.02% 0.01% 0.02% 0.01% 
B1 Q3/Q1 0.04% 0.02% 0.05% 0.02% 
B1 (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) 0.04% 0.02% 0.04% 0.02% 
B2 Q5/Q1 0.06% 0.05% 0.07% 0.05% 
B2 Q5/Q3 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 
B2 Q3/Q1 0.04% 0.03% 0.04% 0.03% 
B2 (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) 0.03% 0.03% 0.04% 0.03% 
 
Notes: Table shows the percentage difference of American Q5/Q1, Q5/Q3, Q3/Q1 and (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) ratios from counterfactual 
baseline ratios at 2020 and 2100, and the maximum and minimum percentage difference from counterfactual baseline ratios observed 
during this time period. Q1 represents the income of the lowest income quintile, and Q5 represents the income of highest income quintile. 
Differences arose as a result of FUND’s estimated climate change impacts on agricultural output, energy expenditure, expenditure building 
coastal defences and expenditure on reconstruction after storm damages. Results are aggregated direct and indirect effects from all four 
sectors. The case study was run from 2020 to 2100 for SRES scenarios A1B, A2, B1 and B2. The counterfactual baseline incomes assume no 







As shown in Figure 6.11, cumulative impacts in absolute terms were unequally distributed across 
household groups, with higher expenditure quintiles experiencing greater deviations in incomes 
from the baseline. Impacts were positive for all household groups between 2020 and 2100. In B1, all 
household groups experienced impacts that rose to a peak around 2067 to 2069, before falling. In 
A1B, all household groups, except the highest expenditure quintile, saw impacts rise to a peak 
between 2076 and 2088, before impacts started to decrease. Meanwhile, impacts for the highest 
expenditure quintile continuously rose throughout the 2020 to 2100 time period. In A2, impacts for 
the two lowest expenditure quintiles rose to a peak just before the end of the time period, while for 
all other income quintiles, impacts continuously increased. Finally, the three lowest expenditure 
quintiles in B2 saw impacts rise until around 2081 to 2093, before starting to diminish, while impacts 
for the two highest expenditure quintiles continuously increased. 
When viewed as percentage changes from baseline incomes, these cumulative impacts did not alter 
any household group’s income by more than 4.24%, at any time, in any scenario. As shown in Figure 
6.12, impacts in percentage terms in all scenarios started out more dispersed across household 
groups at the start of the time period, and became more concentrated towards 2100; although in 
A1B and B2, they started to slightly disperse again towards the very end of the time period. 
Specifically, the spread of proportional impacts across household groups in 2020 was between 2.28 
and 2.42 percentage points. In A1B and B2, these spreads reduced to around 0.03 to 0.04 
percentage points, before slightly rising again. In A2 and B1, spreads gradually decreased over time 
to 0.92 and 0.29 percentage points respectively in 2100.The ranking of proportional impacts across 
household groups remained the same across time in A2 and B1, with lower expenditure quintiles 
seeing proportionately greater impacts. This was the initial pattern in A1B and B2; however, as 
dispersion of proportional impacts across household groups contracted and then expanded again, 
with the latter the trend was reversed, i.e. higher expenditure quintiles saw proportionately greater 
impacts. 
The baseline ratios, i.e. the Q5/Q1, Q5/Q3, Q3/Q1 and (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) ratios in the Vietnam SAM, 
were 6.50, 2.79, 2.33, and 3.66 respectively. Table 6.7 shows the percentage difference between 
these ratios after climate change impacts and the baseline ratios at 2020 and 2100, and the 
maximum and minimum percentage difference observed during this time period, in the four SRES 
scenarios. At the start of the time period, one can see that cumulative climate change impacts 
reduced inequality in all scenarios. This remained true throughout the time period in A2 and B1. In 
A1B and B2, however, cumulative climate change impacts started to increase inequality by the end 
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of the time period. The largest ratio percentage change observed was a decrease of 2.33% at 2020 in 
the Q5/Q1 ratio from the baseline in A2. Percentage changes in ratios at the end of the time period 
were smaller across all scenarios and ratios. 
Figure 6.11 – Cumulative changes (in 1995 USD billions) in Vietnamese household expenditure 
quintiles’ incomes from counterfactual baseline incomes, in four SRES scenarios 
 
Notes: Figure shows the cumulative changes in income for each Vietnamese household expenditure quintile as a result of FUND’s 
estimated climate change impacts on agricultural output, energy expenditure, expenditure building coastal defences and expenditure on 
reconstruction after storm damages. Results are aggregated direct and indirect effects from all four sectors. The case study was run from 
2020 to 2100 for SRES scenarios A1B, A2, B1 and B2. Q1 represents the income of the lowest expenditure quintile, and Q5 represents the 





Figure 6.12 – Cumulative changes in Vietnamese household expenditure quintiles’ incomes, as 
percentages of counterfactual baseline incomes, in four SRES scenarios 
 
Notes: Figure shows the cumulative changes in incomes, expressed as percentages of counterfactual baseline incomes, for each 
Vietnamese household expenditure quintile, as a result of FUND’s estimated climate change impacts on agricultural output, energy 
expenditure, expenditure building coastal defences and expenditure on reconstruction after storm damages. Results are aggregated direct 
and indirect effects from all four sectors. The case study was run from 2020 to 2100 for SRES scenarios A1B, A2, B1 and B2. The 
counterfactual baseline incomes assume no effects from climate change. Q1 represents the income of the lowest expenditure quintile, 







Table 6.7 – Percentage difference of Vietnamese Q5/Q1, Q5/Q3, Q3/Q1 and (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) ratios 
from baseline ratios at 2020 and 2100, and maximum and minimum percentage difference observed 
during this time period, in four SRES scenarios 
Scenario Ratio Change at 2020 Change at 2100 
Maximum change 
between 2020 and 
2100 
Minimum change 
between 2020 and 
2100 
A1B Q5/Q1 -2.20% 0.10% 0.10% -2.20% 
A1B Q5/Q3 -1.22% 0.06% 0.06% -1.22% 
A1B Q3/Q1 -0.99% 0.04% 0.04% -0.99% 
A1B (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) -1.69% 0.10% 0.10% -1.69% 
A2 Q5/Q1 -2.33% -0.89% -0.89% -2.33% 
A2 Q5/Q3 -1.29% -0.48% -0.48% -1.29% 
A2 Q3/Q1 -1.05% -0.41% -0.41% -1.05% 
A2 (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) -1.79% -0.67% -0.67% -1.79% 
B1 Q5/Q1 -2.20% -0.28% -0.28% -2.20% 
B1 Q5/Q3 -1.22% -0.16% -0.16% -1.22% 
B1 Q3/Q1 -0.99% -0.13% -0.13% -0.99% 
B1 (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) -1.69% -0.22% -0.22% -1.69% 
B2 Q5/Q1 -2.21% 0.25% 0.25% -2.21% 
B2 Q5/Q3 -1.23% 0.15% 0.15% -1.23% 
B2 Q3/Q1 -1.00% 0.10% 0.10% -1.00% 
B2 (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) -1.70% 0.22% 0.22% -1.70% 
 
Notes: Table shows the percentage difference of Vietnamese Q5/Q1, Q5/Q3, Q3/Q1 and (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) ratios from counterfactual 
baseline ratios at 2020 and 2100, and the maximum and minimum percentage difference from counterfactual baseline ratios observed 
during this time period. Q1 represents the income of the lowest expenditure quintile, and Q5 represents the income of highest 
expenditure quintile. Differences arose as a result of FUND’s estimated climate change impacts on agricultural output, energy expenditure, 
expenditure building coastal defences and expenditure on reconstruction after storm damages. Results are aggregated direct and indirect 
effects from all four sectors. The case study was run from 2020 to 2100 for SRES scenarios A1B, A2, B1 and B2. The counterfactual baseline 







As shown in Figure 6.13, cumulative impacts in absolute terms were unequally distributed across 
household groups, with higher expenditure quintiles experiencing greater deviations in incomes 
from the baseline. Impacts were positive for all household groups between 2020 and 2100, and 
continuously increased in all scenarios, except B1, where they rose to a peak around 2074 to 2077, 
and then fell. 
When viewed as percentage changes from baseline incomes, these cumulative impacts did not alter 
any household group’s income by more than 1.42%, at any time, in any scenario. As shown in Figure 
6.14, the spread of percentage impacts across household groups at 2020 was 0.16 to 0.18 
percentage points across all scenarios. These spreads increased in A1B and B2 to 0.42 and 0.61 
percentage points respectively, decreased slightly then increased to 0.47 percentage points in A2, 
and increased slightly then decreased to 0.11 percentage points in B1. The ranking of proportional 
impacts across household groups remained the same across time and all scenarios, with higher 
expenditure quintiles seeing proportionately greater impacts. 
The baseline ratios, i.e. Q5/Q1, Q5/Q3, Q3/Q1 and (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) ratios in the Zambian SAM, 
were 22.08, 7.52, 2.93, and 9.71 respectively. Table 6.8 shows the percentage difference between 
these ratios after climate change impacts and the baseline ratios at 2020 and 2100, and the 
maximum and minimum percentage difference observed during this time period, in the four SRES 
scenarios. One can see that cumulative climate change impacts increased inequality throughout the 












Figure 6.13 – Cumulative changes (in 1995 USD billions) in Zambian household expenditure quintiles’ 
incomes from counterfactual baseline incomes, in four SRES scenarios 
 
Notes: Figure shows the cumulative changes in income for each Zambian household expenditure quintile as a result of FUND’s estimated 
climate change impacts on agricultural output and energy expenditure. Results are aggregated direct and indirect effects from both 
sectors. The case study was run from 2020 to 2100 for SRES scenarios A1B, A2, B1 and B2. Q1 represents the income of the lowest 








Figure 6.14 – Cumulative changes in Zambian household expenditure quintiles’ incomes, as 
percentages of counterfactual baseline incomes, in four SRES scenarios 
 
Notes: Figure shows the cumulative changes in incomes, expressed as percentages of counterfactual baseline incomes, for each Zambian 
household expenditure quintile, as a result of FUND’s estimated climate change impacts on agricultural output and energy expenditure. 
Results are aggregated direct and indirect effects from both sectors. The case study was run from 2020 to 2100 for SRES scenarios A1B, A2, 
B1 and B2. The counterfactual baseline incomes assume no effects from climate change. Q1 represents the income of the lowest 







Table 6.8 – Percentage difference of Zambian Q5/Q1, Q5/Q3, Q3/Q1 and (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) ratios 
from baseline ratios at 2020 and 2100, and maximum and minimum percentage difference observed 
during this time period, in four SRES scenarios 
Scenario Ratio Change at 2020 Change at 2100 
Maximum change 
between 2020 and 
2100 
Minimum change 
between 2020 and 
2100 
A1B Q5/Q1 0.16% 0.42% 0.42% 0.16% 
A1B Q5/Q3 0.08% 0.27% 0.27% 0.08% 
A1B Q3/Q1 0.08% 0.15% 0.15% 0.08% 
A1B (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) 0.13% 0.36% 0.36% 0.13% 
A2 Q5/Q1 0.15% 0.47% 0.47% 0.15% 
A2 Q5/Q3 0.08% 0.29% 0.29% 0.07% 
A2 Q3/Q1 0.08% 0.18% 0.18% 0.07% 
A2 (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) 0.12% 0.39% 0.39% 0.12% 
B1 Q5/Q1 0.18% 0.11% 0.19% 0.11% 
B1 Q5/Q3 0.09% 0.07% 0.10% 0.07% 
B1 Q3/Q1 0.08% 0.04% 0.09% 0.04% 
B1 (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) 0.14% 0.09% 0.15% 0.09% 
B2 Q5/Q1 0.16% 0.61% 0.61% 0.16% 
B2 Q5/Q3 0.08% 0.39% 0.39% 0.08% 
B2 Q3/Q1 0.08% 0.22% 0.22% 0.08% 
B2 (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) 0.13% 0.51% 0.51% 0.13% 
 
Notes: Table shows the percentage difference of Zambian Q5/Q1, Q5/Q3, Q3/Q1 and (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) ratios from counterfactual 
baseline ratios at 2020 and 2100, and the maximum and minimum percentage difference from counterfactual baseline ratios observed 
during this time period. Q1 represents the income of the lowest expenditure quintile, and Q5 represents the income of highest 
expenditure quintile. Differences arose as a result of FUND’s estimated climate change impacts on agricultural output and energy 
expenditure. Results are aggregated direct and indirect effects from both sectors. The case study was run from 2020 to 2100 for SRES 
scenarios A1B, A2, B1 and B2. The counterfactual baseline incomes assume no effects from climate change. 
6.4 Summary 
This chapter presents the first case study, which uses FUND to explore the impact of climate change 
on income inequality in Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, the US, Vietnam and Zambia. It introduced 
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the FUND model, explained how impacts estimated by the model would be used as inputs into the 
coupling methodology outlined in Chapter 5, described how FUND regional impact estimates were 
disaggregated into country-level impacts, and how budget constraints would be imposed to ensure 
that increases in expenditures don’t automatically increase economic growth. 
The chapter then introduced FUND’s sectoral impact functions and the results they generated, which 
were used as inputs in this case study. Particular attention was drawn to the fact that FUND’s 
agricultural impact functions, which have a large impact on FUND’s overall results, are based on out-
of-date studies that are more optimistic than more recent papers. In addition, implausibly large, i.e. 
greater than 100%, decreases in water output were observed for many countries and scenarios. This 
was most likely down to flaws in FUND’s water impact function, which is unfortunately based on 
studies from 1995 and 1996 that were not published in journals and can no longer be found online, 
so the logic behind this function could not be examined. For scenario analysis to be useful, scenarios 
must be plausible and internally consistent. Greater than 100% decreases in output clearly do not 
meet this criterion. As such, water impacts were excluded from the case study. Chapter 8 does, 
however, use an IOA of the SAMs to estimate impacts from a unit change in water sector output, 
and then compares these to equivalent results generated for other sectors, to reflect on the possible 
effects that water sector impacts could have, relative to other sectors, on climate change income 
inequality effects. The strong influence of FUND’s assumptions on results will also be discussed 
further in Chapter 9. 
Finally, this chapter presented the results of the case study for all seven countries. Results were 
aggregated effects from all four sectors, agriculture, energy, SLR and storms. A breakdown of the 
sector-by-sector contributions to the aggregate results presented in this chapter can be found in 
Chapter 8. 
Impacts, in absolute terms, were found to be positive for all household groups in all countries and 
scenarios. Absolute impacts were not, however, equally distributed across households, with higher 
expenditure or income households experiencing greater absolute impacts in all countries and 
scenarios. The same pattern across time was followed in all cases, with absolute impacts increasing, 
then peaking and falling, or continuously increasing for all household groups. The latter gave the 
impression of the peak having not yet been reached. 
When expressed in percentage terms, which is what determines changes to inequality ratios, the 
distribution of relative impacts across household groups displayed a greater variety of patterns 
across countries and scenarios than were found with absolute impacts. Firstly, with regards to 
differences in relative impacts across different household groups, this spread was consistently 
192 
 
narrow for some countries, and more sizable at times for others. In Egypt, India and Mexico, for 
example, spreads were small and ranged from 0.01 to 0.14, 0.05 to 0.25, and 0.02 to 0.16 
percentage points respectively. The US was found to have the narrowest spread of relative impacts, 
ranging between only 0.03 and 0.08 percentage points. Somewhat greater variety was observed in 
Zambia, where differences in percentage impacts ranged from 0.11 to 0.61 percentage points, but 
only Ethiopia and Vietnam displayed more substantial differences at times between household 
groups, with differences in percentage impacts ranging from 0.1 to 1.2 and 0.03 to 2.42 percentage 
points respectively.  
Even the maximum spread observed, 2.42 percentage points in Vietnam, was relatively small, 
particularly given that FUND’s impact estimates are cumulative. One should keep in mind however, 
that FUND impact estimates do not alter any household’s income by more than 2.64%, 2.72%, 1.3%, 
0.78%, 0.17%, 4.24% and 1.42% in Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, the US, Vietnam and Zambia 
respectively. 
The spread of percentage impacts across household groups often narrowed as time progressed; 
although it sometimes increased slightly first, before ending the time period more concentrated 
than at the start. This was the case for Egypt in B1, Ethiopia in all scenarios, India in A1B and B1, 
Mexico in all scenarios, the US in A1B, B1 and B2, Vietnam in A2 and B1, and Zambia in B1. In some 
cases, such as India in A2 and B2, and the US in A2, this appeared to be the direction of travel; 
however, the spread had not yet sufficiently narrowed from its peak, so the dispersion of percentage 
impacts in 2100 was equal to or greater than that in 2020. Similarly, in Vietnam in A1B and B2, the 
spread narrowed so much that it then inverted. This suggests that a similar pattern may have been 
seen in some other countries and scenarios had the model been run for a longer time period. Not all 
results, however, followed this overall pattern. The spread of percentage damages across Zambian 
household groups in A1B, A2 and B2, for example, generally increased with time, with the spread of 
relative impacts at 2100 being significantly larger than that at 2020. Meanwhile, the spread of 
Egyptian percentage impacts across households fluctuated in a relatively constrained range, despite 
the average percentage impact varying noticeably over time and, in A2 and B2, in patterns across 
time that were not observed in any other country.   
With regards to which households experienced greater proportional impacts, this also varied across 
countries, and, on occasion, across time. In Ethiopia and India, lower expenditure or income 
quintiles always saw greater percentage impacts, while the opposite was true in Mexico and Zambia. 
A slightly less clear pattern was observed in the US, where, generally, higher income quintiles 
experienced greater impacts; although proportional impacts in all scenarios started off more skewed 
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towards the third versus the fourth quintile, with this skew switching to the opposite as time 
progressed. Similarly, in Vietnam, lower expenditure quintiles saw greater impacts in A2 and B1, and 
at the start of A1B and B2; however, in the latter two scenarios, the opposite became true over time. 
Finally, the ranking of proportional impacts across household groups in Egypt displayed no clear 
pattern, with rankings changing across scenarios and time. 
Changes in inequality ratios naturally reflected all these percentage impacts results. For example, 
countries where higher proportional impacts were experienced by lower expenditure quintiles saw 
inequality consistently reducing120 across all ratios. Even Egypt and the US, where the spread of 
percentage impacts across household groups followed less clear patterns, changes in inequality 
ratios displayed distinct trends. In Egypt, inequality ratios decreased then increased in all scenarios, 
while in the US, inequality increased from the baseline at all times for all ratios and scenarios. Where 
lower or higher expenditure groups consistently experienced greater or lesser impacts, ratio changes 
were greatest for the Q5/Q1 ratio, followed by the Q5/Q3 and then the Q3/Q1 ratios. This was as 
one would expect mathematically. Whether the (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) ratio displayed greater changes 
than the Q5/Q3 ratio depended on the spacing of percentage impacts and initial incomes. The 
ranges of ratio changes displayed similar magnitudes to the ranges of differences in proportional 
impacts across household groups, with the ranges of ratio changes being -0.07% to 0.14%, -0.03% to 
-1.22%, -0.02% to -0.24%, 0% to 0.16%, 0.01% to 0.08%, -2.33% to 0.25%, and to 0.04% to 0.61% 
respectively for Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, the US, Vietnam and Zambia. 
Chapter 8 analyses all the above results, along with those from the Alaska case study in Chapter 7, to 
address the research questions outlined in Chapter 2. This includes an exploration of the linkages in 
the SAM for each sector, along with a breakdown of the sector-by-sector contributions to the 
aggregate results presented in this chapter. This helps probe questions such as ‘Which sectors have 
the greatest inequality effects?’ and ‘Are sector inequality effects consistent across countries?’. 
Results from this chapter are also examined across countries to analyse if starting levels or inequality 
and income appear to affect the extent that climate change impacts on inequality, and if inequality 
effects appear large enough to merit the trade-off of increased model complexity. Finally, Chapter 8 
considers the sensitivity of results to uncertainty surrounding economic structures, and to different 
disaggregation of factor accounts, by comparing results using the 2016 US SAM to those using the US 
2003 SAM, 2010 SAM and 2016 edu-SAM. 
 
 
120 Inequality was reduced as impacts were positive over the time period in all countries and scenarios. 
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Chapter 7 – Impact of climate change on income 
inequality in Alaska 
This chapter presents the second case study, which used a range of impact studies estimating the 
effects of climate change on different economic sectors in Alaska to explore the impact of climate 
change on Alaskan income inequality. An introduction to Alaska is provided in Section 7.1, along with 
a summary of the expected physical effects that climate change may have on the region. Section 7.2 
describes the impact studies used in the case study. Section 7.3 explains the methodology, including 
how impact estimates were used as inputs in the input-output analysis (IOA) outlined in Chapter 5, 
and how scenarios were generated. Finally, the results of the case study are provided in Section 7.4. 
These results are analysed in Chapter 8, as this enabled results from the Climate Framework for 
Uncertainty, Negotiation and Distribution (FUND) case study in Chapter 6 to also be used to address 
the research questions outlined in Chapter 2. 
7.1 Introduction to Alaska 
Alaska is the largest United States (US) state by geographical area, covering 665,000 square miles, of 
which 86% is land and 14% is water (Census, 2012). With an estimated 737,000 residents in 2018 
(Census, 2019a), however, it is also the most sparsely populated state, with approximately 0.77 
people per square mile of land in 2018. 44% of Alaskans reside in the two largest cities, Anchorage 
and Fairbanks (DOLWD, 2019), and only 4% live in boroughs north of the Arctic Circle (DOLWD, 
2019). It is a wealthy state, having the tenth highest personal income per capita in 2018 (BEA, 2019). 
In 2008, it was the most equal state, with an estimated income Gini coefficient of 0.403 (Census, 
2019b). By 2017, income inequality had increased, with the Gini coefficient changing to 0.424. This 
made Alaska the second most equal state, coming just behind Utah.  It is also a resource-rich state, 
with oil and gas, mining, and fishing. While Arctic oil and gas production is predominantly 
concentrated in Russia (Peters et al., 2011), between 1990 and 2004, Alaska was responsible for 18% 
of Arctic oil production and 3% of Arctic gas production (Peters et al., 2011). Other prominent 
economic sectors in Alaska include government, services, transportation and construction (Seung, 
2014). The state pays citizens who have lived in the state for the full calendar year an annual 
dividend, which amounted to $1,600 per person in 2018, from the state-owned Alaska Permanent 
Fund. This sovereign wealth fund is funded through oil and investment revenue. Alaska also receives 
extensive federal government funding. In 2013, it received $3,604 in federal grants per capita (PEW, 
2014). This was more than any other state. Alaska was also the third highest state recipient of total 
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federal spending per capita in 2013, as when including grants, benefits, contracts and salaries and 
wages, it received $14,375 per person. 
7.2 Alaskan impact studies 
7.2.1 Introduction to Alaskan impact studies 
As explored in Chapter 3, global warming in the Arctic has been approximately twice the global 
average (Cohen et al., 2014). In addition to Arctic climate processes potentially having a strong 
influence on the global climate system (Abbot et al., 2009; Holland et al., 2006; Lenton et al., 2008; 
Shakhova et al., 2010), the Arctic itself is expected to undergo large changes over the coming 
decades and centuries. These changes are likely to bring a mixture of opportunities and challenges 
to people living in the region (Alvarez et al., 2019). There is great uncertainty, however, surrounding 
the consequences of a warmer Arctic. 
As a result of reduced sea-ice, for example, Arctic oceans may absorb more carbon dioxide (CO2), 
and thus become more acidic (Thor et al., 2018), which could undermine calcifying species (Lischka 
and Riebesell, 2012), such as pteropods, mussels, and clams. In addition, changing ocean 
temperatures could lead to fish migrating from lower latitudes to higher latitudes, with invasive 
species possibly disrupting existing species (Frainer et al., 2017). On the other hand, warmer Arctic 
oceans and reduced sea ice might boost primary production through photosynthesising 
phytoplankton (Park et al., 2015), which, in turn, could increase Arctic fish stocks. 
As another example, it is estimated that 25% of the world’s undiscovered petroleum may be found 
in the Arctic (Lindholt and Glomsrød, 2012), with 28% of undiscovered oil and 14% of undiscovered 
gas thought to be found in Alaska and its waters. There may be fewer resources, however, than are 
estimated. Moreover, as sea-ice retreats and such reserves, including some onshore reserves, may 
become more accessible, costs are still anticipated to be high (Wood Mackenzie, 2006), due to 
difficult weather, including possibly more intense Arctic cyclones in summer (Day et al., 2018), the 
inherent challenges of offshore extraction, and the remoteness of sites, with their accompanying 
lack of existing infrastructure. As such, exploiting such assets may only be financially viable if prices 
are high (Petrick et al., 2017). 
Different economic sectors in Alaska may, thus, see large and diverse impacts from climate change. 
As discussed, the Alaskan economy is particularly linked to the environment and natural resources, 
so these changes could, in turn, have large and diverse economic impacts on different households. 
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This case study does not claim to be a comprehensive and definitive study of the impact of climate 
change on income inequality in Alaska, but rather a first attempt to explore the subject.  
Impact estimates could not be found for all the sectors that could be affected by climate change. No 
impact study could be found, for example, that estimated how reduced sea-ice might change 
Alaskan shipping output, due to ‘unlocking’ the Northwest Passage above Canada. Most research 
exploring the impact of reduced sea ice on shipping has focused on the Northeast Passage above 
Europe and Russia, as it is generally believed that the Northwest Passage is not likely to become 
financially viable (Lackenbauer and Lajeunesse, 2014; Stewart et al., 2007; Wilson et al., 2004). 
An economic impact study also could not be found for Alaskan agriculture. Agriculture is currently a 
relatively small part of the Alaskan economy, but may grow in importance as Alaska warms. Lader et 
al. (2018) estimated, for a given climate scenario, that the Alaskan growing season length could 
increase from current levels by 48-87 days by the end of the century. It was not possible, however, 
to easily convert this into an estimated change in agricultural yield, as there isn’t a straightforward 
relationship between growing season length and the latter (Kukal and Irmak, 2018). 
In addition, while Melvin et al. (2017) provides some estimates of future coastal erosion in Alaska, 
without a land use analysis, which was beyond the scope of this thesis, it would be difficult to 
attribute these dryland losses across households or economic sectors. 
This case study thus explored a subset of the sectors likely to be impacted by climate change, 
specifically, infrastructure, fisheries, oil extraction and tourism. Finally, one should reemphasise that 
there is extensive debate around whether fisheries and oil extraction will be boosted by climate 
change. The studies used in this case study explore scenarios where these sectors benefit, but one 
should remember that this is controversial. Chapter 8 does, however, use an IOA of the Alaskan 
social accounting matrix (SAM) to estimate impacts from a unit change to these sectors, and one 
could use this estimate the effects of less optimistic scenarios.  
7.2.2 Infrastructure 
One of the largest economic costs from climate change in Alaska may be damages to infrastructure 
due to increased freeze-thaw dynamics, cracking and subsidence from permafrost thaw, 
precipitation, and precipitation-caused flooding. Melvin et al. (2017) compiled an inventory of public 
Alaskan infrastructure, and then used the University of Alaska, Fairbanks’ Scenarios Network for 
Alaska and Arctic Planning (SNAP) downscaled climate projections for Alaska in two scenarios, 
representative concentration pathway (RCP) 8.5 and RCP 4.5 (SNAP, 2017), along with reduced form 
permafrost equations and an infrastructure model tailored for northern latitudes, to estimate repair 
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costs from damages to roads, railways, pipelines, airports and buildings between 2015 and 2099. The 
model incorporated replacement costs where infrastructure was estimated to be too badly damaged 
to be repaired, while costs unrelated to climate change, such as those associated with routine 
maintenance, were excluded. The quantity of infrastructure was also assumed to remain constant 
throughout the study. Finally, adaptation costs and benefits were also considered. Where the costs 
of adaptation were estimated to exceed the cost of repairing damages without adaptation, the latter 
was used for the cost estimate, i.e. it was assumed no adaptation took place. 
Table 7.1 – Mean estimated infrastructure costs (in 2015 USD millions) in RCP 4.5 and RCP 8.5, with 
and without adaptation, broken down by infrastructure and damage type 
 Mean estimated damages without adaptation 




Precipitation Freeze-thaw Total 
Roads 
RCP 8.5 8600 700 2200 -64 11000 
RCP 4.5 5900 190 1700 -56 7700 
Buildings 
RCP 8.5 Not modelled 2800 350 Not modelled 3100 
RCP 4.5 Not modelled 2300 350 Not modelled 2600 
Airports 
RCP 8.5 690 360 440 -15 1500 
RCP 4.5 470 250 320 -13 1000 
Railroads 
RCP 8.5 Not modelled 620 0 0 620 
RCP 4.5 Not modelled 220 0 0 220 
Pipelines 
RCP 8.5 Not modelled 170 Not modelled Not modelled 170 
RCP 4.5 Not modelled 16 Not modelled Not modelled 16 
Total 
RCP 8.5 9300 4600 3000 -78 17000 









 Mean estimated damages with adaptation 




Precipitation Freeze-thaw Total 
Roads 
RCP 8.5 390 700 1200 -64 2200 
RCP 4.5 370 190 910 -56 1400 
Buildings 
RCP 8.5 Not modelled 2800 10 Not modelled 2800 
RCP 4.5 Not modelled 2300 5 Not modelled 2300 
Airports 
RCP 8.5 85 360 290 -15 720 
RCP 4.5 82 250 210 -13 540 
Railroads 
RCP 8.5 Not modelled 620 0 0 620 
RCP 4.5 Not modelled 220 0 0 220 
Pipelines 
RCP 8.5 Not modelled 170 Not modelled Not modelled 170 
RCP 4.5 Not modelled 16 Not modelled Not modelled 16 
Total 
RCP 8.5 470 4600 1500 -78 6500 
RCP 4.5 450 3000 1100 -69 4500 
 
Notes: Table details costs of repairing or replacing Alaskan infrastructure damaged by climate change between 2015 and 2099 as 
estimated by (Melvin et al., 2017). Negative costs are benefits. All costs were changes relative to a baseline, where the latter assumed 
‘normal’ weather and maintenance costs, but no impacts from climate change. Costs are estimated for roads, buildings, airports, railroads 
and pipelines for two climate scenarios, RCP 8.5 and RCP 4.5. Four different causes of damages were considered, flooding, permafrost 
thaw, precipitation and freeze-thaw dynamics, and models were run assuming and not assuming adaptation to climate change. Where 
adaptation costs exceeded costs of repairs, adaptation was assumed to not occur. The quantity of infrastructure was assumed to remain 
constant throughout the study. 
Table 7.1 shows cumulative, undiscounted costs, in 2015 USD millions, for each scenario at the end 
of the time period, with and without adaptation, broken down by infrastructure and damage type. 
All impacts were changes relative to a baseline, where the latter assumed ‘normal’ weather and 
maintenance costs, but no impacts from climate change. For flooding and precipitation, there were 
estimated to be large benefits from adaptation, with total costs reducing by 95% and 50% 
respectively in RCP 8.5, and 93% and 52% respectively in RCP 4.5. Conversely, the estimated costs of 
adaptation to permafrost thaw exceeded the cost of repairs, while freeze-thaw cycles were 
estimated to decrease with climate change, and so reduce infrastructure maintenance costs. 
Without adaptation, flooding was responsible for the majority of damages, whereas with adaptation, 
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permafrost thaw was the biggest problem. Similarly, without adaptation, roads were the source of 
approximately 65% of total costs, while with adaptation there were greater damages to buildings. 
In this case study, cumulative costs were aggregated across infrastructure and damage types, so that 
four scenarios for increased expenditure on infrastructure were considered: RCP 4.5 with 
adaptation; RCP 4.5 without adaptation; RCP 8.5 with adaptation; and RCP 8.5 without adaptation. 
As can be seen in Table 7.1, total costs in these four scenarios amounted to 4.5, 12, 6.5 and 17 billion 
2015 USD respectively. 
7.2.3 Fisheries 
As discussed earlier, fisheries are another sector likely to be impacted by climate change. Lam et al. 
(2016) used a Dynamic bioclimate envelope model (DBEM) to project changes in fisheries’ yields in 
10 Arctic countries and regions, including Alaska. Based on species’ observed environmental 
preferences, along with a population model and an ecophysiology model, the DBEM projected how 
the quantity and location of oceanic species may evolve due to changes in oceanic temperature, 
salinity, acidity, sea-ice and other factors. Projections of these explanatory variables were obtained 
from four carbon-cycle-climate-models for Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES) A2. 
Lam et al. (2016) aggregated results for 62 harvested species, which historically have amounted to 
93% of Arctic fisheries’ collective output, and then compared the current catch potential in each 
country or region to its projected catch potential at 2050, assuming SRES A2. Results were quoted 
firstly when modelling climate change effects except ocean acidification, and then secondly when 
including ocean acidification as well. The Alaskan catch potential was estimated to increase above 
the 2000 catch level by 129% by 2050 with climate change but no ocean acidification, and by 126% 
with climate change and ocean acidification. 
7.2.4 Oil extraction 
Peters et al. (2011) uses the National Center for Atmospheric Research’s Community Climate System 
Model to project future sea-ice coverage in the SRES A2 scenario. A partial equilibrium global energy 
model, called the Framework of International Strategic Behaviour in Energy and Environment 
(FRISBEE), is then used to project how this change in ice coverage may impact on future oil and gas 
supplies and the geographical sources of these supplies. The model took account of the current 
distribution of oil and gas production, likely positions of undiscovered reserves, operational costs, 
and access to infrastructure. As mentioned earlier, the financial viability of extracting Arctic reserves 
will be heavily dependent on prices, due to high expected costs of extraction. The oil price in the 
FRISBEE model was exogenous, due to the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
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(OPEC), and set to $80 per barrel of oil equivalent in 2005 USD. In contrast, the gas price was 
determined by the model, as the gas market is not heavily influenced by a cartel. The projected 
increase in Alaskan oil supply was thus independent of increases in global demand from changes in 
gross domestic product (GDP) or population, as the FRISBEE model assumed that OPEC adjusted its 
supply to accommodate the latter and maintain fixed prices (Lindholt and Glomsrød, 2011). This 
meant that the estimated variation in Alaskan oil supply reflected the shifting financial viability of 
extracting Alaskan reserves as a result of climate change. In contrast, as gas prices were 
endogenous, the estimated alteration in Alaskan gas supply incorporated both changes in financial 
viability as a result of climate change and changes in gas demand due to GDP and population growth. 
As such, only the Peters et al. (2011) projected oil supply increase could be used in this case study, as 
the gas estimate could not be interpreted as a deviation from a 2050 baseline that incorporated the 
population and income aspects of SRES A2, but not effects from climate change. However, the 
estimated changes in oil supply still captured the majority of changes to total Alaskan oil and gas 
production as, in 2008 and 2050, Peters et al. (2011) estimated that oil was responsible for 75% and 
79% of total Alaskan oil and gas production in million tonnes of oil equivalent (Mtoe). 
While Peters et al. (2011) estimated that total Arctic oil production would increase by only 
approximately 11% between 2008 and 2050, Alaska was projected to see a much larger proportional 
increase of 282%. 
7.2.5 Tourism 
Tol and Walsh (2015) used data from the Hamburg Tourism Model (HTM) (Tol, 2010) to project 
changes, compared to 2009 levels, in tourists numbers to Alaska and other arctic regions in 2085, 
assuming SRES A2, B1 and B2. The HTM is an econometric model that simulates flows of tourists 
between 207 countries. The total number of global tourists provided by a given home country is a 
function of the population and income per capita in that home country. Whether those tourists 
choose to go abroad or to be domestic tourists, is a function of temperature and income per capita 
in the home country. Those that go abroad choose their destination based on the distance, 
temperature, attractiveness121, and per capita income of destination countries. SRES A2, B1 and B2 
population and income growth scenarios are explored, along with their accompanying temperature 
projections. A baseline was provided for each scenario that assumed changes in tourism levels due 
to evolving populations and incomes, but no changes from climate effects. This allowed 2085 results 
with and without climate change effects to be compared. As Alaska is not a country, it did not 
 
121 Attractiveness is measured using an index. 
201 
 
feature in the HTM; so Tol and Walsh (2015) assumed that tourist levels in Alaska grew at the same 
rate as that projected for Iceland122. 
Tol and Walsh (2015) estimated that tourism numbers in Iceland, and thus Alaska, would increase 
due to warmer weather. Non-domestic tourist numbers in 2085 in Iceland, taking climate change 
effects into account, were predicted in SRES A2, B1 and B2 to be 40%, 49%, and 50% respectively 
above projected 2085 tourist levels that didn’t take climate change effects into account. This case 
study thus assumed that the projected number of tourists in Alaska in 2085, when taking climate 
change effects into account, would be these percentages above the 2085 baselines in each SRES 
scenario, where the baseline assumed changes in tourism due to evolving populations and incomes, 
but no changes from climate effects. 
7.3 Methodology 
7.3.1 Overview of methodology 
This case study follows the same methodological approach as that used for the case study in Chapter 
6. In short, the exogenous impacts taken from the aforementioned impact studies form a mixture of 









(𝑰 − 𝑨 ) 𝟎
−𝑨 −𝑰
 and 𝑵 =
𝑰 𝑨
𝟎 (𝑨 − 𝑰)
. If the matrix of technical coefficients, 𝑨, is 
arranged so that the 𝑛 row and column accounts with endogenous account totals are at the top and 
left respectively, with the remaining 𝑚 − 𝑛 accounts with exogenous account totals at the bottom 
and right respectively, then 𝑨 , 𝑨 , 𝑨  and 𝑨  are matrices containing the technical coefficients 
in rows 1 to 𝑛, 1 to 𝑛, 𝑛 + 1 to 𝑚, and 𝑛 + 1 to 𝑚 respectively, and columns 1 to 𝑛, 𝑛 + 1 to 𝑚, 1 to 
𝑛, and 𝑛 + 1 to 𝑚 respectively of 𝑨. 𝑰 and 𝟎 are identity matrices of sizes 𝑛 and 𝑚 − 𝑛 
respectively. 𝒙( ), 𝒙( ), 𝒇( ) and 𝒇( ) are vectors of endogenous account totals, exogenous 
account totals, exogenous final demand and endogenous final demand respectively. As usual, 
 
122 As described in Chapter 1, there is a history of extrapolating estimates from one country to others in 




government accounts123, savings-investment and rest-of-the-world (ROW) accounts124 were assumed 
to lie outside of the model and so comprised final demand. The reasoning behind this was detailed in 
Chapter 5.  
As with the case study in Chapter 6, it was thus assumed that all parts of Alaska’s economy grew by 
𝛾 = (1 + 𝑔 ) between 𝑡 − 1 and 𝑡, where 𝑔  was exogenous GDP growth at time 𝑡, which differed 
across scenarios. For impacts associated with SRES scenarios, FUND’s exogenous GDP growth rates 
for the USA were used. It was thus assumed that Alaska would grow at the same rate as the entire 
US. For infrastructure impacts, which were developed for two RCP scenarios, estimating growth 
rates was more complicated, as different Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) could give rise to 
each RCP, so there is no unique matching between socioeconomic and greenhouse gas (GHG) 
concentration scenarios. This was explained in Chapter 3. RCPs 4.5 and 8.5 are, however, coherently 
paired with SSP2 and SSP5 respectively (Riahi et al., 2017), so these pairings were used in this case 
study. Projected USA GDP data for these scenarios, in 2005 USD billions, was downloaded from the 
SSP Public Database (Dellink et al., 2017; Riahi et al., 2017; SSP, 2018), and used to calculate growth 
rates for RCPs 4.5 and 8.5. Projections were available at five-year intervals, so linear interpolation 
was used, where necessary, to estimate growth within an interval. 
As with Chapter 6, let 𝒙 =
𝒙( )
𝒙( )
 represent the vector of Alaskan account totals in a given 
scenario at time 𝑡, after climate impacts in time 𝑡 have been taken into account. Similarly, let ∆𝒙 =
∆𝒙( )
∆𝒙( )
  represent the vector of changes in Alaskan account totals at time 𝑡 due to climate 
impacts for the given scenario at time 𝑡. All impacts from the impact studies were cumulative 
impacts from a counterfactual economic baseline, 𝒙 , where incomes were consistent with the given 
scenario, but there have hitherto been no economic impacts from climate change. This meant that  
𝒙 = 𝒙 𝛾 + ∆𝒙 , 
where the year of the SAM, 𝑡 = 𝑆𝐴𝑀, was 2008. Meanwhile, the counterfactual economic baseline, 
𝒙 , was calculated using 
 
123 The Alaska SAM contains both a federal government and an Alaskan state and local government account. 
Both of these accounts were assumed to lie outside of the model, and so formed part of final demand. 
124 There are three ROW accounts in the Alaskan SAM: a rest-of-the-United-States account, a ROW current 
account, and a ROW capital account. 
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𝒙 = 𝒙 𝛾 . 
𝒙 , 𝒙  and ∆𝒙  all differed across scenarios. To fully facilitate comparisons between this case study 
and the FUND case study in the previous chapter, the Alaska SAM and exogenous impacts were 
converted into 1995 USD. 
There are three household accounts in the Alaskan SAM, labelled low, medium and high-income 
households accounts. These are respectively defined to be households earning less than $25,000, 
$25,000 to $75,000, and more than $75,000 a year, in 2008 USD. Three inequality ratios125 were thus 
used to assess changes in inequality: H/L, H/M and M/L, where L, M and H were the total incomes of 
low, medium and high-income households respectively126. The reasoning behind using inequality 
ratios to assess inequality, instead of an inequality index, such as the Gini coefficient, was detailed in 
Chapter 6. 
These inequality ratios were determined from the applicable account totals in the 𝒙  vector. The 
ratios were then compared to the equivalent baseline ratios to explore impacts on income 
inequality. Cumulative climate impacts at 𝑡 were also expressed as percentages of the baseline 





These percentages captured the proportion of baseline income at time 𝑡 that was gained or lost due 
to cumulative climate change impacts at 𝑡, and so helped assess whether ∆𝑥( )  was large or small 
for each household group. 
As the Alaskan impact studies, with the exception of the fisheries study, did not estimate the effect 
of impacts on macroeconomic variables, GDP impacts were also estimated in this case study. As 
𝒇 = 𝒇 ∏ 𝛾 + ∆𝒇  in a given scenario at time 𝑡, where 𝒇  represents the vector of final 
demands, i.e. payments from the accounts deemed to lie outside of the model, and 
 
125 While three inequality ratios were calculated, it should be noted that inequality is being captured using two 
rather than three dimensions, as (H/M)*(M/L) = H/L. Results for all three ratios were quoted to make changes 
to the upper part, lower part, and top and bottom of the income distribution explicitly clear. 
126 It's an assumption (and shortcoming) of input-output analysis that households do not transition between 
household groups. So there is an implicit assumption that the relative total number of people in each income 
group does not change over time. This means that ratios of total impacts and per capita impacts across the 







, then GDP was calculated as 
𝐺𝐷𝑃 = (𝒙 − 𝒇 ), 
where 𝐺 to 𝐺  were the account numbers spanning the GDP accounts, i.e. labour, capital and 
indirect taxation accounts. Payments to GDP accounts from accounts outside of the model had to be 
subtracted from GDP account totals, as GDP excludes factor payments to and from ROW. Baseline 
GDP, 𝐺𝐷𝑃 , could similarly be calculated as , 𝐺𝐷𝑃 = ∑ 𝒙 − 𝒇 , where 𝒇  was baseline 
payments from accounts outside of the model.  
As the impact studies provided cumulative impact estimates at different points in time and, 
frequently, for different scenarios, results for different sectors were run separately, and not 
aggregated together. An alternative to this would have been to attempt to calibrate an impact 
function for each sector that would translate any temperature change into a sector impact, and so 
allow impacts to be generated across time for all scenarios. This is the approach taken in integrated 
assessment models (IAMs), such as FUND. One impact study for each sector, however, is clearly not 
sufficient to meaningfully propose a functional form for each sector and calibrate it. In addition, a 
first principles analysis of how, say, Arctic fisheries stocks may respond to different future climates is 
clearly beyond the scope of this thesis. Thus, no attempt was made to construct impact functions for 
this case study. 
7.3.2 Translation of impact study estimates into exogenous inputs for IOA 
Melvin et al. (2017) estimated costs of infrastructure adaptation and damage repairs were projected 
expenditure changes, and so formed exogenous demand changes, i.e. part of 𝒇 , in the 
subsequent IOA. As the estimates from Melvin et al. (2017) were for state infrastructure only, they 
were modelled as expenditure on the construction commodity funded by the Alaskan state and local 
(S&L) government account. As per chapter 6, a budget constraint was imposed by assuming that 
increased S&L government spending on construction was funded by reduced expenditure on all 
other commodities, with the reduction spread across commodities in proportion to S&L 
government’s spending on those goods and services in the SAM.  
Lam et al. (2016) estimated climate-change-induced cumulative increases in fisheries catch yields, in 
tonnes, at 2050 compared to 2000 levels. Estimates were provided both with and without 
considering the effects of ocean acidification. As the Alaska SAM was for 2008, the estimated 
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percentage increases needed to be adjusted by the percentage change between the 2000 and 2008 
Alaskan catches. Data from the Sea Around Us database (UBC, 2015), provided by the Institute for 
the Oceans and Fisheries at The University of British Columbia, indicated that the Alaskan fishing 
sector’s catch, in tonnage, reduced by approximately 1.2% between 2000 and 2008. Thus, the FUND 
A2 USA exogenous growth rates were then used to inflate the SAM up to the baseline 2050 scenario, 
with the change in fisheries’ output due to climate change then estimated to be the 2050 baseline 
fisheries output multiplied by [([1 + 𝑟] [1 − 0.012]⁄ ) − 1], where 𝑟 was the estimated percentage 
change from (V. W. Y. Lam et al., 2016). These estimated changes in fisheries’ outputs due to climate 
change formed exogenous account total changes, i.e. part of 𝒙 , in the subsequent IOA. 
The Alaskan SAM has one collective account for oil and gas production; however, only the projected 
oil supply increases in Peters et al. (2011) represents changes in production due to climate change. 
As discussed earlier, the estimated changes in gas supply also included changes in demand due to 
increased GDP and population, and thus could not be used in this case study. To isolate baseline 
2050 oil production output, the oil and gas commodity account, and the rest of the SAM, was first 
inflated up to 2050 using SRES A2 FUND income growth rates. The value of 2050 total oil and gas 
commodity output then needed to be disaggregated into separate estimated baseline outputs for oil 
and gas. This was done in proportions indicated by the ratio of 2008 Alaskan annual production of 
barrels of oil, from McDowell (2017), times the 2008 average West Texas intermediate (WTI) crude 
oil price per barrel, to 2008 Alaskan annual production of thousands of cubic feet of gas, from 
McDowell (2017), times the 2008 average price per thousand cubic feet of gas. This indicated an 88% 
to 12% split of the 2050 total oil and gas commodity output between oil and gas respectively. Crude 
oil and gas prices were taken from the U.S. Energy Information Administration’s database (EIA, 
2019). The 282% increase indicated by Peters et al. (2011) was then applied just to the estimated 
2050 baseline oil commodity output. This represented an exogenous account total change, and so 
formed part of 𝒙( ) , in the subsequent IOA. 
McDowell (2010) estimated that out-of-state visitors spent USD 1.5 billion in Alaska between 
October 2008 and September 2009. The value of the USD decreased by only 0.36% between 2008 
and 2009, and no data could be found around how 2008 Alaska tourist numbers differed from those 
in 2009. It was thus assumed that out-of-state tourists spent USD 1.5 billion in Alaska in 2008. To get 
the tourism 2085 baseline, which took account of evolving population and incomes, but not climate 
change effects, 1.5 billion 2008 USD was converted into 1995 USD millions, and then FUND income 
growth rates were used to project both the Alaska SAM and exogenous expenditure by tourists up to 
a 2085 baseline for the three SRES scenarios. From McDowell (2010), 40%, 49%, and 50% of baseline 
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2085 exogenous expenditure by tourists in A2, B1 and B2 respectively were then taken to be the 
change in exogenous expenditure by tourists due to increased tourism from climate change. 
As can be seen in Appendix F, the Alaskan SAM does not have a tourism account. McDowell (2010), 
however, analysed 2006 to 2007 Alaskan tourist survey data, and concluded that 23%, 19%, 19%, 
16%, 13% and 10% of visitor spending went on gifts/souvenirs, tours/activities, lodging, 
food/beverages, other spending, and transportation respectively. The tours/activities category 
excluded tour operators’ fees, while the other spending category primarily consisted of buying 
holiday packages. In this case study, it was assumed that the change in exogenous expenditure by 
tourists due to increased tourism from climate change could be disaggregated across the Alaskan 
SAM to the ‘other retail trade’, ‘entertainment’, ‘lodging’, ‘eating and drinking’, ‘admin and support 
services’, and  transportation commodity accounts respectively, in the proportions estimated by 
McDowell (2010). Spending on holiday packages was allocated to the admin and support services 
commodity account, as this account included services provided by travel agencies, tour operators 
and visitors’ bureaus. Expenditure on transportation was further broken down across SAM 
transportation commodity accounts, i.e. ‘air transportation’, ‘water transportation’ and ‘other 
transportation’, in proportion to existing exogenous ROW and rest-of-the-US spending on these 
accounts. All these projected expenditure changes were exogenous demand changes, and so formed 
part of 𝒇( ) . Increased expenditure by out-of-state tourists was funded by people who don’t 
live in Alaska, so no budget constraint was required, as this increase in spending represented an 
influx of new money into the Alaskan economy, not a redistribution of existing spending in the state. 
7.4 Case study results 
7.4.1 Infrastructure 
The cumulative changes in infrastructure expenditure in 2099, sourced from Melvin et al. (2017), 
produced 37% or 99% increases in output of the construction commodity, compared to the 
counterfactual baseline with no impacts from climate change, in RCP 4.5 when respectively including 
and not including adaptation. In RCP 8.5, the increased infrastructure expenditure produced 19% 
and 49% increases in construction commodity output with and without adaptation respectively. The 
percentage changes for the two RCP 8.5 scenarios were lower than for their RCP 4.5 equivalents, due 
to the very high exogenous income growth rates in RCP 8.5.  
The cumulative infrastructure expenditure in 2099 also produced 2.94% and 7.89% decreases in GDP 
from the counterfactual baseline in RCP 4.5, with and without adaption respectively, due to reduced 
state and local government spending on other goods and services. Similarly, in RCP 8.5, GDP was 
estimated to fall by 1.46% and 3.87% respectively with and without adaption. 
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As can be seen from Table 7.2, cumulative impacts in absolute terms were unequally distributed 
across household groups, with middle income households seeing the greatest impacts, and low 
income households the smallest impacts, in all scenarios with or without adaptation. If one looks at 
the relative impacts in Table 7.3, however, one can see that impacts, as percentages of baseline 
incomes, fell more heavily on lower income than higher income household groups, in all scenarios 
with or without adaptation. The range of percentage impacts across household groups was more 
than twice as wide in scenarios without adaptation as it was in scenarios with adaption. The range 
was 1.83 and 4.83 percentage points in RCP 4.5, respectively with and without adaptation, and 0.94 
and 2.40 percentage points in RCP 8.5, respectively with and without adaptation. 
As the impacts on all household groups were negative and, in percentage terms, fell more on low 
income households and less on high income households, increased infrastructure spending, in all 
scenarios, with and without adaption, produced increases in the three inequality ratios. As one can 
see from Table 7.4, ratios changed by 0.24% to 5.28%, depending on the scenario, level of 
adaptation and ratio. In all cases, the H/L ratio saw the greatest changes and the M/L ratio the least. 
Table 7.2 – Infrastructure impacts: cumulative changes (in 1995 USD millions) at 2099 in Alaskan 
household income groups’ incomes from counterfactual baseline incomes in two RCP scenarios, 
broken down into impacts with and without adaptation 
 RCP 4.5 
adaptation 




RCP 8.5 no 
adaptation 
L -153 -408 -220 -577 
M -576 -1542 -826 -2178 
H -331 -899 -462 -1258 
 
Notes: Table shows estimated cumulative changes in Alaskan household income groups’ incomes in 2099 due to direct and indirect 
economic costs of repairing Alaskan infrastructure damaged by climate change. H represents the total income of high income households 
(households earning more than $75,000 a year, in 2008 USD), M represents the total income of medium income households (households 
earning between $25,000 and $75,000 a year, in 2008 USD), and L represents the total income of low income households (households 
earning less than $25,000 a year, in 2008 USD). Changes are quoted in reference to a baseline in which there are no economic impacts 
from climate change. Results were estimated for two climate scenarios, RCP 4.5 and RCP 8.5, and are broken down into impacts assuming 




Table 7.3 – Infrastructure impacts: cumulative changes at 2099 in Alaskan household income groups’ 
incomes, as percentages of counterfactual baseline incomes, in two RCP scenarios, broken down into 
impacts with and without adaptation 
 RCP 4.5 
adaptation 




RCP 8.5 no 
adaptation 
L -3.20% -8.54% -1.60% -4.20% 
M -2.73% -7.31% -1.36% -3.59% 
H -1.36% -3.70% -0.66% -1.80% 
 
Notes: Table shows estimated cumulative changes in Alaskan household income groups’ incomes in 2099 due to direct and indirect 
economic costs of repairing Alaskan infrastructure damaged by climate change, with cumulative changes quoted as percentages of 
counterfactual baseline incomes. This baseline assumed there were no economic impacts from climate change. H represents the total 
income of high income households (households earning more than $75,000 a year, in 2008 USD), M represents the total income of 
medium income households (households earning between $25,000 and $75,000 a year, in 2008 USD), and L represents the total income of 
low income households (households earning less than $25,000 a year, in 2008 USD). Results were estimated for two climate scenarios, RCP 
4.5 and RCP 8.5, and are broken down into impacts assuming adaptation does or does not take place. 
Table 7.4 – Infrastructure impacts: percentage differences at 2099, due to cumulative impacts, of 
Alaskan H/L, H/M and M/L income ratios from baseline ratios, in two RCP scenarios, broken down 









RCP 8.5 no 
adaptation 
H/L 5.08 1.89% 5.28% 0.95% 2.50% 
H/M 1.15 1.40% 3.89% 0.71% 1.85% 
M/L 4.42 0.48% 1.34% 0.24% 0.64% 
 
Notes: Table shows estimated cumulative percentage changes in H/L, H/M and M/L Alaskan income ratios in 2099 due to direct and 
indirect economic costs of repairing Alaskan infrastructure damaged by climate change. H represents the total income of high income 
households (households earning more than $75,000 a year, in 2008 USD), M represents the total income of medium income households 
(households earning between $25,000 and $75,000 a year, in 2008 USD), and L represents the total income of low income households 
(households earning less than $25,000 a year, in 2008 USD). Changes are quoted in reference to the 2008 baseline income ratios 
calculated from (Seung, 2014). Results were estimated for two climate scenarios, RCP 4.5 and RCP 8.5, and are broken down into impacts 





The Lam et al. (2016) projected 129% and 126% increases in fisheries commodity output, 
respectively including and not including the effects of ocean acidification, in SRES A2 at 2050, 
respectively produced 3.99% and 4.09% increases in GDP. The difference with and without 
acidification was small, as Alaskan fisheries harvest few species, such as clams, that are expected to 
be strongly affected by pH changes. 
One can see from Table 7.5 that increases in fisheries yields benefited higher income households 
more than lower income households, both with and without the effects of ocean acidification. The 
range of percentage impacts across household groups was 3.58 and 3.67 percentage points, 
respectively with and without ocean acidification. While subsidence activities are not modelled, as 
the Alaska SAM only captures monetary flows, one should note that only around 0.3% of total Alaska 
fisheries tonnage is caught by subsistence fishers (UBC, 2015), so including subsistence activities is 
not likely to substantially change results. 
Table 7.5 – Fisheries impacts: cumulative changes (in 1995 USD millions) in Alaskan household 
income groups’ incomes from counterfactual baseline incomes, and cumulative changes in Alaskan 
household income groups’ incomes, as percentages of counterfactual baseline incomes, at 2050 in 
SRES A2, broken down into impacts with and without the effects of ocean acidification 
 With ocean acidification Without ocean acidification 
Absolute change 











L 27 0.96% 28 0.98% 
M 253 2.03% 259 2.07% 
H 652 4.54% 667 4.65% 
 
Notes: Table shows estimated cumulative changes in Alaskan household income groups’ incomes in 2050 due to direct and indirect 
economic impacts of climate change on Alaskan fisheries, and these estimated cumulative changes as percentages of counterfactual 
baseline incomes. This baseline assumed that there were no economic impacts from climate change. H represents the total income of high 
income households (households earning more than $75,000 a year, in 2008 USD), M represents the total income of medium income 
households (households earning between $25,000 and $75,000 a year, in 2008 USD), and L represents the total income of low income 
households (households earning less than $25,000 a year, in 2008 USD). Results were estimated for one scenario, SRES A2, and are broken 
down into impacts with and without ocean acidification. 
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The skew of relative impacts across household groups increased all three inequality ratios in both 
scenarios. One can see from Table 7.6, that the ratios increased by 1.05% to 3.63% depending on the 
ratio and scenario, with the H/L and M/L ratios consistently increasing respectively the most and 
least. 
Table 7.6 - Fisheries impacts: percentage difference, due to cumulative impacts, of Alaskan H/L, H/M 
and M/L income ratios from baseline ratios, at 2050 in SRES A2, broken down into impacts with and 







H/L 5.08 3.55% 3.63% 
H/M 1.15 2.47% 2.53% 
M/L 4.42 1.05% 1.08% 
 
Notes: Table shows estimated cumulative changes in H/L, H/M and M/L Alaskan income ratios in 2050 due to direct and indirect 
economic impacts of climate change on Alaskan fisheries. Changes are quoted in reference to the 2008 baseline income ratios 
calculated from (Seung, 2014). H represents the total income of high income households (households earning more than $75,000 a 
year, in 2008 USD), M represents the total income of medium income households (households earning between $25,000 and 
$75,000 a year, in 2008 USD), and L represents the total income of low income households (households earning less than $25,000 a 
year, in 2008 USD). Results were estimated for one scenario, SRES A2, and are broken down into impacts with and without ocean 
acidification. Positive percentages indicate increases in inequality. 
 
7.4.3 Oil extraction 
The Peters et al. (2011) projected 282% cumulative increase in oil production in SRES A2 at 2050 was 
estimated to produce an 8.94% increase in Alaskan GDP. As shown in Table 7.7, in both absolute and 
percentage terms, this produced the largest benefits for high income households and the smallest 
benefits for low income households. These differences in percentage impacts were sizable, with the 
range of percentage impacts spanning 7.84 percentage points. As percentage impacts were more 
moderate for low income households, all inequality ratios, but particularly the H/L and M/L ratios, 





Table 7.7 – Oil impacts: cumulative changes (in 1995 USD millions) in Alaskan household income 
groups’ incomes from counterfactual baseline incomes, and cumulative changes in Alaskan 
household income groups’ incomes, as percentages of counterfactual baseline incomes, in SRES A2 
at 2050 
 Absolute change  
(in 1995 USD millions) 
Percentage change from 
baseline 
L 73 2.59% 
M 968 7.76% 
H 1495 10.42% 
 
Notes: Table shows estimated cumulative changes in Alaskan household income groups’ incomes in 2050 due to direct and indirect 
economic impacts of climate change on Alaskan oil production, and these estimated cumulative changes as percentages of counterfactual 
baseline incomes. This baseline assumed that there were no economic impacts from climate change. H represents the total income of high 
income households (households earning more than $75,000 a year, in 2008 USD), M represents the total income of medium income 
households (households earning between $25,000 and $75,000 a year, in 2008 USD), and L represents the total income of low income 
households (households earning less than $25,000 a year, in 2008 USD). Results were estimated for one scenario, SRES A2. 
Table 7.8 - Oil impacts: percentage differences, due to cumulative impacts, of Alaskan H/L, 













Notes: Table shows estimated cumulative changes in H/L, H/M and M/L Alaskan income ratios in 2050 due to direct and indirect 
economic impacts of climate change on Alaskan oil production. Changes are quoted in reference to the 2008 baseline income ratios 
calculated from (Seung, 2014).  H represents the total income of high income households (households earning more than $75,000 a 
year, in 2008 USD), M represents the total income of medium income households (households earning between $25,000 and 
$75,000 a year, in 2008 USD), and L represents the total income of low income households (households earning less than $25,000 a 





The 40%, 49% and 50% projected cumulative increases in tourism from Tol and Walsh (2015), at 
2085 in SRES A2, B1 and B2 respectively, were estimated to increase Alaskan GDP by 1.41%, 1.72% 
and 1.75% respectively. One can see from Tables 7.9 and 7.10, that in both absolute and relative 
terms, middle income household groups experienced the largest increases in income, followed by 
high income and then low income household groups. This result held for all scenarios, with the range 
of percentage impacts between household groups being 0.73, 0.89, and 0.91 percentage points in 
SRES A2, B1 and B2 respectively. As can be seen from Table 7.11, the H/M ratio thus decreased and 
the H/L and M/L ratios increased in all scenarios. 
 Table 7.9 – Tourism impacts: cumulative changes (in 1995 USD millions) in Alaskan household 
income groups’ incomes from counterfactual baseline incomes, in three SRES scenarios at 2085 
 SRES A2 SRES B1 SRES B2 
L 39 38 27 
M 341 330 238 
H 281 270 194 
 
Notes: Table shows estimated cumulative changes in Alaskan household income groups’ incomes in 2085 due to direct and indirect 
economic impacts of climate change on Alaskan tourism. Changes are in reference to a baseline, which assumed that there were no 
economic impacts from climate change. H represents the total income of high income households (households earning more than $75,000 
a year, in 2008 USD), M represents the total income of medium income households (households earning between $25,000 and $75,000 a 
year, in 2008 USD), and L represents the total income of low income households (households earning less than $25,000 a year, in 2008 











Table 7.10 – Tourism impacts: cumulative changes in Alaskan household income groups’ incomes, as 
percentages of counterfactual baseline incomes, in three SRES scenarios at 2085 
 SRES A2 SRES B1 SRES B2 
L 0.76% 0.92% 0.94% 
M 1.49% 1.82% 1.86% 
H 1.06% 1.29% 1.32% 
 
Notes: Table shows estimated cumulative changes in Alaskan household income groups’ incomes in 2085, as percentages of 
counterfactual baseline incomes, due to direct and indirect economic impacts of climate change on Alaskan oil production. Changes are in 
reference to a baseline, which assumed that there were no economic impacts from climate change. H represents the total income of high 
income households (households earning more than $75,000 a year, in 2008 USD), M represents the total income of medium income 
households (households earning between $25,000 and $75,000 a year, in 2008 USD), and L represents the total income of low income 
households (households earning less than $25,000 a year, in 2008 USD). Results were estimated for three scenarios, SRES A2, B1 and B2. 
Table 7.11 – Tourism impacts: percentage difference, due to cumulative impacts, of Alaskan H/L, 
H/M and M/L income ratios from baseline ratios, in three SRES scenarios at 2085 
 Baseline SRES A2 SRES B1 SRES B2 
H/L 5.08 0.31% 0.37% 0.37% 
H/M 1.15 -0.42% -0.52% -0.53% 
M/L 4.42 0.73% 0.89% 0.90% 
 
Notes: Table shows estimated cumulative changes in H/L, H/M and M/L Alaskan income ratios in 2085 due to direct and indirect 
economic impacts of climate change on Alaskan tourism. Changes are quoted in reference to the 2008 baseline income ratios 
calculated from (Seung, 2014).  H represents the total income of high income households (households earning more than $75,000 a 
year, in 2008 USD), M represents the total income of medium income households (households earning between $25,000 and 
$75,000 a year, in 2008 USD), and L represents the total income of low income households (households earning less than $25,000 a 
year, in 2008 USD). Results were estimated for three scenarios, SRES A2, B1 and B2. Positive (negative) percentages indicate 
increases (decreases) in inequality. 
 
7.5 Summary 
This chapter introduced a range of impact studies exploring the effects of climate change on 
different sectors in Alaska, and described how these results were translated into inputs for the IOA 
detailed in Chapter 5. Results were then presented for the different sectors; however, unlike the 
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case study in Chapter 6, these results couldn’t be aggregated, as the impact studies covered 
different scenarios and periods of time. Due to data limitations, this case study was only able to 
explore a subset of the sectors likely to be impacted by climate change, specifically, infrastructure, 
fisheries, oil extraction and tourism. In addition, there is extensive debate around whether fisheries 
and oil extraction will be boosted by climate change. The studies used in this case study explore 
scenarios where these sectors benefit, but one should remember that this is controversial. This case 
study, thus, did not claim to be a comprehensive and definitive study of the impact of climate 
change on income inequality in Alaska, but rather a first attempt to explore the subject.  
For all sectors, impacts, in both absolute and percentage terms, were unequally distributed across 
household groups. While the costs of infrastructure repairs, in absolute terms, impacted on middle 
income households the most and lower income households the least, in percentage terms, the 
poorer the household the greater the experienced impact. As impacts were negative in all scenarios, 
inequality ratios consistently increased. With impacts on fisheries, higher income household groups 
were more affected, both in absolute and percentage terms, which, as impacts were positive both 
with and without the effects of ocean acidification, resulted in all inequality ratios increasing. The 
same was true for the effects of increased oil extraction. Finally, in both absolute and relative terms, 
the projected increases in tourism affected middle income households the most, followed by high 
and then low income households. This result held for all scenarios, and naturally produced a 
decrease in the H/M ratio, but increases in the H/L and M/L ratios. 
Chapter 8 analyses the results from this case study, in combination with the results from the case 











Chapter 8 – Reflecting on climate change and 
income inequality in light of the case studies 
This chapter analyses the results from the case studies in Chapters 6 and 7 for insights on the 
research questions outlined in Chapter 2. Section 8.1 reflects on each research question in turn in 
light of the case study results. Meanwhile, by comparing results generated using the 2016 United 
States (US) SAM, which was used to derive the US estimates in the Chapter 6 case study, to those 
generated using the US 2003 SAM, 2010 SAM and 2016 edu-SAM, Section 8.2 explores the sensitivity 
of results to uncertainty surrounding economic structures and the extent of disaggregation of social 
accounting matrix (SAM) factor accounts. 
8.1 Research questions in light of the case studies 
8.1.1 Climate change induced changes to which sectors seem likely to have the greatest 
effect on within-country income inequality? 
Figure 8.1 gives a breakdown, for each country and sector in the Climate Framework for Uncertainty, 
Negotiation and Distribution (FUND) case study, of the largest percentage change in each inequality 
ratio that was observed in any scenario at any point during the 2020 to 2100 time period. For nearly 
all countries and ratios, the largest percentage change in inequality ratios stemmed from the 
agricultural and energy sectors. The exceptions to this were Mexico and the United States (US), 
where, in comparison to the energy sector, construction costs from coastal defence against sea-
level-rise (SLR) had slightly larger and similar magnitude maximum effects respectively on the Q3/Q1 
ratio. In Egypt and India, the magnitudes of the largest percentage changes to each ratio from 
agriculture and energy were similar; although the net changes from these two sectors diminished 
and reinforced each other in Egypt and India respectively. In Ethiopia, Mexico, the US and Vietnam, 
the magnitudes from agricultural changes were notably greater than for those from changes in 
energy consumption. In contrast, the magnitudes of the largest ratio percentage changes from 
energy impacts were greater in Zambia than those from agricultural changes. In most cases, building 
coastal defences and repairing storm damages produced percentage changes in inequality ratios 
that were many multiples smaller than those arising from agricultural and energy impacts. Mexico 
and the US were exceptions, as differences between the magnitudes of maximum ratio percentage 
changes from energy and coastal defence impacts were less pronounced for these countries; 
although, as discussed, energy still generally produced larger changes to inequality. Ratio changes 
from repairing storm damages were small for all countries and ratios. In the US, however, they were 
approximately similar in magnitude to those from energy and coastal defence expenditure, which 
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were also relatively small. Similarly, in Mexico, ratio changes from repairing storm damages were 
similar in magnitude to the relatively small SLR impacts. 
Figure 8.1 - Largest percentage change in each inequality ratio that was observed in any scenario at 
any point during the 2020 to 2100 time period, for each country and sector in the FUND case study 
 
Notes: Figure shows, for each country in 
the FUND case study, the largest 
percentage changes in the four inequality 
ratios, Q5/Q1, Q5/Q3, Q3/Q1, 
(Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2), that were observed in 
any of the four scenarios, Special Report 
on Emissions Scenarios (SRES) A1B, A2, B1 
and B2, at any point during the 2020 to 
2100 time period. Q1 represents the 
income of the lowest expenditure or 
income quintile, while Q5 represents the 
income of highest expenditure or income 
quintile. Mexico and the US used income 
quintiles, while all other countries used 
expenditure quintiles. The percentage 
changes were driven by impacts to four 
economic sectors: agriculture, energy, 
coastal defence from sea-level rise (SLR), 
and repairs after tropical and extratropical 
storms. These impacts were estimated 
using the FUND model, as described in 
Chapter 6. Changes driven by impacts to 
each of the four FUND sectors are shown 
separately, where blue, red, green and 
purple bars respectively represent 
maximum changes driven by climate 
change impacts on agricultural output, 
energy demand, coastal defence 
expenditure, and repairing economic 
damages from tropical and extratropical 
storms. Positive (negative) changes 
indicate increases (decreases) in the 
relevant inequality ratio. 
 
Figure 8.2 shows the largest percentage change in each Alaskan inequality ratio that was observed in 
any scenario at any time, for each sector in the Alaska case study. Changes in tourism produced the 
smallest result for each Alaskan inequality ratio and, with the exception of the change to the M/L 
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ratio, these changes were of much smaller magnitudes than those arising from the other three 
sectors. Oil produced the largest percentage changes in the H/L and M/L ratios, while infrastructure 
had the greatest effect on the H/M ratio. 
Figure 8.2 - Largest percentage change in each Alaskan inequality ratio that was observed in any 
scenario at any time, for each sector in the Alaska case study 
 
Notes: Figure shows the largest percentage changes in the three Alaskan inequality ratios, H/L, H/M, and M/L, that were observed at any 
point in time in any of the scenarios in the Alaska case study, which is detailed in Chapter 7. H represents the total income of high income 
households (households earning more than $75,000 a year, in 2008 USD), M represents the total income of medium income households 
(households earning between $25,000 and $75,000 a year, in 2008 USD), and L represents the total income of low income households 
(households earning less than $25,000 a year, in 2008 USD). Maximum changes to the H/L, H/M and M/L ratios are represented using 
blue, red and green bars respectively. These percentage changes were driven by climate change impacts to four economic sectors: 
fisheries output, oil industry output, spending by tourists, and expenditure on infrastructure (road, buildings, airports, railroads, and 
pipelines) repairs after damage from flooding, permafrost thaw, precipitation and freeze-thaw dynamics. These impacts were estimated 
using impact studies, as described in Chapter 7. Changes driven by impacts to each of the four sectors are shown separately. Positive 
(negative) changes indicate increases (decreases) in the relevant inequality ratio. 
 
There were two separate components driving the magnitudes of sector percentage changes to 
inequality ratios. The first was the magnitudes of the exogenous changes to sectors, as estimated by 
FUND and the Alaskan impact studies, which were then used as inputs in the input-output analysis 
(IOA). The second was the economic structure of each country, specifically the extent that a unit 
change to each sector would impact on the different household groups. Let us now explore both of 
these drivers in turn. 
As was seen in Chapter 7, the Alaskan impact studies estimated extremely large percentage changes, 


















changes were estimated to the construction sector from infrastructure repairs and sectors 
associated with tourism, with these changes averaging at approximately 19 to 99% and 40 to 50%, 
depending on the scenario. Given the baseline sizes of these sectors in the Alaskan economy, these 
percentage changes amounted to large exogenous changes from oil and infrastructure. These were, 
respectively, approximately 6 to 7 and 4 to 5 times larger than those from tourism. Exogenous 
impacts from fisheries were approximately double those from tourism. It is, thus, not surprising that 
oil and tourism respectively produced particularly large and small changes in inequality ratios in the 
case study in Chapter 7, nor that infrastructure produced relatively large changes. That fisheries 
produced sizable impacts, however, suggests that a unit change in fisheries must have a particularly 
large impact on the inequality ratios. 
Meanwhile, as shown in Figure 6.1 in Chapter 6, FUND typically estimated much larger relative 
impacts for agriculture, water and energy than for other sectors. In the US in Special Report on 
Emissions Scenarios (SRES) A1B, for example, agricultural output and energy demand were 
estimated to change by 8.2% and 8.8% respectively, while construction expenditures from repairing 
storm damages and coastal protection were estimated to change by only 0.3% and less than 0.1% 
respectively. When taking into account the relative baseline sizes of the sectors, agriculture and 
energy still produced the largest exogenous changes. This can be seen in Appendix G, which shows 
FUND estimated exogenous changes across time for each sector, scenario and country. In this light, 
it is not surprising that agriculture and energy were typically found to produce the largest effects on 
inequality ratios. For Mexico and the US, however, the effects of a unit change on the Q3/Q1 ratio 
must be significantly larger for SLR than for energy, as SLR produced larger and similar effects 
respectively in the case study in Chapter 6, despite FUND estimated exogenous effects on energy to 
be approximately 40 and 90 times greater than those from SLR. 
Moving on to the second driver, to explore the extent that a unit change to each sector would 
impact on the different household groups, increases of USD 1 billion, in 1995 USD billions127, in 
agricultural output, water output, energy expenditure, coastal defence expenditure and storm 







For energy, coastal defence and storms, the same budget constraints were imposed as for the FUND 
case study. Water was included, even though the water impacts from FUND could not be used in 
 




Chapter 6, to probe to what extent this sector, which is likely to be affected by climate change, may, 
relative to other sectors, impact on income inequality ratios.  
Figure 8.3 – For each SAM in the FUND case study, effects on inequality ratios of increases of USD 1 
billion (in 1995 USD billions) in, each in turn, agricultural output, water output, energy expenditure, 











Notes: Figure shows, for each of the seven countries in the FUND case study, the effects on inequality ratios of increases of USD 1 billion 
(in 1995 USD billions) in, taking each in turn, agricultural output, water output, energy expenditure, expenditure on coastal defence, and 
expenditure on repairing storm damages. Results are shown separately for each sector. Effects were calculated using the model described 
in Section 8.1.1 of this chapter. Q1 represents the income of the lowest expenditure or income quintile, while Q5 represents the income of 
highest expenditure or income quintile. Mexico and the US used income quintiles, while all other countries used expenditure quintiles. 




The results of this analysis are displayed in Figure 8.3. A unit increase in expenditure on coastal 
defence was the only sector that had a consistent effect on inequality ratios across all countries, 
which was to decrease inequality. Unit increases in all other sectors produced effects that varied by 
country. Increased energy expenditure, for example, increased inequality ratios in all countries, 
except India. Similarly, increased water output increased inequality ratios in all countries, except 
Egypt. Generally, sectors changed all inequality ratios in a country in the same direction. Repairing 
storm damages in the US was the one exception to this, where Q3/Q1 increased, while all other 
inequality ratios decreased. 
One can see that while agriculture and energy results typically dominated impacts in the FUND case 
study, when one is dealing with unit increases, these sectors did not always produce the largest 
magnitude impacts. In India, for example, agriculture produced smaller inequality effects for all 
ratios than every other sector. In Mexico and the US, as predicted earlier in the analysis, unit 
changes in construction from SLR produced much larger impacts on the Q3/Q1 ratio than unit 
changes in energy. Conversely, impacts from repairing storm damages and building coastal defences 
generally produced relatively small results in the FUND case study. In this unit change analysis, 
however, these sectors were responsible for some of the largest inequality changes in Egypt and 
India, while, in Mexico and Vietnam, the unit increase in coastal defence spending produced some of 
the largest impacts. This demonstrates that, if the FUND model is incorrect about the small relative 
magnitude of impacts from SLR and storms, spending on coastal defence and storm damage repairs 
has the potential to cause greater inequality effects than the FUND case study indicates. Similarly, 
effects on inequality ratios from unit changes in water output were relatively large in all countries, 
which demonstrates that this sector also has the potential to produce sizable inequality effects. 
Appendix H shows how the impacts in Figure 8.3 are decomposed into direct and indirect effects. 
Direct impacts are the change in inequality ratios resulting from delivering only the additional 
exogenous unit of, say, agriculture. These were determined from the technical coefficient matrix, 𝑨, 
by taking the technical coefficient for the exogenous commodity to its activity account, and 
multiplying it by the technical coefficient for its activity to a value-added account, and then the 
technical coefficient for that value-added account to a household group. This process was repeated 
for all value-added accounts and all household groups to determine the total direct impact of a unit 
change in the given commodity on each household group, from which the direct impacts on 
inequality ratios could be calculated. Indirect impacts were then all remaining changes in inequality 
ratios. Indirect impacts were brought about, for example, as increased quantities of other products 
required in the exogenous commodity’s production recipe also required additional production of 
goods used in their own production processes, and so on, or, as changes in households’ incomes 
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resulted in changes in the quantities of consumer goods bought, which, in turn, changed production 
requirements further, etc. Whether direct or indirect effects had a stronger impact on inequality 
ratios depended on how interconnected the sector seeing the exogenous change was with the rest 
of the economy and household groups, and the extent to which it directed income unevenly across 
household groups compared to the skew of income across household groups generated by 
stimulated other sectors of the economy. 
The breakdown of impacts into direct and indirect effects illustrates the importance of taking a 
macroeconomic approach and considering how sectors impact on one another, rather than 
modelling each sector individually and then summing the results, as was done in Rozenberg and 
Hallegatte (2015). As one can see in Appendix H, while some impacts were nearly entirely composed 
of direct effects, for others, indirect effects were far greater. For example, when looking at impacts 
in India from expenditure on repairing storm damages, 90% of the impacts on the Q5/Q1 inequality 
ratio were direct effects. In contrast, when looking at impacts in the US from a change in water 
utilities output, only 11% of the impacts on the Q3/Q1 inequality ratio were direct. In some cases, 
direct and indirect effects were even found to move inequality ratios in opposite directions. In Egypt, 
for example, the direct impact of a unit increase in agricultural production was to decrease the 
Q5/Q1 ratio by 0.2%, whereas the indirect impacts increased the Q5/Q1 ratio by 0.1%, leaving an 
overall decrease of 0.1%. Thus, in many cases, taking a microeconomic approach and then summing 
the results would produce a very incomplete picture. 
The same approach was taken for Alaska, only modelling, each in turn, increases of USD 1 billion, in 
1995 USD billions, in fisheries output, oil output, expenditure on tourism and expenditure on 
infrastructure repairs. For the latter, the same budget constraint was imposed as for the Alaskan 
case study, and no budget constraint was imposed for tourism expenditure, once again, as per 
Chapter 7.  
Results are shown in Figure 8.4. One can see that unit changes to fisheries had the largest impact on 
H/L and H/M ratios, while tourism had the largest impact on the M/L ratio. The fact that oil had the 
largest impact on the H/L and M/L ratios in the Alaska case study was thus down to the size of the 
exogenous increase in oil output relative to that for fisheries output and tourism expenditure. 
A decomposition of these impacts into direct and indirect effects can be found in Appendix H. Once 
again, indirect effects were sometimes minor and sometimes very influential. For example, when 
looking at tourism, only 1% of impacts on the H/M ratio were indirect, whereas, when looking at 
fisheries output, 84% of the impacts on the M/L ratio were indirect. As before, sometimes direct and 
indirect effects reinforced each other, while, at other times, they acted in opposite directions. 
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Impacts on all ratios from a change to oil output were examples of the former, whereas impacts on 
all ratios from a change in expenditure on infrastructure were examples of the latter. 
Figure 8.4 – Effects on Alaskan inequality ratios of increases of USD 1 billion (in 1995 USD billions) in, 
each in turn, expenditure on infrastructure, increased tourism, oil output, and fisheries output 
 
Notes: Figure shows the effects on Alaskan inequality ratios of increases of USD 1 billion (in 1995 USD billions) in, taking each in turn, 
expenditure on infrastructure, increased tourism, oil output, and fisheries output. Results are shown separately for each sector. Effects 
were calculated using the model described in Section 8.1.1 of this chapter. Q1 represents the income of the lowest expenditure or income 
quintile, while Q5 represents the income of highest expenditure or income quintile. Mexico and the US used income quintiles, while all 
other countries used expenditure quintiles. Positive (negative) changes indicate increases (decreases) in the relevant inequality ratio. 
 
In short, while the FUND case study indicated that agriculture and energy expenditure, particularly 
agriculture, are likely to be the sectors responsible for the largest inequality effects, an analysis of 
unit changes to each sector suggested that water, SLR and storms impacts have the potential to also 
generate large effects, if the FUND model is incorrect in estimating that impacts from these sectors 
will be far smaller than those for other sectors. Moreover, even when examining just the FUND case 
study, the dominance of the agricultural sector results had exceptions, as the energy sector 
produced the largest magnitude results in Zambia. Finally, in some countries, the inequality effects 
from agriculture and energy expenditure reinforced each other, while in others, they moved 
inequality in opposite directions. They thus have the potential to cancel each other out, in which 
case, smaller impacts from other sectors could instead determine the change in inequality. 
Meanwhile, the Alaskan case study found that changes to infrastructure, fisheries and especially oil 
are most likely to be responsible for changes to inequality. Modelling unit changes to the different 


















study suggested. The magnitudes of impacts from tourism in this analysis were closer to those from 
other sectors than was observed in the case study, and fisheries were even found to have the largest 
impact on two ratios. 
 
8.1.2 Do impacts to certain sectors consistently increase within-country income 
inequality across different economies? Or do impacts in some countries reduce 
inequality and in other countries increase inequality? 
As smaller impacts can be difficult to see on graphs, Table 8.1 details the data behind Figure 8.1. One 
can see that only effects due to increased spending on coastal defence impacted on inequality in all 
countries in the same way; in this case, by consistently decreasing inequality. Table 8.1 would 
suggest that this is very nearly also true for increased spending on repairing storm damages, as this 
sector appeared to decrease inequality in all cases, except for the American Q3/Q1 ratio. If one looks 
at the sector-by-sector unit change analysis in Figure 8.3, however, it becomes clear that this is only 
true if the extremely small estimated impacts from storm damages in Ethiopia and Zambia are 
ignored, as a unit change to this sector in these countries also increased inequality. 
In addition, as was discussed in Chapter 6 and one can also see from Appendix G, in Mexico and the 
US, there were small projected reductions in energy expenditure for the first few decades of 
analysis, due to savings from reduced space heating, which were later overwhelmed by increased 
costs of space cooling. This meant that for these countries, effects from energy expenditure acted on 
inequality in opposite ways at different points in time. Although, for both countries, the magnitudes 
of benefits from reduced space heating were much smaller, and shorter-lived, than the subsequent 
costs from increased space cooling.  
Similarly, while FUND estimated positive agricultural impacts throughout the time period used for 
the FUND case study, had the model been run for longer, the benefits of carbon dioxide (CO2) 
fertilisation would have been cancelled out by growing negative impacts from climate change level 
effects. This would have been true for all countries. Thus, agriculture is another sector that could 






Table 8.1 - Largest percentage change in each inequality ratio that was observed in any scenario at 
any point during the 2020 to 2100 time period, for each country and sector in the FUND case study 
 Ratio Baseline Agriculture Energy SLR Storms 
Egypt 
Q5/Q1 4.783 -0.160% 0.182% -0.005% Negligible 
Q5/Q3 2.704 -0.094% 0.084% -0.002% Negligible 
Q3/Q1 1.769 -0.067% 0.098% -0.003% Negligible 
(Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) 2.908 -0.132% 0.117% -0.004% Negligible 
Ethiopia 
Q5/Q1 6.042 -1.357% 0.240% None Negligible 
Q5/Q3 2.952 -0.969% 0.170% None Negligible 
Q3/Q1 2.047 -0.392% 0.070% None Negligible 
(Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) 3.338 -1.034% 0.184% None Negligible 
India 
Q5/Q1 6.114 -0.180% -0.151% -0.010% -0.006% 
Q5/Q3 3.016 -0.092% -0.073% -0.006% -0.003% 
Q3/Q1 2.028 -0.088% -0.078% -0.004% -0.003% 
(Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) 3.632 -0.131% -0.106% -0.007% -0.004% 
Mexico 
Q5/Q1 8.046 0.158% 0.034% -0.006% -0.003% 
Q5/Q3 4.347 0.146% 0.032% -0.002% -0.002% 
Q3/Q1 1.851 0.011% 0.002% -0.004% -0.001% 
(Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) 4.303 0.126% 0.026% -0.005% -0.003% 
USA 
Q5/Q1 14.673 0.080% 0.009% -0.002% -0.001% 
Q5/Q3 3.512 0.034% 0.010% -0.002% -0.007% 
Q3/Q1 4.178 0.046% -0.001% -0.001% 0.006% 
(Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) 6.074 0.050% 0.006% -0.002% -0.002% 
Vietnam 
Q5/Q1 6.501 -2.181% 1.129% -0.231% -0.004% 
Q5/Q3 2.786 -1.199% 0.631% -0.137% -0.003% 
Q3/Q1 2.333 -0.993% 0.495% -0.094% -0.001% 
(Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) 3.662 -1.672% 0.894% -0.182% -0.003% 
Zambia 
Q5/Q1 22.075 -0.182% 0.660% None Negligible 
Q5/Q3 7.525 -0.140% 0.425% None Negligible 
Q3/Q1 2.934 -0.041% 0.233% None Negligible 




Notes: Table shows, for each country in the FUND case study, the largest percentage changes in the four inequality ratios, Q5/Q1, Q5/Q3, 
Q3/Q1, (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2), that were observed in any of the four scenarios, SRES A1B, A2, B1 and B2, at any point during the 2020 to 2100 
time period. Q1 represents the income of the lowest expenditure or income quintile, while Q5 represents the income of highest 
expenditure or income quintile. Mexico and the US used income quintiles, while all other countries used expenditure quintiles. The 
percentage changes were driven by climate change impacts on four economic sectors, agricultural output, energy demand, coastal 
defence expenditure from sea-level rise (SLR), and expenditure on repairing economic damages from tropical and extratropical storms. 
These impacts were estimated using the FUND model, as described in Chapter 6. Changes driven by impacts to each of the four FUND 
sectors are shown separately, and are compared to the baseline inequality ratios, i.e. initial inequality ratios calculated from the relevant 
countries’ social accounting matrices (SAMs). Positive (negative) changes indicate increases (decreases) in the relevant inequality ratio. 
Changes from impacts on coastal defence expenditure were not modelled for Ethiopia or Zambia, as these countries are landlocked. 
 
None of the sectors in the Alaska and FUND case studies overlapped, so the Alaska case study could 
not be included in this analysis. 
8.1.3 Do certain household groups seem particularly vulnerable across economies?  
The FUND case study in Chapter 6 found that impacts were positive over the time period in all 
countries and scenarios, and higher income households experienced greater absolute impacts in all 
cases. The distribution of proportional impacts, however, varied across countries. In Ethiopia and 
India, for example, lower expenditure or income quintiles always saw greater percentage impacts, 
while the opposite was true in Mexico and Zambia. A slightly less clear pattern was observed in the 
US, where, generally, higher income quintiles experienced greater impacts; although proportional 
impacts in all scenarios started off more skewed towards the third versus the fourth quintile, with 
this skew switching to the opposite as time progressed. Similarly, in Vietnam, lower expenditure 
quintiles saw greater impacts in A2 and B1, and at the start of A1B and B2; however, in the latter 
two scenarios, the opposite became true over time. Finally, the ranking of proportional impacts 
across household groups in Egypt displayed no clear pattern, with rankings changing across scenarios 
and time. 
In the Alaskan case study, low-income households experienced the smallest effects in absolute terms 
across impacts from all sectors. Meanwhile, high-income households experienced the largest 
absolute impacts from projected changes to fisheries and oil extraction, and middle-income 
households experienced the largest absolute impacts from projected changes to tourism and 
spending on infrastructure repairs. In percentage terms, however, lower income households 
consistently did least well across all sectors, as this group saw the highest percentage impacts for the 
negative income effects from increased infrastructure repair costs, and the lowest percentage 
impacts for the positive income effects from increased tourism, and fishing and oil outputs. High 
income households enjoyed the greatest proportional benefits from increased fishing and oil 
outputs, while middle income households benefited the most, relatively speaking, from tourism.  
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The results from this thesis, thus, do not support a simple narrative, such as ‘climate change will 
always hit the poor the hardest’. While the Alaska case study and the Mexican and Zambian results 
from the FUND case study demonstrate that the poor could do least well out of climate change, the 
results from Ethiopia and India in the FUND case study conversely show that it is also plausible that 
the poor could benefit most from a warmer world. Although had the FUND case study been run over 
a longer time period, the benefits of warming would have been outweighed by the costs of warming, 
and households that had been seeing the largest proportional increases in income could then find 
themselves, in relative terms, suffering the most. 
8.1.4 Is there evidence to support the conclusion in Rozenberg and Hallegatte (2015) 
that starting levels of average income and within-country income inequality may 
affect the extent that climate change impacts on inequality?  
Using Pearson correlation coefficients128, let us first examine if impacts from exogenous unit changes 
to sectors129 differed linearly according to starting inequality ratios and average income. Low, 
moderate and high correlations were defined to be correlation coefficients with absolute values 
below 0.4, from 0.4 to 0.6, and above 0.6 respectively. As one can see from Table 8.2, no moderate 
or strong correlation could be found between the changes in inequality ratios and starting incomes, 
as no correlation coefficient had an absolute value greater than 0.4. 
In contrast, the linear correlations between the effects on inequality ratios of unit exogenous 
increases of each given sector and starting levels of inequality were frequently high; although, 
sometimes they were moderate or low. Impacts from a unit change in water utilities output on 
inequality ratios were strongly positively correlated with all baseline inequality ratios. In other 
words, more unequal countries typically saw greater increases in inequality from a unit increase in 
water output, and inequality ratios even slightly decreased in Egypt, the most equal country. 
Meanwhile, impacts from unit changes in expenditure on energy and repairing storm damages were 
also strongly positively correlated with all baseline inequality ratios, except Q3/Q1, where the 
correlations were only weak. For a unit increase in energy expenditure, more unequal countries 
typically saw greater increases in inequality, with India, one of the more equal countries even seeing 
small decreases in inequality ratios. Similarly, for a unit increase in expenditure on repairing storm 
 
128 The Pearson correlation coefficient is the ratio of the covariance of two variables to the product of their 
standard deviations. This ratio can vary between -1 and 1, which represent total negative and positive linear 
correlations respectively. When a correlation coefficient is equal to zero, this means there is no linear 
correlation between the variables. 
129 Impacts from exogenous unit changes were calculated in Section 8.1.1 of this chapter, using an IOA of each 
country’s SAM, and were detailed in Figure 8.3. None of the sectors or household groupings in the Alaska and 
FUND case studies overlapped, so the Alaska case study could not be included in this analysis. 
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damages, more unequal countries typically saw greater increases in inequality, with many of the 
more equal countries instead seeing small decreases in inequality ratios. Agriculture was strongly 
negatively correlated with all baseline inequality ratios, except Q3/Q1, where the correlations were 
only weak. So more unequal countries typically saw greater reductions in inequality; although the US 
and Mexico saw very small increases in inequality ratios. Finally, impacts on inequality ratios from a 
unit change in expenditure on coastal protection were weakly correlated with all inequality ratios, 
except Q5/Q3, where there was a moderate positive correlation; that is, more equal countries 
typically saw greater decreases in this inequality ratio. 
Table 8.2 – Correlations between impacts on inequality ratios from unit exogenous increases to 



























































Agriculture 0.33 0.31 0.38 0.32 -0.69 -0.81 -0.09 -0.77 
Water -0.32 -0.33 -0.32 -0.32 0.67 0.64 0.71 0.70 
Energy -0.32 -0.33 -0.32 -0.32 0.70 0.78 0.16 0.76 
SLR 0.34 0.32 0.35 0.34 0.28 0.43 0.14 0.27 
Storms -0.24 -0.24 -0.24 -0.24 0.66 0.65 0.19 0.71 
 
Notes: Table shows the Pearson correlation coefficients of impacts on four inequality ratios from exogenous unit increases to five sectors 
in the seven countries featuring in the FUND case study, and 2017 GDP per capita, in USD, and starting inequality ratios in those countries. 
The four inequality ratios are Q5/Q1, Q5/Q3, Q3/Q1 and (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2). Q1 represents the income of the lowest expenditure or 
income quintile, while Q5 represents the income of highest expenditure or income quintile. Income quintiles were used for Mexico and 
the US, while expenditure quintiles were used for Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Vietnam and Zambia. Correlation coefficients can vary between -1 
and 1, which represent total negative and positive linear correlations respectively. When a correlation coefficient is equal to zero, this 
means there is no correlation between the variables. Unit exogenous increases were explored for five sectors: agricultural output, water 
utilities output, expenditure on energy, expenditure on coastal defence from SLR, and expenditure on repairing damages from storms. The 
impacts of unit changes were taken from Figure 8.3 in this chapter, while 2017 GDP per capita, in USD, were taken from Table 3.2 in 
Chapter 3. Baseline inequality ratios were calculated from the relevant countries’ SAMs. 
These results suggest that more unequal countries could generally experience greater changes in 
inequality ratios than their more equal counterparts. Whether this occurs, however, is dependent on 
if there is a correlation between the size of exogenous increases to sectors and starting levels of 
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inequality. To assess this, Pearson correlations were explored between the largest percentage 
changes in a given inequality ratio that were observed for each sector in each country in the FUND 
case study130, and starting inequality ratios and average income. These correlation coefficients are 
shown in Table 8.3.  
Table 8.3 – Correlations between largest percentage changes in inequality ratios from exogenous 
changes to given sectors that were observed in any scenario at any point during the FUND case study 



























































Agriculture 0.36 0.36 0.35 0.36 0.34 0.34 0.21 0.32 
Energy -0.32 -0.33 -0.30 -0.32 0.19 0.28 -0.01 0.26 
SLR 0.30 0.30 0.31 0.30 0.24 0.42 0.08 0.23 
Storms 0.87 -0.94 0.98 0.80 0.90 0.15 0.98 0.85 
 
Notes: Table shows the Pearson correlation coefficients between the largest percentage changes in four inequality ratios that were 
observed in any scenario at any point during the FUND case study, due to FUND-estimated exogenous changes to given sectors, and 2017 
GDP per capita, in USD, and the four starting inequality ratios, in the seven countries in the FUND case study. The four inequality ratios are 
Q5/Q1, Q5/Q3, Q3/Q1 and (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2). Q1 represents the income of the lowest expenditure or income quintile, while Q5 
represents the income of highest expenditure or income quintile. Income quintiles were used for Mexico and the US, while expenditure 
quintiles were used for Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Vietnam and Zambia. Correlation coefficients can vary between -1 and 1, which represent 
total negative and positive linear correlations respectively. When a correlation coefficient is equal to zero, this means there is no 
correlation between the variables. Exogenous changes were explored for four sectors: agricultural output, water utilities output, 
expenditure on energy, expenditure on coastal defence from SLR, and expenditure on repairing damages from storms. Exogenous changes 
to water output were excluded from this analysis, as they were from the FUND case-study, due to the concerns raised in Chapter 6 about 
the calibration of the water impact functions. The largest percentage changes were taken from Table 8.1 in this chapter, while 2017 GDP 
per capita, in USD, were from Table 3.2 in Chapter 3. Baseline inequality ratios were calculated from the relevant countries’ SAMs. 
One can see that for exogenous changes to agriculture and energy sectors, there were only low 
correlations between impacts on inequality ratios and 2017 GDP per capita, in USD, and baseline 
inequality ratios in the countries. The same was true for impacts from exogenous increases in 
construction for repairing storm damages, with the exception of the correlation between impacts on 
 
130 These percentage changes were detailed earlier in this chapter, in Table 8.1. 
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the Q5/Q3 ratio and baseline Q5/Q3 ratios, where there was a moderate correlation. This 
correlation, however, was 0.42, and so was only just over the threshold to be classified as moderate. 
Finally, very strong correlations were typically observed between impacts from exogenous increases 
in construction for building coastal defences and both starting levels of inequality and income, with 
correlation coefficients ranging from 0.80 to 0.98. The exception was the correlation between 
impacts on the Q5/Q3 ratio and baseline Q5/Q3 ratios, where there was a very weak correlation of 
0.15. 
Thus, with the exception of expenditure on repairing storm damages, no convincing correlations 
were found between the maximum changes in inequality ratios in the FUND case study and starting 
levels of income and inequality ratios. The absence of correlations with FUND’s estimated exogenous 
changes thus outweighed the correlations between impacts from unit exogenous increases in 
sectors and starting levels of inequality. For example, maximum changes in inequality ratios from 
FUND’s estimated exogenous increases in expenditure on repairing storm damages were typically 
strongly correlated with starting levels of income and inequality ratios, despite impacts on inequality 
ratios from a unit change in expenditure on coastal protection having no convincing correlation with 
starting incomes or inequality.  
To illustrate the correlations, Figure 8.5 shows scatter plots of the baseline Q5/Q1 ratios versus the 
largest percentage changes in the Q5/Q1 ratios that were observed in each country in the FUND 
case study, due to exogenous changes in each sector. While these plots are for the Q5/Q1 ratio, very 
similar patterns were observed for other ratios. One can clearly see that the only convincing 
correlation is with impacts from repairing storm damages. 
In short, the correlations between the effects on inequality ratios of unit exogenous increases of 
each given sector and starting levels of inequality were frequently high, which suggests there is 
potential for starting levels of within-country income inequality to affect the extent that climate 
change impacts on inequality. The results from the FUND case study, however, demonstrate that 
these correlations play only a very small role. The correlations, or lack thereof, between the scale of 







Figure 8.5 – Baseline Q5/Q1 ratios versus maximum percentage changes in Q5/Q1 ratios in the seven 
countries in the FUND case study, broken down according to the sector exogenously driving changes 
 
Notes: Figure plots the largest percentage changes in the Q5/Q1 inequality ratios that were observed in any of the four scenarios and at 
any point in time for each of the seven countries in the FUND case study detailed in Chapter 6, against baseline inequality ratios, i.e. initial 
inequality ratios calculated from the relevant countries’ SAMs.  Q1 represents the income of the lowest expenditure or income quintile, 
while Q5 represents the income of highest expenditure or income quintile. Mexico and the US used income quintiles, while all other 
countries used expenditure quintiles. The percentage changes were driven by climate change impacts on four economic sectors, 
agricultural output, energy demand, coastal defence expenditure from sea-level rise (SLR), and expenditure on repairing economic 
damages from tropical and extratropical storms. Changes driven by impacts to each of the four sectors are shown in separate graphs. In 
each graph, there is a separate data point for each country. Changes from impacts on coastal defence expenditure were not modelled for 
Ethiopia or Zambia, as these countries are landlocked. Positive (negative) changes indicate increases (decreases) in the relevant inequality 
ratio. One can see that, with the exception of impacts from repairing storm damages, no convincing correlations can be found. Correlation 









8.1.5 Are within-country income inequality effects relatively small in many or all 
scenarios compared to projected growth in average income? Alternatively, is it 
possible, as suggested by Dennig et al. (2015) and Rozenberg and Hallegatte 
(2015), that increased inequality from climate change might cancel out 
improvements in overall standards of living from GDP growth for low-income 
households?  
To explore this question, a new ratio, 𝑌𝑜𝑌( ) , was introduced to see cumulative climate impacts 
incurred in 𝑡 as percentages of the exogenous year-on-year (YoY) growth in incomes between 𝑡 − 1 
and 𝑡. Using the variables and notation defined in Chapter 6, as the economy of a given country in a 





This ratio captured the proportion of the most recent YoY exogenous growth in income that was 
gained or lost at time 𝑡 due to cumulative climate change impacts. For example, if 𝑌𝑜𝑌( ) = −1, i.e. 
∆𝑥( ) = −𝑔 𝑥( ) , this would mean that all of the most recent YoY exogenous growth in baseline 
income had been negated by the cumulative climate change impacts at 𝑡. While, as detailed in 
Chapter 6, all net cumulative impacts in the FUND case study were positive, and so could not 
possibly cancel out the effects of positive growth, it was still interesting to compare the magnitude 
of the impacts generated by FUND with YoY growth, to assess the scale of the estimates. 
For the FUND case study results, the pattern the 𝑌𝑜𝑌( )  percentage followed over time varied by 
country and scenario, with YoY percentages sometimes falling with time, sometimes rising to a peak 
and then falling, sometimes continuously rising, and other times fluctuating throughout the time 
period. As an example, Figure 8.6 shows YoY ratios for Ethiopian household groups in the four SRES 
scenarios. 
Table 8.4 shows how the maximum 𝑌𝑜𝑌( )  percentage observed over the time period varied by 
household group, country and scenario, and the range of these maximum percentages observed 
across the household groups for each country and scenario. One can see that the maximum 
cumulative impacts, as a percentage of the most recent exogenous YoY growth in incomes, differed 
greatly across countries and scenarios, as did the range observed across household groups. In 
addition, which household groups experienced the largest cumulative impacts, as percentages of 
YoY growth, differed from country to country and, in the case of Egypt, across scenarios. These 
differences naturally mirrored the distribution of cumulative changes in incomes across household 
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groups, as percentages of counterfactual baseline incomes, which were observed in Chapter 6. 
Figure 8.6 – Ethiopian cumulative climate impacts incurred each year, as percentages of the most 
recent exogenous year-on-year (YoY) growth in incomes, in four SRES scenarios, for each household 
expenditure quintile 
 
Notes: Figure shows, for Ethiopia, the cumulative total changes in household expenditure quintiles’ incomes at each point in time between 
2020 and 2100, in each scenario, SRES A1B, A2, B1 and B2, as percentages of exogenous YoY income growth for the relevant quintile. A 
separate graph is shown for each scenario. Q1 represents the income of the lowest expenditure quintile, while Q5 represents the income 
of highest expenditure quintile. The cumulative changes were driven by climate change impacts on four economic sectors, agricultural 
output, energy demand, coastal defence expenditure from sea-level rise (SLR), and expenditure on repairing economic damages from 
tropical and extratropical storms, but were modelled together to give cumulative total changes.  
All FUND-estimated total impacts were positive across all countries and scenarios. This naturally 
resulted in all 𝑌𝑜𝑌( )  percentages being positive, so YoY exogenous growth couldn’t even be partly 
negated by climate change impacts. These positive impacts were primarily down to sizable projected 
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agricultural benefits from CO2 fertilisation and the level of climate change; although, agricultural 
benefits diminished but didn’t turn negative by the end of the time period. However, if FUND’s 
impact functions were overly optimistic about these effects, which some argue, for example, see 
Ackerman and Munitz (2012), than total impacts across all sectors could swiftly turn negative. It was, 
thus, still interesting to explore the scale of the estimates by comparing the magnitudes of the 
impacts generated by FUND with YoY growth. 
The largest cumulative impact, as a percentage of the most recent YoY exogenous growth in income, 
was observed for Q1 in Vietnam in SRES A2, and amounted to nearly three years of exogenous 
growth, with all other quintiles seeing maximum cumulative impacts that amounted to 174% to 
264% of the most recent YoY exogenous growth. Quintile impacts in Vietnam in SRES A1B and B2 
were, respectively, equivalent to approximately one and two years of exogenous YoY growth, while 
cumulative quintile impacts in SRES B1 ranged from 57% to 112% of the most recent YoY exogenous 
growth. Egyptian quintiles in A1B, A2 and B2, saw cumulative impacts that amounted to 100 to 200% 
of the most recent YoY exogenous growth. Similar sized effects were seen for all quintiles in Ethiopia 
in A2. While the two poorest Ethiopian quintiles and two wealthiest Zambian quintiles in B2 saw 
impacts approximately equivalent to the most recent YoY exogenous growth. There is thus evidence 
to suggest that climate change could conceivably negate a few years of exogenous growth. Effects in 
India, Mexico and the US, however, were smaller with cumulative impacts never respectively 
exceeding 89%, 54% and 23% for any quintile in any scenario. Even if FUND estimated total impacts 
were negative instead of positive, such impacts wouldn’t erode even one year of exogenous growth. 
Table 8.4 – Maximum percentage of the most recent YoY exogenous growth in income that was 
gained or lost, due to cumulative climate change impacts, in any year during the time period, broken 
down by country, scenario and household group 






A1B 111% 113% 113% 112% 114% 3 
A2 194% 197% 196% 194% 196% 3 
B1 66% 67% 66% 65% 65% 2 
B2 170% 174% 175% 174% 178% 9 
Ethiopia 
 
A1B 87% 83% 78% 72% 54% 32 
A2 191% 179% 166% 150% 106% 85 
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B1 74% 70% 64% 58% 40% 34 
B2 107% 102% 96% 89% 72% 36 
India 
 
A1B 40% 37% 35% 33% 30% 9 
A2 89% 84% 81% 78% 72% 17 
B1 35% 33% 32% 31% 28% 6 
B2 68% 63% 60% 56% 51% 17 
Mexico 
 
A1B 19% 19% 19% 20% 23% 5 
A2 43% 43% 44% 45% 54% 11 
B1 16% 16% 16% 17% 20% 4 
B2 22% 22% 22% 23% 29% 7 
USA 
A1B 5% 7% 8% 8% 10% 5 
A2 12% 15% 18% 17% 22% 10 
B1 11% 14% 16% 16% 19% 9 
B2 13% 16% 20% 18% 23% 10 
Vietnam 
A1B 130% 122% 114% 107% 96% 35 
A2 294% 264% 231% 199% 174% 120 
B1 112% 100% 87% 74% 57% 55 
B2 214% 202% 194% 203% 208% 20 
Zambia 
 
A1B 39% 42% 47% 56% 65% 27 
A2 71% 76% 85% 95% 108% 37 
B1 22% 24% 25% 28% 30% 8 
B2 67% 74% 85% 101% 118% 51 
 
Notes: Table shows, for each of the seven countries in the FUND case study, the maximum percentage of exogenous year-on-year (YoY) 
income growth that was gained as a result of climate change impacts, at any point in time between 2020 and 2100, for each household 
expenditure or income quintile. Climate change impacts on four economic sectors were considered: agricultural output, energy demand, 
coastal defence expenditure from sea-level rise (SLR), and expenditure on repairing economic damages from tropical and extratropical 
storms. The cumulative changes to the four sectors were modelled together to give cumulative total changes. Note that these total 
changes were positive in all cases, as FUND estimates large agricultural benefits from climate change. Results are given for each of the four 
scenarios, SRES A1B, A2, B1 and B2, and for each household quintile. Q1 represents the income of the lowest expenditure or income 
quintile, while Q5 represents the income of highest expenditure or income quintile. Mexico and the US used income quintiles, while all 
other countries used expenditure quintiles. The greatest difference in these maximum percentages observed across quintiles in each 




Table 8.5 – Percentage of the most recent YoY exogenous growth in income that was gained or lost 
due to cumulative climate change impacts, broken down by sector, scenario and household group 
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L 70% 68% -1431% -536% -215% -82% 184% 42% 86% 113% 
M 147% 144% -1226% -458% -184% -70% 551% 83% 169% 223% 
H 330% 322% -621% -228% -92% -34% 739% 60% 120% 158% 
 
Notes: Table shows the maximum percentage of exogenous year-on-year (YoY) income growth that was gained or lost as a result of 
climate change impacts, over the time period covered in the case study detailed in Chapter 7, for each Alaskan household income group. H 
represents the total income of high income households (households earning more than $75,000 a year, in 2008 USD), M represents the 
total income of medium income households (households earning between $25,000 and $75,000 a year, in 2008 USD), and L represents the 
total income of low income households (households earning less than $25,000 a year, in 2008 USD).  Climate change impacts on four 
economic sectors were considered: fisheries output, oil industry output, spending by tourists, and expenditure on infrastructure (road, 
buildings, airports, railroads, and pipelines) repairs after damage from flooding, permafrost thaw, precipitation and freeze-thaw dynamics. 
Changes driven by impacts to each of the four sectors are shown separately. As described in Chapter 7, one scenario was used for impacts 
to the oil industry, two scenarios, with and without ocean acidification, were used for changes to fisheries, four scenarios, RCPs 4.5 and 
8.5, both with and without adaptation, were used for changes to infrastructure, and three scenarios, SRES A2, B1 and B2 were used for 
changes to tourism. The results from these different scenarios are all shown separately. 
 
The 𝑌𝑜𝑌( )  percentages observed in the Alaska case study were generally much larger than those 
observed in the FUND case study. Table 8.5 details the percentages for each household group, sector 
and scenario. As was seen in Chapter 7, the impacts from all sectors, except infrastructure, were 
positive and so reinforced YoY growth. The impacts from infrastructure were negative and, at times, 
particularly large, negating up to over 14 times the most recent year’s exogenous YoY growth. In 
some scenarios, however, impacts were more modest, for example, in RCP 8.5 with adaptation, 
cumulative costs from infrastructure expenditure never amounted to more than 34% of the most 
recent exogenous YoY income growth. Cumulative impacts from changes to oil output were also 
large, ranging from 184 to 739% of the most recent exogenous YoY income growth. Cumulative 
impacts from changes to fisheries output were typically smaller, as they spanned 68 to 330% of the 
most recent exogenous YoY income growth. This was a similar range to that observed for Vietnam in 
the FUND case study, i.e. the largest cumulative impacts in the FUND case study. Finally, the 
magnitudes of cumulative Alaskan impacts were typically smallest when generated by changes in 
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tourism. These were, however, still comparable in size to those typically observed in the FUND case 
study, as they ranged from 42% to 158% of the most recent exogenous YoY income growth. 
Once again, the distribution of cumulative impacts, as percentages of YoY growth, across household 
groups naturally mirrored the distribution of cumulative changes in incomes across household 
groups, as percentages of counterfactual baseline incomes, which were observed in Chapter 7. 
It must be emphasised that the impacts used to estimate the YoY percentages in both case studies 
were cumulative impacts, and that these were being compared to exogenous average income 
growth from just one year to the next. If it would take cumulative impacts many years to negate 
growth over just one year, or over a relatively small number of years, then this suggests that the 
cumulative impacts of climate change on household incomes are unlikely to significantly diminish the 
benefits of cumulative exogenous growth in average incomes. Despite the variety of maximum 
𝑌𝑜𝑌( )  percentages observed across countries and scenarios in the FUND case study, the largest 
observed was still only 294%. Three times the most recent exogenous year-on-year (YoY) growth in 
incomes is, arguably, not a large cost from cumulative impacts from climate change that have built 
up over many years. Similarly, while costs of over 14 times the most recent year’s exogenous YoY 
growth were generated for Alaska from infrastructure, these cumulative effects occurred in 2099. 
These 14 to 15 years of lost growth would be more than compensated for by many preceding 
decades of growth. The results of this thesis thus do not support the suggestion in Dennig et al. 
(2015) and Rozenberg and Hallegatte (2015) that climate change may disrupt the notion that 
‘growth is good for the poor’, even though growth is driving climate change.  
8.1.6 Is it only in the most extreme climate damage scenarios and time frames that 
relatively sizable inequality effects emerge? Or are they plausible in shorter-term, 
moderate scenarios? 
Table 8.6 shows the largest percentage cumulative changes in inequality ratios for each inequality 
ratio observed across all scenarios for each country in the FUND case study. The cumulative changes 
appear small, as no ratio changed from its baseline by more than 0.14%, 1.22%, 0.24%, 0.16%, 







Table 8.6 – Largest changes in each inequality ratio, as percentages of baseline inequality ratios, 





Notes: Table shows, for each country in 
the FUND case study, the largest 
percentage change observed in each of 
the four inequality ratios, Q5/Q1, Q5/Q3, 
Q3/Q1, and (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2), in the 
FUND case study. Q1 represents the 
income of the lowest expenditure or 
income quintile, while Q5 represents the 
income of highest expenditure or income 
quintile. Mexico and the US used income 
quintiles, while all other countries used 
expenditure quintiles. Percentages 
represent deviations from counterfactual 
baseline ratios. Counterfactual baseline 
ratios were calculated from the SAMs, 
and so they assume no effects from 
climate change. Positive (negative) 
changes indicate increases (decreases) in 
the relevant inequality ratio. Data on 
largest observed percentage changes 
















































To help define a ‘relatively sizable’ change in inequality, historical standard deviations of the four 
inequality ratios were calculated for each country in the FUND case study using World Bank time 
series on income quintiles’ shares of total household income (World Bank, 2019b). The largest 
cumulative change observed in each inequality ratio for each country in the FUND case study was 
then compared to the standard deviation of historical changes in the relevant ratio generated from 
the World Bank time-series. This gave a measure of whether the inequality impacts generated by 
climate change were comparable in magnitude to fluctuations in inequality in recent memory. 
The results are displayed in Table 8.7. In all countries except Vietnam, which typically saw the largest 
proportional impacts in the FUND case study, the maximum magnitudes of changes in inequality 
ratios amounted to only small percentages of historical standard deviations of inequality ratios. 
Specifically, never more than 3%, 5%, 6%, 2%, 2% and 4% for Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, the US, 
and Zambia respectively. Thus, even over eighty-years, let alone a shorter time-scale, FUND-
estimated cumulative impacts on income inequality, for most countries, typically looked fairly small 
compared to recent changes in inequality that were unrelated to climate change.  
For Vietnam, changes to inequality ratios were equivalent to up to 41% of historical standard 
deviations. Thus, if a Vietnamese inequality ratio were to change by 2.33%, this could feel more 
significant to the population than one might anticipate, as such a change would be equivalent to 
approximately two fifth of the standard deviation of inequality ratios since 1992. Nevertheless, it 
would not represent a dramatic change in inequality, particularly as inequality ratios in Vietnam 
have not historically experienced large fluctuations131. 
Impacts on inequality ratios were often larger in the Alaskan case study, with ratios changing by 
maximums of 5.28%, 3.63%, 7.64% and 0.90% as a result of exogenous changes to infrastructure 
spending, fisheries output, oil output and tourism respectively. Moreover, these are impacts due to 
exogenous changes to individual sectors, with those from infrastructure, oil and fisheries all changes 
to the H/L ratio. This implies that the H/L ratio could increase by 16.55% if the relevant changes to 
these three sectors were to occur together. This could easily represent a sizable change; however, as 
historical income-inequality ratios for these household groupings could not be found for Alaska, it 
was not possible to compare these changes with historical standard deviations. This was 
disappointing, as it is plausible that these larger proportional impacts could have been comparable 
in magnitude to, or even possibly exceeded, fluctuations in inequality in recent memory. 
 
131 The historical relative standard deviations, i.e. ratios of standard deviations to means, for Vietnamese 
inequality ratios were 0.07, 0.06, 0.07 and 0.05 for the Q5/Q1, Q5/Q3, Q3/Q1 and (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) ratios 
respectively, which are all low variance. 
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Table 8.7 – Largest absolute changes in each inequality ratio, as percentages of the historical 
standard deviations of each ratio, observed in the FUND case study across all scenarios, broken 









Standard deviation of 
historical time series, 
as a percentage of the 
historical mean 
Largest absolute change observed in 
the FUND case study across all 
scenarios, as a percentage of the 
historical standard deviation 
Egypt 1990 - 2015 
Q5/Q1 4.50 4.4% 3.3% 
Q5/Q3 2.54 2.9% 2.1% 
Q3/Q1 1.77 2.5% 3.2% 
(Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) 2.82 3.3% 2.5% 
Ethiopia  1995 - 2015 
Q5/Q1 5.80 27.2% 4.7% 
Q5/Q3 2.84 20.5% 4.4% 
Q3/Q1 2.02 8.7% 4.1% 
(Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) 3.33 19.4% 4.8% 
India  1983 - 2011 
Q5/Q1 5.02 6.1% 4.8% 
Q5/Q3 2.71 6.5% 2.1% 
Q3/Q1 1.85 2.2% 6.0% 
(Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) 3.08 4.6% 4.5% 
Mexico 1984 - 2016 
Q5/Q1 11.65 14.1% 0.8% 
Q5/Q3 4.09 7.1% 2.2% 
Q3/Q1 2.84 8.2% 0.1% 
(Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) 5.53 10.4% 0.9% 
USA 1979 - 2016  
Q5/Q1 8.50 9.3% 1.4% 
Q5/Q3 2.87 6.5% 0.5% 
Q3/Q1 2.96 3.9% 1.8% 
(Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) 4.24 6.6% 1.0% 
Vietnam  1992 - 2016 
Q5/Q1 6.06 6.7% 37% 
Q5/Q3 2.82 6.0% 21% 
Q3/Q1 2.15 7.2% 16% 
(Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) 3.50 4.5% 41% 
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Zambia 1991 - 2015 
Q5/Q1 21.25 81.0% 0.8% 
Q5/Q3 4.93 16.4% 3.6% 
Q3/Q1 4.12 68.7% 0.2% 
(Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) 7.97 39.9% 1.6% 
 
Notes: Table shows, for each country in the FUND case study, the historical means of the four inequality ratios, Q5/Q1, Q5/Q3, Q3/Q1, and 
(Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2), the standard deviations of the historical inequality ratio time series, expressed as percentages of the historical means, 
and the largest absolute changes observed in the FUND case study across all scenarios, expressed as percentages of the standard 
deviations of the historical inequality ratio time series. Q1 represents the income of the lowest expenditure or income quintile, while Q5 
represents the income of highest expenditure or income quintile. Mexico and the US used income quintiles, while all other countries used 
expenditure quintiles. Historical data was taken from World Bank (2019b). Data on largest absolute changes observed in the FUND case 
study were taken from Table 8.1 in this chapter. 
8.2 Sensitivity of results 
To explore the sensitivity of results to uncertainty surrounding economic structures, and the 
sensitivity of results to differently disaggregated factor accounts in SAMs, results for the US from the 
FUND case study, which were generated using the 2016 US SAM, were compared to results 
generated using the 2003, 2010 and 2016-edu SAMs. All other aspects of the methodology remained 
the same, except that FUND exogenous growth rates starting from 2003, 2010 and 2016 were used 
as appropriate. Once again, results were run for all sectors, except water. 
Figure 8.7 shows results for the B2 scenario when using the different SAMs. This is provided as an 
example; however, similar pictures emerged for the other scenarios. One can see that impacts 
across household groups, in absolute terms, followed very similar patterns when using the 2016, 
2010, 2003 and 2016-edu SAMs. Impacts in all scenarios rose to a peak and then fell, or continuously 
increased throughout the time period. Magnitudes of impacts were closest between the 2016 and 
2016-edu SAMs. In B2, for example, the average percentage difference of impacts calculated using 
these two SAMs amounted to 12%, 12%, 6%, 6% and 3% for impacts on Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4 and Q5 
respectively. The largest percentage changes occurred for the smallest absolute impacts, as here a 
small absolute deviation still resulted in a sizable percentage deviation. Larger percentage changes 
were, however, typically observed when comparing absolute impacts calculated using the 2003 and 
2010 SAMs. The average percentage difference of impacts calculated using these SAMs, compared 
to the 2016 SAM, amounted to 14%, 13%, 10%, 5% and 24% for impacts on Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4 and Q5 
respectively when using the 2010 SAM, and 44%, 45%, 30%, 23% and 13% for impacts on Q1, Q2, 
Q3, Q4 and Q5 respectively when using the 2003 SAM. 
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When looking at impacts as percentage changes from households’ baseline incomes, differences 
between the 2003, 2010 and 2016 SAMs become even more pronounced. Figure 8.8 gives data using 
SRES A1B as an example; however, the following observations also applied to the other scenarios. As 
one can see, the ranking of which households experienced the greatest impacts in percentage terms 
varied depending on whether the 2003, 2010 or 2016 SAM was used. Even when moving from using 
the 2016 SAM to using the 2016-edu SAM, the ranking of the third and fourth income quintiles 
switched. All these differences in impacts in percentage terms affected the projected changes to the 
four inequality ratios. When using the 2016 and 2016-edu SAMs for SRES A1B, for example, 
inequality increased throughout the time period according to all four ratios. When using the 2003 
and 2010 SAMs, however, the Q5/Q3 ratio decreased throughout the time period, while the 
(Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) ratio started to decrease towards the end of the time period, when using the 
2003 SAM, and both the (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) and Q5/Q1 ratios started to decrease towards the end of 
the time period when using the 2010 SAM. 
As shown in Figure 8.9, when looking at the maximum percentage changes to inequality ratios from 
impacts to different sectors of the economy, the pattern that agriculture produced the largest 
magnitude changes, significantly larger than those from other sectors, with energy, storms and SLR 
then producing progressively smaller results, was generally preserved. There were, however, 
noticeable differences between results generated using the different US SAMs; the most important 
being that impacts from the two most significant sectors could have different effects on inequality 
depending on the SAM used. For example, when using the 2003 or 2010 SAMs, the largest 
percentage changes in the Q5/Q3 ratio from agriculture and energy were negative, whereas when 
using either of the 2016 SAMs they were positive. Similarly, when using the 2003 or 2010 SAMs, the 
largest percentage changes in the Q5/Q1 and (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) ratios from energy were negative, 
whereas when using the 2016 SAM they were positive. 
Thus, while many key features of results were preserved when using the different SAMs, the results 
of this sensitivity analysis demonstrated that changes to US economic structure, over even a short 
period of time, could reverse the relationship between certain sectors and measures of inequality. 
This reinforces the conclusion from the stability analysis in Chapter 5 that the results from this thesis 
should not be interpreted as predictions for any given country, but rather as an attempt to explore 
the range of results that could arise across economies.       
While differences between results generated using the two 2016 SAMs did exist, they were typically 
small in comparison to those observed when using SAMs from different time periods. Nevertheless, 
they were sufficient to reverse the relationship between the energy sector and the Q5/Q1 and 
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(Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) inequality ratios. These both increased when using the 2016 SAM and decreased 
when using the 2016-edu SAM.  The aggregated nature of labour accounts distinguished solely by 
educational level, thus, does lose information and can produce different inequality results than 
when using factor disaggregation that preserves industry-specific dynamics. Such aggregation biases 
are a common problem in input-output analysis (Miller and Blair, 2009). 
Figure 8.7 – Cumulative changes (in 1995 USD billions) in US household income quintiles’ incomes, 
from counterfactual baseline incomes, in SRES B2, when using 2003, 2010, 2016 and 2016-edu SAMs 
 
Notes: Figure shows the cumulative changes in income for each American household income quintile as a result of FUND’s estimated 
climate change impacts on agricultural output, energy expenditure, expenditure building coastal defences and expenditure on 
reconstruction after storm damages. Results are aggregated direct and indirect effects from all four sectors. The case study was run from 
2020 to 2100, using the four different US SAMs constructed in Chapter 4, for 2003, 2010, 2016, and 2016-edu, where 2016-edu was an 
alternatively disaggregated 2016 SAM, as described in Chapter 4. Q1 represents the income of the lowest income quintile, and Q5 
represents the income of highest income quintile. 
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Figure 8.8 – Cumulative changes in US household income quintiles’ incomes, as percentages of 
counterfactual baseline incomes, in SRES A1B, when using 2003, 2010, 2016 and 2016-edu SAMs 
 
Notes: Figure shows the cumulative changes in incomes, expressed as percentages of counterfactual baseline incomes, for each American 
household income quintile, as a result of FUND’s estimated climate change impacts on agricultural output, energy expenditure, 
expenditure building coastal defences and expenditure on reconstruction after storm damages. The case study was run from 2020 to 
2100, using the four different US SAMs constructed in Chapter 4, for 2003, 2010, 2016, and 2016-edu, where 2016-edu was an 
alternatively disaggregated 2016 SAM, as described in Chapter 4. Q1 represents the income of the lowest income quintile, and Q5 
represents the income of highest income quintile. The counterfactual baseline incomes assume no effects from climate change. 
Comparing results generated using the two 2016 SAMs does not, however, provide support for the 
conjecture in Pieters (2010) that differing inequality effects from growth in different sectors cannot 
be observed unless SAMs have factor accounts disaggregated by industry, not just by level of labour 
education and capital, as the different sectors produced markedly different impacts on inequality 
ratios when using both SAMs.   
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Figure 8.9 - Largest percentage change in each inequality ratio that was observed in any scenario at 
any point during the 2020 to 2100 time period, for each sector, and when using each of the four US 
SAMs to generate results 
 
Notes: Figure shows, when using each of the four US 
SAMs, 2003, 2010, 2016 and 2016-edu, the largest 
percentage changes in the four American inequality 
ratios, Q5/Q1, Q5/Q3, Q3/Q1, (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2), that 
were observed in any of the four scenarios, SRES A1B, 
A2, B1 and B2, at any point during the 2020 to 2100 
time period. Q1 represents the income of the lowest 
income quintile, while Q5 represents the income of 
the highest income quintile. The percentage changes 
were driven by impacts to four economic sectors, 
agriculture, energy, coastal defence from sea-level 
rise (SLR), and repairs after tropical and extratropical 
storms. These impacts were estimated using the 
FUND model, as described in Chapter 6. Changes 
driven by impacts to each of the four FUND sectors 
are shown separately, where blue, red, green and 
purple bars respectively represent maximum changes 
driven by climate change impacts on agricultural 
output, energy demand, coastal defence expenditure, 
and repairing economic damages from tropical and 
extratropical storms. Positive (negative) changes 







This chapter analysed the results from the case studies in Chapters 6 and 7 for insights on the 
research questions outlined in Chapter 2.  
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While the FUND case study indicated that agriculture and energy expenditure, particularly 
agriculture, are likely to be the sectors responsible for the largest inequality effects, an analysis of 
unit changes to each sector suggested that SLR and storms impacts also have the potential to 
generate large effects, if the FUND model is incorrect in estimating that impacts from these sectors 
will be far smaller than those for other sectors. Similarly, unit changes to water output typically 
produced large effects, so this sector, which had to be excluded from the FUND case study, could 
also be a significant driver of inequality. 
The Alaskan case study found that changes to infrastructure, fisheries and especially oil are most 
likely to drive changes in inequality. Modelling unit changes to the different sectors, however, 
implied that fisheries and tourism could play larger roles than the Alaska case study suggested, as 
the magnitudes of impacts from tourism in this analysis were closer to those from other sectors than 
was observed in the case study, and fisheries were even found to have the largest impact on two of 
the ratios. 
With regards to whether changes to sectors had a consistent effect on inequality across countries, a 
unit increase in expenditure on coastal defence, which decreased inequality, was the only sector 
where this was the case. Unit increases in all other sectors produced effects that varied by country. 
In addition, in some countries, increased energy expenditures started off negative but then became 
positive as time went on. Similarly, while FUND estimated positive agricultural impacts throughout 
the time period used for the FUND case study, had the model been run for longer, the benefits of 
CO2 fertilisation would have been cancelled out by growing negative impacts from climate change 
level effects. Energy and agriculture, thus, could produce different inequality effects in a country at 
different points in time.  
While the Alaska case study and the Mexican and Zambian results from the FUND case study 
demonstrated that the poor could do least well out of climate change, the results from Ethiopia and 
India in the FUND case study conversely showed that it is also plausible that the poor could benefit 
most from a warmer world. Meanwhile in Egypt, a clear pattern was not discernible. The results 
from this thesis, thus, do not support a simple narrative, such as ‘climate change will always hit the 
poor the hardest’.  
Meanwhile, no moderate or strong correlation could be found between 2017 GDP per capita, in 
USD, in the seven countries, and the changes in inequality ratios arising from unit exogenous 
increases in the different sectors. In contrast, the correlations between the effects on inequality 
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ratios of unit exogenous increases of each given sector, and starting levels of inequality were 
frequently high. 
These results suggest that more unequal countries could generally experience greater changes in 
inequality ratios than their more equal counterparts. The results from the FUND case study, 
however, demonstrated that correlations between impacts from unit exogenous increases in the 
different sectors, and starting levels of inequality, played only a very small role. The correlations, or 
lack thereof, between the scale of exogenous impacts and starting levels of inequality were far more 
influential. 
In the FUND case study, there typically weren’t correlations between exogenous changes to sectors 
and starting levels of average income and inequality, so, with the exception of expenditure on 
repairing storm damages, no convincing correlation was found between the maximum changes in 
inequality ratios in the FUND case study and starting income and inequality. Changes in inequality 
from increased expenditure on repairing storm damages generally, but not always, displayed strong 
positive correlations. 
The largest cumulative impact132 observed in the FUND case study, as a percentage of most recent 
YoY income growth, was only 294%. While costs of over 14 times the most recent year’s exogenous 
YoY growth were generated for Alaska from infrastructure, these cumulative effects occurred in 
2099. As one is comparing cumulative impacts with YoY growth, such loses would be more than 
compensated for by many previous decades of growth. The results of this thesis thus do not support 
the suggestion in Dennig et al. (2015) and Rozenberg and Hallegatte (2015) that climate change may 
disrupt the notion that ‘growth is good for the poor’. 
The cumulative changes in inequality ratios in the FUND case study appear small, as no ratio 
changed from its baseline by more than 2.33%. Moreover, in all countries except Vietnam, which 
saw the largest proportional impacts, the maximum magnitudes of changes in inequality ratios did 
not exceed 6% of the historical standard deviations. Thus, even over eighty-years, let alone a shorter 
time-scale, FUND-estimated impacts on income inequality, for nearly all countries, typically looked 
fairly small compared to recent changes in inequality that were unrelated to climate change.  
 
132 All FUND-estimated total impacts were positive across all countries and scenarios, primarily due to sizable 
projected agricultural benefits from carbon dioxide (CO2) fertilisation and the level of climate change. It was, 
however, still interesting to explore the scale of the estimates, by comparing the magnitudes of the impacts 




For Vietnam, the maximum cumulative change in inequality ratio was equivalent to approximately 
two fifth of the standard deviation of inequality ratios since 1992. This sounds reasonably large; 
however, inequality ratios in Vietnam have historically been low variance. So even the Vietnamese 
results did not correspond to a sizable change in inequality. 
Changes to inequality ratios in the Alaska case study were often larger, and indicated that the H/L 
ratio could potentially increase by 16.55%. This sounds sizable; however, this could not be verified, 
as historical standard deviations of inequality ratios for the appropriate household groupings were 
not available. 
Meanwhile, by comparing results generated using the 2016 US SAM, which was used in the FUND 
case study, to those generated using the US 2003 SAM, 2010 SAM and 2016 edu-SAM, this chapter 
also explored the sensitivity of results to uncertainty surrounding economic structures.  
While many key features of results were preserved when using the US 2013, 2010 and 2016 SAMs, 
including which sectors were primarily responsible for inequality impacts, and similar ranges and 
progressions of absolute and percentage impacts, albeit with some notable differences at any given 
instance in time, the sensitivity analysis demonstrated that changes to US economic structure over 
even this short period of time could reverse the relationship that agriculture and, in particular, 
energy had on some measures of inequality. As agriculture and energy were the two sectors most 
responsible for inequality impacts, these changes were important.        
While differences between results generated using the two 2016 US SAMs did exist, for example, 
whether proportional impacts were greater for the third or fourth income quintiles, such differences 
were small in comparison to those observed when using American SAMs from different time 
periods. Nevertheless, they were sufficient to reverse the relationship between the energy sector 
and two inequality ratios. Thus, while industry-by-industry disaggregated factor accounts were not 
necessary to observed differing inequality effects from growth in different sectors, the aggregated 
nature of labour accounts distinguished solely by educational level lost sufficient information to 








Chapter 9 – Conclusion 
This chapter reviews the thesis’ conclusions and contributions, demonstrates how the thesis has met 
its stated goals, and reflects on the limitations of the project. Section 9.1 summarises the thesis’ 
motivation, goals and conclusions. Section 9.2 explores the thesis’ limitations, while Section 9.3 
reflects on other contributions made and implications for future research. 
9.1 Thesis motivation, goals and conclusions 
Coupled economic-environmental models have typically been used to estimate impacts of climate 
change on gross domestic product (GDP) or production of a specific commodity. Where inequality 
was considered, studies generally focused on exploring how impacts may differ across regions or 
time. Intra-regional inequality, particularly within-country inequality, is generally not studied, and, 
where it has been, hypothetical income and impacts distributions were frequently used. Many 
studies from other disciplines, however, suggest that climate change is unlikely to equally impact 
different income groups.  
While the relationship between inequality and growth is currently unclear, they could plausibly 
interact. Beyond purely economic dynamics, inequality could also cause political instability, 
regulatory capture, increased crime, and moral concerns. Behavioural studies moreover indicate that 
relative income is a key factor in wellbeing. Finally, if climate change were to cause the poor’s 
incomes to fall while average incomes still rise, this could sever the link between GDP growth and 
poverty reduction. So, ending poverty, reducing inequality, and taking action against climate change, 
three of the United Nation’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), could be interlinked tasks. 
This thesis did not attempt to comprehensively answer all questions surrounding climate change and 
within-country income inequality, or even to definitively answer the six research questions that 
formed the focus of this thesis. Its goal was to probe an area that had hitherto been neglected, to 
better understand why this area had not been properly addressed to date, to put forward a 
methodology to facilitate studies into within-country income inequality and climate change, and to 
generate results for a range of scenarios, so beginning exploration into this highly complex and 
uncertain problem. 
A methodology was proposed that extends coupled economic-environmental models so that, in 
addition to estimating impacts on GDP or production, they can also estimate impacts on within-
country income inequality. The methodology was piloted for two case studies, one for each of the 
two identified types of coupled economic-environmental models, that is, impact studies and 
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Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs). These two case studies illustrated how the proposed 
methodology is applied, and were also used to address six research questions. These questions were 
chosen to explore key areas of interest identified in the literature review. Firstly, the hypothesis that 
inequality effects from climate change may vary depending on which sector is driving the changes, 
and that the relationship between growth in a sector and inequality may vary across countries. 
Secondly, if certain household groups appear particularly vulnerable to climate change. Thirdly, if 
wealthier or more equal countries are less vulnerable to climate change inequality effects, and 
finally, if the induced changes to inequality are relatively large or small. 
To review the conclusions drawn from the case studies, let us revisit each research question in turn. 
9.1.1 Climate change induced changes to which sectors seem likely to have the greatest 
effect on within-country income inequality? 
The Climate Framework for Uncertainty, Negotiation and Distribution (FUND) case study indicated 
that impacts to agriculture and energy, particularly the former, are likely to have the largest impact 
on inequality. This was heavily influenced, however, by FUND predicting that these sectors 
experienced the largest exogenous changes, as the unit change analysis indicated that impacts on 
coastal defence and storm repair expenditures frequently produced similarly sized or even larger 
effects. Similarly, in the Alaska case study, impacts on infrastructure spending, fisheries and 
especially oil were responsible for the largest changes in inequality. The unit change analysis, 
however, indicated that impacts on fisheries and tourism could play a more important role that the 
case study indicated. Thus, once again, relative sizes of exogenous changes across sectors, as 
estimated by the impact studies, were primarily responsible for which sectors predominantly drove 
changes in inequality.  
9.1.2 Do impacts to certain sectors consistently increase within-country income 
inequality across different economies? Or do impacts in some countries reduce 
inequality and in other countries increase inequality? 
Changed expenditure on coastal defence was the only sector that had a consistent effect on 
inequality ratios across all countries, which was to decrease inequality. Unit increases in all other 
sectors increased inequality ratios in some countries yet decreased them in others. Generally, a unit 
increase in a sector changed all inequality ratios in a country in the same direction. In addition, as 
agricultural and energy sectors could potentially initially benefit from global warming, before 
impacts turn negative at higher temperature levels, effects on inequality from changes to these 
sectors could act in opposite directions at different points in time.  
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9.1.3 Do certain household groups seem particularly vulnerable across economies?  
This thesis did not find evidence to support a simple narrative, such as ‘climate change will always hit 
the poor the hardest’. While results for some countries demonstrated that the poor could do least 
well out of climate change, results for others suggested the converse. Moreover, cases were found 
where the skew of proportional impacts across household groups varied with time and, in one 
instance, no general pattern was discernible.  
9.1.4 Is there evidence to support the conclusion in Rozenberg and Hallegatte (2015) 
that starting levels of average income and within-country income inequality may affect 
the extent that climate change impacts on inequality? 
Results indicated that the frequently high and always low correlations between impacts from unit 
exogenous increases in the different sectors and, respectively, starting inequality and average 
income, played only very small roles in determining whether more wealthy or unequal countries 
experienced greater changes in inequality from climate change. The correlations, or lack thereof, 
between the scale of exogenous impacts and starting levels of inequality and average income were 
far more influential. In the FUND case study, these latter correlations were typically weak, so, with 
the exception of exogenous changes in expenditure on repairing storm damages, no convincing 
correlations were found between the maximum changes in inequality ratios and starting inequality 
or average income. Changes in inequality from increased expenditure on repairing storm damages 
generally, but not always, displayed strong positive correlations with starting inequality and average 
income.   
9.1.5 Are within-country income inequality effects relatively small in many or all 
scenarios compared to projected growth in average incomes? Alternatively, is it possible, 
as suggested by Dennig et al. (2015) and Rozenberg and Hallegatte (2015), that increased 
inequality from climate change might cancel out improvements in overall standards of 
living from GDP growth for low-income households? 
The largest cumulative impacts133 observed in the FUND and Alaskan case studies amounted, 
respectively, to approximately 3 and 14 years of exogenous year-on-year (YoY) growth. As one is 
comparing cumulative impacts with YoY growth, this suggests that the cumulative impacts of climate 
 
133 All FUND-estimated total impacts were positive across all countries and scenarios, primarily due to sizable 
projected agricultural benefits from carbon dioxide (CO2) fertilisation and the level of climate change. It was, 
however, still interesting to explore the scale of the estimates, by comparing the magnitudes of the impacts 
generated by FUND with YoY growth. 
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change on household incomes are unlikely to significantly diminish the benefits of cumulative 
exogenous growth in incomes.    
9.1.6 Is it only in the most extreme climate damage scenarios and time frames that 
relatively sizable within-country income inequality effects emerge? Or are they plausible 
in shorter-term, moderate scenarios? 
The cumulative changes in inequality ratios appeared small in the FUND case study, as no ratio 
changed from its baseline by more than 2.33%. Moreover, in all countries except Vietnam, which 
saw the largest proportional impacts, the maximum magnitudes of changes in inequality ratios did 
not exceed 6% of the historical standard deviations. Thus, even over eighty-years, let alone a shorter 
time-scale, FUND-estimated impacts on income inequality, for nearly all countries, typically looked 
fairly small compared to recent changes in inequality that were unrelated to climate change.  
For Vietnam, the maximum cumulative change in inequality ratio was equivalent to approximately 
two fifths of the standard deviation of the relevant inequality ratio since 1992. This sounds 
reasonably large; however, inequality ratios in Vietnam have historically been low variance. Thus, 
even the Vietnamese results did not correspond to a sizable change in inequality.  
Changes to inequality ratios in the Alaska case study were often much larger, and indicated that one 
ratio could potentially increase by 16.55%. This sounds sizable; however, this could not be verified, 
as historical standard deviations of inequality ratios for the appropriate household groupings were 
not available.  
9.2 Thesis limitations 
There are many limitations to this thesis. Firstly, FUND assumes that economic growth from one year 
to the next was exogenous, i.e. not affected by climate change, and this assumption was also made 
in the Alaska case study. In reality, it is likely that capital could be damaged by climate change 
impacts, or that investment suffers due to increased resources being directed towards repairs. Dell 
et al. (2012), for example, did a panel regression on historical data, and found that, in lower-income 
countries, a 1oC increase in temperature reduced the annual growth rate, on average, by 1.3 
percentage points. Thus, exogenous rather than endogenous growth may be the biggest limitation of 
this thesis as, like with compound interest, small changes in the short-run can have large impacts in 
the long-run. 
It is plausible the endogenous growth could significantly alter results and so, in turn, conclusions. 
Specifically, it could increase climate change induced income inequality, and reduce YoY growth 
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rates, so increasing annual impacts as a percentage of YoY growth. The latter could prompt a re-
evaluation of whether climate change could cancel out improvements in standards of living for some 
or all household groups, for example, by severing the relationship between rising average incomes 
and increased incomes for the poor. In addition, if, say, poorer or more unequal countries appear to 
experience greater impacts to growth rates than their wealthier or more equal counterparts, then 
this could change whether starting levels of average income and within-country income inequality 
affect the extent that climate change impacts on inequality. Exploring how climate change may alter 
rates of growth is, thus, a crucial next step to better understand the impact of climate change on 
economic inequality, or, for that matter, GDP. 
Results are, of course, only as good as the assumptions that underpin them. In addition to the 
general criticisms levied at IAMs, which were detailed in Chapter 3, it is important to emphasise that 
there are issues specifically surrounding FUND. Firstly, as mentioned earlier, total impacts in the 
FUND case study were positive in all countries and scenarios throughout the time period, primarily 
down to sizable projected agricultural benefits from carbon dioxide (CO2) fertilisation and the level 
of climate change; although agricultural benefits diminish but don’t turn negative by the end of the 
time period.  
As highlighted in Chapter 6, there are concerns around FUND’s estimated impacts of CO2 fertilisation 
on agricultural yields, as the impact function relies on studies published between 1992 and 1996. 
More recent studies on this topic typically estimate more moderate benefits from CO2 fertilisation. 
This is because early experiments took place in enclosed greenhouses, rather than in the open air 
using technological innovations, such as free-air concentration enrichment (FACE) technology (Long 
et al., 2006). Long et al. (2006), for example, suggests that benefits from CO2 enrichment could be 
50% lower than earlier estimates. 
Other studies raise doubts about FUND’s level of climate change agricultural impact function. 
Schlenker and Roberts (2009), for example, indicates that once the optimal temperature has been 
past, benefits should fall away and turn to costs at a much faster rate than the quadratic function 
specified in FUND. Schlenker and Roberts (2009) also casts doubt on the degree of agricultural 
adaptation to climate change assumed in FUND. Finally, FUND’s conclusion that climate impacts on 
agriculture were positive throughout the period for all countries in the study, despite the optimal 
regional temperature above preindustrial times being exceeded in all regions and scenarios by 2100, 
is contrary to observations that climate change is already having a negative impact on global 
agricultural production (Lobell et al., 2011).  
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As seen in Chapter 8, agricultural impacts were typically larger than those from other sectors, so the 
agricultural impact functions had a strong influence on overall results. With more moderate benefits 
from CO2 fertilisation, level-related costs emerging rapidly after the optimal temperature is 
exceeded, and less optimistic adaptation assumptions, FUND could project agricultural costs rather 
than benefits, and total impacts netted across all sectors could turn negative. 
One should, however, note that Chapter 6’s comparison of the sizes of FUND’s estimated reduced 
water utilities outputs to baseline water utilities outputs, suggested that FUND’s estimates for this 
sector were too large. This was why water was excluded from the FUND case study. Thus, in this 
regard, FUND’s estimates may be overly pessimistic. 
Nevertheless, FUND is, in general, more optimistic about the economic impacts of climate change 
than other prominent IAMs, such as the Dynamic Integrated Climate-Economy (DICE) model. For 
example, FUND doesn’t model climate ‘tipping points’, such as the Greenland ice sheet melting, 
where a threshold is breached that leads to catastrophic climate change. In contrast, such impacts 
are responsible for around 25% of the estimated social cost of carbon (SCC) in Policy Analysis of the 
Greenhouse Effect (PAGE) (Hope, 2013). In a clear indication of FUND’s overall optimism, FUND 
produces much lower SCC estimates, for a given discount rate, than the other two IAMs. For 
example, as seen in Table 3.1 in Chapter 3, assuming a 5% discount rate, the SCCs estimated by 
PAGE, DICE and FUND are respectively 23, 12 and 3 USD per tonne of carbon. The positive total 
impacts estimated in the FUND case study are, thus, controversial, and many researchers would 
argue that net effects would be negative by 2100, and possibly already are so. 
Many researchers would also query the optimism in the Alaskan impact studies. As discussed in 
Chapter 7, there is great uncertainty around how climate change may affect certain Alaskan sectors. 
For example, many undiscovered oil reserves could lie under the arctic ocean and become accessible 
due to melting sea ice. On the other hand, extraction costs are anticipated to be high due to difficult 
weather, including possibly more intense Arctic cyclones, the inherent challenges of offshore 
extraction, and the remoteness of sites, with their accompanying lack of existing infrastructure. As 
such, it is unclear whether exploiting such assets will be financially viable. Similarly, as a result of 
reduced sea-ice, Arctic oceans may absorb more CO2, and thus become more acidic, which could 
undermine calcifying species, such as pteropods, mussels, and clams. Changing ocean temperatures 
could also lead to fish migrating from lower latitudes to higher latitudes, with invasive species 
possibly disrupting existing species. On the other hand, warmer Arctic oceans and reduced sea ice 
might boost primary production through photosynthesising phytoplankton, which, in turn, could 
increase Arctic fish stocks. Thus, while the studies used in the Alaska case study explored scenarios 
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where the fisheries and oil sectors enjoyed large benefits, one should remember that such 
assumptions are controversial and could be overly optimistic. 
Exogenous changes to sectors in both case studies could, thus, plausibly differ from those modelled, 
and, quite possibly, be more negative. The analysis in Section 8.1.1 of Chapter 8 is particularly useful 
in this light, as it explored, for all seven countries plus Alaska, the effects on inequality ratios of a 
unit exogenous increase in each sector. The effects from these unit changes are independent of any 
models or studies subsequently used to estimate by how many units a sector is exogenously 
changed. As such, if one had greater confidence in exogenous changes estimated by another IAM or 
set of impact studies, the results from the unit change analysis could be used, in combination with 
the exogenous changes estimated by the alternative models, to quickly generate revised inequality 
impacts. 
Data availability also introduced limitations. Firstly, this thesis was unable to explore exogenous 
changes to all sectors that could be impacted by climate change. For example, FUND’s forestry 
impact estimates could not be included in the analysis, as FUND’s output for this sector estimated 
changes to producer and consumer surpluses, which could not be used as an input in input-output 
analysis (IOA). As another example, an economic impact study could not be found for Alaskan 
agriculture. Agriculture is currently a relatively small part of the Alaskan economy, but it could grow 
in importance as Alaska warms. Thus, while impacts to the main sectors likely to be affected by 
climate change were explored, this thesis does not claim to have comprehensively studied the 
impacts of climate change on income inequalities. It is instead an early attempt at the subject. 
Moreover, when impact studies for other sectors become available, the methodology outlined in 
Chapter 5 could be used to explore the impacts of these exogenous changes. 
Data also restricted the number of countries that could be studied. In particular, relatively few high 
and upper-middle income countries were included, and the countries included had Gini coefficients 
that spanned only 63% of the range of all countries’ Gini coefficients. Exploring impacts on additional 
countries, particularly wealthier countries and those at the two extremes of the inequality spectrum, 
would help further illuminate if starting levels of average income and within-country income 
inequality may affect the extent that climate change impacts on inequality. Similarly, only six of 
FUND’s 16 regions featured in the FUND case study. As discussed in Chapter 6, some regions were 
estimated to experience far larger relative exogenous impacts to sectors than in other regions. It 
would therefore be useful to include countries from other FUND regions, for example, a European 
region. 
The final key data limitation was that a time series of historical income inequality ratios could not be 
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found for the household income groups used in the Alaska case study. This meant that the Alaskan 
results could not be analysed in the discussion exploring whether the inequality impacts generated 
by climate change were comparable in magnitude to fluctuations in inequality in recent memory. 
This was disappointing, as the Alaskan case study indicated than an inequality ratio could increase by 
16.55%, so it is plausible that this large proportional impact could have been comparable in 
magnitude to, or even possibly exceeded, historical fluctuations. 
IOA’s key assumption, that technical coefficients are constant, was another limitation, as this was a 
crude approximation that did not allow economies to adapt to mitigate the effects of exogenous 
changes. The empirical stability analysis in Chapter 5, however, demonstrated that it is workable in 
practice, if not in theory, over the short to medium-term, and thus can be used to generate plausible 
scenarios of economic responses to climate change impacts in a given year. 
The empirical stability analysis in Chapter 5 also showed that social accounting matrices (SAMs) 
change significantly over the medium to long-term. Moreover, the sensitivity analysis in Chapter 8 
found that while many key features of results were preserved when using the US 2013, 2010 and 
2016 SAMs, including which sectors were primarily responsible for inequality impacts, and similar 
ranges and progressions of absolute and percentage impacts, changes to US economic structure 
over even this short period of time could reverse the relationship that agriculture and, in particular, 
energy had on some measures of inequality. As agriculture and energy were the two sectors most 
responsible for inequality impacts, these changes were not immaterial. In short, economies in, say, 
2100, are unlikely to share many characteristics with the SAMs used in the FUND case study. While 
this was undoubtably a shortcoming, it was mitigated by taking a scenario approach to uncertainty. 
All results were interpreted as plausible scenarios, not predictions. Moreover, results were not 
viewed as vulnerability analyses for specific countries. They were instead considered collectively to 
see if general patterns emerged and to explore the range of results. 
The sensitivity analysis in Chapter 8 also revealed that using the American 2016-edu SAM, instead of 
the 2016 SAM, reversed the relationship between the energy sector and two inequality ratios. Thus, 
while industry-by-industry disaggregated factor accounts were not necessary to observe differing 
inequality effects from growth in different sectors, the aggregated nature of labour accounts 
distinguished solely by educational level lost sufficient information to produce different inequality 
results for a key sector. The US SAM, which was built from scratch, and the Alaska SAM, which had 
its labour accounts disaggregated in this thesis, were the only SAMs used in the case studies with 
labour accounts disaggregated by industry. Labour accounts in the other SAMs were disaggregated, 
for example, by educational level, ethnicity, rural or urban location, or region. It is thus possible that 
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results generated using non-US SAMs could suffer from aggregation bias, a common problem in IOA. 
Consequently, it would be useful to repeat the analysis performed in this thesis using SAMs with 
alternatively disaggregated labour accounts. 
Beyond aggregation bias and assuming fixed technical coefficients, further limitations stem from the 
use of IOA. Firstly, as explained in Chapter 3, IOA is a demand-driven model, so supply-side effects 
were overlooked in this thesis. Similarly, effects on wealth could not be modelled, as IOA models 
flows not stocks. Meanwhile, modelling changes in energy consumption would have required 
changing business activities’ and household’s technical coefficients. The latter is not possible in IOA, 
so changes in energy expenditure were instead modelled as changes in investment in electricity. A 
consequence of this was that other budget constraints134, that is, financing increased expenditure on 
construction or energy through changes in borrowing or savings, could not be modelled, as this 
would have required an endogenous capital-savings account. This was not possible, as IOA needed 
this account to be a component of final demand, so that impacts of changes in energy investment 
could be estimated. 
The SAMs used also had limitations, including that one cannot explore inequality within household 
groups, or model skewed impacts within economic sectors, for example, the distribution of a 
national reduction in agricultural yields being borne predominantly by poorer farmers. In addition, 
non-market activities, such as subsistence farming, were not included in the SAMs135, and SAMs 
were based on survey data, which always have shortcomings, such as poor participation at the very 
upper and lower ends of the income distribution. 
All these limitations emphasise that this thesis has not definitively answered all questions 
surrounding climate change and inequality, or even the research questions that formed the focus of 
this thesis. It has begun exploration into this complex subject, but clearly there is further work to be 
done. 
9.3  Other contributions and implications for further research 
Inequality effects appear to be small, as cumulative impacts never amounted to more than 14 times 
the most recent YoY growth, and frequently were equivalent to less than one year of YoY growth. In 
addition, the maximum change to an inequality ratio observed in the FUND case study was 
 
134 Only one type of budget constraint was explored in this thesis for increases in expenditure on construction 
and energy. Specifically, expenditures on other goods and services were changed, in proportion to existing 
spending on those goods and services, so that total expenditure remained constant. 
135 Attempts are sometimes made to value non-market activities to include them in SAMs, but this did not 
occur in the SAMs used in this thesis. 
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approximately two fifths of the given ratio’s low historical standard deviation. From these findings, 
one might conclude that the impacts from climate change on income inequality were too small to 
merit increased model complexity and researchers’ time, and that future studies should concentrate 
on exploring other aspects of the economic consequences of climate change. There are, however, 
three crucial caveats to this conclusion.  
Firstly, historical ratio data was not available for Alaska, so one could not compare the ratio changes 
in this case study with historical variation. This was a significant shortcoming, as the Alaskan case 
study indicated a maximum ratio change that was over seven times larger than the maximum ratio 
change observed in the FUND case study. 
Secondly, FUND’s estimated exogenous sector changes could be substantially smaller than those 
indicated by other studies, as FUND is generally relatively optimistic about the impacts of climate 
change. For example, its estimated SCC is over seven times lower than PAGE’s estimate. 
Finally, YoY growth rates in both case studies were exogenous and so not impacted by climate 
change. Studies indicate that, in reality, this is unlikely to be the case. Moreover, small changes in 
YoY growth rates could have a large impact over time. Endogenous growth thus has the potential to 
increase the magnitude of cumulative climate change impacts and decrease the YoY growth rate, so 
impacting on both inequality ratio changes and cumulative impacts on households as percentages of 
YoY growth. 
As explored in Chapter 2, the implications of sizable changes in inequality could be widespread, 
including via potentially affecting growth, political stability, corruption, crime, or even severing the 
link between rising average income and poverty reduction. High levels of inequality could also pose 
moral concerns. As such, and in light of the three caveats listed above, this thesis does not suggest 
that researchers should not further study the impact of climate change on inequality. The analysis 
does, however, reveal that a key bottleneck, exogenous growth, must be addressed to enable 
further progress. Helpfully, endogenous economic growth has received research focus in recent 
years; such as in Burke et al. (2015) and Dell et al. (2012). Attempts at incorporating endogenous 
growth into IAMs have, however, generally not been empirically founded; for example, Fankhauser 
and Tol, (2005). Thus, if results from studies such as Burke et al. (2015) were to be integrated into 
IAMs, this would be an important addition to the field that would enable a fuller exploration of the 
impacts of climate change on inequality, and indeed GDP. 
In addition, it is advisable that IAM impact functions are urgently updated to reflect the most up-to-
date knowledge. As discussed in Chapter 3, all IAMs, not just FUND, are criticised for having impact 
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functions based on studies conducted sometimes decades ago. As highlighted in Chapter 8, such 
studies are often more optimistic than more recent research. 
This thesis has identified many challenges in studying the impact of climate change on income 
inequality, including uncertainty around future economic structures and having to introduce some 
crude assumptions, such as, fixed technical coefficients. This thesis, nevertheless, has also 
demonstrated that such challenges can be managed by taking a scenario approach to uncertainty, 
and understanding that results should not be interpreted as predictions for any given country, but 
rather that results from many countries should be considered collectively to identify any general 
patterns and explore the range of effects.        
In addition to suggesting that the impact of climate change on income inequality is a fruitful topic for 
further research, a further contribution from this thesis is the coupling methodology. This could be 
used in combination with other coupled economic-environmental models, including ones that do not 
study the economic impacts of climate change, to explore inequality effects from a wide range of 
environmental economic problems. Furthermore, when further research has been done into the 
impact of climate change on growth, the case studies from this thesis could be rerun using 
endogenous growth rates. The methodology could once again be deployed when SAMs for other 
countries or impact studies for other sectors become available. 
As suggested in Chapter 8, the inequality impacts from a unit exogenous change in each sector could 
be used in combination with any study estimating exogenous changes for those sectors, to quickly 
generate inequality impacts. This is because IOA is a linear model, and the effects from these unit 
changes are independent of studies estimating by how many units a sector is exogenously changed. 
The results from the unit change analysis are particularly useful, in this light, given that the impact 
studies used in the two case studies were generally relatively optimistic in comparison to the rest of 
the literature. The unit change analysis results could easily be used with estimates from more 
pessimistic studies. 
The breakdown of impacts into direct and indirect effects was an additional contribution. It 
illustrated the importance of taking a macroeconomic approach and considering how sectors impact 
on one another, rather than modelling each sector individually and then summing the results, as was 
done in Rozenberg and Hallegatte (2015) or indeed FUND itself. As one can see in Appendix H, while 
some impacts were nearly entirely composed of direct effects, for others, indirect effects were far 
greater. Thus, in many cases, taking a microeconomic approach and then summing the results, as is 
frequently done in the literature, would produce a very incomplete picture. 
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As discussed in Chapter 2, the few papers that incorporated within-region inequality into IAM 
estimates of the SCC used hypothetical damage incidences across income groups. Revised estimates 
of the SCC were not calculated in this project, as conclusions with quantified uncertainties were 
deemed inappropriate given the deep uncertainties present. However, for those researchers who 
wish to focus on the SCC, this thesis can provide a more informed alternative to hypothetical skews 
of impacts across household groups. 
The US SAM time-series and the adapted Alaskan SAM can also be used by other researchers. The 
time-series is particularly useful, given that so few SAM time-series currently exist. Furthermore, the 
stability analysis in Chapter 5, that empirically tested IOA assumptions and predictions, and explored 
the extent that key economic characteristics were preserved across time, is valuable because 
previous work in this area used input-output table time-series, which map only a small subset of an 
economy.  
This thesis also provides evidence refuting the conjecture in Pieters (2010) that industry-by-industry 
disaggregated factor accounts are necessary to observe differing inequality effects from growth in 
different sectors. However, the aggregated nature of labour accounts distinguished solely by 
educational level did lose sufficient information to produce different inequality results for a key 
sector. This thesis has thus identified a key source of aggregation bias that is highly relevant for IOA, 
as most SAMs with disaggregated labour accounts are typically disaggregated at a high level, such as 
by education, rather than by industry. 
Finally, the Alaskan case study was the first macroeconomic study of the impacts of climate change 
on an arctic region. As discussed in Chapters 3 and 7, the Arctic is of particular interest in the climate 
change literature, as changes are expected to be greater towards the poles than elsewhere in the 
world. 
9.4 Summary 
This thesis aimed to probe the impact of climate change on within-country income inequality, an 
area that had hitherto been neglected, to better understand why this area had not been properly 
addressed to date, to put forward a methodology to facilitate studies into within-country income 
inequality and climate change, and to generate results for a range of scenarios, so beginning 
exploration into this highly complex and uncertain problem.  
Chapter 2 presented a history of economists’ evolving attitudes towards income inequality as an 
economic question, which was used to help understand why this research area is frequently 
overlooked. Chapter 5 put forward a coupling methodology that enables effects on income 
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inequality to be modelled by coupled economic-environmental models. Meanwhile, Chapters 6 and 
7 piloted the coupling methodology to generate results for a range of scenarios in two case studies. 
These scenarios were then analysed in Chapter 8 to explore key areas of interest that were identified 
in the literature review. The thesis has thus met its goals. 
There are, of course, limitations to the work. Firstly, YoY growth was exogenous, that is, not 
impacted by climate change. Secondly, the IAM and impact studies used to estimate exogenous 
changes to sectors in the case studies were at the optimistic end of the relevant literature. Data 
availability also introduced limitations, for example, on the number of sectors and number of 
countries that could be included in the study, especially wealthier countries and those at the 
extremes of the inequality spectrum. Using IOA meant assuming constant technical coefficients, 
which are a crude approximation; although, empirical analysis indicated that the assumption works 
in the short or medium-term in practice, albeit not in theory. IOA also resulted in the methodology 
being demand-side only; supply-side effects could not be studied. Similarly, impacts of climate 
change on wealth could not be considered, and using IOA placed limitations on the budget 
constraints that could be modelled. Finally, the SAMs themselves restricted the thesis, by not 
enabling exploration of within household group inequality, skewed impacts within an economic 
sector, or impacts on subsistence farming. They may also suffer from aggregation bias, as labour 
accounts were often not disaggregated by industry. Many of these shortcomings, however, reflect 
that this thesis has not definitively answered all questions surrounding climate change and 
inequality, or even the research questions that formed the focus of this thesis. It has begun 
exploration into this complex subject, but clearly there is further work to be done. 
Unsurprisingly, this thesis revealed a complex picture that did not support any simple narrative, such 
as “climate change is likely to hurt the poor the most”. While scenarios emerged where this was 
indeed the result, others could be found where the opposite was true, and many presented a more 
mixed picture. Similarly, while agriculture and energy, for example, were typically found to generate 
the largest inequality impacts in the FUND case study, there were exceptions, and only effects due to 
increased spending on coastal defence impacted on inequality in all countries in the same way. 
When examining unit changes to different sectors, those that had produced relatively small impacts 
in the case studies demonstrated the potential to generate sizable inequality impacts if the 
estimated exogenous changes applied were notably underestimated. Finally, for only one sector, 
expenditure on repairing storm damages, could any evidence be found to support the conjecture 
that there may be a correlation between starting inequality or average income and vulnerability to 
climate change induced income inequality. 
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Inequality effects appeared to be small, as cumulative impacts never amounted to more than 14 
times the most recent YoY growth, and frequently were equivalent to less than one year of YoY 
growth. In addition, the maximum change to an inequality ratio observed in the FUND case study 
was approximately two fifths of the given ratio’s low historical standard deviation. However, 
historical ratio data was not available for Alaska, so one could not compare the much larger ratio 
changes in this case study with historical variation. The IAM and impact studies used in the case 
studies were also generally more optimistic about the impacts of climate change than a lot of the 
literature, and YoY growth rates in both case studies were exogenous, which is likely unrealistic. As 
such, this thesis does not advise that researchers should not further study the impact of climate 
change on inequality. However, incorporating endogenous growth and more up-to-date impact 
studies should be top research priorities when exploring the effects of climate change on inequality 


















Appendix A – Key characteristics of Special 
Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES) families 
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Notes: Table outlines the characteristics shared by each SRES family, A1, A2, B1 and B2, broken down by four key factors driving emissions: 
economic growth; population; globalisation; and adaptation of cleaner and more energy efficient technologies. Family A1 is further 
divided into three sub-families, A1F1, A1B and A1T, which reflect different percentages of zero-carbon energy in total energy usage. In 
A1F1, the world remains heavily dependent on fossil fuels, in A1T, energy is primarily zero-carbon, while in A1B, there is a balance 





Appendix B – Key differences between the five 
Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSP) 
narratives 
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Notes: Table outlines the differences between the five SSP narratives, SSP1, SSP2, SSP3, SSP4, and SSP5, in terms of population, economic 
growth, inequality, meeting development goals, global cooperation, achieving environmental sustainability, and resource and energy 





Appendix C – Challenges to adaptation and 
mitigation in the five Shared Socioeconomic 
Pathways (SSPs)  
 





Low challenges to 
mitigation 
High challenges to 
adaptation 




 SSP2  
Low challenges to 
adaptation 
SSP5  SSP1 
 
Notes: Table shows how the five SSPs, SSP1, SSP2, SSP3, SSP4, and SSP5, embody a range of low to high challenges to adaptation and 













Appendix D – Data sources for United States 
macro and micro social accounting matrices’ 
(SAMs) elements 
Table B.1 – Data forming macro-SAM elements 
SAM code Data source 
C1 Gross output, from Bureau of Economic Analysis’ (BEA’s) use table (BEA, 2018c) 
C2 Imports, from National Income and Product Accounts (NIPAs) (FED, 2018b) 
I1 Tcom – Hcur1 – Gcur1 – Inv - Sd – Cap1 – R1 
I2 Gross domestic income, from NIPAs 
F1 Compensation of employees, from NIPAs (BEA, 2018g) 
F2 Tfac – F1 – F3 – F4 
F3 Taxation on production and imports less subsidies, from NIPAs 
F4 Current payments to the rest of the world: income payments, from NIPAs 
Hcur1 Personal consumption expenditures, from NIPAs (BEA, 2018h) 
Hcur2 Interest payments from households to enterprises, estimated by the author as 
described in Chapter 4 
Hcur3 Personal current taxes + contributions for government social insurance, domestic + 
personal current transfer payments: to government, all from NIPAs, + interest 
payments from households to government, estimated by the author as described in 
Chapter 4 
Hcur4 Consumption of fixed capital: private: households and institutions + personal saving, 
both from NIPAs 
Hcur5 Current taxes and transfer payments to the rest of the world: from persons, from 
NIPAs 
Ecur1 Personal income receipts on assets: personal dividend income + personal current 
transfer receipts: other current transfer receipts, from business (net) + proprietors’ 
income with inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustments + rental 
income of persons with capital consumption adjustment + consumption of fixed 
capital: private: households and institutions, all from NIPAs, + interest payments 
from enterprises to households, estimated by the author as described in Chapter 4 
Ecur2 Federal government: tax receipts on corporate income + state and local 
government: tax receipts on corporate income + federal government current 
receipts: income receipts on assets: dividends + state and local government current 
receipts: income receipts on assets: dividends + business current transfer payments 
(net): payments to government (net) + current surplus of government enterprises + 
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consumption of fixed capital: government, all from NIPAs, + interest payments from 
enterprises to government, estimated by the author as described in Chapter 4 
Ecur3 Consumption of fixed capital: private: domestic business + corporate profits with 
inventory valuation adjustment (IVA) and capital consumption adjustment (CCAdj) – 
taxes on corporate income – net corporate dividend payments, all from NIPAs. 
Ecur4 Current taxes and transfer payments to the rest of the world from business (net), 
from NIPAs  
Gcur1 Government consumption expenditures, from NIPAs 
Gcur2 Personal current transfer receipts: government social benefits to persons, from 
NIPAs, + interest payments from government to households, estimated by the 
author as described in Chapter 4 
Gcur3 Interest payments from government to enterprises, estimated by the author as 
described in Chapter 4 
Gcur4 Net government saving + consumption of fixed capital: government, both from 
NIPAs  
Gcur5 Government current transfer payments: government social benefits: to the rest of 
the world + government current transfer payments: other current transfer 
payments to the rest of the world (net), both from NIPAs 
Inv Change in private inventories, from NIPAs 
Sd – gross domestic product (GDP); statistical discrepancy (calculated from 
components) (IMA), flow, from NIPAs 
Cap1 Gross domestic investment – change in private inventories, from NIPAs 
Cap2 Change in private inventories, from NIPAs 
Cap3 – gross domestic product (GDP); statistical discrepancy (calculated from 
components) (IMA), flow, from NIPAs 
Cap4 Capital account transactions (net): government + capital account transactions (net): 
private: domestic business + capital account transactions (net): private: households 
and institutions – rest of the world; net lending (+) or borrowing (-) (capital 
account), flow, all from NIPAs 
R1 Exports of goods and services, from NIPAs 
R2 Current receipts from the rest of the world: income receipts, from NIPAs 
R3 Current taxes, contributions for government social insurance, and transfer receipts 
from the rest of the world: to persons, from NIPAs 
R4 Current taxes, contributions for government social insurance, and transfer receipts 
from the rest of the world: to business, from NIPAs 
R5 Government current tax receipts: taxes from the rest of the world + contributions 
for government social insurance: rest-of-the-world contributions + government 
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current transfer receipts: from the rest of the world, from NIPAs 
Tcom Gross output, from use table + imports of goods and services, from NIPAs 
Tind Gross output, from use table 
Tfac Gross national income + current payments to the rest of the world: income 
payments, both from NIPAs (BEA, 2018i) 
Thcur Personal income + consumption of fixed capital: private: households and 
institutions + contributions for government social insurance, domestic + current 
taxes, contributions for government social insurance, and transfer receipts from the 
rest of the world: to persons, all from NIPAs (BEA, 2018j) 
Tecur National income + consumption of fixed capital + current taxes, contributions for 
government social insurance, and transfer receipts from the rest of the world: to 
business – national income: compensation of employees – taxation on production 
and imports less subsidies, all from NIPAs, + interest payments from households 
and government to enterprises, estimated by the author as described in Chapter 4 
Tgcur Government current receipts + consumption of fixed capital: government – gross 
domestic income: subsidies – government current expenditures: interest payments: 
to the rest of the world, all from NIPAs 
Tinv Change in private inventories, from NIPAs 
Tsd – gross domestic product (GDP); statistical discrepancy (calculated from 
components) (IMA), flow, from NIPAs 
Tcap Cap1 + Cap2 + Cap3 




Author’s estimates using personal income receipts on assets: personal interest 
income, government current expenditures: interest payments: to the rest of the 
world, current payments to the rest of the world: income payments on assets: 
interest, uses of private enterprise income: income payments on assets: interest 
and miscellaneous payments, net interest and miscellaneous payments on assets, 
government current expenditures: interest payments, all from NIPAs, Tgcur, F3, 
Hcur3, Ecur2, R5, and Financial accounts of the United States (FED, 2018d). 
Estimation procedure is described in Chapter 4. 
 
Notes: Table lists data sources and relevant calculations for each element in the US macro-SAMs. For brevity, the SAM elements are 










Table B.2 – Data sources used to estimate proportions for disaggregating macro-SAM elements for 
the micro-SAMs 
SAM code for element being 
disaggregated 
Data source 
C1 Flows from commodities to industries in BEA’s make 
table (BEA, 2018b) 
C2 Imports of goods and services by commodity from 
use table 
I1 Flows from industries to commodities from use 
table 
I2 Value added by industry from use table 
F1 Disaggregated across industries using compensation 
of employees by industry from use table. Then US 
Current Population Survey (CPS) (Census, 2018a) 
and household income quintile income limits from 
Census Bureau’s historical income tables (Census, 
2018b) were used to disaggregate each industry 
across household groups, as described in Chapter 4. 
Finally, RAS procedure used to reconcile totals for 
each household group with distribution of total 
wages and salaries per income quintile, as indicated 
by Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES). 
F2 Gross operating surplus by industry from use table 
(BEA, 2018c) 
F3 Taxes on production and imports less subsidies by 
industry from use table 
F4 Value added of majority-owned U.S. affiliates by 
industry of affiliate (BEA, 2018e) 
Hcur1 First disaggregated into personal consumption 
expenditures by commodity from use table (BEA, 
2018c). To disaggregate each commodity across 
household groups, used CES by expenditure 
category and household income quintile (BLS, 
2018b), in combination with the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics’ (BLS’) glossary to match SAM 
commodities to their equivalent CES expenditure 
categories (BLS, 2018c). Finally, RAS procedure used 
to reconcile consumption totals for each household 




Hcur2 Family holdings of debt by household percentile of 
income: any debt, from Survey of Consumer 
Finances (SCF) (Fed, 2018) 
Hcur3 While personal taxes component could use personal 
taxes by household income quintile from CES, no 
data could be found on distribution of loans taken 
out from the government across households groups, 
so this element was disaggregated in the 
proportions that would balance the SAM. 
Hcur4 Personal saving component used income after taxes 
– expenditures in CES. Consumption of fixed capital 
component used ‘housing: maintenance, repairs, 
insurance, other expenses’ category in CES. 
Hcur5 Money sent outside of the US: how much in total 
dollars given, from 2008 CPS 
immigration/emigration supplement (Census, 
2018a), and household income quintile income 
limits from Census Bureau’s historical income 
tables, as described in Chapter 4.    
Ecur1 Personal dividend income, personal current transfer 
receipts from business, proprietors’ income, rental 
income and interest receipts used sources of 
income and personal taxes: interest, dividends, 
rental income, other property income by household 
income quintile, from CES. Consumption of fixed 
capital component used ‘housing: maintenance, 
repairs, insurance, other expenses’ category in CES. 
Gcur1 Federal national defense: consumption 
expenditures by commodity + federal national 
nondefense: consumption expenditures by 
commodity + state and local: consumption 
expenditures by commodity, all from use table 
Gcur2 While interest payments could be disaggregated in 
proportions indicated by sources of income and 
personal taxes: interest, dividends, rental income, 
other property income by household income 
quintile from the CES, only data on the 
disaggregation of federal transfers could be found in 
the Congressional Budget Office’s (CBO’s) 
Distribution of Household Income and Federal Taxes 
(CBO, 2018). As data on state and local government 
transfers across household groups could not be 
found, this element was disaggregated in the 
proportions that would balance the SAM.  
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Inv Change in private inventories by commodity from 
use table 
Sd Residuals that balanced the micro-SAMs 
Cap1 Nonresidential private fixed investment in 
structures by commodity + nonresidential private 
fixed investment in equipment by commodity + 
nonresidential private fixed investment in 
intellectual property products by commodity + 
residential private fixed investment by commodity + 
federal national defense: gross investment in 
structures by commodity + federal national defense: 
gross investment in equipment by commodity + 
federal national defense: gross investment in 
intellectual property products by commodity + 
federal national nondefense: gross investment in 
structures by commodity + federal national 
nondefense: gross investment in equipment by 
commodity + federal national nondefense: gross 
investment in intellectual property products by 
commodity + state and local: gross investment in 
structures by commodity + state and local: gross 
investment in equipment by commodity + state and 
local: gross investment in intellectual property 
products by commodity, all from use table 
R1 Exports of goods and services by commodity from 
use table 
R2 U.S. direct investment abroad, all U.S. parent 
companies, value added (gross product): by industry 
of U.S. parent company (BEA, 2018d), and value 
added by industry from use table when a BEA NIACS 
category spans more than one SAM NIACS category, 
as described in Chapter 4 
R3 Money received from outside of the US: how many 
dollars received, from 2008 CPS 
immigration/emigration supplement, and 
household income quintile income limits from 
Census Bureau’s historical income tables, as 
described in Chapter 4. 
Tcom Total commodity output by commodity + imports of 
goods and services by commodity, both from use 
table 
Tind Total industry output by commodity from use table 
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Tfac F1 + F2 + F3 + F4 
Thcur Personal income component used share of 
aggregate income received by each fifth of 
households (Census, 2018c). Consumption of fixed 
capital component used ‘housing: maintenance, 
repairs, insurance, other expenses’ category in CES. 
Domestic government social insurance component 
used distribution of payroll taxes across income 
groups from the CBO’s Distribution of Household 
Income and Federal Taxes. Transfer receipts from 
the rest of the world was as per R3. 
 
Notes: Table lists data sources and relevant calculations used to establish the proportions by which each element in the 2003, 2010 and 
2016 US-macro SAMs was disaggregated to produce the 2003, 2010 and 2016 US micro-SAMs. As is usual with SAM compilation, the 
values of the macro-SAM elements were thus preserved, as one has greater confidence in national accounts data than other survey data. 




























Table B.3 – Data sources used to estimate proportions for alternatively disaggregating macro-SAM 
elements for the edu-SAM 
 
SAM code for element being 
disaggregated 
Data source 
I2 First disaggregated into payments to labour, capital 
and taxes less subsidies using compensation of 
employees, gross operating surplus and taxes on 
production and imports less subsidies proportions 
in use table. Then these were disaggregated by 
industry using proportions indicated in use table. 
Labour payments from each industry were further 
disaggregated by labour factors using CPS data, as 
described in Chapter 4. Finally, totals across each 
labour factor category were reconciled with CPS 
data on distribution of total earnings across labour 
categories using the RAS procedure. 
F1 Same as before, except amendments to use of CPS 
data and household income quintile income limits 
from Census Bureau’s historical income table, as 
described in Chapter 4. 
F4 Value added, net income and compensation of 
employees by majority-owned U.S. affiliates (BEA, 
2018k). Then CPS, as described in Chapter 4. 
R2 All U.S. parent companies: value added, net income 
and compensation of employees (BEA, 2018l). Then 
CPS, as described in Chapter 4. 
Notes: Table lists data sources and relevant calculations used to establish the proportions by which some elements in the 2016-edu US-
macro SAM were disaggregated to produce the 2016-edu US micro-SAM. All SAM elements not covered in this table, were disaggregated 
as described in Table B2. As is usual with SAM compilation, the values of the macro-SAM elements were preserved, as one has greater 
confidence in national accounts data than other survey data. For brevity, the SAM elements are referred to using codes. A diagram of how 










Appendix E – Balanced United States (US) macro-
social accounting matrices (SAMs) 


























































































































































 1  82
7 
























  1 -2
 


























































































Notes: Figure shows macro social accounting matrix (SAM) for the US in 2003. There are ten macro accounts: commodities, industries, 
factors, households, enterprises, government, inventories, capital account, rest-of-the-world (ROW) and statistical discrepancy. The SAM 
captures total monetary flows from column accounts to row accounts in 2003. For example, the industries account paid the commodities 
account $8,663,168 million in 2003. All amounts are expressed in 2003 USD. Totals are also shown for each account. An account’s column 
total is equal to its row total, as all spending and saving must be financed. Grey cells contain no monetary flows. 
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discrepancy     1






























































































Notes: Figure shows macro social accounting matrix (SAM) for the US in 2010. There are ten macro accounts: commodities, industries, 
factors, households, enterprises, government, inventories, capital account, rest-of-the-world (ROW) and statistical discrepancy. The SAM 
captures total monetary flows from column accounts to row accounts in 2010. For example, the industries account paid the commodities 
account $11,162,500 million in 2010. All amounts are expressed in 2010 USD. Totals are also shown for each account. An account’s column 
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Notes: Figure shows macro social accounting matrix (SAM) for the US in 2016. There are ten macro accounts: commodities, industries, 
factors, households, enterprises, government, inventories, capital account, rest-of-the-world (ROW) and statistical discrepancy. The SAM 
captures total monetary flows from column accounts to row accounts in 2016. For example, the industries account paid the commodities 
account $13,250,812 million in 2016. All amounts are expressed in 2016 USD. Totals are also shown for each account. An account’s column 
total is equal to its row total, as all spending and saving must be financed. Grey cells contain no monetary flows. 
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Appendix F – List of accounts in social accounting 
matrices (SAMs) 
The SAMs are listed in alphabetical order, i.e. Alaska, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, the United 
States (US), Vietnam and Zambia. SAM accounts are listed in alphabetical order within categories, 
specifically ‘activities’, ‘commodities’, ‘factors of production’, ‘institutions’ and ‘other’. Where a SAM 





services Information Professional services 
Agriculture Lodging Real Estate 
Air transportation Management services Refined petroleum 
Construction Mining services Repair services 
Eating and drinking Miscellaneous Seafood processing 
Educational services Oil and gas State /local government services 
Entertainment services Other food manufacturing Utilities 
Federal government services Other manufacturing Waste management 
Finance and insurance Other mining Water transportation 
Fish harvesting Other retail trade Wholesale trade 
Food stores Other services Wood products 




services Lodging Professional services 
Agriculture Management services Raw fish 
Air transportation Mining services Real Estate 
Construction Miscellaneous Refined petroleum 
Eating and drinking Oil and gas Repair services 
Educational services Other food manufacturing State /local government services 
Entertainment services Other manufacturing Utilities 
Federal government services Other mining Waste management 
Finance and insurance Other retail trade Water transportation 
Food stores Other services Wholesale trade 
Health services Other transportation Wood products 




Factors of production 
Capital Labour - Health services Labour - Other transportation 
Labour - Administration 
support services Labour - Information Labour - Professional services 
Labour - Agriculture Labour - Lodging Labour - Real Estate 
Labour - Air transportation Labour - Management services Labour - Refined petroleum 
Labour - Construction Labour - Mining services Labour - Repair services 
Labour - Eating and drinking Labour - Miscellaneous Labour - Seafood processing 
Labour - Educational services Labour - Oil and gas Labour - State /local government services 
Labour - Entertainment 
services 
Labour - Other food 
manufacturing Labour - Utilities 
Labour - Federal government 
services Labour - Other manufacturing Labour - Waste management 
Labour - Finance and insurance Labour - Other mining Labour - Water transportation 
Labour - Fish harvesting Labour - Other retail trade Labour - Wholesale trade 
Labour - Food stores Labour - Other services Labour - Wood products 
 
Institutions 
Federal government Low income households State and local governments 
High income households Medium income households  
 
Other 
Indirect taxes Rest-of-the-world (ROW) capital account 
Savings-investment account 
 











Accommodation & food 
services Finance and insurance Other services 
Agriculture Fishery and aquaculture Petroleum and products 
Beverages Grain milling, grain & other food products Public administration 
Business services Health and social work Real estate activities 
Chemicals Information & communication Textiles 
Clothing Leather and footwear Tobacco processing 
Construction Machinery and equipment Transportation and storage 
Crude oil and natural gas Meat, fish, fruits, vegetables, oils & fats Water 
Dairy Metals and metal products Wholesale and retail trade 
Education Non-metal minerals Wood and paper 
Electricity Other mining  
 
Commodities  
Accommodation & food 
services Finance and insurance Other services 
Agriculture Fishery and aquaculture Petroleum and products 
Beverages Grain milling, grain & other food products Public administration 
Business services Health and social work Real estate activities 
Chemicals Information & communication Textiles 
Clothing Leather and footwear Tobacco processing 
Construction Machinery and equipment Transaction, transportation costs 
Crude oil and natural gas Meat, fish, fruits, vegetables, oils & fats Transportation and storage 
Dairy Metals and metal products Water 
Education Non-metal minerals Wholesale and retail trade 
Electricity Other mining Wood and paper 
 
Factors of production 
Capital Semi-skilled labour Unskilled labour 






Enterprises Household expenditure decile 2 
Household expenditure decile 
6 
Government 
Household expenditure decile 
3 
Household expenditure decile 
7 
Household expenditure decile 
1 
Household expenditure decile 
4 
Household expenditure decile 
8 
Household expenditure decile 
10 
Household expenditure decile 
5 




Direct taxes Net sales taxes Savings/Investment 




















Accommodation and food 
services Fishing Other mining 
Agriculture Forestry Other services 
Animal feed Fruit and vegetable processing Paper products and publishing 
Beverages Grain milling Public administration 
Business services Health and social work Real estate activities 
Clothing Information and communication Sugar refining 
Construction Leather and footwear Textiles 
Dairy Machinery and other equipment Tobacco processing 
Education Meat processing Transportation and storage 
Electrical equipment Metals and metal products Vehicles and transport equipment 
Electricity, gas and steam Non-metal minerals Water supply and sewage 
Fats and oils Other chemicals Wholesale and retail trade 
Finance and insurance Other foods Wood products 
Fish and seafood processing Other manufacturing  
 
Commodities 
Accommodation and food 
services Fish and seafood processing Other mining 
Agriculture Fishing Other services 
Animal feed Forestry Paper products and publishing 
Beverages Fruit and vegetable processing Petroleum products 
Business services Grain milling Public administration 
Clothing Health and social work Real estate activities 
Coal and lignite Information and communication Sugar refining 
Construction Leather and footwear Textiles 
Dairy Machinery and other equipment Tobacco processing 
Education Meat processing Transportation and storage 
Electrical equipment Metals and metal products Vehicles and transport equipment 
Electricity, gas and steam Non-metal minerals Water supply and sewage 
Fats and oils Other chemicals Wholesale and retail trade 
Fertilizers and herbicides Other foods Wood products 
Finance and insurance Other manufacturing Other mining 
Accommodation and food 
services Fish and seafood processing Other services 
Agriculture Fishing Paper products and publishing 
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Animal feed Forestry Petroleum products 
Beverages Fruit and vegetable processing Public administration 
Business services Grain milling Real estate activities 
Clothing Health and social work Sugar refining 
Coal and lignite Information and communication Textiles 
Construction Leather and footwear Tobacco processing 
Dairy Machinery and other equipment Transportation and storage 
Education Meat processing Vehicles and transport equipment 
Electrical equipment Metals and metal products Water supply and sewage 
Electricity, gas and steam Non-metal minerals Wholesale and retail trade 
Fats and oils Other chemicals Wood products 
Fertilizers and herbicides Other foods  
Finance and insurance Other manufacturing  
 
Factors of production 
Capital - crops Labour - rural secondary Labour - urban tertiary 
Capital - livestock Labour - rural tertiary Labour - urban uneducated 
Capital - mining Labour - rural uneducated Land - agricultural crops  
Capital - other Labour - urban primary  
Labour - rural primary Labour - urban secondary  
 
Institutions 
Enterprises Household per capita expenditure quintile 2 
Household per capita 
expenditure quintile 5 
Government 
Household per capita 
expenditure quintile 3 
 
Household per capita 
expenditure quintile 1 
Household per capita 




Rest-of-the-World (ROW) Taxes - direct Taxes - sales 







Agriculture Furniture & Fixture Printing, publishing and allied activities 
Air Transport Hotel & Restaurants Processed food 
Banking and Insurance Iron Ore Public administration 
Bauxite Land Transport Railways 
Beverages Leather and Leather Products Real Estate 
Business Service Manganese Rubber Products 
Cement Medical & Health Storage & Warehouse 
Chemicals Metal Products Sugar & Khandsari 
Coal & Lignite Metals Supporting Services 
Coal Tar Products Natural Gas Tea & Coffee Processing 
Communication Non-electrical Machinery Textile Products 
Construction Non-metallic Mineral Products Textiles 
Copper Non-Metallic Minerals Tobacco Products 
Crude Petroleum Other Manufacturing Trade 
Education & Research Other Metallic Minerals Transport Equipment 
Electrical Machinery Other services Vanaspati & Edible Oil 
Electricity Ownership of Dwelling Water Supply 
Fertilizer Paper, paper products Water Transport 
Fishing Petroleum Products Wood & Wooden Product 
Forestry & Logging Plastic Products  
 
Factors of production 
Capital 
 
Labour is a collection of the following four indicators into the 48 possible combinations. 
Male Female   
Rural Urban   
Schedule Tribe Schedule caste Other caste Others 
Illiterate 
Up to High School 










Government Household expenditure decile 4 
Household expenditure decile 
9 
Household expenditure decile 
1 
Household expenditure decile 
5 Private enterprises 
Household expenditure decile 
10 
Household expenditure decile 
6 Public enterprices 
Household expenditure decile 
2 
Household expenditure decile 
7 
 
Household expenditure decile 
3 










Agriculture Financial services Paper and wood 
Chemicals and oil refinery Food processing Public services 
Commerce, transport and 
storage 
Forestry, timber, fishing, 
hunting Renting of dwellings 
Communal and social services Health services Restaurants and hotels 
Communication Hydrocarbons Services to firms 
Construction Metallic products, machinery, equipment Textiles and leather products 
Education Mining  
Electricity, water and gas Other private services  
 
Commodities 
Agriculture Financial services Paper and wood 
Chemicals and oil refinery Food processing Public services 
Commerce, transport and 
storage 
Forestry, timber, fishing, 
hunting Renting of dwellings 
Communal and social services Health services Restaurants and hotels 
Communication Hydrocarbons Services to firms 
Construction Metallic products, machinery, equipment Textiles and leather products 
Education Mining  




Factors of production 
Capital  Labour, male, semi-skilled Land - North and East Arid 
Labour, female, semi-skilled Labour, male, skilled Land - Southern Humid 
Labour, female, skilled Labour, male, unskilled Land - West Arid 
Labour, female, unskilled Land - Central High Arid  
 
Institutions 
Household income decile 1 Household income decile 5 Household income decile 9 
Household income decile 2 Household income decile 6 Household income decile 10 
Household income decile 3 Household income decile 7 Enterprises 
Household income decile 4 Household income decile 8 Government 
 
Other  
Direct taxes Rest of world Savings-investment 
Import tariffs Sales taxes  
 
United States (2003/2010/2016) 
Activities 
Accommodation Funds, trusts, and other financial vehicles 
Performing arts, spectator 
sports, museums, and related 
activities 
Administrative and support 
services Furniture and related products Petroleum and coal products 
Air transportation General merchandise stores Pipeline transportation 
Ambulatory health care 
services Hospitals Plastics and rubber products 
Amusements, gambling, and 
recreation industries Housing Services Primary metals 
Apparel and leather and allied 
products 
Insurance carriers and related 
activities 
Printing and related support 
activities 
Broadcasting and 
telecommunications Legal services 
Publishing industries, except 
internet (includes software) 
Chemical products Machinery Rail transportation 
Computer and electronic 
products 
Management of companies 
and enterprises 
Rental and leasing services and 
lessors of intangible assets 
Computer systems design and 
related services Mining, except oil and gas 
Securities, commodity 
contracts, and investments 
Construction Miscellaneous manufacturing Social assistance 
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Data processing, internet 
publishing, and other 
information services 
Miscellaneous professional, 
scientific, and technical 
services 
State and local general 
government 
Educational services Motion picture and sound recording industries 
State and local government 
enterprises 
Electrical equipment, 
appliances, and components 
Motor vehicle and parts 
dealers Support activities for mining 
Fabricated metal products Motor vehicles, bodies and trailers, and parts 
Textile mills and textile 
product mills 
Farms Non-metallic mineral products Transit and ground passenger transportation 
Federal general government 
(defence) 
Nursing and residential care 
facilities Truck transportation 
Federal general government 
(non-defence) Oil and gas extraction Utilities 
Federal government 
enterprises Other Real Estate Warehousing and storage 
Federal Reserve banks, credit 
intermediation, and related 
activities 
Other retail Waste management and remediation services 
Food and beverage and 
tobacco products 
Other services, except 
government Water transportation 
Food and beverage stores Other transportation and support activities Wholesale trade 
Food services and drinking 
places 
Other transportation 
equipment Wood products 
Forestry, fishing, and related 
activities Paper products  
 
Commodities 
Accommodation Furniture and related products Petroleum and coal products 
Administrative and support 
services General merchandise stores Pipeline transportation 
Air transportation Hospitals Plastics and rubber products 
Ambulatory health care 
services Housing Services Primary metals 
Amusements, gambling, and 
recreation industries 
Insurance carriers and related 
activities 
Printing and related support 
activities 
Apparel and leather and allied 
products Legal services 
Publishing industries, except 
internet (includes software) 
Broadcasting and 
telecommunications Machinery Rail transportation 
Chemical products Management of companies and enterprises 
Rental and leasing services and 
lessors of intangible assets 
Computer and electronic 
products Mining, except oil and gas 
Scrap, used and second-hand 
goods 
Computer systems design and 
related services Miscellaneous manufacturing 
Securities, commodity 





scientific, and technical 
services 
Social assistance 
Data processing, internet 
publishing, and other 
information services 
Motion picture and sound 
recording industries 
State and local general 
government 
Educational services Motor vehicle and parts dealers 
State and local government 
enterprises 
Electrical equipment, 
appliances, and components 
Motor vehicles, bodies and 
trailers, and parts Support activities for mining 
Fabricated metal products 
Noncomparable imports and 
rest-of-the-world 
adjustment 
Textile mills and textile 
product mills 
Farms Non-metallic mineral products Transit and ground passenger transportation 
Federal general government 
(defence) 
Nursing and residential care 
facilities Truck transportation 
Federal general government 
(non-defence) Oil and gas extraction Utilities 
Federal government 
enterprises Other Real Estate Warehousing and storage 
Federal Reserve banks, credit 
intermediation, and related 
activities 
Other retail Waste management and remediation services 
Food and beverage and 
tobacco products 
Other services, except 
government Water transportation 
Food and beverage stores Other transportation and support activities Wholesale trade 
Food services and drinking 
places 
Other transportation 
equipment Wood products 
Forestry, fishing, and related 
activities Paper products  
Funds, trusts, and other 
financial vehicles 
Performing arts, spectator 




Factors of production 
Value added: Accommodation Value added: Funds, trusts, and other financial vehicles 
Value added: Performing arts, 
spectator sports, museums, 
and related activities 
Value added: Administrative 
and support services 
Value added: Furniture and 
related products 
Value added: Petroleum and 
coal products 
Value added: Air 
transportation 
Value added: General 
merchandise stores 
Value added: Pipeline 
transportation 
Value added: Ambulatory 
health care services Value added: Hospitals 




Value added: Amusements, 
gambling, and recreation 
industries 
Value added: Housing Services Value added: Primary metals 
Value added: Apparel and 
leather and allied products 
Value added: Insurance 
carriers and related activities 
Value added: Printing and 
related support activities 
Value added: Broadcasting and 
telecommunications Value added: Legal services 
Value added: Publishing 
industries, except internet 
(includes software) 
Value added: Chemical 
products Value added: Machinery 
Value added: Rail 
transportation 
Value added: Computer and 
electronic products 
Value added: Management of 
companies and enterprises 
Value added: Rental and 
leasing services and lessors of 
intangible assets 
Value added: Computer 
systems design and related 
services 
Value added: Mining, except 
oil and gas 
Value added: Securities, 
commodity contracts, and 
investments 
Value added: Construction Value added: Miscellaneous manufacturing Value added: Social assistance 
Value added: Data processing, 
internet publishing, and other 
information services 
Value added: Miscellaneous 
professional, scientific, and 
technical services 
Value added: State and local 
general government 
Value added: Educational 
services 
Value added: Motion picture 
and sound recording industries 
Value added: State and local 
government enterprises 
Value added: Electrical 
equipment, appliances, and 
components 
Value added: Motor vehicle 
and parts dealers 
Value added: Support activities 
for mining 
Value added: Fabricated metal 
products 
Value added: Motor vehicles, 
bodies and trailers, and parts 
Value added: Textile mills and 
textile product mills 
Value added: Farms Value added: Non-metallic mineral products 
Value added: Transit and 
ground passenger 
transportation 
Value added: Federal general 
government (defence) 
Value added: Nursing and 
residential care facilities 
Value added: Truck 
transportation 
Value added: Federal general 
government (non-defence) 
Value added: Oil and gas 
extraction Value added: Utilities 
Value added: Federal 
government enterprises Value added: Other Real Estate 
Value added: Warehousing 
and storage 
Value added: Federal Reserve 
banks, credit intermediation, 
and related activities 
Value added: Other retail 
Value added: Waste 
management and remediation 
services 
Value added: Food and 
beverage and tobacco 
products 
Value added: Other services, 
except government 
Value added: Water 
transportation 
Value added: Food and 
beverage stores 
Value added: Other 
transportation and support 
activities 
Value added: Wholesale trade 
Value added: Food services 
and drinking places 
Value added: Other 
transportation equipment Value added: Wood products 
Value added: Forestry, fishing, 





Enterprises Household income quintile 2 Household income quintile 5 
Government Household income quintile 3  
Household income quintile 1 Household income quintile 4  
 
Other 
Inventories Savings-investment  
Rest-of-the-world (ROW) Statistical discrepancy  
 
United States (2016-Edu) 
Activities, commodities, institutions and other are the same as for the other US SAMs. 
Factors of production 
Capital Labour: Bachelor's degree or higher 
Labour: Some college, no 
degree 
Indirect taxes less subsidies Labour: High school graduates, no college 
 













Agriculture Fishery Other mining 
Air transport Footwear Other services 
Alcoholic beverages Forestry Other transport 
Aquaculture Furniture Paper products 
Basic metals Health Petroleum products 
Business services Hotels and catering Printing products 
Cement Leather products Public administration 
Clothing Machinery and equipment Real estate 
Coal mining Meat processing Retail and wholesale trade 
Communications Metal products Rice husking 
Construction Natural gas Road transport 
Crude oil Non-alcoholic beverages Textiles 
Dairy Non-metallic minerals Tobacco processing 
Education Oils and fats processing Vegetable and fruit processing 
Electrical machinery Other chemicals Vehicles and transport equipment 
Electricity and gas distribution Other flours Water distribution and utilities 
Financial services Other food processing Wood products 
Fish processing Other manufacturing Yarn and other fibres 
 
Commodities 
Agriculture Fishery Other services 
Air transport Footwear Other transport 
Alcoholic beverages Forestry Paper products 
Aquaculture Furniture Petroleum products 
Basic metals Health Printing products 
Business services Hotels and catering Public administration 
Cement Leather products Real estate 
Clothing Machinery and equipment Retail and wholesale trade 
Coal mining Meat processing Rice husking 
Communications Metal products Road transport 
Construction Non-alcoholic beverages Textiles 
Crude oil Non-metallic minerals Tobacco processing 
Dairy Oils and fats processing Vegetable and fruit processing 
Education Other chemicals Vehicles and transport equipment 
Electrical machinery Other flours Water distribution and utilities 
Electricity and gas distribution Other food processing Wood products 
Financial services Other manufacturing Yarn and other fibres 




Factors of production 
Agricultural capital Labour - rural, secondary education 
Labour - urban, tertiary 
education 
Agricultural land Labour - rural, tertiary education Livestock 
Fisheries capital Labour - urban, primary education Non-agricultural capital 
Labour - rural, primary 
education 

















Activity taxes Factor taxes Sales taxes 
Changes in stocks or 
inventories Import tariffs Savings-investment 




Agriculture Government administration Other private services 
Beverages Grain milling Petroleum 
Business services Health Real estate 
Chemicals Hotels and catering Retail and wholesale trade 
Communication and post Machinery and vehicles Sugar refining 
Construction Meat, fish and dairy Textiles and clothing 
Education Metals Tobacco curing and processing 
Electricity Mining Transport and storage 
Financial services Non-metals Water 
Fisheries Other food processing Wood and paper 





Agriculture Government administration Other private services 
Beverages Grain milling Petroleum 
Business services Health Real estate 
Chemicals Hotels and catering Retail and wholesale trade 
Communication and post Machinery and vehicles Sugar refining 
Construction Meat, fish and dairy Textiles and clothing 
Education Metals Tobacco curing and processing 
Electricity Mining Transport and storage 
Financial services Non-metals Water 
Fisheries Other food processing Wood and paper 
Forestry Other manufacturing  
 
Factors of production 
Capital Labour - completed secondary Livestock 
Crop land Labour - completed tertiary  




Enterprises Household per capita expenditure quintile 2 
Household per capita 
expenditure quintile 5 
Government 
Household per capita 
expenditure quintile 3 
 
Household per capita 
expenditure quintile 1 
Household per capita 




Change in stocks Taxes - Direct Taxes - Sales 
Rest-of-the-world (ROW) Taxes - Export Taxes - Value Added 








Appendix G – Climate Framework for 
Uncertainty, Negotiation and Distribution 
(FUND) estimated impacts by country, sector and 
Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES) 
scenario 
 
Figure G1: The figure shows the change in Egyptian agricultural production as a result of climate change, as estimated by FUND using the 
regional to national disaggregation process described in Chapter 6. Results are shown between 2020 and 2100, the time span of the FUND 
case study in Chapter 6. Changes are relative to a baseline in which there are no effects from climate change. Results were run for four 
SRES scenarios, A1B, A2, B1 and B2, and positive numbers represent increases in agricultural production. The results from the different 
scenarios are shown separately in the figure. FUND has three agricultural impact functions, which are dependent on the rate of climate 
change, the level of climate change, and CO2 fertilisation respectively. The first and last of these are always negative and positive 
respectively, while level effects can be negative or positive depending on whether the regional temperature exceeds the specified optimal 
temperature for the given region. CO2 fertilisation is a logarithmic function, so there are diminishing marginal benefits to increased CO2. 
Agricultural production initially increases due to benefits from level and CO2 fertilisation effects growing and outweighing the negative 
impacts from rate effects. Benefits to agricultural production from climate change peak and then start to decline when the optimal 
regional warming above preindustrial times is exceeded, so that level effects turn negative and slowly increasingly negate some of the 
benefits from CO2 fertilisation. Impacts on agriculture were positive throughout the period, as CO2 fertilisation benefits still dominated 





























Figure G2: The figure shows the change in Ethiopian agricultural production as a result of climate change, as estimated by FUND using the 
regional to national disaggregation process described in Chapter 6. Results are shown between 2020 and 2100, the time span of the FUND 
case study in Chapter 6. Changes are relative to a baseline in which there are no effects from climate change. Results were run for four 
SRES scenarios, A1B, A2, B1 and B2, and positive numbers represent increases in agricultural production. The results from the different 
scenarios are shown separately in the figure. FUND has three agricultural impact functions, which are dependent on the rate of climate 
change, the level of climate change, and CO2 fertilisation respectively. The first and last of these are always negative and positive 
respectively, while level effects can be negative or positive depending on whether the regional temperature exceeds the specified optimal 
temperature for the given region. CO2 fertilisation is a logarithmic function, so there are diminishing marginal benefits to increased CO2. 
Agricultural production initially increases due to benefits from level and CO2 fertilisation effects growing and outweighing the negative 
impacts from rate effects. Benefits to agricultural production from climate change peak and then start to decline when the optimal 
regional warming above preindustrial times is exceeded, so that level effects turn negative and slowly increasingly negate some of the 
benefits from CO2 fertilisation. Impacts on agriculture were positive throughout the period, as CO2 fertilisation benefits still dominated 
negative rate and level effects at 2100. 
 
 
Figure G3: The figure shows the change in Indian agricultural production as a result of climate change, as estimated by FUND using the 
regional to national disaggregation process described in Chapter 6. Results are shown between 2020 and 2100, the time span of the FUND 
case study in Chapter 6. Changes are relative to a baseline in which there are no effects from climate change. Results were run for four 
SRES scenarios, A1B, A2, B1 and B2, and positive numbers represent increases in agricultural production. The results from the different 
scenarios are shown separately in the figure. FUND has three agricultural impact functions, which are dependent on the rate of climate 
change, the level of climate change, and CO2 fertilisation respectively. The first and last of these are always negative and positive 

















































temperature for the given region. CO2 fertilisation is a logarithmic function, so there are diminishing marginal benefits to increased CO2. 
Agricultural production initially increases due to benefits from level and CO2 fertilisation effects growing and outweighing the negative 
impacts from rate effects. Benefits to agricultural production from climate change peak and then start to decline when the optimal 
regional warming above preindustrial times is exceeded, so that level effects turn negative and slowly increasingly negate some of the 
benefits from CO2 fertilisation. Impacts on agriculture were positive throughout the period, as CO2 fertilisation benefits still dominated 
negative rate and level effects at 2100. 
 
 
Figure G4: The figure shows the change in Mexican agricultural production as a result of climate change, as estimated by FUND using the 
regional to national disaggregation process described in Chapter 6. Results are shown between 2020 and 2100, the time span of the FUND 
case study in Chapter 6. Changes are relative to a baseline in which there are no effects from climate change. Results were run for four 
SRES scenarios, A1B, A2, B1 and B2, and positive numbers represent increases in agricultural production. The results from the different 
scenarios are shown separately in the figure. FUND has three agricultural impact functions, which are dependent on the rate of climate 
change, the level of climate change, and CO2 fertilisation respectively. The first and last of these are always negative and positive 
respectively, while level effects can be negative or positive depending on whether the regional temperature exceeds the specified optimal 
temperature for the given region. CO2 fertilisation is a logarithmic function, so there are diminishing marginal benefits to increased CO2. 
Agricultural production initially increases due to benefits from level and CO2 fertilisation effects growing and outweighing the negative 
impacts from rate effects. Benefits to agricultural production from climate change peak and then start to decline when the optimal 
regional warming above preindustrial times is exceeded, so that level effects turn negative and slowly increasingly negate some of the 
benefits from CO2 fertilisation. Impacts on agriculture were positive throughout the period, as CO2 fertilisation benefits still dominated 



























Figure G5: The figure shows the change in American agricultural production as a result of climate change, as estimated by FUND, between 
2020 and 2100, the time span of the FUND case study in Chapter 6. Changes are relative to a baseline in which there are no effects from 
climate change. Results were run for four SRES scenarios, A1B, A2, B1 and B2, and positive numbers represent increases in agricultural 
production. The results from the different scenarios are shown separately in the figure. FUND has three agricultural impact functions, 
which are dependent on the rate of climate change, the level of climate change, and CO2 fertilisation respectively. The first and last of 
these are always negative and positive respectively, while level effects can be negative or positive depending on whether the regional 
temperature exceeds the specified optimal temperature for the given region. CO2 fertilisation is a logarithmic function, so there are 
diminishing marginal benefits to increased CO2. Agricultural production initially increases due to benefits from level and CO2 fertilisation 
effects growing and outweighing the negative impacts from rate effects. Benefits to agricultural production from climate change peak and 
then start to decline when the optimal regional warming above preindustrial times is exceeded, so that level effects turn negative and 
slowly increasingly negate some of the benefits from CO2 fertilisation. Impacts on agriculture were positive throughout the period, as CO2 
fertilisation benefits still dominated negative rate and level effects at 2100. 
 
 
Figure G6: The figure shows the change in Vietnamese agricultural production as a result of climate change, as estimated by FUND using 
the regional to national disaggregation process described in Chapter 6. Results are shown between 2020 and 2100, the time span of the 
FUND case study in Chapter 6. Changes are relative to a baseline in which there are no effects from climate change. Results were run for 
four SRES scenarios, A1B, A2, B1 and B2, and positive numbers represent increases in agricultural production. The results from the 
different scenarios are shown separately in the figure. FUND has three agricultural impact functions, which are dependent on the rate of 
climate change, the level of climate change, and CO2 fertilisation respectively. The first and last of these are always negative and positive 
respectively, while level effects can be negative or positive depending on whether the regional temperature exceeds the specified optimal 













































Agricultural production initially increases due to benefits from level and CO2 fertilisation effects growing and outweighing the negative 
impacts from rate effects. Benefits to agricultural production from climate change peak and then start to decline when the optimal 
regional warming above preindustrial times is exceeded, so that level effects turn negative and slowly increasingly negate some of the 
benefits from CO2 fertilisation. Impacts on agriculture were positive throughout the period, as CO2 fertilisation benefits still dominated 
negative rate and level effects at 2100. 
 
 
Figure G7: The figure shows the change in Zambian agricultural production as a result of climate change, as estimated by FUND using the 
regional to national disaggregation process described in Chapter 6. Results are shown between 2020 and 2100, the time span of the FUND 
case study in Chapter 6. Changes are relative to a baseline in which there are no effects from climate change. Results were run for four 
SRES scenarios, A1B, A2, B1 and B2, and positive numbers represent increases in agricultural production. The results from the different 
scenarios are shown separately in the figure. FUND has three agricultural impact functions, which are dependent on the rate of climate 
change, the level of climate change, and CO2 fertilisation respectively. The first and last of these are always negative and positive 
respectively, while level effects can be negative or positive depending on whether the regional temperature exceeds the specified optimal 
temperature for the given region. CO2 fertilisation is a logarithmic function, so there are diminishing marginal benefits to increased CO2. 
Agricultural production initially increases due to benefits from level and CO2 fertilisation effects growing and outweighing the negative 
impacts from rate effects. Benefits to agricultural production from climate change peak and then start to decline when the optimal 
regional warming above preindustrial times is exceeded, so that level effects turn negative and slowly increasingly negate some of the 
benefits from CO2 fertilisation. Impacts on agriculture were positive throughout the period, as CO2 fertilisation benefits still dominated 



























Figure G8: The figure shows the change in Egyptian water utility output as a result of climate change, as estimated by FUND using the 
regional to national disaggregation process described in Chapter 6. Results are shown between 2020 and 2100, the time span of the FUND 
case study in Chapter 6. Changes are relative to a baseline in which there are no effects from climate change. Results were run for four 
SRES scenarios, A1B, A2, B1 and B2, and negative numbers represent decreases in water utility output. The results from the different 
scenarios are shown separately in the figure. For a global mean surface temperature (GMST) higher than the preindustrial level, the FUND 
water impact function always produces negative impacts, with impacts becoming more negative the higher GMST is above the 
preindustrial level.   
 
 
Figure G9: The figure shows the change in Ethiopian water utility output as a result of climate change, as estimated by FUND using the 
regional to national disaggregation process described in Chapter 6. Results are shown between 2020 and 2100, the time span of the FUND 
case study in Chapter 6. Changes are relative to a baseline in which there are no effects from climate change. Results were run for four 
SRES scenarios, A1B, A2, B1 and B2, and negative numbers represent decreases in water utility output. The results from the different 
scenarios are shown separately in the figure. For a global mean surface temperature (GMST) higher than the preindustrial level, the FUND 
water impact function always produces negative impacts, with impacts becoming more negative the higher GMST is above the 


















































Figure G10: The figure shows the change in Indian water utility output as a result of climate change, as estimated by FUND using the 
regional to national disaggregation process described in Chapter 6. Results are shown between 2020 and 2100, the time span of the FUND 
case study in Chapter 6. Changes are relative to a baseline in which there are no effects from climate change. Results were run for four 
SRES scenarios, A1B, A2, B1 and B2, and negative numbers represent decreases in water utility output. The results from the different 
scenarios are shown separately in the figure. For a global mean surface temperature (GMST) higher than the preindustrial level, the FUND 
water impact function always produces negative impacts, with impacts becoming more negative the higher GMST is above the 
preindustrial level.   
 
 
Figure G11: The figure shows the change in Mexican water utility output as a result of climate change, as estimated by FUND using the 
regional to national disaggregation process described in Chapter 6. Results are shown between 2020 and 2100, the time span of the FUND 
case study in Chapter 6. Changes are relative to a baseline in which there are no effects from climate change. Results were run for four 
SRES scenarios, A1B, A2, B1 and B2, and negative numbers represent decreases in water utility output. The results from the different 
scenarios are shown separately in the figure. For a global mean surface temperature (GMST) higher than the preindustrial level, the FUND 
water impact function always produces negative impacts, with impacts becoming more negative the higher GMST is above the 



















































Figure G12: The figure shows the change in American water utility output as a result of climate change, as estimated by FUND, between 
2020 and 2100, the time span of the FUND case study in Chapter 6. Changes are relative to a baseline in which there are no effects from 
climate change. Results were run for four SRES scenarios, A1B, A2, B1 and B2, and negative numbers represent decreases in water utility 
output. The results from the different scenarios are shown separately in the figure. For a global mean surface temperature (GMST) higher 
than the preindustrial level, the FUND water impact function always produces negative impacts, with impacts becoming more negative the 
higher GMST is above the preindustrial level.   
 
 
Figure G13: The figure shows the change in Vietnamese water utility output as a result of climate change, as estimated by FUND using the 
regional to national disaggregation process described in Chapter 6. Results are shown between 2020 and 2100, the time span of the FUND 
case study in Chapter 6. Changes are relative to a baseline in which there are no effects from climate change. Results were run for four 
SRES scenarios, A1B, A2, B1 and B2, and negative numbers represent decreases in water utility output. The results from the different 
scenarios are shown separately in the figure. For a global mean surface temperature (GMST) higher than the preindustrial level, the FUND 
water impact function always produces negative impacts, with impacts becoming more negative the higher GMST is above the 
















































Figure G14: The figure shows the change in Zambian water utility output as a result of climate change, as estimated by FUND using the 
regional to national disaggregation process described in Chapter 6. Results are shown between 2020 and 2100, the time span of the FUND 
case study in Chapter 6. Changes are relative to a baseline in which there are no effects from climate change. Results were run for four 
SRES scenarios, A1B, A2, B1 and B2, and negative numbers represent decreases in water utility output. The results from the different 
scenarios are shown separately in the figure. For a global mean surface temperature (GMST) higher than the preindustrial level, the FUND 
water impact function always produces negative impacts, with impacts becoming more negative the higher GMST is above the 
preindustrial level.   
 
 
Figure G15: The figure shows the change in Egyptian demand for energy as a result of climate change, as estimated by FUND using the 
regional to national disaggregation process described in Chapter 6. Results are shown between 2020 and 2100, the time span of the FUND 
case study in Chapter 6. Changes are relative to a baseline in which there are no effects from climate change. Results were run for four 
SRES scenarios, A1B, A2, B1 and B2, and positive (negative) numbers represent increases (decreases) in demand for energy. The results 
from the different scenarios are shown separately in the figure. FUND models changes in energy demand for space heating and cooling 
separately. Savings from reduced space heating display decreasing marginal benefits from temperature rises, which saturate. The costs of 
increased space cooling, however, do not saturate. Demand for energy increases if the costs of increased space cooling exceed the savings 
from reduced space heating. Demand for energy decreases if the savings from reduced space heating exceed the costs of increased space 
cooling. The balance of savings and costs is different at different temperatures. As savings from reduced space heating saturate, whereas 
costs from increased space cooling do not, then, all other things being equal, demand for energy will increase at higher temperatures. 
However, the heating and cooling demand functions also depend on growth in income per capita, population growth and autonomous 
energy efficiency improvement, which is why energy demand begins to dip in the B1 scenario towards the end of the century. Note that an 










































Egypt: change in energy expenditure 







imposed, as described in Chapter 6, to ensure that increases in expenditures didn’t automatically increase economic growth. An increase 
(decrease) in expenditure was thus funded through decreased (increased) expenditure on other goods and services, so that households’ 
total spending remained constant. 
 
 
Figure G16: The figure shows the change in Ethiopian demand for energy as a result of climate change, as estimated by FUND using the 
regional to national disaggregation process described in Chapter 6. Results are shown between 2020 and 2100, the time span of the FUND 
case study in Chapter 6. Changes are relative to a baseline in which there are no effects from climate change. Results were run for four 
SRES scenarios, A1B, A2, B1 and B2, and positive (negative) numbers represent increases (decreases) in demand for energy. The results 
from the different scenarios are shown separately in the figure. FUND models changes in energy demand for space heating and cooling 
separately. Savings from reduced space heating display decreasing marginal benefits from temperature rises, which saturate. The costs of 
increased space cooling, however, do not saturate. Demand for energy increases if the costs of increased space cooling exceed the savings 
from reduced space heating. Demand for energy decreases if the savings from reduced space heating exceed the costs of increased space 
cooling. The balance of savings and costs is different at different temperatures. As savings from reduced space heating saturate, whereas 
costs from increased space cooling do not, then, all other things being equal, demand for energy will increase at higher temperatures. 
However, the heating and cooling demand functions also depend on growth in income per capita, population growth and autonomous 
energy efficiency improvement, which is why energy demand begins to dip in the B1 scenario towards the end of the century. Note that an 
increase (decrease) in energy demand did not necessarily have a positive (negative) effect on the economy, as a budget constraint was 
imposed, as described in Chapter 6, to ensure that increases in expenditures didn’t automatically increase economic growth. An increase 
(decrease) in expenditure was thus funded through decreased (increased) expenditure on other goods and services, so that households’ 
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Figure G17: The figure shows the change in Indian demand for energy as a result of climate change, as estimated by FUND using the 
regional to national disaggregation process described in Chapter 6. Results are shown between 2020 and 2100, the time span of the FUND 
case study in Chapter 6. Changes are relative to a baseline in which there are no effects from climate change. Results were run for four 
SRES scenarios, A1B, A2, B1 and B2, and positive (negative) numbers represent increases (decreases) in demand for energy. The results 
from the different scenarios are shown separately in the figure. FUND models changes in energy demand for space heating and cooling 
separately. Savings from reduced space heating display decreasing marginal benefits from temperature rises, which saturate. The costs of 
increased space cooling, however, do not saturate. Demand for energy increases if the costs of increased space cooling exceed the savings 
from reduced space heating. Demand for energy decreases if the savings from reduced space heating exceed the costs of increased space 
cooling. The balance of savings and costs is different at different temperatures. As savings from reduced space heating saturate, whereas 
costs from increased space cooling do not, then, all other things being equal, demand for energy will increase at higher temperatures. 
However, the heating and cooling demand functions also depend on growth in income per capita, population growth and autonomous 
energy efficiency improvement, which is why energy demand begins to dip in the B1 scenario towards the end of the century. Note that an 
increase (decrease) in energy demand did not necessarily have a positive (negative) effect on the economy, as a budget constraint was 
imposed, as described in Chapter 6, to ensure that increases in expenditures didn’t automatically increase economic growth. An increase 
(decrease) in expenditure was thus funded through decreased (increased) expenditure on other goods and services, so that households’ 
total spending remained constant. 
 
 
Figure G18: The figure shows the change in Mexican demand for energy as a result of climate change, as estimated by FUND using the 
regional to national disaggregation process described in Chapter 6. Results are shown between 2020 and 2100, the time span of the FUND 
case study in Chapter 6. Changes are relative to a baseline in which there are no effects from climate change. Results were run for four 
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from the different scenarios are shown separately in the figure. FUND models changes in energy demand for space heating and cooling 
separately. Savings from reduced space heating display decreasing marginal benefits from temperature rises, which saturate. The costs of 
increased space cooling, however, do not saturate. Demand for energy increases if the costs of increased space cooling exceed the savings 
from reduced space heating. Demand for energy decreases if the savings from reduced space heating exceed the costs of increased space 
cooling. The balance of savings and costs is different at different temperatures. As savings from reduced space heating saturate, whereas 
costs from increased space cooling do not, then, all other things being equal, demand for energy will increase at higher temperatures. 
However, the heating and cooling demand functions also depend on growth in income per capita, population growth and autonomous 
energy efficiency improvement. Note that an increase (decrease) in energy demand did not necessarily have a positive (negative) effect on 
the economy, as a budget constraint was imposed, as described in Chapter 6, to ensure that increases in expenditures didn’t automatically 
increase economic growth. An increase (decrease) in expenditure was thus funded through decreased (increased) expenditure on other 
goods and services, so that households’ total spending remained constant. 
 
 
Figure G19: The figure shows the change in American demand for energy as a result of climate change, as estimated by FUND, between 
2020 and 2100, the time span of the FUND case study in Chapter 6. Changes are relative to a baseline in which there are no effects from 
climate change. Results were run for four SRES scenarios, A1B, A2, B1 and B2, and positive (negative) numbers represent increases 
(decreases) in demand for energy. The results from the different scenarios are shown separately in the figure. FUND models changes in 
energy demand for space heating and cooling separately. Savings from reduced space heating display decreasing marginal benefits from 
temperature rises, which saturate. The costs of increased space cooling, however, do not saturate. Demand for energy increases if the 
costs of increased space cooling exceed the savings from reduced space heating. Demand for energy decreases if the savings from reduced 
space heating exceed the costs of increased space cooling. The balance of savings and costs is different at different temperatures. As 
savings from reduced space heating saturate, whereas costs from increased space cooling do not, then, all other things being equal, 
demand for energy will increase at higher temperatures. However, the heating and cooling demand functions also depend on growth in 
income per capita, population growth and autonomous energy efficiency improvement. Note that an increase (decrease) in energy 
demand did not necessarily have a positive (negative) effect on the economy, as a budget constraint was imposed, as described in Chapter 
6, to ensure that increases in expenditures didn’t automatically increase economic growth. An increase (decrease) in expenditure was thus 





















US: change in energy expenditure on 








Figure G20: The figure shows the change in Vietnamese demand for energy as a result of climate change, as estimated by FUND using the 
regional to national disaggregation process described in Chapter 6. Results are shown between 2020 and 2100, the time span of the FUND 
case study in Chapter 6. Changes are relative to a baseline in which there are no effects from climate change. Results were run for four 
SRES scenarios, A1B, A2, B1 and B2, and positive (negative) numbers represent increases (decreases) in demand for energy. The results 
from the different scenarios are shown separately in the figure. FUND models changes in energy demand for space heating and cooling 
separately. Savings from reduced space heating display decreasing marginal benefits from temperature rises, which saturate. The costs of 
increased space cooling, however, do not saturate. Demand for energy increases if the costs of increased space cooling exceed the savings 
from reduced space heating. Demand for energy decreases if the savings from reduced space heating exceed the costs of increased space 
cooling. The balance of savings and costs is different at different temperatures. As savings from reduced space heating saturate, whereas 
costs from increased space cooling do not, then, all other things being equal, demand for energy will increase at higher temperatures. 
However, the heating and cooling demand functions also depend on growth in income per capita, population growth and autonomous 
energy efficiency improvement, which is why energy demand begins to dip in the B1 scenario towards the end of the century. Note that an 
increase (decrease) in energy demand did not necessarily have a positive (negative) effect on the economy, as a budget constraint was 
imposed, as described in Chapter 6, to ensure that increases in expenditures didn’t automatically increase economic growth. An increase 
(decrease) in expenditure was thus funded through decreased (increased) expenditure on other goods and services, so that households’ 
total spending remained constant. 
 
 
Figure G21: The figure shows the change in Zambian demand for energy as a result of climate change, as estimated by FUND using the 
regional to national disaggregation process described in Chapter 6. Results are shown between 2020 and 2100, the time span of the FUND 
case study in Chapter 6. Changes are relative to a baseline in which there are no effects from climate change. Results were run for four 
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from the different scenarios are shown separately in the figure. FUND models changes in energy demand for space heating and cooling 
separately. Savings from reduced space heating display decreasing marginal benefits from temperature rises, which saturate. The costs of 
increased space cooling, however, do not saturate. Demand for energy increases if the costs of increased space cooling exceed the savings 
from reduced space heating. Demand for energy decreases if the savings from reduced space heating exceed the costs of increased space 
cooling. The balance of savings and costs is different at different temperatures. As savings from reduced space heating saturate, whereas 
costs from increased space cooling do not, then, all other things being equal, demand for energy will increase at higher temperatures. 
However, the heating and cooling demand functions also depend on growth in income per capita, population growth and autonomous 
energy efficiency improvement, which is why energy demand begins to dip in the B1 scenario towards the end of the century. Note that an 
increase (decrease) in energy demand did not necessarily have a positive (negative) effect on the economy, as a budget constraint was 
imposed, as described in Chapter 6, to ensure that increases in expenditures didn’t automatically increase economic growth. An increase 
(decrease) in expenditure was thus funded through decreased (increased) expenditure on other goods and services, so that households’ 
total spending remained constant. 
 
 
Figure G22: The figure shows the change in Egyptian expenditure on coastal protection as a result of climate change, as estimated by 
FUND using the regional to national disaggregation process described in Chapter 6. Results are shown between 2020 and 2100, the time 
span of the FUND case study in Chapter 6. Changes are relative to a baseline in which there are no effects from climate change. Results 
were run for four SRES scenarios, A1B, A2, B1 and B2, and positive numbers represent increases in expenditure on coastal protection. The 
results from the different scenarios are shown separately in the figure. The level of coastal protection estimated in FUND was determined 
by a cost-benefit analysis (CBA) that accounted for the cost of coastal protection and the value of wetland and dryland lost. The cost of 
coastal protection depended on costs per unit of protection, the extent of sea-level rise (SLR), the rate of pure time preference, and the 
consumption elasticity of marginal utility. Meanwhile, the value of wetland lost was a function of income per capita, SLR and degree of 
coastal protection. Finally, the value of dryland lost depended on income per square kilometre and lost land area. Note that an increase in 
expenditure on coastal protection did not necessarily have a positive effect on the economy, as a budget constraint was imposed, as 
described in Chapter 6, to ensure that increases in expenditures didn’t automatically increase economic growth. An increase in 



























Figure G23: The figure shows the change in Indian expenditure on coastal protection as a result of climate change, as estimated by FUND 
using the regional to national disaggregation process described in Chapter 6. Results are shown between 2020 and 2100, the time span of 
the FUND case study in Chapter 6. Changes are relative to a baseline in which there are no effects from climate change. Results were run 
for four SRES scenarios, A1B, A2, B1 and B2, and positive numbers represent increases in expenditure on coastal protection. The results 
from the different scenarios are shown separately in the figure. The level of coastal protection estimated in FUND was determined by a 
cost-benefit analysis (CBA) that accounted for the cost of coastal protection and the value of wetland and dryland lost. The cost of coastal 
protection depended on costs per unit of protection, the extent of sea-level rise (SLR), the rate of pure time preference, and the 
consumption elasticity of marginal utility. Meanwhile, the value of wetland lost was a function of income per capita, SLR and degree of 
coastal protection. Finally, the value of dryland lost depended on income per square kilometre and lost land area. Note that an increase in 
expenditure on coastal protection did not necessarily have a positive effect on the economy, as a budget constraint was imposed, as 
described in Chapter 6, to ensure that increases in expenditures didn’t automatically increase economic growth. An increase in 




Figure G24: The figure shows the change in Mexican expenditure on coastal protection as a result of climate change, as estimated by 
FUND using the regional to national disaggregation process described in Chapter 6. Results are shown between 2020 and 2100, the time 
span of the FUND case study in Chapter 6. Changes are relative to a baseline in which there are no effects from climate change. Results 
were run for four SRES scenarios, A1B, A2, B1 and B2, and positive numbers represent increases in expenditure on coastal protection. The 
results from the different scenarios are shown separately in the figure. The level of coastal protection estimated in FUND was determined 
by a cost-benefit analysis (CBA) that accounted for the cost of coastal protection and the value of wetland and dryland lost. The cost of 

















































consumption elasticity of marginal utility. Meanwhile, the value of wetland lost was a function of income per capita, SLR and degree of 
coastal protection. Finally, the value of dryland lost depended on income per square kilometre and lost land area. Note that an increase in 
expenditure on coastal protection did not necessarily have a positive effect on the economy, as a budget constraint was imposed, as 
described in Chapter 6, to ensure that increases in expenditures didn’t automatically increase economic growth. An increase in 




Figure G25: The figure shows the change in American expenditure on coastal protection as a result of climate change, as estimated by 
FUND, between 2020 and 2100, the time span of the FUND case study in Chapter 6. Changes are relative to a baseline in which there are 
no effects from climate change. Results were run for four SRES scenarios, A1B, A2, B1 and B2, and positive numbers represent increases in 
expenditure on coastal protection. The results from the different scenarios are shown separately in the figure. The level of coastal 
protection estimated in FUND was determined by a cost-benefit analysis (CBA) that accounted for the cost of coastal protection and the 
value of wetland and dryland lost. The cost of coastal protection depended on costs per unit of protection, the extent of sea-level rise 
(SLR), the rate of pure time preference, and the consumption elasticity of marginal utility. Meanwhile, the value of wetland lost was a 
function of income per capita, SLR and degree of coastal protection. Finally, the value of dryland lost depended on income per square 
kilometre and lost land area. Note that an increase in expenditure on coastal protection did not necessarily have a positive effect on the 
economy, as a budget constraint was imposed, as described in Chapter 6, to ensure that increases in expenditures didn’t automatically 
increase economic growth. An increase in expenditure was thus funded through decreased expenditure on other goods and services, so 

















































Figure G26: The figure shows the change in Vietnamese expenditure on coastal protection as a result of climate change, as estimated by 
FUND using the regional to national disaggregation process described in Chapter 6. Results are shown between 2020 and 2100, the time 
span of the FUND case study in Chapter 6. Changes are relative to a baseline in which there are no effects from climate change. Results 
were run for four SRES scenarios, A1B, A2, B1 and B2, and positive numbers represent increases in expenditure on coastal protection. The 
results from the different scenarios are shown separately in the figure. The level of coastal protection estimated in FUND was determined 
by a cost-benefit analysis (CBA) that accounted for the cost of coastal protection and the value of wetland and dryland lost. The cost of 
coastal protection depended on costs per unit of protection, the extent of sea-level rise (SLR), the rate of pure time preference, and the 
consumption elasticity of marginal utility. Meanwhile, the value of wetland lost was a function of income per capita, SLR and degree of 
coastal protection. Finally, the value of dryland lost depended on income per square kilometre and lost land area. Note that an increase in 
expenditure on coastal protection did not necessarily have a positive effect on the economy, as a budget constraint was imposed, as 
described in Chapter 6, to ensure that increases in expenditures didn’t automatically increase economic growth. An increase in 




Figure G27: The figure shows the change in Egyptian expenditure on repairing damages from tropical and extra-tropical storms as a result 
of climate change, as estimated by FUND using the regional to national disaggregation process described in Chapter 6. Results are shown 
between 2020 and 2100, the time span of the FUND case study in Chapter 6. Changes are relative to a baseline in which there are no 
effects from climate change. Results were run for four SRES scenarios, A1B, A2, B1 and B2, and positive numbers represent increases in 
expenditure on storm repairs. The results from the different scenarios are shown separately in the figure. FUND’s economic damages from 
tropical storms impact function is dependent on the increase in regional income per capita and temperature, while FUND’s economic 
damages from extratropical storms impact function is dependent on regional income per capita and atmospheric CO2 concentration. 
Damages from tropical and extratropical storms were summed and so taken collectively in the FUND case study. Note that an increase in 
expenditure on storm repairs did not necessarily have a positive effect on the economy, as a budget constraint was imposed, as described 
in Chapter 6, to ensure that increases in expenditures didn’t automatically increase economic growth. An increase in expenditure was thus 
funded through decreased expenditure on other goods and services, so that household, enterprise and government’s total investment 




























Figure G28: The figure shows the change in Indian expenditure on repairing damages from tropical and extra-tropical storms as a result of 
climate change, as estimated by FUND using the regional to national disaggregation process described in Chapter 6. Results are shown 
between 2020 and 2100, the time span of the FUND case study in Chapter 6. Changes are relative to a baseline in which there are no 
effects from climate change. Results were run for four SRES scenarios, A1B, A2, B1 and B2, and positive numbers represent increases in 
expenditure on storm repairs. The results from the different scenarios are shown separately in the figure. FUND’s economic damages from 
tropical storms impact function is dependent on the increase in regional income per capita and temperature, while FUND’s economic 
damages from extratropical storms impact function is dependent on regional income per capita and atmospheric CO2 concentration. 
Damages from tropical and extratropical storms were summed and so taken collectively in the FUND case study. Note that an increase in 
expenditure on storm repairs did not necessarily have a positive effect on the economy, as a budget constraint was imposed, as described 
in Chapter 6, to ensure that increases in expenditures didn’t automatically increase economic growth. An increase in expenditure was thus 
funded through decreased expenditure on other goods and services, so that household, enterprise and government’s total investment 
spending remained constant. 
 
 
Figure G29: The figure shows the change in Mexican expenditure on repairing damages from tropical and extra-tropical storms as a result 
of climate change, as estimated by FUND using the regional to national disaggregation process described in Chapter 6. Results are shown 
between 2020 and 2100, the time span of the FUND case study in Chapter 6. Changes are relative to a baseline in which there are no 
effects from climate change. Results were run for four SRES scenarios, A1B, A2, B1 and B2, and positive numbers represent increases in 
expenditure on storm repairs. The results from the different scenarios are shown separately in the figure. FUND’s economic damages from 
tropical storms impact function is dependent on the increase in regional income per capita and temperature, while FUND’s economic 
damages from extratropical storms impact function is dependent on regional income per capita and atmospheric CO2 concentration. 











































expenditure on storm repairs did not necessarily have a positive effect on the economy, as a budget constraint was imposed, as described 
in Chapter 6, to ensure that increases in expenditures didn’t automatically increase economic growth. An increase in expenditure was thus 
funded through decreased expenditure on other goods and services, so that household, enterprise and government’s total investment 
spending remained constant. 
 
 
Figure G30: The figure shows the change in American expenditure on repairing damages from tropical and extra-tropical storms as a result 
of climate change, as estimated by FUND, between 2020 and 2100, the time span of the FUND case study in Chapter 6. Changes are 
relative to a baseline in which there are no effects from climate change. Results were run for four SRES scenarios, A1B, A2, B1 and B2, and 
positive numbers represent increases in expenditure on storm repairs. The results from the different scenarios are shown separately in the 
figure. FUND’s economic damages from tropical storms impact function is dependent on the increase in regional income per capita and 
temperature, while FUND’s economic damages from extratropical storms impact function is dependent on regional income per capita and 
atmospheric CO2 concentration. Damages from tropical and extratropical storms were summed and so taken collectively in the FUND case 
study. Note that an increase in expenditure on storm repairs did not necessarily have a positive effect on the economy, as a budget 
constraint was imposed, as described in Chapter 6, to ensure that increases in expenditures didn’t automatically increase economic 
growth. An increase in expenditure was thus funded through decreased expenditure on other goods and services, so that household, 































Figure G31: The figure shows the change in Vietnamese expenditure on repairing damages from tropical and extra-tropical storms as a 
result of climate change, as estimated by FUND using the regional to national disaggregation process described in Chapter 6. Results are 
shown between 2020 and 2100, the time span of the FUND case study in Chapter 6. Changes are relative to a baseline in which there are 
no effects from climate change. Results were run for four SRES scenarios, A1B, A2, B1 and B2, and positive numbers represent increases in 
expenditure on storm repairs. The results from the different scenarios are shown separately in the figure. FUND’s economic damages from 
tropical storms impact function is dependent on the increase in regional income per capita and temperature, while FUND’s economic 
damages from extratropical storms impact function is dependent on regional income per capita and atmospheric CO2 concentration. 
Damages from tropical and extratropical storms were summed and so taken collectively in the FUND case study. Note that an increase in 
expenditure on storm repairs did not necessarily have a positive effect on the economy, as a budget constraint was imposed, as described 
in Chapter 6, to ensure that increases in expenditures didn’t automatically increase economic growth. An increase in expenditure was thus 
funded through decreased expenditure on other goods and services, so that household, enterprise and government’s total investment 





































Appendix H – Breakdown of impacts from unit 
exogenous changes into direct and indirect 
effects 
Alaska 














due to total 
effects 
Percentage of 
total change in 
inequality ratio 
that is down to 
direct effects 
Percentage of 
total change in 
inequality ratio 
that is down to 
indirect effects 
Infrastructure H/L 3.06% -1.04% 2.0% 152% -52% 
Infrastructure H/M 2.00% -0.50% 1.5% 134% -34% 
Infrastructure M/L 1.04% -0.53% 0.5% 203% -103% 
Tourism H/L -0.12% 0.75% 0.6% -19% 119% 
Tourism H/M -1.03% 0.01% -1.0% 101% -1% 
Tourism M/L 0.92% 0.75% 1.7% 55% 45% 
Oil H/L 1.25% 0.86% 2.1% 59% 41% 
Oil H/M 0.59% 0.11% 0.7% 84% 16% 
Oil M/L 0.66% 0.74% 1.4% 47% 53% 
Fisheries H/L -0.09% 3.23% 3.1% -3% 103% 
Fisheries H/M -0.24% 2.42% 2.2% -11% 111% 
Fisheries M/L 0.15% 0.79% 0.9% 16% 84% 
 
Table H1: Table shows how the effects on Alaskan inequality ratios of increases of USD 1 billion (in 1995 USD billions) in, each in turn, 
expenditure on infrastructure, increased tourism, oil output, and fisheries output, are broken down into direct and indirect effects. Total 
effects were taken from Figure 8.4 in Chapter 8, and direct, indirect and total effects were calculated as described in Section 8.1.1 of 
Chapter 8. Total effects are defined to be direct plus indirect effects. H represents the total income of high income households 
(households earning more than $75,000 a year, in 2008 USD), M represents the total income of medium income households (households 
earning between $25,000 and $75,000 a year, in 2008 USD), and L represents the total income of low income households (households 





























due to total 
effects 
Percentage of 
total change in 
inequality ratio 
that is down to 
direct effects 
Percentage of 
total change in 
inequality ratio 
that is down to 
indirect effects 
Agriculture Q5/Q1 -0.20% 0.10% -0.10% 195% -95% 
Agriculture Q5/Q3 -0.12% 0.06% -0.06% 199% -99% 
Agriculture Q3/Q1 -0.08% 0.04% -0.04% 190% -90% 
Agriculture (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) -0.15% 0.06% -0.08% 178% -78% 
Water Q5/Q1 -0.12% 0.04% -0.08% 151% -51% 
Water Q5/Q3 -0.09% 0.02% -0.08% 123% -23% 
Water Q3/Q1 -0.03% 0.02% 0.00% 611% -511% 
Water (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) -0.09% 0.02% -0.07% 135% -35% 
Energy Q5/Q1 -0.01% 0.06% 0.05% -23% 123% 
Energy Q5/Q3 -0.01% 0.03% 0.02% -59% 159% 
Energy Q3/Q1 0.00% 0.02% 0.02% 7% 93% 
Energy (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) -0.01% 0.04% 0.03% -28% 128% 
SLR Q5/Q1 -0.13% 0.00% -0.12% 104% -4% 
SLR Q5/Q3 -0.09% 0.03% -0.06% 143% -43% 
SLR Q3/Q1 -0.04% -0.02% -0.06% 68% 32% 
SLR (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) -0.10% 0.00% -0.10% 101% -1% 
Storms Q5/Q1 -0.13% 0.03% -0.10% 133% -33% 
Storms Q5/Q3 -0.09% 0.02% -0.07% 128% -28% 
Storms Q3/Q1 -0.04% 0.01% -0.03% 143% -43% 
Storms (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) -0.10% 0.02% -0.08% 127% -27% 
 
Table H2: Table shows how the effects on Egyptian inequality ratios of increases of USD 1 billion (in 1995 USD billions) in, each in turn, 
agricultural output, water output, energy expenditure, expenditure on coastal defence, and expenditure on repairing storm damages, are 
broken down into direct and indirect effects. Total effects were taken from Figure 8.3 in Chapter 8, and direct, indirect and total effects 
were calculated as described in Section 8.1.1 of Chapter 8. Total effects are defined to be direct plus indirect effects. Q1 represents the 


























due to total 
effects 
Percentage of 
total change in 
inequality ratio 
that is down to 
direct effects 
Percentage of 
total change in 
inequality ratio 
that is down to 
indirect effects 
Agriculture Q5/Q1 -2.29% -1.41% -3.7% 62% 38% 
Agriculture Q5/Q3 -1.66% -1.00% -2.7% 63% 37% 
Agriculture Q3/Q1 -0.63% -0.43% -1.1% 59% 41% 
Agriculture (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) -1.73% -1.09% -2.8% 61% 39% 
Water Q5/Q1 0.12% 2.59% 2.7% 4% 96% 
Water Q5/Q3 0.09% 1.80% 1.9% 5% 95% 
Water Q3/Q1 0.03% 0.77% 0.8% 4% 96% 
Water (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) 0.10% 1.96% 2.1% 5% 95% 
Energy Q5/Q1 0.20% 1.84% 2.0% 10% 90% 
Energy Q5/Q3 0.15% 1.29% 1.4% 10% 90% 
Energy Q3/Q1 0.05% 0.54% 0.6% 9% 91% 
Energy (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) 0.17% 1.40% 1.6% 11% 89% 
Storms Q5/Q1 0.00% 1.23% 1.2% 0% 100% 
Storms Q5/Q3 0.00% 0.86% 0.9% 1% 99% 
Storms Q3/Q1 0.00% 0.37% 0.4% -1% 101% 
Storms (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) 0.02% 0.93% 0.9% 2% 98% 
 
Table H3: Table shows how the effects on Ethiopian inequality ratios of increases of USD 1 billion (in 1995 USD billions) in, each in turn, 
agricultural output, water output, energy expenditure, and expenditure on repairing storm damages, are broken down into direct and 
indirect effects. Total effects were taken from Figure 8.3 in Chapter 8, and direct, indirect and total effects were calculated as described in 
Section 8.1.1 of Chapter 8. Total effects are defined to be direct plus indirect effects. Q1 represents the income of the lowest expenditure 






























due to total 
effects 
Percentage of 
total change in 
inequality ratio 
that is down to 
direct effects 
Percentage of 
total change in 
inequality ratio 
that is down to 
indirect effects 
Agriculture Q5/Q1 -0.05% 0.03% -0.02% 244% -144% 
Agriculture Q5/Q3 -0.03% 0.02% -0.01% 251% -151% 
Agriculture Q3/Q1 -0.02% 0.01% -0.01% 237% -137% 
Agriculture (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) -0.04% 0.02% -0.02% 249% -149% 
Water Q5/Q1 0.01% 0.02% 0.04% 37% 63% 
Water Q5/Q3 0.00% 0.01% 0.01% -5% 105% 
Water Q3/Q1 0.01% 0.01% 0.03% 55% 45% 
Water (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) 0.01% 0.02% 0.03% 34% 66% 
Energy Q5/Q1 -0.04% -0.01% -0.05% 79% 21% 
Energy Q5/Q3 -0.02% 0.00% -0.02% 82% 18% 
Energy Q3/Q1 -0.02% -0.01% -0.02% 76% 24% 
Energy (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) -0.03% -0.01% -0.03% 80% 20% 
SLR Q5/Q1 -0.05% 0.00% -0.05% 104% -4% 
SLR Q5/Q3 -0.03% 0.00% -0.03% 93% 7% 
SLR Q3/Q1 -0.02% 0.00% -0.02% 121% -21% 
SLR (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) -0.03% 0.00% -0.03% 108% -8% 
Storms Q5/Q1 -0.05% -0.01% -0.05% 90% 10% 
Storms Q5/Q3 -0.03% 0.00% -0.03% 89% 11% 
Storms Q3/Q1 -0.02% 0.00% -0.02% 91% 9% 
Storms (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) -0.03% 0.00% -0.04% 90% 10% 
 
Table H4: Table shows how the effects on Indian inequality ratios of increases of USD 1 billion (in 1995 USD billions) in, each in turn, 
agricultural output, water output, energy expenditure, expenditure on coastal defence, and expenditure on repairing storm damages, are 
broken down into direct and indirect effects. Total effects were taken from Figure 8.3 in Chapter 8, and direct, indirect and total effects 
were calculated as described in Section 8.1.1 of Chapter 8. Total effects are defined to be direct plus indirect effects. Q1 represents the 


























due to total 
effects 
Percentage of 
total change in 
inequality ratio 
that is down to 
direct effects 
Percentage of 
total change in 
inequality ratio 
that is down to 
indirect effects 
Agriculture Q5/Q1 -0.04% 0.07% 0.03% -119% 219% 
Agriculture Q5/Q3 -0.03% 0.06% 0.03% -89% 189% 
Agriculture Q3/Q1 -0.01% 0.01% 0.00% -498% 598% 
Agriculture (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) -0.03% 0.06% 0.03% -118% 218% 
Water Q5/Q1 0.00% 0.06% 0.05% -8% 108% 
Water Q5/Q3 -0.01% 0.05% 0.04% -26% 126% 
Water Q3/Q1 0.01% 0.01% 0.02% 30% 70% 
Water (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) 0.00% 0.04% 0.04% -11% 111% 
Energy Q5/Q1 0.00% 0.04% 0.04% -12% 112% 
Energy Q5/Q3 -0.01% 0.04% 0.03% -28% 128% 
Energy Q3/Q1 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 296% -196% 
Energy (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) 0.00% 0.03% 0.03% -16% 116% 
SLR Q5/Q1 -0.06% -0.02% -0.07% 75% 25% 
SLR Q5/Q3 -0.05% 0.02% -0.02% 219% -119% 
SLR Q3/Q1 -0.01% -0.04% -0.05% 19% 81% 
SLR (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) -0.05% -0.01% -0.06% 76% 24% 
Storms Q5/Q1 -0.06% 0.02% -0.03% 178% -78% 
Storms Q5/Q3 -0.05% 0.03% -0.02% 236% -136% 
Storms Q3/Q1 -0.01% 0.00% -0.01% 86% 14% 
Storms (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) -0.05% 0.02% -0.03% 176% -76% 
 
Table H5: Table shows how the effects on Mexican inequality ratios of increases of USD 1 billion (in 1995 USD billions) in, each in turn, 
agricultural output, water output, energy expenditure, expenditure on coastal defence, and expenditure on repairing storm damages, are 
broken down into direct and indirect effects. Total effects were taken from Figure 8.3 in Chapter 8, and direct, indirect and total effects 
were calculated as described in Section 8.1.1 of Chapter 8. Total effects are defined to be direct plus indirect effects. Q1 represents the 


























due to total 
effects 
Percentage of 
total change in 
inequality ratio 
that is down to 
direct effects 
Percentage of 
total change in 
inequality ratio 
that is down to 
indirect effects 
Agriculture Q5/Q1 -0.0005% 0.0043% 0.004% -13.5% 113.5% 
Agriculture Q5/Q3 -0.0005% 0.0021% 0.002% -31.9% 131.9% 
Agriculture Q3/Q1 0.0000% 0.0022% 0.002% -0.1% 100.1% 
Agriculture (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) -0.0004% 0.0027% 0.002% -15.2% 115.2% 
Water Q5/Q1 0.0014% 0.0058% 0.007% 19.9% 80.1% 
Water Q5/Q3 0.0011% 0.0030% 0.004% 27.2% 72.8% 
Water Q3/Q1 0.0003% 0.0029% 0.003% 10.7% 89.3% 
Water (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) 0.0013% 0.0042% 0.005% 22.9% 77.1% 
Energy Q5/Q1 0.0014% -0.0012% 0.000% 617.5% -517.5% 
Energy Q5/Q3 0.0011% -0.0008% 0.000% 430.3% -330.3% 
Energy Q3/Q1 0.0003% -0.0004% 0.000% -1563.9% 1663.9% 
Energy (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) 0.0013% -0.0011% 0.000% 822.3% -722.3% 
SLR Q5/Q1 0.0012% -0.0048% -0.004% -33.0% 133.0% 
SLR Q5/Q3 -0.0008% -0.0017% -0.003% 32.4% 67.6% 
SLR Q3/Q1 0.0020% -0.0031% -0.001% -180.4% 280.4% 
SLR (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) 0.0009% -0.0037% -0.003% -32.7% 132.7% 
Storms Q5/Q1 0.0012% -0.0015% 0.000% -434.6% 534.6% 
Storms Q5/Q3 -0.0008% -0.0012% -0.002% 41.2% 58.8% 
Storms Q3/Q1 0.0020% -0.0003% 0.002% 118.2% -18.2% 
Storms (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) 0.0009% -0.0013% 0.000% -208.8% 308.8% 
 
Table H6: Table shows how the effects on American inequality ratios of increases of USD 1 billion (in 1995 USD billions) in, each in turn, 
agricultural output, water output, energy expenditure, expenditure on coastal defence, and expenditure on repairing storm damages, are 
broken down into direct and indirect effects. Total effects were taken from Figure 8.3 in Chapter 8, and direct, indirect and total effects 
were calculated as described in Section 8.1.1 of Chapter 8. Total effects are defined to be direct plus indirect effects. Q1 represents the 


























due to total 
effects 
Percentage of 
total change in 
inequality ratio 
that is down to 
direct effects 
Percentage of 
total change in 
inequality ratio 
that is down to 
indirect effects 
Agriculture Q5/Q1 -0.74% -0.77% -1.5% 49% 51% 
Agriculture Q5/Q3 -0.41% -0.41% -0.8% 50% 50% 
Agriculture Q3/Q1 -0.32% -0.36% -0.7% 47% 53% 
Agriculture (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) -0.57% -0.59% -1.2% 49% 51% 
Water Q5/Q1 0.44% 0.31% 0.7% 58% 42% 
Water Q5/Q3 0.31% 0.14% 0.4% 69% 31% 
Water Q3/Q1 0.12% 0.18% 0.3% 41% 59% 
Water (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) 0.36% 0.25% 0.6% 59% 41% 
Energy Q5/Q1 0.39% 0.35% 0.7% 52% 48% 
Energy Q5/Q3 0.22% 0.19% 0.4% 54% 46% 
Energy Q3/Q1 0.16% 0.16% 0.3% 50% 50% 
Energy (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) 0.31% 0.27% 0.6% 53% 47% 
SLR Q5/Q1 -0.41% -0.98% -1.4% 30% 70% 
SLR Q5/Q3 -0.30% -0.53% -0.8% 37% 63% 
SLR Q3/Q1 -0.11% -0.46% -0.6% 19% 81% 
SLR (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) -0.32% -0.78% -1.1% 29% 71% 
Storms Q5/Q1 -0.41% 0.08% -0.3% 125% -25% 
Storms Q5/Q3 -0.30% 0.04% -0.3% 117% -17% 
Storms Q3/Q1 -0.11% 0.04% -0.1% 155% -55% 
Storms (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) -0.32% 0.06% -0.3% 126% -26% 
 
Table H7: Table shows how the effects on Vietnamese inequality ratios of increases of USD 1 billion (in 1995 USD billions) in, each in turn, 
agricultural output, water output, energy expenditure, expenditure on coastal defence, and expenditure on repairing storm damages, are 
broken down into direct and indirect effects. Total effects were taken from Figure 8.3 in Chapter 8, and direct, indirect and total effects 
were calculated as described in Section 8.1.1 of Chapter 8. Total effects are defined to be direct plus indirect effects. Q1 represents the 


























due to total 
effects 
Percentage of 
total change in 
inequality ratio 
that is down to 
direct effects 
Percentage of 
total change in 
inequality ratio 
that is down to 
indirect effects 
Agriculture Q5/Q1 -2.23% -0.05627 -7.9% 28% 72% 
Agriculture Q5/Q3 -1.74% -0.04434 -6.2% 28% 72% 
Agriculture Q3/Q1 -0.50% -0.01295 -1.8% 28% 72% 
Agriculture (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) -1.87% -0.05125 -7.0% 27% 73% 
Water Q5/Q1 2.02% 0.030498 5.1% 40% 60% 
Water Q5/Q3 1.38% 0.017817 3.2% 44% 56% 
Water Q3/Q1 0.63% 0.012184 1.9% 34% 66% 
Water (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) 1.72% 0.025526 4.3% 40% 60% 
Energy Q5/Q1 1.88% 0.024815 4.4% 43% 57% 
Energy Q5/Q3 1.29% 0.014909 2.8% 46% 54% 
Energy Q3/Q1 0.59% 0.009553 1.5% 38% 62% 
Energy (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) 1.60% 0.020836 3.7% 43% 57% 
Storms Q5/Q1 0.55% 0.014647 2.0% 27% 73% 
Storms Q5/Q3 0.26% 0.007859 1.0% 25% 75% 
Storms Q3/Q1 0.28% 0.006696 1.0% 30% 70% 
Storms (Q4+Q5)/(Q1+Q2) 0.45% 0.012224 1.7% 27% 73% 
 
Table H8: Table shows how the effects on Zambian inequality ratios of increases of USD 1 billion (in 1995 USD billions) in, each in turn, 
agricultural output, water output, energy expenditure, and expenditure on repairing storm damages, are broken down into direct and 
indirect effects. Total effects were taken from Figure 8.3 in Chapter 8, and direct, indirect and total effects were calculated as described in 
Section 8.1.1 of Chapter 8. Total effects are defined to be direct plus indirect effects. Q1 represents the income of the lowest expenditure 
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